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S. S. Barlingay  
Rajendra Prasad



University of Poona

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I

## THE DISCOVERY OF THE PERSON

When the invitation came to me from the Registrar of the University of Madras to deliver this year the Śrī L. D. Swamikannu Pillai Endowment Lectures, I felt humbly grateful for the undeserved privilege of addressing the worthy company which would assemble here and, beyond the trustees of this endowment, my gratitude turned towards the great scholarly gentleman whose love for truth it perpetuates for our common benefit.

The subject of my lectures is the concept of the Person, its emergence and discovery, its obscuration and loss, and its rediscovery in our times. Upon the person are focused the studies and concerns of the philosophers and the priests, the psychologists and the sociologists, as well as of those responsible for maintaining the rights enshrined in our Constitution and fulfilling the promises born from our adoption of democracy. But the concept of the person is a highly complex and perfectible one. It is loaded with consequents derivable from it which affect the very direction of our life for our weal or woe. It will, therefore, be no idle enquiry to study the course of its ascertainment from ancient times to our own century.

### 1. Emergence of the term ‘Person’ in Greek and Latin Antiquity

Long before the adoption of the term ‘person’ men had ways of designating those subjects which they held to be intelligent and responsible agents. For this they used proper nouns and pronouns or other indicative expressions. But the Greeks and Romans had the particular habit of referring to the whole agent by mentioning his most prominent aspect or the part of his individuality which appeared most directly engaged in a given manifestation or behaviour. Thus Homer sings of “the abominable wrath of Achilleus” (rather than of the irate Achilleus,) of “the will of Zeus,” of “the destiny” or “the honour” or “the shame”

Lectures delivered at the University of Madras under Sri L. D. Swamikannu Pillai Endowment, 1969–70. Permission to publish is gratefully acknowledged.

of his heroes and he speaks of their "liver" or their "thorax" or their "arms" as responsible for their prowess in battle. Hesiodes and Lycurgos use the term 'body' (*sóma*) to signify an individual, as we still do in English. Pythagoras and Plato play on the similarity between *sóma* and *séma*, body and tomb, and hook up on this pun philosophies which exalt the universal and disparage the particular. Against Plato, Aristotle vindicates the individual existent as the paragon of reality and calls it "primary or first substance" (*prôtê ousia*) in opposition to the "secondary substance" which is merely conceptual. For him, the "first substance" is *hypostasis*, i.e., subject, but this term is not yet specialized and he uses it to mean all possible sorts of subjects, substrates, supports, supposita or subject-matter. Thus Greek thinkers have met early with the problem whether individuality is something superficial or deep, a negligible or an important value, a property of parts or of the whole subject.

The next development concerns the term *prosópon* which Polybios (200–120 B.C.) seems to have been the first to use in the sense of person. Its first meaning is 'face' since a face consists of that which is found "near and around the eyes" (*pros* + accus. of *ops*) and it was quickly used to designate the made up faces or masks of the Greek theatre. Its Latin cognate *persona*, which is perhaps of Etruscan origin, was popularly understood to indicate the utility of those masks as loudspeakers. But the first function of such masks was to present in an immediately recognizable form the various roles or *dramatis personae* of the tragedy or comedy. Here again, a part, the mask, stood for a whole personage and impersonation. The *prosópon Basileôs* or *persona Regis* began really to signify, almost in our own sense, the person of the king, the king as king. But this implied a differentiation between the personage and the actor who sustains him, between the social figure and the empirical man. The Stoics tried to suppress this subtle difference with their theory that the world is a stage set by God and each man has been entrusted with a part to play on that stage. As given by God each such part constitutes the very nature, temperament and destiny which make a man what he is. Thus for the Stoics the *prosópon* or *persona* is not an impersonation taken up by a man but rather his very individual essence; it is this very man as constituted by God. Of course, such a personality is

mysterious and reveals surprises to its owner himself as it unwinds and develops under the omniscient guidance of the divine Producer. The Stoic conception is religious, interiorizing, holistic and dynamic but it depends on a too simple notion of divine Providence and, hence, fails to secure for man the full measure of his dignity.

In the law-courts, on the other hand, *persona* has entered the juridical vocabulary precisely to express the kind of dignity which the law recognises. From the end of the 2d century A.D. the *persona* is the subject of legal rights, i.e., concretely, the Roman citizen. The slave, on the contrary, is a *non-persona*, being deprived of any right. However, a new religious influence, that of Christianity, is already at work, though still in the underground, to vindicate the rights which every man, be he even a slave, owns by nature and, hence, inalienably.

About the same period, Plotinus is reviving Platonism and his concept of the human being is not at all holistic. According to his analysis, man is made of body, soul and spirit, causality being the link which unites these three. But "it is in the spirit (*nous*) that we are mostly ourselves; that which comes before is ours, (not we) .. We are up there, directing the animal from that top." (*Enneades*, 1, 1, 7). Plotinus goes back to the primitive meaning of *prosépon* and compares men under the influence of the discursive reason to "a number of faces (or masks) which are turned outwards though inwardly they are attached to one head.. But if one of us, like one of these faces, could turn round either by his own effort or by the aid of Athénê, he would behold at once God, himself and the whole" (quoted by Caird, II, 296).

Thus what Plotinus contributes to this evolution is a dimension of religious depth which links man more radically to a less anthropomorphic God than the one of the Stoics. But he tends to reduce personality to its spiritual centre whereas the Stoics' view tends towards a larger integrality.

## 2. The Individual in Indian Antiquity

Before taking up this Western development to its next stage, it will be enriching to enquire about the views which paralleled it in ancient India.

Here also the individual usually referred to by proper nouns and pronouns, among which the reflective pronoun *ātman* is destined to a great philosophical career. What is more interesting is that the Indian mind manifests early a bent towards reflective analysis and discrimination (*viveka*) which, applied to this term *ātman*, transfers it from the outer to the inner man. While *ātman* does not cease completely to designate the gross body or its main part, the trunk, it progressively comes to designate in turn the complex of life, made of breaths (*prāṇa*), the complex of the senses (*indriya*), each one of the great intellectualising functions (*manas*, *ahaṅkāra*, *buddhi*) or their whole complex (*antaḥkarana* or *manas*), up to the innermost reaches of knowledge (*vijñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*). This kind of analysis pursued by various thinkers whose formulations differ but it is systematized in the doctrine of the five sheaths (*pañca-kosā*) of which man is comprised, as found in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2, 1-5. The first sheath, the gross body (*annarasmaya*), is said to be filled with the second (*prāṇamaya*), the second with the third (*manomaya*), and so forth. Each inner sheath is said to be other than, interior to, and the *ātman* of its containing sheath. Śaṅkara will add that it is also higher than it. Man is thus conceived as a hierarchy of *ātmans* whose inner imbrication resembles that of the Chinese balls. We may remember here that the Indian conception of human society is also essentially hierarchical as opposed to equalitarian.

The same *Taittirīya* text designates man as the *puruṣa*. Like the Latin *persona*, *puruṣa* is probably of non-aryan origin and its etymology is uncertain but its basic meaning seems to be 'male being'. Popular etymologies connect it with the ideas of whole and all-inclusiveness. The mythical *Puruṣa* of *Rgveda*, x, 90 is the cosmic male Giant from whose sacrificial dismemberment the whole world has originated. We learn from the *Brāhmaṇas* that the brahmanic sacrifice is meant to reintegrate symbolically this *Prajāpati* who is the Whole (*Sarva*) and thus to secure the integrity and wholesomeness of the world and of man who by it becomes also all (*sarva*).

This idea of plenitude or integrality should not be neglected. In the *Brāhmaṇas*, it directs the search for affinities (*bandhu* or *bandhutā*) between the three realms of the sacrifice, of the

cosmos or macrocosm, and of man the microcosm. The powers at work in the sacrifice are set in correspondence and even identified with the *devas* who preserve the order (*rta*) of the cosmos and with the inner functions discoverable in man. The sages of the *Upaniṣads* continue this search for such connections and do not hesitate to call man's senses and higher inner functions *devas* or *devatās* or *puruṣas* as well as *ātmans*. Here again they introduce the idea of hierarchy and the resulting picture of man is that of a city (*pura*) rather than that of a monad.

Yet, the sense of man's unity asserts itself too. Reflection upon the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep suggests to those thinkers that the lower functions which first appeared to be separately active though ruled by the higher ones in the waking state do in the other states return to their ruling functions and merge within them, and these in the heart or in pure consciousness or in bliss. The practice of *yoga* further suggests that these functions which we first grasp as psychological are also cosmogonical. *Yogo hi prabhavāpyayau* (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, vi, 11) : "Yoga, indeed, is emanation into existence (*prabhava*) as well as resorption (*āpyaya*)". Hence, the unity of man results from causality, and this causality is that which characterises the inner causes, variously called *pradhāna*, *upādāna*, or *ātman*. Śaṅkara will later explain that in their ascending ladder each such cause is "higher, more subtle, greater, and more 'inner *ātman*' than its emanation" (*para sākṣmatara mahattara pratyagātmabhāṭa* : *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, iii, 10-11).

Thus man appears as a field of cosmogonic forces and these forces are no longer the *puruṣas*, *devas* and *devatās* who, in earlier texts, appear to act as efficient causes, but rather the emanating and resorbing inner causes which *yoga* suggests.

However, man is aware of himself as agent (*kartṛ*), patient (*bhoktṛ*) and knower (*jñātṛ*). This gives rise to other pictures of man. As knower and witness he is the "knower of the field" (*ksetra-jñā*). As conscious enjoyer and responsible agent, he is the rider of the body-chariot, led by the buddhi-chariooteer towards a goal which is the supreme *Puruṣa* or *Ātman* (*Kaṭha Up.*, iii, 3-11). The relation of man as knower and rider with this supreme *Puruṣa* towards whom he journeys but who also

somehow inhabits, pervades, impels and illumines him, exercises the minds of the upanishadic thinkers.

The analogy of the wheel indicates the progress of their reflection. In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, i, 5, 15, the hub of the psychic wheel is the finite *ātman*. In *Bṛh.*, ii, 5, 15, the wheel is psychic-cosmic and its hub is the infinite *Ātman*. Similarly, it is the highest *Prāṇa* in *Chāndogya Up.*, vii, 15, 1 and the greatest *Puruṣa* in *Pr̄śna Up.*, vi, 6. Finally, in *Śvetāśvatara Up.*, i, 6, the finite *ātman* is the wild goose (*haṁsa*) fluttering about in the universal wheel whose Impeller is the One God favoured by Whom the *haṁsa* passes to immortality. In the parable of the two birds, which *Śvet.*, iv, 6, adapts from *Rgveda*, I, 164, 20, the witnessing is totally attributed to the divine *Ātman* and the fruit-eating to the finite *ātman*. Thus, in the later upaniṣadas, the two *ātmans* are neatly distinguished.

But their relation is very intimate : “ Of the measure of a thumb, the *Puruṣa* abides within the *ātman* ” (*Kaṭha Up.*, 4, 12). The two are unborn, minute and great; however, the inmost *Ātman* (*Antar-ātman* of 6, 17) is “ more minute than the minute (*ātman*) and greater than this great (*ātman*) ” (*Ib.*, 2, 20). Just as the active functions emanated from *prāṇa* and were periodically resorbed into it, so also the finite *ātman* is originated from the supreme *Ātman* and is to return to Him. How ? Through knowledge favoured by His grace. This is but an application of the conception of the inner cause which underlies many upanishadic statements. Any inner cause transcends its effects but is also immanent to them; they originate from it, abide and subsist in it, and are resorbed into it (cf. *Tait.*, iii, 1). The inner cause is the innermost reality of its effects, though it transcends them and is not resoluble into them.

To sum up, man is not an entity closed upon itself but rather the play-field of a hierarchy of psychic-cosmic functions at the top of which stands the divine Energy-Consciousness which is Fulness, Existence and Bliss imperishable. His individuality radiates from his self-awareness which posits him as an ‘ I ’ (*aham*) encountering a world of objects and responsibly active in their midst. But he can discover that his very individuality is, as it were, open upwards and shot through with the transcendence of a

universal Ātman-Brahman apart from which it has no consistency and towards which it is directed to find there its blissful fulfilment.

However, its consistency is hardly holistic since it resides in the unity of layers or sheaths linked by inner causality. Yet, in the upanishadic conception of this causality, these layers are resorbable into their inner cause and, therefore, not altogether perishable. But in Buddhism the analyzability of the individual is much more radical and the unity of the *dharma*s or elements which constitute him is due to the special causality of *karman*, to the exclusion of any *ātman*. The resulting doctrine hardly gives place to any positive conception of personality.

### 3. The Christian Adoption of the Term ‘Person’

Coming back to the mediterranean world, we have now to consider the development of the concept of person in the hands of Christian thinkers.

At the centre of the Christian experience was a man, Jesus of Nazareth, who had exhibited extraordinary knowledge and powers. He had presented himself as the Son of God as well as the Son of Man. He had appeared to synthesise in himself both the divine and the human attributes in a most intimate way and without flaws. What was he ? A mere man in whom the inner presence of the Creator in all his creatures had attained special transparency ? Or a holy man raised by divine grace to adoptive sonship ? Or, as he claimed, the original and eternal Son of God, made man to partake with all men his unique Sonship ?

The answer of most of the Christian believers was the latter assertion which they called the “Good News” or Gospel. It is in their effort to spread it that they got hold of the term ‘person’ and some other terms and endeavoured to give them a higher precision.

The Greek and Latin culture contained pairs of terms, the notion of which was still floating and ambiguous. These pairs were : *prosōpon-persona*; *hypostasis-substantia/subsistentia/subjectum/suppositum*; *ousia-essentia/substantia*; *physis-natura*.

In Greek, the term *prosōpon* was currently retaining its ancient denotation of : face/mask/role/character/aspect, whereas

in Latin its cognate *persona* was fast becoming used in the sense of *subjectum juris* (subject of rights, citizen), first by the law-courts, then by the ordinary people. Among the Greeks, it was the term *hypostasis* which was acquiring this meaning of *persona*, whereas its Latin cognate *substantia* only meant for the Latins essence (Gk. *ousia*) or substance or nature (Gk. *physis*) for which they also used *natura*. Hence, for a long time there was a lot of haggling about the correct terms between Greek and Latin Christian theologians.

Finally, during the IVth century A.D., they agreed to say that Christ was, in Latin, one *persona* in two distinct *naturae* or *substantiae*, in Greek, one *hypostasis* in two *physeis* or *ousiae*, i.e., one person uniting in himself two complete but distinct and unmixed natures, the divine and the human. Similarly, they declared that God the Unique is one incomplex Essence or Substance (*Ousia/Substantia*) in three Persons (*Hypostaseis/Personae*), Father, Son and Spirit, each identical with the divine Essence but distinct through their mutual relations.

This precise application of the term *persona* or *hypostasis* to Christ and to God clarified indirectly its application to man and opened up the field to Christian humanism. Indeed, man was created in the image of God and, therefore, every man must be said to be a person in the proper sense of the term. Personality would no longer depend on the rights granted to some by positive law but was something ontological and inherent to human nature. It was the burthright of everyone, whether citizen or slave. The proclamation of this dignity was to have great consequences for the emancipation of man from all kinds of oppressions and for the whole development of Western culture and even for the destiny of all mankind.

Around 500 A.D., Boetius formulated an imperfect but, nevertheless, highly successful definition of 'person'. Properly speaking, he said, the term 'person' designates "any individual substance possessed of a rational nature." We shall see later on the corrections which this definition demanded but, imperfect as it was, it sufficed to provide a solid conceptual root to the new humanism.

To conclude this first lecture, we may enunciate a few main features of this personalistic humanism :

( 1 ) In opposition to classical Greek thought, which is dominated by the ideas of universality and of the ordered *cosmos* in which man plays but a lowly part, it puts the central emphasis on the unicity and dignity of every human being and of his relation to God.

( 2 ) The individual human being is no longer a crossroads where several participations in general realities meet ( matter, ideas, etc.) but an indissoluble whole, of which the unity is prior to the multiplicity because it is rooted in the Absolute.

( 3 ) It is not the abstract tyranny of a Destiny, or of a heaven of Ideas, nor it is an impersonal Thought indifferent to men's individual destinies that reigns over them, nor even a Stoic Producer of the world drama. It is a God who is himself personal, albeit in an eminent degree. It is a God who through love brings men into existence; a God who offers to each person a relation of unique intimacy, of participation in his divinity; a God who affirms himself not at all by what he takes away from man but by granting man a freedom analogous to his own.

( 4 ) The profound purpose of human existence is not to assimilate itself to the abstract generality of Nature or of the Ideas, but to accept to become exalted and divinised.

( 5 ) To this transformation each man is freely called. Liberty is constitutive of his existence as a created person.

( 6 ) This absoluteness of the person neither cuts him off from the world nor from other men. The unity of the human race is for the first time fully affirmed and doubly confirmed; every person is created in the image of God; every person is called to full citizenship in the Kingdom of God, which is the Kingdom of divine Love.

In the next lecture, we shall see, first, how the medieval schoolmen improved Boetius's definition of the person, and then, how it became obscured and lost to the detriment of mankind. In the third lecture, however, we shall assist at the rediscovery and enrichment of the conception of the person in our own times.

**II****THE LOSS OF THE PERSON**

The philosophical search for the adequate definition of a concept may appear an idle occupation of intellectuals but we should be aware that in all scientific disciplines concepts are the basic media of thought whose value for life may depend very much on their adequacy. For instance, to define such a term as 'person' adequately is to gain a proper view and evaluation of those beings that are persons and it enables one to adopt the proper attitudes and relations towards them. If, on the other hand, the meaning of 'person' becomes falsified, those relations are disturbed to the detriment of persons themselves.

**1. The Refinement by the Schoolmen of the Notion of Person**

For Boetius, 'person' meant an individual substance possessed of a rational nature. The terseness of this definition made its success but I have already indicated the dissatisfaction which it was to arouse in the best of the medieval schoolmen.

First of all, they objected to the term 'substance' on account of its ambiguity. 'Substance' could mean either that part of a finite essence which is the basic support of accidents and which is also called 'nature' or it could, according to the prevalent usage of Aristotle, mean the whole existent subject, the complete *hypostasis*. Richard of St. Victor and St. Thomas Aquinas insisted that this second meaning alone could suit a definition of 'person'. Aquinas explained further that what is proper to the subject thus understood existentially and holistically is that it subsists, i.e., exists in its own right. As such, it exists by its own act of being, its own inner energy (*energeia*) of existing, whether it is identical with this energy as in the case of God, the Absolute, or whether it receives it in a limiting essence as in the case of creatures which are existentially dependent on this Absolute as on their total Cause. The term 'subsistence' must, therefore, be substituted for 'substance' and we must say that the first condition to be a person is to be subsistent. 'Subsistence' had already been introduced into Latin by Rufinus at the end of the IVth century A.D. to render the Greek *hypostasis* in the sense of 'person' and had been used as such by Pope John II in 534 and by the Church Council of Lateran in 649.

A further refinement introduced by St. Thomas is that the subsistent to be personal must be understood in its totality. The meaning of 'person' is holistic. "It must," he says, "comprehend the whole reality of the subject, i.e., not only its essential elements, (such as its nature or substance in the restricted sense of the term and its intellectual and other faculties) but also its individuating qualities and other accidents. Thus only will it retain the denotation of totality which the notion of 'person' requires." (*In III Sententiarum*, 5, 3, 2, 3.)

St. Thomas, therefore, opposes the platonism of many philosophies which reduces the person in man to man's soul or conscious 'self'. This, he thinks, is neither proper linguistic analysis, for it fails to give a right account of linguistic usage, whether of the Church or of the secular culture, nor does it tally with the desire rooted in man's very nature for the salvation and fulfilment of his whole self. "By nature," he says, "man desires that his whole self be saved; his soul, on the other hand, is not the whole man but only a part of the corporeal man : my soul is not myself; hence, though it be saved in the other life, this does not yet mean that I am saved or that any man whatsoever is saved" (*In I Cor.*, xv, 2.) But the Christian promise of the resurrection assures that the whole person of man, body and soul, will be granted full reintegration by God.

Many other assertions of St. Thomas become clear in the light of his teaching of the holistic character of the person. Man's soul, he says, is immortal but man himself is mortal. Death is not the freeing of the spirit from the jail of the body but a physical evil, a disaster which breaks asunder the natural unity of the human person. To impose it unjustly upon any man is a moral evil, a sin against the inviolability of the person. Christ died the victim of such a sin and, between his death and his resurrection, he was no longer absolutely speaking a man, since his soul was deprived of his body. Further, we should never consider the living Christ as a human person or as a conjunction of two persons, one human and the other divine, but only as one divine Person in two natures. Indeed, the human nature he took up does not exist by a created "act of being" of its own level but by the existential energy of the divine Person who assumed it; hence, it lacks the subsistence which

personality requires. Finally, in the case of God, the two conditions for personality so far demanded are obviously fulfilled. For God being the Absolute is the very subsistent Esse, the perfect existential Energy whose fulness implies in identity all the illimitable ontological perfections. He is without qualities, *nirguna*, not because He lacks them but because they are not present in Him as accidents of a substance. Rather than *having* them, He *is* them; He is their Fulness, incomplex, undiversified, simple. This is the Christian conception of God, Subsistence of Being and Fulness of all perfections, as sanctioned by the first Councils of the Church and faithfully adhered to by St. Thomas Aquinas.

In his definition Boetius had indicated that a person must be an individual. Now, this term also required further refinement. In Latin, '*individuum*' originally meant 'undivided' and designated the 'monadic' character of unparticipable units which could usually retain their wholeness and particularity and oppose themselves to others as original centres of existence, resistance and activity. The above explanation of the holistic character of 'person' has already taken care of this meaning. However, a natural consequence of the undividedness of individuals is that they are by the very fact 'divided from others' or, at least, ontologically distinguishable from them. Individuals are generally observed as single units, distinguishable by their individuating characters; but they are also generally groupable into classes according to their more universal characters. Such are the individuals presented to us by common experience and we are not directly acquainted with any "concrete universal," i.e., with an individual which would at the same time be a universal. However, this would not be in itself absurd since the subsistent forms of Plato and the angels of Christianity are defined as subsistent species. Besides, for all those who hold the unicity and transcendence of the divine Fulness, God is singular and other than all the rest and, in that sense, He is the prefect "concrete universal" or the supremely "universal individual". To include such considerations while avoiding the ambiguities to which they might give rise, St. Thomas opts for the term 'singular' or 'distinct' in preference to 'individual.' Thus the twofold term 'individual substance' of Boetius' definition is so far replaced by the threefold term 'singular (or distinct) integral subsistent'.

Boetius had said finally that a person is 'possessed of a rational nature'. This is important since it marks the difference between personal and non-personal subjects. But the term 'rational' must be understood as Boetius probably meant it, namely, as equivalent to the Greek *logikos*, "of the nature of the *logos*", i.e., intellectual. And 'intellectual' must be understood in reference to the intellect proper, which is characterised by the total reflection of self-consciousness and the transcendence which permits to evaluate any object in terms of being. Neither animal intelligence nor the so-called intelligence of machines give any evidence of reaching that level although they are capable of quasi-judgments and quasi-reasonings. On the other hand, reasoning activity as a matter of combinatory calculus would not be intellectual if it were not permeated by the power of the intuitive intellect. Rationality, therefore, stands on the lowest rung of the scale of intellect and the discursivity it generally denotes is not a property of intellect as such but only of the human intellect. Hence, it is better to say that a person must be 'possessed of an intellectual nature'. The term 'possessed of' translates here a mere Latin genitive and does not imply that there should be a distinction between a person and his nature or his intellect. Indeed, we know that in the case of God any such distinction would be absurd. Because He is subsistent *Esse*, God is Consciousness, is Knowledge, is Intellect, just as He is Power, Freedom, Bliss, etc.

The role of a definition is to provide the primary elucidation of a notion but the properties which are derivable from it may extend considerably our understanding of it. In the case of the person, these properties are furthermore of vital importance.

First of all, since a person is a subsistent, he is either the pure act of being (God) or in possession of an act of being received from God (created persons). Hence, every finite person is as such grounded in God and the self-awareness of which he is capable extends virtually to an apprehension of his ontological dependence upon the Absolute and he may recognise the hyper-personality of this Absolute God who verifies eminently all the constitutive notes of the definition of 'person'. Thus the religious dimension is introduced into the world of persons by the bias of the *esse* or energy of being which is intrinsic to personality.

Secondly, since a person is possessed of an intellectual nature, he is endowed with the will which follows the intellect. This means that, consequent upon his acknowledgement of realities and his intellectual evaluation of their goodness, he can choose to bypass them or adhere to them in the measure of their goodness. The proper object of the will is the good as such. Whatever is good attracts the will insofar as it is good, i.e., if relative relatively, if absolute absolutely. The absolute desire for the supreme Good constitutes the human will as a dynamic tendency innately oriented towards a fulfilment which can only consist in a blissful possession of the Godhead. Short of the latter, a man's will is characterised by liberty of choice : It can either adhere to finite goods insofar as their deficient similarity with the divine Good suits this man or neglect them because their goodness is ever deficient. God himself, so long as a man's intellect is still unable to present Him to the will through a perfect intuition, stands within the scope of this liberty of choice. But once revealed through a perfect intuition, He immediately obtains the complete self-surrender of that man whose will has attained its perfect object. In this ecstasy of love, man is still free though not of the freedom of choice but of the freedom of self-determination.

Thirdly, being possessed of an intellectual nature which makes him the free author of his activity, a person is either the pure Energy of the perfect Activity of absolute Bliss (God) or endowed with the dynamism of a constantly self-integrating and spiritually progressing being. The human person tends innately towards this spiritual self-integration. His personality is meant to grow on every level, physical, psychological, social, intellectual moral and affective. St. Thomas, in his Treatise on Man of the *Summa Theologica*, constantly recalls this dynamism of growth and refuses any static conception of the human person.

Fourthly, besides God who is the noblest of all beings, created persons are the noblest of all creatures. Because of the perfection of their nature and the greatness of their end, they have the dignity of ends-in-themselves as opposed to the inferiority of means or instruments. In reference to this, St. Thomas quotes *Book of Wisdom*, xii, 18 : " You have dealt with us, O God, with great reverence ". Human persons, though the lowest in the

scale of persons, are capable of spiritual activities, even ultimately of knowing God by intuition and loving Him in blissful self-surrender, which in the realm of activity are ends, pursuable for their own sake, and not only steps towards a final attainment. In such highest activities, they accomplish the purpose of the whole creation which non-personal creatures can only subserve but not attain. This is why men are ends-in-themselves, are inviolable, have rights, and are lovable for their own sake. This is why the least of men is to be respected and not abused of, and I may sacrifice my own life for his sake. This is why also the good even of the whole human society must not be sought by trampling on the essential rights of any individual. In brief, the whole of ethics and morality derives from this acknowledgement that each man is an end in himself.

Fifthly, because of his freedom and his spiritual powers, the human person is capable of initiating interpersonal relations of dialogue, free exchange, free contracts, friendship, love, service of love, etc. with other persons. Through these relations he extends and fulfils himself and helps others to fulfil themselves. What has been called the "I-Thou" relationship is an exigency of his very nature. It must constitute the fabric of human society. As a member of that society, each man is bound to contribute his part of the common work in view of the common good of the whole of his species. But, as a person, he transcends this society, and must above all pursue his own personal vocation. This consists in uniting himself by the love of friendship with his human brethren and with God. Since each man has such a personal vocation, the common good is subordinate to each individual's personal good. Hence, the temporal order and welfare is an end (because it is the common good of persons) but only an intermediary end. Not being ultimate, it is to be pursued during the whole course of human history in a way which is autonomous but subordinate to the ultimate end of each human person.

## 2. The Twilight of the Person

The views of St. Thomas concerning persons become a living part of medieval culture and have never ceased to inspire what we may call the silent majority of Christian orthodoxy. But many of the philosophers who came after him followed contrary

winds of thought and, often unwittingly, jeopardized his comprehensive doctrine.

The first rent was made by Duns Scotus. He was a voluntarist and a formalist. His fundamental theory asserted that the universe consisted of absolute individuals depending exclusively on the absolute Free-Will of God. Whereas St. Thomas, the intellectualist, had explained that the Will of God, though absolutely free, should never be considered apart from His intellect and Wisdom, Scotus considered it absolutely, as a purely arbitrary power. For him the laws of nature and morality do not express ontological exigencies of being at its various levels but are pure impositions of the divine Will. God could have willed their opposites. He could have willed that evil acts be acts of virtue, that lies, hatred, murders be good deeds, etc. Similarly in man the will is given primacy over the intellect and the blissful end of man is to be obtained in a supreme act of the will rather than in a supreme intellectual intuition. This will is no longer Aquinas's "rational appetite" but an absolute power free of any necessary relation to reason. It is no longer derivable from the possession of an intellectual nature but an isolated datum. Thus Scotus initiated a voluntaristic trend which afterwards reappeared again and again and gave rise to such nefarious political doctrines as fascism and nazism.

He also endangered the thomistic understanding of the integrality of the human person. Better gifted for analysis than for synthesis, he multiplied the distinctions and conceived man as a bundle of "formalities", i.e., of intelligible elements set side by side but not linked by any intrinsic relation. Scotus's conception of personality remained apparently holistic but in reality it was emptied of the necessity of inner unity without which it is liable to all forms of disintegration.

Ockam, whose thought was to dominate the xivth and xvth centuries, opposed this Scotistic riot of ontological formalities through his theory of terminism but this theory closed the door to any deep metaphysics of man. Further, he retained and even exaggerated Scotus's voluntarism.

The xvith century saw an important revival of Thomism but which, in Suarez at least, remained too eclectic. Suarez

failed to see the constitutive role of the act of being, the *esse* of St. Thomas, in the ontological making of personality. Therefore, he invented the astonishing theory that personality is only a mode which is superadded to the subsistent essence. Thus it becomes merely accidental and perhaps alienable.

Modern philosophy at least up to Kant is dominated by the influence of Descartes. The problem of personality is at the centre of his philosophy. His *Cogito* reveals immediately the intellectual nature of the human person. Unfortunately the *Cogito* is already an abstraction : it brackets out not only the *cogitata* but also the sensible as such. This is serious because sensing is intrinsic to the act of concrete knowledge, the direct judgment, which is synthetically sensitive and intellectual and which alone should be our adequate point of departure. On the basis of his narrowed starting-point Descartes could only discover that the I who thinks is a thinking reality. According to his definitions of substance and attribute, this thinking reality is a substance, characterised by the fundamental attribute of thinking; hence, it is distinct, complete, absolutely simple and, consequently, spiritual and immortal. If this were correctly derived, I would indeed be a person since the defining notes of 'person' are verified here (subsistence, distinction, completeness, intellectuality) but I would be only a mind. Yet, Descartes has to face the fact that to all evidence he is also a body. But he cannot prove it to himself indubitably except through a queer roundabout way. He first proves—by arguments which, I think, are invalid—that God exists as the infinitely perfect Being, supremely personal and the all powerful and free Cause of the universe. Now those of our ideas which are clear and distinct can only be innate and, hence, received from God. But God would not be God if He were not truthful. Hence, those ideas cannot be erroneous. But among them is the idea of matter or extension, and since it is warranted by God, I am right in thinking that a material universe exists and that I am not only mind but body.

The question, however, comes up, what is the relation between mind and body. The first answer of Descartes is that each of the two is a complete and independent substance. But it

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seems monstrous to say that man consists of two independent substances. Their union, answers Descartes, is stricter than the merely accidental union of the pilot and his ship but it cannot be the substantial union affirmed by St. Thomas because two substances can never merge into one. Neither can it be a necessary union because each of the two can be conceived apart from the other. Hence it is contingent and consists in a certain interaction of which Descartes avows the mystery. To clarify this somehow, he has recourse to the voluntarism which he has inherited from the late medieval thinkers. God, he says, has willed these two substances to co-exist and interact, and God's will is absolute and independent of rationality though assuredly good.

To sum up, Descartes bequeaths to his successors the so-called body-mind problem. It is already the problem of the mind in the machine, since for him an animal and, hence, a human body too is only a highly complex machine, and it will after Hume become the problem of the ghost in the machine. Thus, for Descartes, the human person is no longer a unitary and integral subsistent, it is no longer the centre and source of a whole network of relations, and the will of man like the will of God has been isolated from his intellect. The kind of radical individualism which dissolves society into a mere aggregate of isolated units and was to triumph at the French Revolution has its source in Cartesianism.

Spinoza abolishes the body-mind problem but at the high cost of his monism of the substance. For him, the correspondence between psychic events and physical events results from the fact that these two forms of existence express the same eternal reality, which is divine. Since, for him, there is only one substance, Descartes' difficulty over the interaction of substances is avoided. The supposed interaction of body and mind is for him an illusion. To believe that it occurs would be to make the mistake of someone who, seeing the same action in a number of mirrors, believed that what he saw in one mirror was caused by what he saw in another. Plurality is due to the variety of the modes of the one substance which is simply expressed in various ways as a thought can be expressed in diverse languages. Man is neither a substance nor an original source of activity and relations, but only a peculiar mode of God. He has only an appearance

of freedom, for determinism, both physical and rational, reigns supreme and admits of no contingency.

Leibniz refuses the monism of Spinoza and flatters himself that he has overcome the Cartesian dualism through his doctrine of the monads. His reduction of space to an infinity of points leads him, first, to an atomic conception of matter. And matter is not merely extension, as for Descartes, but it resists pressure, it exerts a certain force, which is not the case with mere extension. The source of the force thus exerted cannot be merely a geometric point; it must be a point endowed with force. This is the final indivisible element of material reality, the monad. On the other hand, Leibniz tells us, minds as thinking substances are indivisible in space like monads and, like them, have force. Could not each thinking substance be regarded as a monad, and each monad as a thinking substance? The virtue of this idea would be to conceive the whole universe as made up of substances of the same nature and thus avoid the dualism of Descartes. This idea would constitute a sort of monism, not the monism of Spinoza but a unitary view of reality which reduces all forms of being to substances of one and the same kind. Leibniz' monism is a spiritual monism; each monad is conceived as a kind of mind, either actually or virtually conscious. Each monad mirrors the whole universe from its particular angle and position. Leibniz calls this its *perception*. Conscious monads are aware of this perception. This awareness is their *appereception*. The internal force of a monad is called *appetition*. In this view of the universe each monad is "windowless"; it remains shut up in its own universe and its own internal structure determines the entirety of its changes and development. Solipsism is avoided by recourse to the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony among monads. In brief, reality is conceived by Leibniz as a complete series of monads which differ imperceptibly from each other and which constitute a harmonic scale extending up to God. God is the perfect Monad whose appereception is equal to his perception and whose appetition is unrestricted Free Will. His decrees, however, are governed by the principle of the best which imposes moral necessity upon his Freedom.

Leibniz' monads retain some essential traits of the 'person' but his extreme reationalism perverts his understanding of

personal freedom, and hence, of interpersonal relationships, of society, of the transcendence of God, of the sovereign freedom of His creative causality, etc.

After considering the reduction of the person in the hands of Rationalists, we may look at the other end of the philosophical spectrum and see what happened to it in the hands of empiricists.

Hobbes eliminates the Cartesian dualism by subjecting man's reason totally to his senses and describing him in a mechanistic language in which the genuine notion of freedom is reduced to mere absence of external constraint. But Hobbes inaugurates a new kind of dualism between the natural and the social states of man. In this he is probably inspired by the modern theory of Natural Law. This theory is itself a novelty as compared with the ancient or classical theory of Natural Law of St. Thomas Aquinas and other medieval thinkers. For the latter, man is a social being by essence and metaphysical reflection upon this essence can descry the necessary principles which form the basis of private and social morality. All positive law must develop in conformity with this order of nature. For the moderns, on the contrary, man is first of all an individual and autonomous being independent of any social attachment. It is from the inherent properties of this isolated individual that these jurists extract or deduce the first principles of social order. This is what they call the state of nature, which is logically prior to social and political life. The passage from the natural to the social and political state is a matter of contracts or covenants. In Hobbes we find a similar passage from man to the commonwealth, from the state of nature where man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" to the artificial state of commonwealth where he accedes to pure rationality but by entering into political subjection. For Hobbes the social is restricted to the political. Indeed, if man is not social by nature, one can pass from the individual to the group only in terms of "covenant", i.e., in terms of conscious transaction or artificial design. And what can the individual bring into the bargain except "force"? It is by pooling their forces, more or less contractually, that isolated individuals can constitute the political Leviathan which subjects them to itself despotically. This despotism is mitigated only

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## THE LOSS OF THE PERSON

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by Hobbes' assertion of the natural convergency of the social good with the individual good.

For Locke as for Hobbes the origin of society is contractual but he evades the consequence of despotism by distinguishing two contracts. The "social" contract introduces the idea of fellowship in equality; the "political" contract introduces subjection to a ruling agency but only in terms of Trust. Citizens retain their rights, especially to property, except the right of coercion which they entrust to a limited monarchy. The triple political power of such a monarchy originates in the people who retain the faculty of claiming it back even through violence and revolution. The political doctrine of Locke is thus liberal and more favourable to persons but his conception of the origin of society and, we must add, of morality and religion views them as rational constructs rather than postulates of man's nature. For him also the human person rather than being social by essence is radically an isolated atom.

Berkeley, though he belongs to the empiricist current, is to a large extent a reactionary. He dematerializes the ego but asserts its permanent subsistence as spirit. Rejecting the static conception of substance of the Rationalists, he comes nearer to St. Thomas' dynamic conception when he affirms that this spirit is not an inert substratum of accidents but an active principle endowed with intellect and free-will. He also retains the essentials of the classical conception of God as the Personal Absolute though he weakens God's transcendence by his perceptionism. However, Berkeley's influence does not seem to have been determinant in the development of social philosophy.

Hume's radical phenomenism is much more influential in this evolution. He does away with the Berkeleyan active self and sees the ego only as the pure possibility of a series of felt phenomena. As to the foundation of morality and social life he cannot see it in God, whose existence we cannot know, or in reason, which cannot prescribe anything, but he sees it only in the natural instinct for general utility and in the natural feeling of "humanity". The universality of moral ideas results from the strength of social habit. Regarding the birth of political society, he rejects the theory of the divine right of kings as well as the

theory of the social contract and attributes the birth of nations solely to force or ambition. The legitimacy of a government remains constantly dependent on its actual efficiency in pursuing the common good.

To end this survey, let us turn to J. J. Rousseau. Like Hobbes, Rousseau posits a discontinuity between the man of nature and political man whose "social contract" marks the actual birth of humanity proper. He also starts from premises which are extremely individualistic to proceed to anti-individualistic conclusions. And he too endeavours to legitimize social order and the transcendence of the Sovereign, though in his case the Sovereign is not Hobbes' Ruler but the General Will and is thus in a sense identified with the subjects. Rousseau's position of the problem is purely utopian :

"Some form of association", he writes, "must be found as a result of which the whole strength of the community will be enlisted for the protection of the person and property of each constituent member, in such a way that each, when united to his fellows, renders obedience to his own will and remains as free as he was before".

And this is the startling solution which he immediately proposes : "The complete alienation by each associate member to the community of all his rights". (*The Social Contract*, I, vi).

Another quotation may bring forth even more forcefully the paradoxical nature of Rousseau's theory : "To institute a People (means) to change, as it were, the very stuff of human nature; to transform each individual who, in isolation, is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in a sense, he derives his life and his being" (*Ibid.*, II, vii.). Truly we are here not far from the divinised State of Hegel.

Such are the vicissitudes of the person from the XIVth century to the eve of the French Revolution. It has been atomized, formalised and disintegrated into a bundle of formalities by Duns Scotus; modalised by Suarez; dualised by Descartes; pantheised by Spinoza; monadised and mentalised by Leibniz; desocialised and despoticised by Hobbes and even by Rousseau; and fictionalised by Hume.

Towards the end of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century the theories of those philosophers begin to yield their fruits, good and bad, in the Declarations of the Human Rights and in social and political revolutions, especially the French Revolution. I intend to study next what happened to the person during the tumultuous period inaugurated by this revolution and to pass on finally to our own times in which, I believe, a recovery of the person is increasingly taking place.

Jnana Deepa

Poona-16

R. DeSmet

## DIALOGUE

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## PRIVACY AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE

### PART II

25. Let us now turn to the second mistake that the supporter of 'private language' makes, namely, that sensation-specifying terms acquire meaning, that they can be taught and used, by private ostensive definition. We can make a list of sensation-specifying terms, or the terms, or words, that mean kinds of sensations : 'Itch', 'ache', 'pain', 'toothache', 'headache', 'stomachache', 'muscular ache', 'smarting or throbbing pain', 'burning sensation', 'dizziness', 'tickle', 'tingling', 'bitter taste', 'nausea', 'surmising sensation', 'fluish feeling', 'ringing in the ears', 'bright image'. One can add many more. All these are quite familiar and are of long standing. For the reasons already stated in section III, we shall take the example of 'pain'.

Wittgenstein's criticism of the mistake can be divided into two parts :

(i) The first part is concerned with the concept formation or acquisition of a concept.

(ii) The second part is concerned with the retention of a concept. The first mistake that a private linguist makes is the claim that he can name his sensation by a private ostensive definition he can form a concept *S* of a sensation by means of associating a word 'S' with the occurrence of the sensation *S*. The word 'S' was hitherto indefinable, but he gives it a stipulative definition by mental ostentation. From this it follows that he treats the sensation *S* as the object, and the word 'S' as its name.<sup>1</sup>

26. Wittgenstein objects to this account on two grounds. First naming that is, forming a new concept bringing a particular object or the incarnation of some general characteristics under a general concept expressed by means of words, presupposes a variety of complex conditions. As Wittgenstein says :

"What does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'—How has he done the naming of pain? And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says "He gave a name to his sensations" one forgets that a great deal of

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This is the Concluding part of Shri Ashok Vohra's article, the first Part of which was published in IPQ Vol III no. 4

stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make a sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain" it shows the post where the new word is stationed" (PI 257).

In the case of private linguist there is *ex hypothesi* no such stage-setting, there is no grammar to show us the 'post' where the new word say 'S' which names the sensations is to be stationed. Therefore, 'naming' in a private linguist's theory makes no sense. (In the course of this discussion, I shall show, also that even if naming in a private linguist's theory had made some sense, he would have been able to consistently use it.

Secondly, Wittgenstein denies that words such as 'pain', 'itch', 'tickle', and the like name private sensations. In *Zettel* Wittgenstein's wayward self says "joy" surely designates a inward thing, and his sterner self replies "No", "Joy" designates nothing. Neither any inward nor any outward thing" (Z 487). We must, however, make it clear that he is not denying that there is a trivial sense in which 'pain' is the name of a sensation. In this sense 'pain' denotes a sensation as 'five' denotes a number or as 'understanding' denotes a mental process and as obviously every word denotes something or the other. For instance, 'pain' is a sensation word; and it has uses closely allied to the other sensation words, as for instance, 'itch' and 'tickle', just as 'five' is a number word and has uses closely allied to other number words, as for example 'One', 'Two', 'Three' and 'Four'.

27. The genesis of the idea that 'pain' is the name of a sensation is that we talk about pains very much as we talk about colours, sounds, and textures. For example, we refer to people and attribute sensations to them as in the locations 'He is in pain', 'You are in pain', 'I am in pain' in the same way as we refer to objects and attribute colours to them in 'That is red', 'This book is red'. So, we come to think that the naming relation in the two must be very much the same.

The first absurd consequence of the idea that 'pain' is the name of a private sensation is that the proposition 'He is in pain' assumes that the person referred to has a particular sensation

before his consciousness, which I cannot have or feel. Since I cannot have his sensation of pain, I can never know whether he has pain or not. We have shown earlier that it is quite possible for us to know with almost the same certainty with which we know “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ”, that another person is in pain.

28. Next, if ‘pain’ is the name of a sensation which I only experience in the privacy of my consciousness, then the proposition ‘He is in pain’ or ‘You are in pain’ would be unintelligible to me. For, if ‘pain’ denotes an item of my consciousness, for me, then pain can exist only when I am aware of it. It makes no sense to say that I no longer feel the pain yet it is going on all the same. On this view, therefore, the essential characteristics of pain is that I feel it, and I would be guilty of contradicting myself if I said that there is pain which I do not feel, but which another person feels. One possible objection to this view may be that though it is true that I only know what pain is from my own case but, surely, I can imagine that someone else feels the same as I feel when I have pain, when he says ‘I am in pain’, or ‘He is in pain’. Wittgenstein replies to this :

But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had ”—That gets us no further. It is as if I were to say : “ You surely know what ‘it is 5 o'clock here means; so you also know what ‘It is 5 O'clock on the sun means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock ”. The explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 O'clock here and 5 O'clock there “the same time”, but what I do not know is in what case one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.

In exactly the same way, it is no explanation to say that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For that part of grammar is quite clear to me that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, If one says it is in pain and I am in pain (PI 350).

The reason for our inability to imagine what it would be like 5 O'clock in the afternoon on the sun is that the very notion of being a certain time of being 5 o'clock, or 7 o'clock, presupposes a

system of time zones. And, one can speak of its being a particular time only for a particular time-zone, as for example, 5 o'clock in the afternoon in India, in America, or in France. But we cannot talk of its being 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the earth. In short, the concept '5 o'clock in the afternoon on the sun' does not have a stage setting in the language-game. We do not know where the concept is stationed. Similarly, if 'pain' is the name of a sensation, then I cannot conceive that another person feels the same sensation as I do when I feel pain, though I may imagine all sorts of images in connection with those words. Part of my imagining that another person experiences the same private sensation which I feel when I have pain is that I imagine him feeling a private sensation. But, how can I do this? We might say that he has the private sensation which I feel when I have pain, But,

....this is not too easy a thing to do : for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the mode of the pain which *I do feel*. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body (which would also be possible) (PI 302).

There are no specifiable condition under which I could determine that another person feels the same sensation as I do. For to feel that, I have to feel his pain. But this is impossible in the sense in which it is impossible to have his sneeze. There are no states of affairs that would count as his feeling the same sensation as I do when I have pain, just as there are no states of affairs which would count as its being 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the sun. Since there is no criterion for determining the truth of the assertion 'He feels the same as I do when I have pain,' the assertion is unintelligible.

Someone may still insist that though I am not able to specify the exact conditions yet I mean something when I say I can imagine your pain on the model of my own. To this Wittgenstein replies:

....the phrase "I think I mean something by it", or "I am sure, I mean something by it", which we so often hear in philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no justification at all. We ask : "What do you

mean ?”, i.e., “ How do you use this expression ? ” If someone taught me the word “ bench ” and said that he sometimes or always put a stroke over it thus : bench and that this meant something to him, I should say : I do not know what sort of idea you associate with this stroke, but it does not interest me unless you show me that there is a use for the stroke in the kind of calculus in which you wish to use the word “ bench ”,—I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece inalterated, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which he cannot express by rules. I say : “ as long as it does not alter the use of the piece, it has not what I call a meaning ” ( BB 65 ).

Thus, if the view namely that pain is the name of a sensation is right, then this assertion that another person is in pain is unintelligible. But this is absurd; because the propositions “ you have pain ”, “ He has pain ” are perfectly intelligible to us. It follows that pain is not the name of a sensation.

29. Finally, if the private linguist claims that it is from his own case, his own experiences, that he knows what the word ‘ pain ’, which is the name of a sensation, means, and others only know what pain means from their own case, their own experiences, then we could never be sure that the word ‘ pain ’ stands for the same sensation for all of them. Consequently, they shall never be able to communicate with each other. The position of a group of people who somehow may succeed in communicating with one another, shall, on the private linguist’s model, be analogous to the following case :

Suppose, every one had a box with something in it; we call it a “ beetle ”. No one, can look into anyone else’s box and every one says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle—Here it would be quite possible for every one to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose that word “ beetle ” had a use in these people’s language ?—If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something* : for the box might even be empty. No one can

'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out whatever it is. That is to say : if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensations on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI 293).

Moreover, if the private linguist were right in holding that one learns the meaning of the word 'pain' from his own experiences or from his own case, then a person who had never experienced a pain would never be able to use the word 'pain' in the language. But this is not so; because the sensation pain does not play any part in the language; what matters in the language-game is the grammar of the word 'pain'. This can be illustrated by the following example :

" We may say that a blind man does not see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I do not mean " he agrees with us that he does not see—he does not dispute it ", but rather—he too describes the facts in this way, having learned the same language as we have ". On the private linguist's thesis, a blind man should never have been able to use the word 'see' in language, because he is never able to experience what we call 'seeing' himself which alone, on the private linguist's theory, lends meaning to the word 'seeing'. But, this in fact is not the case. Therefore, the supposition that 'pain' is the name of a sensation is wrong. Hence, 'pain' is not the name of a sensation, but merely a word in the language the use of which like all others requires us to know its grammar. Knowing the grammar of the word does not involve knowing the object but only the langua-gegame in which this word occurs.

## VI

30. So far, we have considered only the absurd consequences of holding the view that ' pain ' is the name of a sensation. Now, we shall examine the view itself.

The teaching of names consists in pointing out examples to the learner, or making him observe what these words are applied to, and then making him apply these words to further examples. The test whether the pupil has got it right or not is his ability to apply these words to the appropriate or inappropriate objects; and the

only way of telling which is the case is for the people to confirm his application when it is correct or rebut when his application is wrong. But nothing of this sort is available in the case of a private linguist. The pupil may continually apply the word ' pain ' to a wrong sensation, and no one could possibly tell him that he was wrong. That means the pupil could not learn the correct use of the word ' pain '.

31. Moreover, what sort of examples can we point to in order to teach the pupil the name ' pain '. Of course, one thing is perfectly certain, namely, that if people showed no outward signs of pain or no overt expression of pain, that if people just inwardly had pain but did not cry, groan, or plead for help, then there would conceivably be no way in which anyone could learn the use of the word ' pain '<sup>2</sup>. So we have to agree that pain behaviour plays an indispensable part in the teaching, or learning of the word ' pain '. By pain-behaviour we mean the behavioural reactions which the subject is inclined to make to mean his sensations<sup>3</sup>. For example, scratching is the typical reaction to an itch; a certain sort of cry, and attention to the affected part is the typical reaction to a certain kind of sharp intense pain; and a different sort of vocal expression like meaning and a different sort of attention like gentle rubbing to the affected part constitute the typical behavioural reaction to an ache. In fact, it is that this general agreement in the pain-behaviour, which essentially is an agreement in the form of life, that makes the teaching and learning of sensation language possible ( Cf PI 241 ).

32. But someone may object here and say that even if there were no overt behaviour, you could teach a child the use of the word ' pain ' by sticking a pin in his hand or by putting a flame under his hand, and telling him that this is what is called ' pain '. This method is called ' indirect ostensive teaching '. The objection, however, is not valid.

In the first place, in the absence of any overt behaviour on the part of the child, there is no guarantee that he felt anything, just as we do not have the idea in the case of stones or plants. Wittgenstein expresses this idea in the following passage :

what gives us *so much as the idea* that living beings, things, can feel ?

Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself, and now I transfer the idea to the objects outside myself ? That I recognise that there is something there (in me) which I can call " pain " without getting into conflict with the way other people use this word ? I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants, etc.. Only of what behaves like a human beings can one say that it *has* pains ( PI 283 ).

In the second place, there is no guarantee that he (the child) interprets our indirect ostensive definition correctly, that he does not take ' pain ' to mean sticking of pin in his flesh or damaging the flesh by putting the flame under his hand. One possible way for the elimination of these alternative interpretations of our ostensive definition is to tell him that it does not mean any overt action or state of affairs which everyone can observe, but that it only means the private sensation that he alone can feel. But, this explanation is not enough. For, how can the child understand what we mean by ' sensation ' and ' feeling ' ? Wittgenstein illustrates this point by taking the case in which a child is taught the name of the colour not by directly pointing at the colour but by making him see a white paper through different coloured spectacles. The different coloured spectacles are of different shapes. For instance, the red one is round, the green one elliptical, and so on. Now, there is no guarantee that he means by ' red ' the round spectacles. Even if we tell him that ' red ' is not the spectacles that he puts on his nose but the colour that he sees when he looks through it, it is quite clear that he will not be in a position to understand us, because he does not know what ' colour ' means. So the whole act of this ostensive teaching does not make sense to a person who does not possess a language. ( We shall discuss this point in detail a little later ).

*Lastly*, even if we suppose that he understands ' sensation ' and ' feeling ' how can we be sure that he feels the same sensation, of pain when the pin is struck into his hand ? He may have felt only the piercing of the pin into his hand or something else.

All this, however, does not show that pain is not the name of a sensation; it only shows that the overt manifestations are a must for teaching or learning the word ' pain '. A child sees others groaning, crying, jerking their hands, when it touches a hot plate,

and claiming that it is painful. The child experiences what he himself feels when he touches hot things, or cries, or groans. In other words, the child learns that certain modes of behaviour are correlated with the inner sensations which are called pain. Thus, outward manifestations are necessary for a child to learn what pain is. He learns that pain is the sensation correlated with such overt manifestations, but that the overt manifestations are not identical with the pain or any part of it.

33. If 'pain' were the name of a sensation, then we could teach the use of 'pain' by an ostensive method, as we do in the case of names of physical object, for example, teaching of 'fan', or physical properties like 'red'. The connection between the name of a public object, for example, 'tree' and the object which it denotes is established by certain modes of human behaviour, e.g., in pointing to the trees, in counting them, making pictures of them, planting them, and the like. None of these games can be played with the word 'pain'. For example, I cannot point to the pain (though what I can show you is overt behaviour), nor draw a picture of pain. In fact, I can do practically nothing with the word 'pain' that I can do with the physical objects, colours, or shapes, in short with the publically observable properties. Thus none of the modes of human behaviour that constitutes the connection between the name of something and the thing named is available in the case of 'pain'. It follows then that 'pain' cannot be the name of a sensation.

Furthermore, the procedure of private ostensive definition, or mental ostentation, which on the private linguist's theory gives meaning to the word seems to be a possible procedure precisely because we do have the concepts of the object in question. For example, we do know what 'table' means, that it is a thing; or what 'red' means, that it is a colour. Therefore, when one gives us an ostensive definition of a certain concept, we understand (pick out) its meaning. Ostensive definition, as such, is a possible procedure for conveying or establishing the meaning of a word only for people already in possession of a language. The learner of a new language<sup>4</sup> is in a position to follow an ostensive definition, but the learner of an initial language<sup>5</sup> is not. In the case of 'pain'

also, a private ostensive definition or subjective ostensive definition seems possible to us, because we do know what ' pain ' means. We are under the illusion that one could always ' pick out ' the sensation pain from the stream of one's consciousness and name it. But we forget that ' picking out ' itself presupposes that we possess the concept of sensation, and therefore it cannot serve to explain our acquisition of it. A concept is not formed merely by looking at a thing, or a colour. To have a concept means to know how the word is used; it is to know the rules which govern the use of the word in the language game.

34. The foregoing discussion shows that if by ' pain ' one means the word whose meaning is learnt by ostensive definition, then ' pain ' is not the name of a sensation; and that private ostensive definition or mental ostentation cannot help a private linguist to acquire a concept. The only means available to him for acquiring a concept is private ostensive definition. But, acquisition of a concept, on the private linguist's theory, does not make any sense, with the result that a private language can never get started.

## VII

35. In the preceding section, we discussed the notion of concept acquisition. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that a private linguist is somehow able to acquire a sensation-specifying concept. We can ask him the question : ' Is it possible to retain the concept ? ' By retention of a concept we mean using it correctly on future occasions. On the private linguist's theory, namely, that sensation-specifying terms are names of sensations, possessing a concept is like having one mental filling cabinet in which examples are correlated with labels, that is, a name is put on each example, or a sample of a sensation. The justification for using the ' name ' again is its resemblance with the sample in the mental cabinet.

36. Now a private linguist acquires a concept say ' S ' by a private ostensive definition. On his theory, there is no other way to acquire the concept. The question then arises ' How shall he use the concept ' S ' on a future occasion ? ' that is, ' How shall he know on a future occasion what he meant by ' S ' ? ' For, to

apply the concept 'S' on a future occasion means that he must know the meaning of 'S'. But this is impossible in the private language. Wittgenstein says :

Let us imagine a table ( something like a dictionary ) that exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination ?—" Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification "—But justification consists in appealing to something independent.—" But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I do not know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time table looked. Is not it the same here ?"—No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually *correct*. If the mental image of the time table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first meimoery ? ( As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true ).

Looking up a table in imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment ( PI 265 ).

The only justification available to a private linguist for the use of 'S' on any occasion is his remembering the connection between 'S' and the object S. But, merely remembering the connection between a 'sign' and a 'sensation' does not always mean identifying the sensation correctly. But simply remembering which sensation the sign means and attaching meaning to a name does not mean acquiring infallibility in its use. For example, knowing what the word 'women' means does not guarantee that one will never mistake woman for a man, or knowing what 'toothache' means does not guarantee that one will never mistake a toothache for a gumache.

The justification, on a private linguist's theory, for using 'S' is his saying that it is 'S'. But, if having the same pain means the same as saying that one has the same pain then 'I have the same pain' means the same as 'I say I have the same pain' and the exclamation 'oh !' means I say oh !<sup>6</sup>.

The justification for using 'S' then is a subjective justification. But, the private linguist forgets that appealing for the justification of something is to ask for (objective) criterion; otherwise, whatever I think is right shall be right. As Wittgenstein puts it : "Whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we cannot talk about 'right'" (PI 258). In such circumstances not only is it impossible for the private linguist to identify a correct sign exemplar, but it is also impossible for him to distinguish a correct from an incorrect correlation. He would not be able to use the word 'same' for, he cannot distinguish between its correct and incorrect use.

37. One possible objection to this account can be that we do not generally ask for justification when we are engaged in our daily discourse. Then why should we so much emphasize on the requirement of justification in the case of a private language ? In our day-to-day life, we do not consciously follow the rules, that we do not first look at the rule and then make an assertion; we just develop habits of speech which rules describe. Thus, our following a rule is a matter of speech-habit. From this, it follows that our use of 'same' in the day-to-day speech is a matter of habit. In the same way, a private linguist could also use the same word for something even if he did not know the rules governing the use of 'same'. He does not necessarily face any problem when he uses the word 'same' because he acts out of a habit<sup>7</sup>.

This objection is invalid on two accounts. In the *first* place, we are said to be in the habit of doing a thing only when we do the same thing regularly. For example, I am said to be having the habit of putting my hand on my nose whenever I speak only if people see me putting my hand on my nose whenever I speak to them. Now, I am said to have this habit only if someone has seen me putting my hand on my nose a number of times on the occasions on which I spoke to him or to anyone else. The criterion for anyone knowing whether I am in the habit of doing so is to see my hand on my nose on any occasion on which I spoke. We can further illustrate this by taking another example. I am said to be in the habit of uttering 'No' after every sentence that I use in discourse with you only if people observed me doing this when I am engaged in talking with them. The criterion for knowing whether I am in the habit of saying 'No' after each sentence is to see me talking to the people.

If someone finds me consistently using the word 'No' after each sentence, then he can assume that I have this habit. So, doing a thing consistently culminates in what we call a habit. But a private linguist cannot use the same word for the same thing consistently and hence cannot form the habit of using them.

In the *second* place, in case of doubt about the usage of a word in a public language where we habitually follow rules, we can always refer to the rules governing its use. Rules are something which are observed. Merely thinking that one is following or observing a rule is not observing it. Rules are objective and not subjective. A rule is not something which one follows once and once only in one's life time. It is what one does regularly. That is why we can always appeal to them for justification. It is because of their objective character that we are able to appeal to them when in doubt.

In the case of the private linguist, one gives oneself the 'private' rule 'I will call the same thing 'S' whenever it occurs'. After having given this 'rule', one can do anything with it; for, there is no objective check on its use. A rule always points towards the way in which it should be followed. The 'private rule' does not point in any direction. The 'private linguist' is the sole arbiter for deciding whether he has correctly used the rule or not. No restriction can be imposed upon his application of the rule. His saying 'This is different now', and after sometimes 'This is the same now', or his uttering nothing, does not make any difference whatsoever. This is not the question about his trusting his memory. It is a question whether remembering makes a sense on his theory. If he doubts his memory, then he can look for a confirmation. But, confirmation makes sense only in the case of public language. There can be neither a question of confirmation nor of doubt in the case of private language. For, there is just no rule for what is the same and what is not the same; there is no distinction between correct and incorrect. It is for this reason that what the private linguist says does not make any difference. And, this implies that he does not say anything; because if he said anything, it should make a difference.

38. A private linguist may say that "I speak or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation....in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation". (PI 258). Thus impressing,

or concentrating one's attention on the sensation that accompanies when he wishes to say 'S' may be another justification offered by a private linguist for his use of 'S'. For example, whenever, he uses the word 'S' he has a particular sensation, and it is this particular sensation 'in' him which makes him say 'S'. He may say that "The occurrence of this sensation is the justification for my using 'S'. To this Wittgenstein's reply is : "The very fact that we should so much like to say : "This is the important thing"—while we point privately to the sensation—is enough to show how much we are inclined to say something which gives no information". ( PI 298 ).

39. A third alternative is that a private linguist correlates his use of 'S' with a publically observable phenomenon. Consider the following example of Wittgenstein's :

Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign 'S' in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shows that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognised the sensation *right* or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least, and that alone shows that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. ( We, as it were, turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all. ) ( PI 270 ).

In this case, there is a check on my use of 'S' namely, seeing that whenever I used 'S' my blood-pressure rises. To see whether I remember the meaning of 'S' right I do not have merely to rely on my memory but can check it up by seeing the mercury rising in the manometer. Here, then, 'S' has a genuine use, but not as a part of private language, because in private language any person other than the speaker cannot know that the speaker is having a sensation. But in such a situation, 'S' tantamounts to a 'sensation which means my blood-pressure is rising'. If the private linguist tries to justify his use of 'S' by associating it with a public referent, then 'S' is not a word in a private language; but it is a word that tantamounts to a sensation which means 'so and so' a public referent.

40. We have shown that the only means for a private linguist to justify his use of 'S' is to appeal to his memory. But, as we have discussed above, memory alone is not a sufficient criterion for our consistent use of 'S'. From this, it follows that there is no way in which he could consistently use 'S'. It seems then that, on his theory, any assertion if at all it is possible to make one, would have to perform two functions simultaneously. *One* : it must perform the function of a statement, and *Two* : it must at the same time serve as a definition in that, the speaker shall have to specify the meaning of 'S' everytime he uses it. But, this is impossible; for making a statement and giving a definition are two different speech acts. They cannot simultaneously be combined in one and the same act of asserting. Thus, on the private linguist's theory, even retention of a concept does not make sense. It follows then that even if, *per impossible*, a private language could ever get started, it could never persist.

41. I close this paper with two remarks :

**One :** The assumption that a private language is possible leads to the consequence that a language could be invented; for, the notion of a private language involves that each one of us invents a new language to report on his inner experiences. But this is absurd, because inventing a new language (in the sense that it involves inventing a new 'form of life') is impossible. To invent a language means to invent a new way of following rules, making promises, giving orders, and so on. All these presuppose usages, practices, conventions, rules and a host of other similar things. To invent a new language, thus, means to invent a new 'form of life'. Nobody would dispute the fact that a form of life cannot be invented but is evolved. Therefore, the supposition that a private language can be invented is false. Hence private language is impossible.

**Two :** Wittgenstein wanted to show not only that 'private language' is impossible, but also that those who hold the view that a language can be private, or that 'private language' is possible, are making a category mistake. They ignore the social nature of language. A language is a set of activities, or practices defined by certain rules which govern the various uses of the words in the language. In short, language is a 'form of life'. As Wittgenstein says : "to imagine a language is to imagine a form

of life" ( PI 23 ). ( Language ) is not agreement in opinion but is a form of life" ( PI 24 ), and "that the speaking of a language is part of the activity or of a form of life" ( PI 23 ). Nobody would dispute the assertion 'that a 'form of life' cannot be private ?' For, 'private' is not the concept which can be used with the concept 'form of life'. Those who allocate the concept 'private' to the concept 'language' have thus made a category mistake.

In writing this article I have profited from discussion with Dr. V. K. Bharadwaja.

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#### NOTES

In writing this article I have profited from discussion with Dr. V. R. Bharadwaja.

1. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and then write the sign in a calendar for every day on which I have a sensation. I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. How ? Can I point to the sensation ? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time concentrate my attention on the sensation. And so, as it were point it inwardly" ( PI 258 ).

2. "private Experience", *op. Cit.*

3. "what would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain ( did not groan, grimace, etc. ). Then it would be impossible to teach a child the word 'toothache'" ( PI 125 ).

4. This includes not only the present short term bodily behaviour, but also the future and past behaviour.

5. By learning a new language is meant learning another language. For example, if I already know English and start learning French, then I shall be said to be learning a new language.

6. But if I do not know any language, then I shall be said to be learning the initial language. For example, a child when he learns his mother tongue, he is said to be learning the initial language.

7. Cf. "Private Experience", *op. cit.*

8. Cf. Todd, W., "Wittgenstein on Private Language", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 12 ( 1962 ).

## PEIRCE, HARTSHORNE AND WEISS

Throughout his philosophical life, C. S. Peirce had one constant fascination—the triad. Throughout his collected works<sup>1</sup> Peirce spends a good deal of time to articulating and defending his view that the triad is the philosophical instrument par excellence. Having considered the nature and applicability of monads, dyads, triads, and tetrads as philosophical instruments, Peirce notes that although higher—and lower—numbers may present interesting configurations, they “cannot rise to the height of philosophical categories so fundamental as those” that have been constructed triadically (1.363).

It is interesting to note that the two editors of Peirce’s collected works, themselves distinguished systematic philosophers, have appraised Peirce’s defense of triads differently. In agreement with Peirce, Hartshorne asserts that “There is....a deep truth in Peirce’s contention that triads are incomparably more adequate than dyads and in a sense than tetrads, as intellectual instruments”.<sup>2</sup> In another place, he adds that “Peirce showed once and for all that the three categories form an irreducible minimum.”<sup>3</sup>

Paul Weiss, on the other hand, has utilized a tetradic instrument in *Modes of Being*. He argues there that “Being is diversely and exhaustively exhibited in four interlocked, irreducible modes.”<sup>4</sup> We cannot have less than four modes without being confronted by insoluble problems. There are thus “no more and no less than four modes of being.”<sup>5</sup> In partial response to Weiss, Hartshorne has said that Weiss’ tetradic ontology is a brilliant example of “how *not* to build a metaphysical system.”<sup>6</sup> Thus whereas Hartshorne agrees with Peirce, Weiss differs with both of them.

In this article, I would like to examine this disagreement. What does Peirce have to say about and in defense of triads? Why does he reject tetrads and uphold triads? How do triads function as opposed to tetrads? If, as both Weiss and Hartshorne believe, the issue over triads versus tetrads is the fundamental difference between them, what is the nature and what are the consequences of the difference?

My procedure will be, first, to examine Peirce's position. Following that, Hartshorne's and then Weiss' stands will be articulated briefly. In the penultimate section of the article, Hartshorne's use of triads will be examined in relation to Weiss' use of tetrads. The attempt there will be to show that the two kinds of instruments entail fundamental differences—on the formal level—between their philosophies.

### I. Peirce

The architecture of a philosophical theory depends for its cogency and significance on the route we embark upon in constructing our basic categories. For philosophy, and metaphysical philosophy in particular, begins with categorial construction. And if the categories are the elements of a philosophy, then they represent together a scale model of the world we wish to describe. The way in which we construct our categories, the instrument(s) we use, will in large part determine the success of our venture.<sup>7</sup>

The problem Peirce faced in trying to determine how to construct his categories was this : to find a philosophical instrument of utter generality, centrality, and power, with which to construct his system. If one holds, as he certainly did, that "metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being," (1.487), then the logical instrument used in constructing the categories must be not merely convenient or conventionally acceptable, but must be definitive of the nature of reality itself—and reality must justify its use<sup>8</sup>. Through the use of the definitive instrument, we should be able to discern the most basic structures of consciousness, achieve generally valid insights, and arrive at systematically arranged statements which codify the nature of reality (cf. 1.522). For Peirce, then, the form in which we cast our categories, the intellectual instrument which acts as our basic "factual finder", is the most important of the methodological tools in theory construction. In short, logic and form may be regarded as the grammar of meaningful metaphysics for Peirce. And of the forms of thought available to us, the most important for Peirce are those forms of thought whose measure is number.

For as is well-known, Peirce argued that of the ‘numbers’ in terms of which we may think—one (or monads), two (or dyads), three (or triads), and four (tetrads)—only the triad is capable of achieving the aim of metaphysical generality. Before considering Peirce’s defense of the triad as normative, we must first consider the nature of the triad itself.

Peirce first of all outlines the ‘numbers’ that have played a part in philosophical reasoning. Some think in terms of monads, some in dyads (as Peter Ramus), some in triads (as Peirce himself does), and others in tetrads (as in Pythagoras) (1.355). Thus although triads are not the only instrument available to us, ever since Hegel every philosopher has become aware of the fact, says Peirce, that triads are the most powerful instrument (1.368). Even though Peirce claims to have no “marked predilection” for triads (1.568Z), he still held that it is the most suitable philosophical tool.

A triad, he tells us, is an idea “relative to two regardless of a fourth”, (1.292). In his “phenomenology” Peirce presents the experimental basis of his triad, while elsewhere he develops the triad as an ontological matrix. The triad has a dual nature. It is both, one, the form of thought as well as, two, one of the elements of a form of thought. Thus an adequate form of thought must be triadic, but all of its elements need not be triadic as well. For Peirce, the triadic form of thought includes as its elements monads (firsts), dyads (seconds), and triads (thirds).

The idea of a monad, he tells us, is freshness, life, freedom. Whenever we encounter measureless variety and multiplicity, there we find monads dominant (1.302). For monads represent pure qualities without parts, features or embodiment (1.303). Were the world composed solely of monads, no analysis, comparison or process would be possible (1.306). Secondness (or the dyad) is exemplified by any mutual action which has no medium (1.322). A dyad is thus two subjects “brought to oneness” and thus a dyad, unlike a monad, has a variety of features (1.326). Finally, thirdness (the triad as element) is that which acts as a mediating agent or connecting bond between the previous elements.

Exemplification of the triadic element is to be found in : continuity, process, moderation, order, and legislation, while the philosophically important thirds are signs, generality, growth and intelligence ( 1.340 ).

The triad as a form, distinct from an element, of thought is to be found in numerous places. There are three moods to the syllogism, three kinds of signs ( 1.369 ), three kinds of facts ( 1.370 ), three departments of mind ( 3.375 ), three kinds of synthetical consciousness ( 1.383 ), and so forth.

Let us now consider arguments which Peirce advances in favour of the triadic form of thought. These are :

( 1 ) "The fact that the minds of man have ever been inclined to threefold divisions is one of the considerations in favour of them," ( 1.368 ).

( 2 ) "I am forced to confess to a leaning to the number three in my philosophy" ( 1.355 ).

( 3 ) There are three moods to the syllogism, three signs, three kinds of facts, three departments of mind, and so forth. ( cf. *supra* ).

( 4 ) "....every relation which is *tetradic*, *pentadic*, or any greater number is nothing but a compound of triadic relations," ( 1.347 ).

( 5 ) Although higher—and lower—numbers may present interesting configurations, they "cannot rise to the height of philosophical categories", so fundamental as those constructed triadically ( 1.363 ).

( 6 ) Meaning is triadic ( 1.345 ).

( 7 ) While a graph with three tails cannot be built out of two, out of three tails all other tails follow ( 1.347 ).

( 8 ) There can be no higher number than a triad for "the obvious reason is that which combines two will by repetition combine any number," ( 1.295 ). It can thus be proved that no element ( of thought ) can have a higher valency than three ( 1.292 ).

Although some of these arguments belong together, I wish to consider them separately, and in order.

(1) I find it difficult to believe that Peirce in fact considered this an argument in support of triads. In the first case, if we utilize the basic logical distinction between genesis and validity, we realize immediately that the genesis of a psychological inclination to think in triads (or in any other form) is just simply not a reason in support of the validity of that form of thought. In the second case, the existence of different forms of thought, which Peirce admits, is *prima facie* evidence against any one of those forms being capable of supporting claims to its validity. From the intuitive preferability of one form of thought over another, it does not follow that that form is in fact logically preferable. In the third case, although Peirce cannot be faulted for not having had any sociological or anthropological awareness of the role of 'threes' within Western culture, his argument is refuted by the fact that thinking-in-threes is culturally determinate.<sup>9</sup> Since it is the case that in different cultures numbers other than three have played a fundamental role, Peirce's claim is simply false—and the argument without foundation.

(2) This argument states a preference, and is a suitable defense of one's own taste, but like the preceding argument, it cannot rise to the level of generality required of a valid argument.

(3) This argument too is defective; in fact, it cannot stand as an argument for these constitute illustrations of triadicity rather than explanations of the principle of triads. To take just one example, the notion that there are three and only three 'departments' of mind is refuted empirically by those traditions which hold that there are four departments of mind.<sup>10</sup> Of course, for logical or conceptual reasons, the tradition of the fourfold mental departments may be as adequate or inadequate as the threefold tradition is.

(4) If one holds, as Peirce does, that the triad is so prolific in its forms "that one may easily conceive that all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it," (4.310), then it follows that Peirce would hold that all relations higher than triadic ones would be conceived as reducible to triadic relations. But Peirce does not exactly mean that relations higher than triadic ones *can* be reduced to triadic ones, but that such relations can add nothing to our understanding which is not already

supplied by triadic relations. This argument is thus analytic—for if in fact the triad (analytically) exhausts the universe, then (analytically) all relations are reducible to it. But the problem is that there is no warrant for holding the triad to be as exhaustive as Peirce says it is.<sup>11</sup>

It could be argued in support of Peirce that since the triad is the combinatory relation, any combination is interpretable in triadic terms (1.515). For Peirce would argue that the basic reason why we must lay claim to the triad as superior to other instruments is that we wish in philosophy to show that all things are ultimately interconnected, combined. But we may question the notion that combination (which triads supply) is the only or even the most important interconnection there is. There is no a priori reason for holding that can implies ought—that because we can reduce all relations to triadic ones, we ought to do so. (I shall give reasons in support of this in Part IV.)

(5) A number of questions must be raised with respect to the claim that only triadic configurations supply us with fundamentally general categories. For one thing, the metaphors of 'height' and of 'fundamental' are troublesome. The height metaphor invites comparison with a triangle—monads and dyads being the two lower points, with triads as the combining third. This suggests that Peirce places priority on the triad, where legitimately we should not, by his own principles, do so. For if things in the universe are either monads (qualities), dyads (reactions), or triads (combinations), then it is illegitimate to ascribe higher status to triads over monads, dyads, or tetrads. In the second place, the notion of being 'more fundamental than' suggests that a principle of priority is operating here.<sup>12</sup> For it is clear that with the initial claim, Peirce is allowing for the existence of the variety of instruments, while with the second claim he is ascribing priority—ontological priority—to triads. What reason has Peirce for saying that the triad is so basic?

The reason he gives is that "the three categories are supposed to be the kinds of elements that attentive perception can make out in the phenomenon."<sup>13</sup> Thus perception discovers a triadically configurated experiential matrix. Supposedly, then, anyone who discovers only a dyadic experiential matrix has not been

attentive enough; while one who discovers a tetradic—or pentadic—experiential matrix is bringing more to the experience than what is to be found there.<sup>14</sup>

But the very fact that triads seem to be basic to the thought patterns of some people(s) and not others, only indicates that one may perceive in the phenomenon what one is ready to perceive.<sup>15</sup> Only a positivist epistemology could warrant the claim that what is given in perception is the phenomenon in its *hic et nunc* purity without any admixture of interpretation. That it is equally plausible and defensible to claim that we may interpret experience in terms of different configurational matrices shows that the claim to find the triad lodged within experience—and by this token fundamental—is a spurious claim.

(6) A Similar set of considerations apply to the claim that meaning is triadic. For the claim here is that an exhaustive matrix for indicating, point out, signifying things, and similarly the matrix in terms of which things present themselves as signifiable is triadic. But from the fact that one may construe the matrix of experience in triadic terms, it does not follow that experience or the signification of things can be carried out only triadically.<sup>16</sup> It is equally (i.e. formally) possible to develop an alternative scheme.

(7) The argument concerning the graphs is not acceptable. If we assume that thought can and must be spatialized, and that (spatial) diagrams (such as graphs) can capture the nature of thought instruments, then this would be an acceptable argument. But in the case where such a possibility is denied, the graphs play none other than a possible heuristic function.

(8) Peirce's final argument is that there can be no number with a higher valency than three. By valency he means value, or the quality which determined the combining capacity of a number. Thus three is for him a quality which by its very nature restricts combinations to triads. But this involves the ascription of value to the number three without any defense of it as a fundamental value. Hence this argument is an empty one-analytic only.

In all of the above arguments, we have seen that Peirce's defense of triads as more fundamental than, more valuable, more basic, more interesting, more experiential, more general, and so

forth, has no basis. As Murphey once asked, "Is it simply an ultimate and inscrutable fact that there are three sorts of experience, or does this riddle admit of an intelligible solution?"<sup>17</sup> The answer, as far as Peirce's arguments are concerned, must be that triadicity remains as inscrutable as ever.

## II. Hartshorne

I can nowhere find in Hartshorne a defense of triads comparable to that which Peirce presents. If Hartshorne shares Peirce's reasons for supporting the use of triads, then his reasons are as faulty as are those of Peirce.

Like Peirce, Hartshorne holds that the triad is the best philosophical instrument. Like Peirce, he holds that the idea of a sign is irreducibly triadic, that there can be no combination without a triad,<sup>18</sup> and that "we think best in threes."<sup>19</sup> But other than agreeing with Peirce on these matters, Hartshorne does not defend the triad qua triad as the best thought instrument. Rather, he assumes the validity of Peirce's arguments, and uses the triad as the key instrument in his own work.

Hartshorne argues against dyadists that "though polarities are ultimate, it does not follow that the two poles are in every sense on an equal status."<sup>20</sup> And he defends this claim as follows:

"In general, polar contrasts, such as abstract/concrete, universal/particular, object/subject, are symmetrical correlatives only so long as we think simply of the categories, themselves, as concepts, and not of what they may be used to refer to or describe. The moment we think of the latter, the symmetrical interdependence is replaced by a radical asymmetry. Thus the universal, abstract, or (at the extreme) eternal is the common factor of diverse particulars, and since the latter *also* possess their differences, they are richer in qualities than the universal."<sup>21</sup>

Hartshorne's main point here is that even though object/subject and other pairs are dyadic in form, they are triadic in reality since the subject term refers to a concrete reality which is a third term. And it follows from Hartshorne's argument above that these constitute genuine triads since the polarities in question would not exist, were the reference to concrete reality eliminated.

In similar fashion, Hartshorne argues that synthesis (provided by the triad) brings contraries into unity. Thus becoming is the inclusive term of which being is a component. Hence one pole is always subordinate to the other, they being related asymmetrically. Thus 'God', for instance, is a higher synthesis of the modal coincidence of the one and the many.<sup>22</sup> It thus seems that the unifying term, or synthesis, for Hartshorne, is a being which occupies the apex of a pyramid of beings. Thus Hartshorne would uphold the reality of three modes of being : one, many, and one-many. One-many thus combines the dyadic pair and its combinatory function works in the same way as Peirce's triad does. In terms of the above triple terms, we could say that Hartshorne's "one" might correlate with Peirce's firstness, his "many" with Peirce's dyad, and his "one-many" with Peirce's thirdness.

(As a logical point, it should be noted that if two concepts are being considered, then either X, or Y, or X and Y, or neither X or Y apply. This logically intelligible tetrad is not used by Hartshorne. He does not consider that the logically existing 'neither X and Y' (neither one nor many) might apply, and thus should be considered as a fourth alternative. Rather, like Peirce, he regards the triad as exhausting the logical and substantive alternatives.)

We have established all that is necessary to establish here, namely that Hartshorne utilizes a triad similar to the one Peirce uses. We need not examine Hartshorne's position further.

### III. Weiss

Unlike both Peirce and Hartshorne, Weiss holds that the tetrad is the best philosophical instrument. As we noted at the start, Weiss holds that "There are no more and no less than four modes of being,"<sup>23</sup> and he adduces two basic reasons in support of this claim. What is less than four (for instance, the triad) is incomplete, while what is more than four is necessarily false. He also adds what I consider a spurious reason, namely that for reasons of economy we need have no more than four modes.<sup>24</sup>

We can gather from this that Weiss does not accept either Peirce's use and defense of the triad, or Hartshorne's use of it. By this stand, he recognizes that the problem of the optimum number of ontological categories is a speculative field which cannot be settled once and for all. In addition, he recognizes that perhaps every degree of complexity has its own irreducible features, and that there are some notions, some realities, that require a four—as distinct from a three—pronged view.<sup>25</sup>

How, one might ask, can Weiss be so sure that there are four and not three—or two or five—modes of being, or that a four-pronged (tetradic) instrument is the best? For an answer to such a question, Weiss appeals, oddly enough, to Peirce :

"No student of Charles S. Peirce can avoid becoming aware of the danger of fastening on some finite number and giving this an import denied to all others.. Any finite reality gives preferential lodgement to some number or other."<sup>26</sup>

Here, I think, we discern two basic reasons in support of tetrads. As is well-known, try as he might, Peirce, for all his genius, could not, for reasons which may well be more personal than logical, develop a systematic triadic philosophy. True, he presented the outlines of such a philosophy, but he did not attain the comprehensive adumbration of his system that he sought. It may, of course, be possible for a different conception of the triad—Cassirer's or Hegel's for instance—to yield systematic results, but in Peirce's case, this was not so. Hence if we can judge an intellectual instrument by its fruits, we could say that Pierce was not able to adumbrate an adequate triadically based philosophy. This is a *prima facie* basis for someone else to present one on a different basis. A second reason Weiss might advance against Peirce's normative claims for the triad has already been mentioned in passing. It is that some realities may require a different number, a different analysis. In Weiss' case, the fact that human beings cannot fulfill some of their obligations is a 'reality' which can be saved only with the use of a tetradic view.<sup>27</sup> For Peirce, on the other hand, even though he argues that non-triadic systems should be thrown out the door (4.318), he also admits that God may be beyond his three categories (6.455).

Earlier it was pointed out that Hartshorne's triad is not of the logically intelligible form which requires that of two applicable concepts there are four possible applications. In Weiss' case, on the other hand, we do have a logically intelligible schema. In terms of the concepts of the one and the many, one could interpret Weiss as holding that : (1) Actuality is one, not many; (2) Existence is many, not one; (3) Ideality is one and many, while (4) God is neither one nor many, but a unity, as distinct from a combination.<sup>28</sup>

The key to Weiss' difference with Hartshorne (and Peirce) lies in the fact that whereas the triad combines, the tetrad unifies; whereas the triad obliterates the difference between concepts (and realities), the tetradic mode of togetherness is not a new entity.<sup>29</sup> It could thus be said that whereas the triad is monistic, the tetrad is pluralistic. Triadic thought, based as it is on the combinatory urge to unite opposing pairs, is monistic in that 'higher reality' is ascribed to the resulting combination. Tetradic thought, on the other hand, is based on a principle of parity; it is illegitimate to ascribe higher reality to one mode of being than to another. Thus in Weiss, all four modes of being are together without thereby being confirmed by a higher reality which combines them. If Peirce were right in his claim that combination of pairs (the triad) is the only mode of togetherness, and that higher numbers can be reduced to combinations, then there could be no mode of togetherness which did not involve a combination. In the final section of this essay, I wish to examine some of these claims.

#### **IV. Pluralism versus Monism : Parity versus Priority**

The fundamental issue dividing Peirce and Hartshorne from Weiss is twofold, Peirce and Hartshorne defend a triadic thought instrument, which, I shall argue, entails monism; while Weiss defends a tetradic instrument which entails pluralism. And for the second part of this issue, the triad not only entails monism, it is also based on a principle of priority, while the tetrad entails pluralism and is based on a principle of parity.<sup>30</sup>

The differences noted above have divided philosophers for ages. Faced by fundamental dualities—such as permanence/change, one/many, and so on—and faced by the question : 'What is real ?' Philosophers have given different answers. Those who

utilize a monadic instrument will end up asserting that one or another of the terms of a duality is unreal—*pace* Parmenides or Cratylus. Those who utilize a dyadic instrument will ascribe priority to one or another of the two terms (as change has lesser reality than permanence for Plato), or may attempt the Manichaean trick of arguing for the fundamental reality—without combination—of both terms. Since monadists and dyadists do not concern us here, we need not deal with them further. We can now pay attention to triadists and tetradists.

We need, first, to distinguish various species of triads, of which there are three—which we may call the triplet, the trinity, and the (genuine) triad. The triplet is simply the threefold repetition of a single reality. Three items of the same kind—or three tokens of the same type—form a triplet. A trinity, on the other hand, distinguishes between the different individuations of the same being. The God-head in Christian thought is a trinity : three-in-one. A genuine triad, finally, distinguishes three beings which are individuated in three different ways. In order to grasp the nature of Peirce's and Hartshorne's triad, we have to add that one of the three beings combines the other two as its mode of being, and as its mode of individuation. Hartshorne's triad is thus a cross between a triad and a trinity. It distinguishes on the formal level between three beings and three modes of individuation, but materially, one of those three beings is the synthesis, the unifying principle, of the other two. Hence on the formal level, Hartshorne holds a triadic conception of the three modes of being, while on the material level he holds to a trinity where one mode of being is superordinate to the other subordinate to some.

Let us now define Weiss' tetrad. A quadruplet is the tetradic counterpart of a triplicity and is of no concern here. Similarly, a quaternary being is the tetradic counterpart of a trinity. A quadratic being will be taken to refer to any view of the foursome where one of the four is the ontological and epistemological ground of the other three—as Plato's *noesis* is the fourth level of the line. A genuine tetrad is one where there is a fundamental distinction between the being and the individuation of a reality, and where the connectedness between these realities is not itself a new entity (as is the combining triad) but part of the nature of the members of the foursome.<sup>31</sup>

One could argue that one cannot decide on the basis of abstract number complexes alone whether a philosophy is successful or not. One might argue that one must evaluate a philosophy on the basis of how it illuminates our world, not on the basis of its tools. This sort of an argument, I would hold, is not a cogent one. For it is apparent that different thought instruments entail fundamentally different conceptions of the procedures to be used in trying to illuminate the real. That is, they are based on fundamentally different modes of discrimination. No matter the 'reality' to which it is applied, it is clear that Hartshorne's triadic instrument will yield significantly different insights than those that Weiss' tetradic instrument will.

The two thinkers, first of all, are guided by two fundamentally different questions. These are not necessarily explicit, but are inferentially derivable from the nature of their instruments. : Hartshorne's triad is no more a "neutral" instrument than is Weiss' tetrad. The concept of the triad noted earlier suggests that users of triadic instruments have the following inclinations : (i) combinations of partial or one-sided realities are sought; (ii) by the principle of unity, that which combines lesser realities is held to be 'higher' in status than the lesser realities; (iii) to seek a 'higher' combination is already to presuppose that realities are hierarchically ordered in terms of priority; and (iv) these imply that there is a monistic tendency in triadic thought.

All monistically inclined thinkers seem to hold that the fundamental metaphysical question is—'What is real?' This implies that of the 'realities' we encounter, monists believe that some are of lesser reality than others, and that our quest is for the 'really real'. And whatever our criterion of the 'really real' happens to be, it is clear that if we ask the question, 'What is real?' our only legitimate response must be—what is highest, more general, more pervasive, etc. than anything else.

A tetradic thought instrument is based on an entirely different question. As we have seen, the combination of realities is not an end sought for. Rather, realities are accepted for what they are—and how they are discerned to be—and the guiding question for tetradiists is not 'What is real?' but "Of the realities that are, how are they together?". Even if we acknowledge that some

realities are more general and more pervasive than others, the very nature of tetradic analysis does not require the ascription of higher reality to one reality over others—all are equally real. Hence the tetrad does not entail that one reality is 'more real' than another.<sup>32</sup> Tetradists seek to ascertain not the status of realities, but to determine *how* they are together.<sup>33</sup>

Counterposing the two fundamental questions to each other, we realize that the question 'What is real?' operates with a hidden premise to the effect that some realities are ontologically prior to others. The question 'How are the realities together?' operates on the basis of a different premise namely, that realities are on a parity. And as Justus Buchler has argued most cogently, the issue of priority versus parity is the most fundamental metaphysical issue.<sup>34</sup>

The issue over the best intellectual instrument, whether it be Hartshorne's triad or Weiss' tetrad, thus reduces to the question—priority or parity? Weiss emphatically upholds the principle of parity by arguing for the equal reality of his four modes of being.<sup>35</sup> Hartshorne, on the other hand, operates with a principle of priority and seeks to ascribe reality-status to the things that are.

Personally, I do not believe that metaphysics must choose between parity and priority. In any adequate metaphysics both parity and priority must be operative. But this is not the place to argue this point.<sup>36</sup>

My basic aim in this article has been to articulate the nature of and the consequences for philosophy of the adoption of one or another of the two thought instruments we have discussed. I have operated on the assumption that the formal consideration of intellectual tools yields significant insights for work in metaphysics.

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## NOTES

1. Charles Hartshorne, and Paul Weiss, Editors. *The Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard, 1929 ff. All references to Peirce will be given in the standard manner in the body of the text.
2. Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, La Salle : Open Court, 1970, p. 100.
3. Charles Hartshorne, "Analysis and Cultural Lag in Philosophy", in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 11, 1-2 (Spring-Summer, 1973), 105-112; p. 108.
4. Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being*, Carbondale : Southern Illinois, 1958, p. 16.
5. *Ibid.* p. 514.
6. Hartshorne, *Op. cit.*, p. 100.
7. Peirce is an advocate of the architectonic approach to philosophy. I have dealt with and developed this view of philosophy in "Architecture as a Philosophical Paradigm", forthcoming in *Metaphilosophy*.
8. I have dealt with this issue at greater length in "Metaphysical Directives in Husserl's Phenomenology", *The Modern Schoolman*, XLVIII, 1 (November, 1970), 1-18.
9. This point has been investigated by several people. Cf. Alan Dundes, "The Number three in American Culture," in Dundes, Editor, *Every Man his Way*, Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 401-423. See also the fascinating study by Georges Dumézil, *L'ideologie tripartite des Indo-Europeans*, Brussels : Collection Latomus, 31, 1958. See also John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, Editors, *Contemporary American Philosophy*, New York : Macmillan, 1930, II, p. 19 : "There were, however, also 'subjective' reasons for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to me; it supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving... Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human... operated as an immense release, a liberation." For an empirical study of the role of three-perception, see Jules Glenn, "Sensory Determinants of the Symbol Three," *The Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association*, 13, 1965, 422-434.

10. C. G. Jung is well-known for his defense of the notion of four departments of mind. Cf. Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, New York : Vintage 1968.
11. Peirce holds that his list of categories is complete because once we have elements and combinations, anything can be built (1.363).
12. Cf. Justus Buchler, *The Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, New York : Columbia, 1966, pp. 32 ff.
13. Letter of June 8, 1903, quoted in R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Ch. ii, p. 429, Boston : Little, Brown, 1935, vol. ii.
14. M. G. Murphey, in his book *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy*, Cambridge : Harvard, 1961, p. 368 has this to say : "It is impossible to regard Peirce's phenomenological treatment of the categories as anything more than a quite unsuccessful sleight of hand."
15. Peirce, like Husserl, seems to me to have made the mistake of believing that we can attain to a 'presuppositionless' philosophy basing oneself on the givens of immediate experience.
16. Murphy, *Op. cit.*, p. 91, says, and I agree with him, that : "Peirce's strategy is now clear : he will elaborate his system first as a system of signs, and then define reality in such a way as to prove that the three references of the sign are real."
17. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
18. Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Rome, Editors, *Philosophical Interrogations*, New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 349.
19. Charles Hartshorne, "The Formally possible Doctrines of God," 336-357, in John Hick, Editor, *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion*, Englewood-Cliffs : Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 342.
20. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis*, p. 99.
21. Charles Hartshorne, "Ontological Primacy : A Reply to Buchler," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXVII, 23, (Dec. 10, 1970), p. 980.
22. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis*, p. 100.
23. Weiss, *Op. Cit.*, p. 518.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
26. Rome, *Op. Cit.*, p. 287.
27. Weiss, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 374; 501–503.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
30. The issue of parity versus priority is nicely juxtaposed in two articles by Buchler and Hartshorne. Cf. Justus Buchler, "A Strain of Arbitrariness in Whitehead's System," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXVI. 19 (Oct. 2, 1969), and Hartshorne, "Ontological Primacy . ." noted above.
31. Weiss, *Op. Cit.*, p. 517.
32. Cf. Buchler, *Metaphysics*, p. 31.
33. Cf. Weiss, *Op. Cit.*, p. 277, 89.
34. Cf. Buchler, "On a Strain . ." p. 592.
35. Cf. Weiss, *Op. Cit.*, p. 277.
36. I have defended this point in "Reflections on the Medicine-Wheel", forthcoming in *Darshana International*.

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## RYLE ON WILL

My aim in the present note is a very limited one. It is to examine just *one* of Ryle's arguments against a cartesian notion of will, namely his Infinite Regress Argument against this notion. The argument, as found in *The Concept of Mind*<sup>1</sup> and as I understand it, may be stated as follows : (1) It is said, directly or by implication, that not only a physical operation but also a mental operation may be voluntary or involuntary; voluntary, as issuing from volition; and involuntary, as issuing otherwise; (2) The question arises : Must not, then, volition, which is called a mental operation, be itself voluntary or involuntary ?; (3) Now, it would be absurd to say that volition is involuntary; and it would lead to infinite regress to say that volition is voluntary, because the volition which makes a given volition voluntary must itself be voluntary, and so on *ad infinitum*.

It is not at all difficult to see that there is at least one unmistakable basic similarity between this argument and Plato's own Infinite Regress Argument against Ideas, which he puts forth in his *Parmenides*.<sup>2</sup> Varying his illustration, this latter argument is simply stated thus : (i) Take the entire set of voluntary objects (actions or operations), a, b, c; they have the Idea of volition, V, common to them all; (ii) Take now, a, b, c, and V; will not there be *another* Idea of volition, V<sub>1</sub>, common to them all ? ; (iii) Take now a, b, c, V, and V<sub>1</sub>; will not there be yet *another* Idea of volition, V<sub>2</sub>, common to them all ? And so on *ad infinitum*. The unmistakable basic similarity between the two arguments, Ryle's and Plato's, is that they both, in one way or another, treat a universal as if it were itself a particular of the same sort of which it is the universal, they both in one way or another treat, for example, volition as if it were itself a particular voluntary action of which it is the universal.

Now, it is found that this basic similarity between the given arguments is also a mistake which they both commit. It is the category-mistake of, in one way or another, conflating a *universal* and a *particular* which falls under that universal, of predicating of a universal what can only be meaningfully predicted of a particular

falling under that universal, by virtue of the fact that it is a particular under that universal. Thus, for example, it is meaningful to ask what is common to what are called voluntary actions, or whether a certain action is voluntary or involuntary. But it is obviously not at all meaningful to ask what is common to *voluntary actions and volition*, which *is* what is common to *all* voluntary actions, to *everything* that is voluntary; nor, further, to ask whether *volition*, which *is* what is common to *all* that is voluntary, is itself *voluntary* or *involuntary*. Similarly, it is meaningful to ask what is common to what are called red objects, or whether a certain object is red or not red. But it is obviously not at all meaningful to ask what is common to *red objects and redness*, which *is* what is common to *all* red objects, to *everything* that is red; nor, further, to ask whether *redness*, which *is* what is common to *all* that is red, is itself *red* or *not red*. In short, it may be said that whatever *else* may or may not be meaningfully predicted of a universal *and* the particulars which fall under it, one can obviously never meaningfully predicate of a universal *that* which will change it into a particular falling under it, *that* which will make us treat it as if it were itself a particular of the same sort of which it is the universal. Both Ryle's and Plato's arguments in one way or another overlook this situation, and thus commit the category-mistake.

As the category-mistake consists in the confusion of different (logical) types, one may adopt a platonic pyramid of objects, from the highest universal down to the very particulars, as a convenient device to elucidate exactly when this mistake is committed. We may say that this mistake is committed when, in the pyramid, any class is confused with any other class, a class is confused with any of its sub-classes, a sub-class is confused with another sub-class under the same class, or when a sub-class is confused with the particulars falling under it. As an illustration, this mistake is committed when the mental is confused with the physical, the mental is confused with the voluntary, the voluntary is confused with the reflective, or when the voluntary is confused with the particular voluntary actions falling under it. Both Ryle's and Plato's arguments, as far as we have seen, commit the category-mistake by, in one way or another, confusing a class with the particulars falling under it.

It would be gathered from the foregoing that the possibility of constructing the above-mentioned defective argument as found in Ryle and Plato can be guarded against by presenting the argument in the form : ‘The *entire* set of *particular* objects signified as S has the *common* character signified as P.’ Both Ryle’s and Plato’s arguments make the mistake of in one way or another treating P as if it were not P but a member of S.

It should also be pointed out here that Ryle’s mode of reasoning, like that of Plato, would indeed be the *reductio ad absurdum* of *all* predication. For not only must we then ask whether volition is itself voluntary, but, *mutatis mutandis*, also whether reflection is itself reflective, emotion itself emotive, and so on. It is gratifying to note that far from being necessary, such a question is quite impossible, thanks to the category-mistake involved.

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#### NOTES

1. Penguin Books, 1966 reprint, pp. 65–66.
2. *The Dialogues of Plato*, translated by B. Jowett, Random House, p. 132.

## THE MONIST

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## DEPTH STRUCTURES IN RECENT PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE

### I

The distinction between appearance and reality is as old and as abused as philosophy itself. Attempts to uncover an underlying reality beyond appearances may easily lead one astray to indulge in idle speculations and bogus conceptions about what that reality could be like, resulting in all sorts of esoteric counterfeit philosophies. There might also be a sober investigation into the deceptive character of certain appearances, pointing not merely to certain depth structures, but illuminating at the same time the surface features of our everyday experiences. Language analysis is vitiated by the same ambivalence of the appearance-reality model : Does language constitute a phenomenon demanding penetration beyond surface appearance to a deeper and more profound reality underlying it ? Is the underlying reality, if any, accessible only to a mystic insight, or could it be substantiated by a logical analysis of linguistic phenomena ?

We can do no better than take Wittgenstein as our point of departure in clarifying the thesis that the way language appears to our untutored consciousness is far from reflecting its true nature. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is profoundly concerned with the problem of logical form, i.e., the structure of a sentence that determines the logical relations it enters into, the possible consequences deducible from it. Wittgenstein discerns, however that the overt grammatical form is not a safe guide to its logical form. From the two sentences, 'There is a fire in my kitchen' and 'My kitchen is in my house' we can conclude, 'There is a fire in my house'. But from the overtly similar sentences, 'There is a pain in my foot' and 'My foot is in my shoe', we cannot infer 'There is a pain in my shoe'. The sentence 'There is a fire in my kitchen' might be equivalently rephrased as 'I have a kitchen which has a fire in it', but it would be distinctly odd to say, 'I have a foot which has a pain in it'. Wittgenstein, like Frege before him, sought some framework within which the logical form of sentences might be represented in a less misleading way than it is in grammatical form.

But the later Wittgenstein abandoned this enterprise entirely and erected another framework for dealing with the question of logical form. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had assumed that the precise depiction of logical form is achieved by reducing a sentence to a set of logical simples and their relations. The later Wittgenstein declares that clarity about form comes, not from penetrating the logical depths of sentential structure to reveal logical simples, but rather from comparing and contrasting the ways in which sentences are used in different spheres of life. "It may come to look.... as if our usual forms of expression were essentially unanalysed; as if there were something hidden that had to be brought to light.... Questions as to the essence of language see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view, but something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within.... which analysis digs out.... Our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras". The pursuit of essence is thus a chimerical venture now. In the Blue Book too he had observed : "What must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial.... But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its *use*". The contrast between the two Wittgensteins essentially centres round the Tractatus slogan that language disfigures thought. From the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it because, as he says, "The outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes". Hence if one seriously believes that the thought expressed by the sentence is irretrievably concealed behind a phonetic or orthographic disguise then one cannot continue to study the logic of sentences by trying to translate their overt grammatical form into a suitable representation of their logical form. This however leads to the justifiable fear that such inscrutable thoughts become suspicious, taking on the air of queer or occult entities. Philosophy could be saved from occultism by replacing the Fregean notion of logical form or meaning, which Wittgenstein himself had adopted in the Tractatus, with a new one according to which meaning lies in the public use of linguistic forms, public features of the

ways speakers actually use sentences to conduct their social intercourse. This replacement of the traditional notion of logical form must have seemed to Wittgenstein the only way out of a Platonic Whirlpool.

The distinction between logical and grammatical form is an appearance-reality distinction which, some recent approaches have sought to show, is as central to the understanding of language as the distinction between surface continuity and underlying discreteness is to the understanding of matter. A Democritean theory of language contrasts with that of the Tractatus in its assumption that logical form is inaccessible. It is possible to accept an underlying conceptual reality in language and yet an admittedly unacceptable dualism. It could be argued however that logical form is accessible if one employs the proper approach to the exploration of the logical substructure. While it is true that language disguises thought, the disguise fits in such a manner as to enable us to frame for ourselves a facsimile of the form of the body hidden underneath—in the way Democritus penetrated the disguise in which nature presents matter to us in sense-experience.

The latter Wittgenstein equates an understanding of the logical features of language with the elimination of conceptual misunderstanding engendered by distorted analogies. When, for example, we try to understand mental privacy in terms of physical privacy, the elimination of the misunderstanding, i.e. the solipsistic interpretation of the concept of mental privacy, is to be achieved by the philosophical activity of exhibiting the inadequacy of the analogy, revealing how language is being misused. As he says : “It is clear that every sentence in our language is in order as it is. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us”. This cuts deeply into the rationale of Frege’s *Begriffsschrift*, and of the Tractatus itself.

## II.

Several attempts have been made in recent philosophy to restore to linguistic philosophy the appearance-reality distinction, but before we consider them it would be in order to meet

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some possible objections. A basic objection is that preoccupation with an underlying reality takes up away from what is actually given and imposes on it a theoretic construction which opens the floodgates of speculation and controversy. We should substitute description for interpretation, describing the structures of linguistic phenomena as we actually find them, and leave the problems of logical form severely alone. In order to clarify the situation we have to disengage several important questions that are assumed in the objection. I call them the what-question, the how-question and the why-question. It is all very well that one should describe and not interpret, but *what* is it that is to be described? Things as given in our experience are infinitely complex, and all the features are not described unless they are in some sense *relevant*. Even a master of description like Flaubert has to single out some aspects of a situation at the cost of many others. One has to select, and selection already implies a criterion, a valuational frame work which enables one to decide what is essential and what is not. But the distinction between the essential and the inessential is itself not *given*, but emerges out of the scheme of values within which one is operating, and is thus a theoretic construct. An allied question is: how does one describe? Does one assume at the very outset that there is a unique way of describing a given structure, or does one also allow for the possibility of alternative descriptions? No single description would seem to command universal assent, so that what we describe and how we describe would seem to depend as much on ourselves, our preferences and our scheme of values as on the given datum. To hold the given in mystic awe, to make a fetish of descriptivism and to denigrate the valuational and subjective context within which alone the given acquires all its significance, would seem to be philosophically naive. A third question is why should we describe at all? Even supposing that one succeeds in achieving a satisfactory and complete description which is also generally acceptable, the nagging question still persists: "so what?" This again implies a theoretic assumption to the effect that such a description is somehow worthwhile, but one might accept the validity of the description while questioning its worthwhileness. An Austin might describe with meticulous care the "Three Ways of Spilling Ink"

but one may still be in doubt as to what all that amounts to. The answers to all these three questions are extremely unclear. Any answer offered would seem to be theory-laden so that the objection itself is of dubious merit.

Another objection comes from Wittgenstein himself. Though he had, in the Tractatus, accepted the reality of an underlying form, he thought that logical form is inaccessible or unspeakable. Form is not something that can be said, but shows itself in whatever we say, so that there is no language, and consequently no theory, about the form. An understanding of the logical features of language is not to be obtained from theories. If by a theory Wittgenstein understands the construction of logically perfect artificial languages, he is certainly right inasmuch as such constructions do not illumine the structures inherent in our ordinary natural languages. But a theory can also be understood in another sense, i.e., a system of descriptive and explanatory principles like those found in the natural sciences. We might try to show that logical form is neither mysterious nor inaccessible but is revealed in the way the hearer penetrates the phonetic disguise of the thought of the speaker. To discover the principles by which users of language perform the encoding and decoding operations of thoughts in linguistic communication is to do precisely what Wittgenstein said could not be done.

Another possible objection is that even if there is an underlying reality in language, it cannot be uniquely determined. But this contention prejudgets the issue and is a priori, and cannot be decided prior to the actual investigation.

### III

Many thinkers have probed the depth-structures of language, of course from quite different philosophical perspectives. Of these, three outstanding efforts may be singled out, viz., the semantic approach led by Frege and Carnap, the linguistic approach ushered in by the Chomskian revolution and the ontico-ontological method of Heidegger. I do not propose discussing Heidegger in the present context because, apart from the extremely difficult task of disentangling Heidegger's thought, his entire endeavour is to situate language in the total context of Dasein-Analytik. Language is not to be treated as a phenomenon in

isolation, but as a pointer to its own transcendence. Language is one of the 'Boundary-situations' (Grenzsituationen) which opens up the way to the beyond, which is at the same time a sort of 'home-coming' (heimkahren), and in this adventurous journey logic is of no avail. Language is not a mere tool or an inert instrument, to be employed and made use of as we choose, but is rather intimately linked up with ontological thinking, and with Being itself. Heidegger's main task is not to narrate accounts of *events* but rather to comprehend the essent in its Being, and for the latter task we not only lack words, but even grammar. Grammar which, since the Greeks, has determined the basic structure and form of discourse, as also the classification of its constituent elements is itself rooted in the essentialist ontology of the 'mere presence-at-hand' (Vorhanden) and the logic in which it has unfolded itself. The attempt to go beyond it necessarily involves circumventing these grammatical limitations, liberating grammar from its subservience to logic. Language, says Heidegger, is the 'house of Being' and, as such, is something more than an activity of man, more than mere expression. Primarily it is language itself which 'speaks', not man; his speaking is only an echo of and response to that, depending upon how he hears what language itself says. Language is the 'chime of stillness' (Geläut der Stelle), itself nothing human in its essence. This method of sounding the depths of language need not be pursued further since, profound though this analysis might be, it does not appear to pertain to language as we understand it in everyday life, and it might seem difficult to call such a rarefied abstraction language at all in any recognizable sense of the term. This is not to decry the ontological method, but merely to confess that this analysis has a different dimension altogether.

## IV

When we turn to semantics we are relieved to find ourselves again treading on the familiar solid earth. Frege is the founder of this relatively new discipline, and inspite of substantial original contributions made by many other philosophers Carnap may be taken as representing the faithful continuation of the Fregean tradition. Frege regards it as a defect in the logical

structure of natural languages that in some contexts a descriptive expression does describe something while in other contexts it remains vacuous. He suggests that rules of language should be so contructed as to secure a descriptum for every description. Certain conventions which are more or less arbitrary in that they deviate from ordinary grammar have to be introduced, with the consequent illumination of the deeper logical structure of language rules. Excepting with the help of these conventions certain logical rules would not be universally valid, e.g., existential generalization : an empty description could not be existentially generalized. Russell had avoided the difficulty of empty description by stipulating that only names, i.e., proper names as understood by him, could refer to the things; descriptions could acquire reference only via names, i.e., only when the description is replaceable by a name. The whole question whether descriptions could be construed as referring expressions centres round the notion of substitutability or interchangeability. If a description and a name are mutually interchangeable, then the two expressions are logically equivalent, and since a name has, by definition, a reference, the description too becomes referring. This method of substitution of equivalents works beautifully in all extensional contexts. Two expressions are then held to be synonymous when their mutual substitution does not affect the truth-value of the whole sentence in which such substitutions are made. But then what about those descriptions for which names are not available for substitution ? In Frege's terminology such expressions lack ordinary reference, and yet they must have some sense if they could at all be meaningfully employed. Frege thus maintains that an expression has a sense and a reference (Sinn and Bedeutung). Vacuous descriptions, while differing in having different senses, have the same reference, viz., the null-set. Frege moreover construes all linguistic expressions as names, so that in his theory even propositions become names, a doctrine which Wittgenstein discarded in the Tractatus. If propositions are a sort of names, they too must then have a sense and a reference. The sense of a proposition is what it says, i.e., the content or thought (Gedanke) of the sentence expressing it. But what does a proposition refer to ? Taking interchangeability as the criterion of the sameness of reference, sheer logic compels him

to adopt the curious doctrine that the reference of a proposition is its truth-value. All true propositions thus have the same reference, viz., truth. In any extensional compound one true proposition could be substituted for another, leaving the value of the compound unaltered. Any proposition thus is a name either of truth or of falsity.

This smooth theory collapses, however, when non-extensional compounds are considered. Take the intensional function 'A thinks that p'. The truth-value of the compound is not a function of the truth-value of p so that in this context, the reference of p could not be a truth-value. Substitution of another equivalent proposition q for p might alter the value of the compound, so that the criterion of interchangeability of equivalents does not work here. Faced with this predicament Frege comes out with the solution that in all non-extensional contexts, which he calls oblique contexts, where a proposition could not have its ordinary reference, its oblique reference is the same as its ordinary or non-oblique sense, that is to say, the proposition itself. Quine describes such contexts as referentially opaque; he however, believes that in such contexts a proposition has neither its ordinary reference, nor again an oblique reference; it has simply no reference at all. This merely shows up how strongly allergic Quine is to modal logic. I shall not here pursue further the subtle intricacies of intensional functions but enough has been said, I hope, to show how grossly ill-equipped ordinary grammar is in dealing with them. It is not even aware of the problem of a proposition having two kinds of reference, or even any reference at all. The distinction between extensional and non-extensional functions does not belong to ordinary grammar, but pertains to the depth-structure of language.

## V

The third approach I propose considering is that of linguistic theory. Chomsky suggests that though an underlying system of language strains our credulity, yet the acceptance of such a system may be necessitated by empirical evidence, and also by the fact that an alternative theory, seeking to eschew all esoterism, does not account for the linguistic facts of ordinary communication. If the appearance of language be the last word on its reality, then

natural languages should have no structure other than what is observationally manifest in the utterances of sentences. A depth theory on the contrary claims that features of the physical content of the utterances that constitute the tokens of a sentence type are not sufficient to predict and explain its grammatical properties and relations. The rules that speakers use to encode their thoughts and decode the utterances of others are not part of the physical content of utterances. Chomsky contrasts two models of grammar, viz., the taxonomic and the transformational. In taxonomic theory the grammar of a natural language is conceived as an elaborate data-cataloguing system, similar to book classification schemes in library science. In transformational theory on the other hand a grammar is conceived as a theory that explains how speakers can associate acoustic signals with the meaning those signals have in the language. It does not thus stop merely with the facts but seeks to provide the reason why the facts are as they are. A grammar is a theory about the system of linguistic rules that speakers have internalized in the process of acquiring a language. The structure represented in such a system of internalized linguistic rules is a depth-structure, for which there is no room in the taxonomic theory. We have to distinguish linguistic performance (what the speaker actually and overtly does) and linguistic competence (the rules that have been internalized). A grammar as a theory of universals in language is a statement of what speakers know about the inherent structure of their language, and thus is a theory of linguistic competence rather than linguistic performance, though it is the latter that provides all the empirical data for the investigation of competence. The competence is an a priori aspect of linguistic behaviour, revealed only in performance.

The most remarkable fact about human speech is that, except for clichés like "How do you do?", "Comment ça va?", we speak and hear daily new sentences that bear little resemblance to familiar ones. Yet we understand almost every new sentence we encounter, and our understanding is immediate. This is in striking contrast to our attempts at understanding new gadgets which often take considerable time and effort, if at all we succeed in it. Wittgenstein too was, in the Tractatus, exercised about this capacity to grasp the meaning of a sentence we have never heard before.

Linguistic competence is the source of the creativity that makes such understanding possible. The speaker's internalized rules must be able to generate recursively (a technical term borrowed from 'decision theory', an important part of logic) each of the infinitely many sentences of his language, so that a sentence, new in the sense that no occurrence of it has previously been uttered, is not new in the sense of being outside the set of sentences defined by these rules. A transformational grammar is an explication of linguistic competence within the framework of these generative principles. The assignment of the same underlying phrase marker to two sentences shows that their depth structure is the same while the assignment of different superficial phrase markers shows that their surface structures differ. Superficially, the two expressions 'the doctor's arrival' and 'the doctor's house' seem to be built on the same model. But, as Jesperson pointed out long back, in 'the doctor's arrival' 'doctor' is the subject of the verb 'arrive' while there is no corresponding verb form of the noun 'house', of which 'doctor' could be the subject. The depth structures of the two expressions are thus not the same, a distinction slurred over by the taxonomic grammarians. The underlying phrase markers in one case would generate such forms as 'doctor's sudden arrival', 'quick arrival', but not his 'sudden house' or 'quick house'. We could speak of his large house, heavy house, but not of his large arrival, heavy arrival. The nominalizing transformation rules are essentially different. Another case of the same type is provided by the sentences : "John is easy to leave" and "John is eager to leave". Both would receive essentially the same taxonomic description, viz. a single labelled bracketing that segments a sentence into continuous substrings, marked as constituents, and their classification into one or another syntactic category. It is obvious however to any fluent speaker of the language that there is an important syntactic difference between the two sentences which the superficial analysis does not reflect. In one case 'John' is the object, in the other, the subject, of the verb 'leave'. The superficial phrase markers offer no clue to the difference in the underlying grammatical form.

Note again how a sentence is paraphrased into a logically equivalent sentence by changing the verb into passive voice : "The doctor examines John"; "John is examined by the doctor".

Does this equivalence carry over in complex contexts ? In some cases it does, in others, not. Compare the pair "I expected the doctor to examine John" and "I expected John to be examined by the doctor" with the pair "I persuaded the doctor to examine John" and "I persuaded John to be examined by the doctor". In the latter pair the two sentences are not equivalent and one cannot be taken as the paraphrase of the other. What then has gone wrong ? Ordinary grammar provides no answer, unless our analysis penetrates to the level of depth structure and seeks out the underlying phrase markers, which are quite different in the two cases. Similarly, the ambiguity of the sentence "John knows a wiser person than Tom" (is/does) is not reflected in its surface structure. This is a case where two different depth structures have collapsed into one surface structure. More elaborate segmentation and classification cannot overcome the inherent inability of taxonomic description to deal with syntactical relations.

## VI

This is not a plea for giving up ordinary language and construct formalized artificial languages, as the logical empiricist mistakenly believed. The constructionist thinks that natural languages are the amorphous products of rationally uncontrolled cultural evolution, and an artificial language, built after the model of a logico-mathematical system, would be a more suitable vehicle for philosophical reasoning. The defect however lies, not in language as such, but in the way linguistic structure has been traditionally represented. It is not language but linguistic theory that needs being reformed. Ordinary language philosophers, led by Ryle, Austin and Strawson, make the same presupposition about the amorphousness of language, but react in an opposite way. They believe that any attempt to theorize about the structure of natural language is futile, and they therefore concentrate their efforts to describe the details of linguistic use. This has resulted in the

accumulation of an enormous number of particular facts about usage, but no principles that give insight into the nature of linguistic structure. What is really required is not merely a piecemeal analysis, as the Oxford school advocates, but a method of systematizing and codifying all the empirical data available. Transformational-generative grammar offers the most promising prospect in this regard.

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## ŚAMKARA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

### I

The aim of this paper is twofold, first, to refute the charge that the Advaita Philosophy of Śamkara hampers the progress of Scientific thought and secondly, to demonstrate that his philosophy has increasingly been confirmed by the discoveries of modern science and the resultant Philosophy of Science. It will be shown here that Śamkara has given the rudiments of a philosophy of science that has grown up in the West in the twentieth century. Paradoxically enough, Śamkara's doctrine of Ne science can be regarded as the Philosophy of Science *par excellence*.

The charge that Advaita Philosophy hampers the progress of scientific thought rests, by and large, on three arguments. At first, the age of domination of Advaita Philosophy in Indian thought is the age of scientific decadence in India inasmuch as no important scientific discovery, has been made in India since the time of Śamkara to the end of the Nineteenth century. Secondly, the Advaita Philosophy of Śamkara declares that the world is unreal and reality is to be discovered in the inmost being of the self. This view of reality is antagonistic to scientific thought because it disregards the human knowledge of the external world which is the concern of science. Thirdly, Śamkara himself has condemned the philosophy of Nature in the most unambiguous terms and maintained with a sense of pride that his philosophy is a philosophy of values which has very little to do with the philosophy of Nature or the Cosmological thought.<sup>1</sup>

But a little consideration of these arguments will indicate that the charge of unscientific character of Advaita philosophy is entirely baseless. The first argument is an example of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. For instance, every student of the History of Western Philosophy knows that the decadence of scientific thought during the Middle Ages cannot be attributed to Greek Philosophy which dominated the entire philosophy of Middle Ages.

Similarly, the decadence of Indian Science, if any, cannot be attributed to the rise of that Philosophy. Just as there is a deep link between modern science and Greek rationalism, there is, similarly, a deep and vital link between Śamkara's Philosophy (rationalism) and modern science. If India suffered from scientific stagnation

in the Middle Ages and thereafter until the beginning of 20th century, its causes are to be discovered elsewhere; i.e. in non-Advaitic circles and spheres. Further, the second argument is based on the misinterpretation of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā and hence is vitiated by *ignoratio elenchi*. The doctrine of Māyā, as will be shown in the sequel, simply indicates that no scientific theory is a genuine description of that which is real. In other words, as the instrumentalist school of modern philosophy of science maintains that scientific theories are only the results of possible observations and are therefore, not to be taken as the description of the essences of observed things, so does the doctrine of Māyā declare that no description of the world can be regarded as a genuine description of Reality, for, every such description is the description of appearances and not of reality. Scientific theories are, thus, not the ultimate explanations of the visible world. The object which they deal with is a mental construction. That is why Śaṅkara calls it māyā. In other words, it is something which is observable but which is not real. Finally, the last argument is based on the misunderstanding of Śaṅkara's own statement. He has undoubtedly made a sharp distinction between the philosophy of values (*Paramārthacintā*) and the philosophy of Nature (*Sṛṣṭicintā*). But he has been careful enough in linking the philosophy of Nature with the Philosophy of values in the rising scale of sciences. Following the entire tradition of Indian thought, he has maintained that as a science, the Philosophy of Nature must ultimately lead to the self-realisation or the liberation of the soul<sup>2</sup>. According to him, Philosophy of Nature has no intrinsic value<sup>3</sup>. But it does not mean that it has no value at all. According to him its value is extrinsic i.e. it is a means for the promotion of a value-philosophy and value-realization<sup>4</sup>. In other words, Śaṅkara's view of the Philosophy of Nature is that it has only instrumental worth. It is not to be looked upon as a store-house of knowledge.

Śaṅkara considers the Philosophy of Nature on the analogy of a myth. For him the scientific model is similar to the mythological model. Just as there is no real object or person described in a myth, so there is no real object described in Science of Nature. The objects of myth are mere names and forms. Similarly the objects of science too are mere names and forms.<sup>5</sup> The ontological

status of the objects of both myths and science are the same. They are simply mental constructions; the objects of myths are images while the objects of science are concepts. Thus both myth and science are conceptual schemes or models to explain that which appears. Moreover, their sole aim is to show that a particular myth or concept is the *sōns et origo* of the whole universe<sup>6</sup>. Śāmkara gives the name of Brahman to that which is the origin, ground and goal of the whole universe. For him, Philosophy of Nature, is a model which points to Brahman as the origin, ground and goal of the whole universe. He has no dispute over the use of the word ‘Brahman’. If Śāmkhya philosophers call it Mūla-Prakṛti or the *First Principle* and avoid its confusion with inert matter, Śāmkara would have no objection to accept their nomenclature<sup>7</sup>. Again if the modern philosophers of science call it *phusis* and understand by that term the *natura naturans* of Spinoza or the Nature whose creative role is present everywhere for all times, then Śāmkara would have no quarrel with them in accepting *phusis* as the sole and the whole reality. Like a philosopher of science, he has tried to show that every phenomenon is essentially related to this First Principle and that the former cannot be differentiated from the latter. According to Śāmkara there are no gaps in the universe at all.

Furthermore, science is akin to common sense. Both are based on observation which is open to all persons (*lokapratyakṣa*). Śāmkara calls this observation as ‘*Avidyā*’. Dr. Paul Deussen rightly translates *Avidyā* as empirical knowledge or the knowledge of the external world<sup>8</sup>. In Platonic terminology *Avidyā* is opinion or conjecture (*Doxa*) and is to be opposed to *Vidya* which is indubitable knowledge (*Epistēmē*). In terms of modern philosophy of science the doctrine of *Avidyā* means that all theories of science are and must remain hypotheses which stand to be corrected by later developments. In Vedānta this very doctrine is maintained by saying that indubitable knowledge is gained through *Adhyāropa* and *Apavāda* i.e. through falsification of previous theories the most probable theory is obtained<sup>9</sup>. As Bhartṛhari has said, by treading the path of untruth one attains truth<sup>10</sup>. In this context it is significant to note that Karl R. Popper’s criterion of scientific theories seems to be a Vedāntic application of the doctrine of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* to the sphere of scientific

knowledge. When he states that “theories are tested by attempts to refute them”, or, “there is no more rational procedure than the method of trial and error, of conjecture and refutation, of boldly proposing theories, of trying our best to show that these are erroneous, and of accepting them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful<sup>11</sup>”, he expresses most appropriately what the Vedāntic dialectic of Śaṅkara implies or what the doctrine of *Adhyāropa* and *apavāda* means. Sureśwara, an immediate disciple of Śaṅkara, says that there are innumerable roads to self-realization or self-knowledge<sup>12</sup>. One of them is the philosophy of Nature (*Sṛṣticintā*). Vedānta of Śaṅkara is thus not antagonistic to science. *Per contra*, it emphasises the cognitive value of science and clarifies a number of scientific concepts which are the *sine qua non* of the development of science.

At this place it can be objected that there is a distinction between the Philosophy of Nature and the philosophy of science and that although there is a place for the former in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, there isn't even mention of the latter in it. The Philosophy of Science has undoubtedly developed from the Philosophy of nature, but it is a recent branch of philosophy and it cannot be attributed to the philosophers of ancient and medieval times. This objection, however, is not, by and large, valid, for, the great philosophers of antiquity were not less interested in the philosophy of science than the contemporary ones. Moreover, Śaṅkara has made genuinely critical observations upon the Philosophy of Nature. If we term Philosophy of Nature as science, the critical reflection upon the Philosophy of Nature must consequently be given a different name, viz. the Philosophy of Science.

The main observations that Śaṅkara has made about the Philosophy of Nature concern its nature, scope, limit and result. Its nature is *arthavāda* i.e. explanatory<sup>13</sup>. Scientific statements are explanations. They are not primary statements. They are secondary statements concerning primary statements which are ontological in character. The subject-matter of science is *avidyākalpitāmarūpa* i.e. the formulas (theories) and forms that are constructed by the aid of *avidyā*. Further the limit of science is the limit of reason. Reason on its own standing, is limited and inconclusive, for, a well-reasoned argument is always liable to be rejected by a better-reasoned argument<sup>14</sup>. Finally

the result of science is the comprehension of the nature of the principle of unity that underlies the whole universe. Science tries to make this incomprehensible unity comprehensible. In this way Śāmkara has given a philosophy of science which makes a critical reflection upon the explanations of science. It is well known to every student of contemporary philosophy and science that to discuss the aims, methods, limits, nature and results of scientific explanations constitutes the philosophy of science. So Śāmkara has a very clear idea of the philosophy of science. It occupies a central place in his theory of knowledge. We shall take a stock of his analysis of categories of thought in order to present a clear picture of his Philosophy of Science.

## II

Śāmkara's analysis of the categories of human knowledge is a genuine attempt to discover the principle of unity which underlies the entire edifice of human knowledge concerning physical universe. The scientific concepts which have largely been used and analysed by him are Space ( Deśa ), Time ( Kāla ), Cause ( Nimitta ), Activity ( Karma ), Manifestation ( Vyākaraṇa ), Verbal formulation ( Nāma ), Form ( Rūpa ), Potentiality ( Śakti ), Structure ( Racanā ), Motion ( Gati or pravṛtti ), Materiality ( Upādāna ), Infinity ( Anantam ), Organism ( Prāṇa ) and a host of other categories. It is not the aim of this paper to give a complete list of all the categories used and analysed by Śāmkara, for, it will require an independent and lengthy treatise which the present paper does not promise. What it wants to emphasize here is the view that Śāmkara's treatment of these categories is not incompatible with the findings of modern Philosophy of Science. *A fortiori*, Śāmkara has anticipated the modern formulations of the most of these categories. We shall illustrate this by considering his treatment of space, time, causality, motion and substance.

It is significant to note that Śāmkara invariably uses space and time together. For him space and time are coordinate and are the effects ( Kārya ) of *avidyā*<sup>15</sup>. As the effects of *avidyā* space and time are finite. They have a beginning as well as an end. Again space and time are objective and are not the subjective ideas of any individual ( *jīva* ). They are the fundamental properties of the sense-manifold ( *Nānātva* ). Again as the effects of

*avidyā* space and time are appearances, that is, they are fraught with inconsistencies. Space-time-coordinates are not the necessary characteristics of the real. They constitute a possible and observable condition (*Upādhi*) of the real.

This view of space and time is basically the same that is advocated by the proponents of the theory of relativity. Śaṅkara anticipated M. Minkowski who made an amalgam of space and time for the first time in the West. "Henceforth space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality<sup>16</sup>." Thus Space-time continuum is the most correct designation of what Śaṅkara calls manifold or *nānā*. Further it is called *Jagat* which means a moving *quid*. This shows that space-time continuum is not motionless but a moving manifold. It is called *prapañca* which means the interrelated texture or intertwinement of all phenomena. About motion Śaṅkara further says that although it belongs to the *body* which moves yet it comes from the whole reality which is *natura naturans*<sup>17</sup>. Hence Śaṅkara's theory of motion takes space, time, matter and Nature into consideration. Motion cannot be separated from space, time, matter and Nature. In short motion and matter are inseparable. There can be no more matter without motion than motion without matter.

It is true that Śaṅkara has no idea of electro-magnetic, nuclear and gravitational fields. But it is infinitely surprising that his theory of motion is not at variance with the theory of motion that takes into consideration these fields of modern science. Modern Indian scientists can, therefore, relate the present scientific theory of motion with that of Śaṅkara's in a more satisfactory and logical way than their western counterparts do so with that of Plato's, Aristotle's or Descartes'.

Śaṅkara's analysis of causality further strengthens the view that his philosophy of science has widely been reinforced in recent times. He does not admit any ontological difference between the cause and its effect. Nor does he call causal nexus as the relation of substance and its property. According to him there is no ontological difference between substance and its property. The effect, as he says, is simply the transfigured or transformed cause<sup>18</sup> (*Saṁsthānamātram*). In other words, causal nexus is 'functional

dependence'. As Russell maintains, causal regularities are nothing but observed regularities of sequence<sup>19</sup>. Śāmkara finds in his analysis that this regularity is universal and approaches the ideal unity of all phenomena. He terms it as the principle of non-differentiation or identity. Śāmkhya philosophy has also reached the same conclusion independently of Vedānta. That is why Śāmkara remarks that Śāmkhya philosophy is very close to Vedānta philosophy<sup>20</sup>. We can further add in this context that modern science is far closer to Vedānta philosophy than Śāmkhya philosophy. The change that Śāmkara brought about from causal nexus to functional dependence is a change of great significance. It has well been established in modern mathematics. Prof. L. S. Stebbing writes, "the advance from the discovery of causal laws to the discovery of functional dependences involves the gradual elimination of any direct reference to a substantive thing or determinate occasion<sup>21</sup>." Thus there is no longer the use of the concept of substance or cause in scientific thought. Śāmkara saw it long ago. This is the reason why he called the whole phenomenal world as Māyā or without substance. The theory of *māyā* thus gets confirmation from the theory of elimination of substances as the theory of *Vivarta* gets from the theory of functional dependence.

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#### NOTES

1. Natu Paramārthacintakānām Sṛṣṭāvā dara ityarthah.  
*Māndākyakārikābhāṣya*, Śāmkara, 1.6.
2. Sā Vidyā yā vimuktaye, Indian Proverb.
3. Nahi srṣṭyakhyāyikādiparijñānāt kiñcit phalam iṣyate.  
*Aitareyopanisadbhāṣya*, Śāmkara, Chapter II, Introduction.
4. Atra atmāvabodhārthamātrasya Vivakṣitavāt.....  
sukhāvabodhanapratipat�artham lokavad ākhyāyikādiprapaṇca iti yuktatarah pakṣah. Ibid.
5. Na ceyam paramārthaviṣaya sṛṣṭiśrutih.  
Avidyākalpita nāmarūpavyavahāragocaratvāt.  
*Śārīrakabhāṣya*, 2.1.33.

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6. Brahmātmabhāvapratipādanaparativāt. Ibid. 2.1.33.
7. Yā mūlaprakṛtitirabhyupagamyate, tadeva ca no brahmaeti abhidhīyate. *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, 2.3.9.
8. The system of Vedānta, Paul Deussen, English translation by C. Johnston, p. 47.
9. Adhyāropāpavādābhyām nisprapancam prapancyate Sarvavedānta siddhānta sārasangraha, Śaṅkara, 295.
10. Vākyapadiya, II, 238.
11. Three views concerning human knowledge, Karl. Popper included in the Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. by H. D. Lewis, p. 378. See British Philosophy in Mid-century, ed. by Mace, p. 179.
12. Brhadāraṇyakavārtika 1.4. 402.
13. Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya, Śaṅkara, Chapter II, Introduction
14. Yad hi kenacit tarkikeṇa idam samyak jñānamiti pratipāditam, tadapareṇa Vyutthāpyate, tenāpi pratisthāpitam tato' pareṇa Vyutthāpyata iti prasiddham loke *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, 2.1.11.
15. See *Indian Philosophical Studies*, Vol. I by M. Hiriyanna, Mysore, 1957, p. 104.
16. M. Minkowski—Space and time in Einstein et al, the *Principle of Relativity*, London, 1923, p. 75.
17. *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, 2.2.2.
18. Nahi kāryakāraṇayor bheda āśritāśrayabhāvo vā Vedāntavādibhir abhyupagamyate, kāraṇasyaiva samsthānamātram kāryam ityabhyupagamāt. *Sārīrakabhāṣya* 2.2.17.
19. *The Analysis of Mind*. Chapter V.
20. *Sārīrakabhāṣya* 1.4.28.
21. *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. P. 376.

## AWARENESS

Although philosophers have given opposite explanations of the world, some claiming that the world was unconscious and material and the other claiming that it was spiritual, it cannot be denied that in this world we come across phenomena which are diverse in nature. Even admitting for the sake of argument that the chair and the man who occupies the chair are both either matter or only spirit, one has in actual practical life to distinguish between the chair and the man who occupies the chair. Whereas one can talk to the man occupying the chair, one cannot in any sense communicate with the chair. The chair is useful, but it is to others. The man too may be useful to others but his personality cannot be ignored. He can be angry with you, he can be pleased with you, he may want something for himself. The chair does not behave in any of these ways. So whether primarily the chair or the man occupying the chair are made of any substance either matter or spirit, one has to accept the primary distinction between a man and a thing like a chair. What constitutes this difference ? One answer is that man is living, man has consciousness, whereas the chair is not living, it does not have consciousness, although a philosophical hypothesis may claim that the chair also has some consciousness, that it may be made of units of consciousness. What is this consciousness of man ? Is it to be regarded as something, existing independently, or is it to be regarded as something inseparable from the body ? Philosophers like Descartes regarded spirit or consciousness as a substance existing in its own right. It means that for such philosophers consciousness and the body are separable; that is, consciousness could exist apart from the body and the body apart from the consciousness. The second of the alternative is experienced when a man dies. When a man dies his consciousness disappears but his body does not. But this alternative does not prove that consciousness exists in its own right. The first alternative is not experienced, but it is claimed that souls

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and ghosts can exist in a disembodied form and that there can be such existence after death. Here also it should be borne in mind that a large number of those who claim that life continues after death attribute some kind of body either linga Śarira, or Karana Śarira to this consciousness or spirit. It is not the object of this paper either to affirm or to deny whether such ghosts exist. Such an investigation would be speculative metaphysics. On the basis of our experience, we can only say that when a man is living, his body and his consciousness are inseparable and in fact a belief in Lingadeha or Karanadeha fortifies this hypothesis. The protagonists of Lingadeha and Karanadeha hypothesis only claim that although some (gross) body and consciousness may be sometimes separated, consciousness is at least not separable from some kind of body. At least the 'subtle' body must be inseparable from it. We then have no experience of consciousness existing in its own right. We shall, therefore, not carry further the investigation whether consciousness exists in its own right. We shall be only making a distinction between something which has consciousness and something which does not have such consciousness at least apparently. Sometimes, this 'consciousness' is expressed by the verb, to be, or to exist when it is used along with a subject denoting living being.

The word consciousness or 'conscious' is, however, very ambiguously used. Let me make it clear in the beginning that when we use the word consciousness we do not mean by it any abstraction. Thus when we say, a dead body has no consciousness we mean thereby that the consciousness is totally absent from the dead body. But when somebody faints then also we say that he is unconscious, he has no consciousness. But when we say that the fainted person has no consciousness we do not mean that he is dead, i.e., although in one sense we are denying consciousness to him we are still saying that Consciousness cannot be completely and in some other sense denied to him. What are these different senses in which we use the word consciousness? When a man is dead and we say he has no consciousness we mean by it that the body is like some kind of organic matter without life. When a man faints we think that he cannot know, remember, desire or do something consciously, although he is living and some kind of involuntary activity of his body proceeds un-

interrupted. He may, for example, breathe, his heart beats may continue and his lungs and kidney may function. Such a man has consciousness, that is he is living although he is unconscious. This case is to be distinguished from one where a person is conscious as he has not failed and of course no-body can be conscious unless he is living or has consciousness. But there is a difference between just having consciousness and being conscious. This 'being conscious' suggests some kind of *awareness* on the part of the man. The first use of the word conscious or consciousness has only the biological significance whereas the second has epistemological significance. I shall, therefore, use the phrase biological consciousness to signify the first use and epistemological consciousness to signify the second use. The second use, so to say, is grafted over the first and it is about this use that we shall confuse ourselves. But here also we have to make a further distinction. It may be generally granted that when a man is unconscious at that time he does not know, or does not know whether he knows or does not know. So one has to make a distinction between one's knowing and one's knowing that one is knowing. This second is sometimes called self-consciousness. It is again not necessary that when a man knows he should consciously know that he knows. But sometimes at least he knows that he knows or he knows that he does not know. So there is a possibility of a man knowing about his knowing. Is this second state totally absent when he merely knows or perceives something ? In most cases knowledge situations or perception situations are complex and there is an element of recognition in such situation. Does recognition pre-suppose an awareness of oneself ? It may also raise a point about the status of memory. Can there be memory without there being awareness of oneself ? But let us take the case of knowing (or Vyavasaya). Does such situation pre-suppose (1) the 'I' or the knower, or (2) the knowledge of the I or the knower ? Descartes' argument "I think therefore I am" could be based on the first alternative. There may be an 'I' without there being an awareness of 'I'. But if this 'I' is not different from consciousness would we be able to say that our consciousness is pre-supposed in the situation without our being aware of it ? In other words if any knowledge situation pre-supposes 'I' and if this 'I' is not different

from awareness shall I be able to say that there is an 'I' but this 'I' is not known in knowledge situation ? For, 'I' would not denote any ontological object but would rather refer to some epistemic situation. There is certainly a difference between human organism being pre-supposed by knowledge and 'I' being pre-supposed. You cannot have both knowledge and non-knowledge (of the same object) at the same time. Thus the first alternative may eventually turn into the second. I think, when Descartes was saying "I think therefore I am" he had in his mind this epistemic 'I' i.e., awareness although he thought he was talking about 'I'. The ontological I or what I would call the biological consciousness cannot be separated from the body. The question of separation of the epistemic I from the body does not arise. In fact, the real point seems to be whether when I have consciousness of objects in the sense I know them or cognize them, I am also conscious of object in the sense that I am aware, that I know. But whether I am aware of my selfconsciousness (or myself) or not, my consciousness of objects does pre-suppose *consciousness*, in the other sense. And this consciousness and awareness cannot be regarded as altogether different. It is because of this that I can be conscious of my consciousness and I can also be conscious that I am conscious of my consciousness. But each time you cannot say that the 'I' is a different 'I'. So whereas my body and my biological consciousness can be distinguished and also my biological consciousness and my epistemic consciousness can be distinguished, my epistemic consciousness cannot be regarded as entirely different and separable from my biological consciousness. This epistemic consciousness, is awareness and I believe, this is the nucleus of what we generally call, *self-consciousness*! Of course, we should distinguish between self-consciousness, consciousness and limiting case of consciousness where consciousness in the sense of life exists but the states of consciousness do not exist.

Let me explicate my point further. What is the difference between man and the other animals ? In a sense both of them are conscious i.e., animate. In the behaviours of man and the other animals, in so far as the urges and drives are concerned, there does not seem to be any difference. Certainly appetites like hunger, sex, fear and sleep seem to be common to man and

other animals. The only difference though a marked one is that the blind behaviour of animals is substituted here by some awareness of what he does. This is purposive. It is a conscious activity. This is a conscious activity because man is conscious of what he does. A man indulges in sex actively almost exactly the way an animal does. But unlike the animal man is conscious of what he is doing. And this consciousness brings him a surplus of pleasure or happiness. This difference in the activities of man and other animals can be shown in this way. The animals do the sex activity only during the mating period. The human can do it any time. Similarly, the humans even though sexually attracted can abstain from sex acts. They are conscious of what they are doing and it is this consciousness alone which prevents them from what they would otherwise do. In the case of individuals where such consciousness is absent neither the acts can be performed nor can they (the individuals) willingly abstain from the acts. It is this additional element of being conscious which plays an important role in human training and discipline and when the occasion arises, of their own accord they can make use what they had learnt by way of conditioning.<sup>2</sup> Both a parrot and a child can be taught certain words. But after some time unlike the parrot the boy can make use of these words for talking to people. To take another example, an infant which moves its hands and feet is definitely conscious. I wonder whether we could *prima facie* call such a movement a self-conscious movement. Again it can be observed that a young infant sometimes 'smiles'. Is it smiling or is it merely a physiological movement, for this 'smiling' does not give an indication that the child is *aware of* what it does. Perhaps the articulate communication is still latent. Contrast this kind of smile with the smile of a slightly grown up child. This smile is suggestive of the fact that the child is now able to recognise, communicate. A smile which is merely a movement of the face and is not accompanied by recognition is to be distinguished from a smile which is not merely a movement of the face, has an element of recognition. The second case suggests that the child not only 'smiles' but also knows other people, recognises other people and to indicate this it *acts*. The smile is such an act of the child. Let us dilate on the difference between the animal behaviour and

the human behaviour. Many times we say that a monkey imitates. If we show our tongue it reciprocates, if we show our teeth, it copies it instantaneously. Perhaps the monkey is in some sense conscious of what it does. That is why when somebody imitates manners or mannerism of other people, we say he is aping. Let us compare this *imitation* of the monkey with the activity of an actor. One is likely to say that the actor too, imitates. But is there no difference between acting of an actor and the aping of a monkey? Will we be able to make a monkey act? Can a monkey or any other animal except a man pretend or do something corresponding to telling a lie? I should suggest that we would have to distinguish between a purely reflexive action, an action controlled by conditioned reflexes and the action consciously controlled. They say the horse runs but it is only the jockey who runs the race. One may point out instances of 'self-consciousness' amongst animals. But there appears important difference between the 'self-consciousness' of an animal and the self-consciousness of a man. If a cow does not 'want' to give milk, the milkman may not be able to take out milk from the cow. Perhaps this could be regarded as a case of self-consciousness. But there is a difference between the behaviour of a cow and the behaviour of a man. One cannot strictly say that cow has a memory, at least the same kind of memory as a man has. So it is doubtful whether the cow will persist in the same kind of behaviour over a long strand of time. The possibility of using tools is equally important for our investigation. It is not the body which uses the tools, it is the man behind the body which is able to use the tools. Of course, one could say that animals also use tools. McDougal in his Psychology quotes a case of a wasp using tools. But there seems to be a difference between a wasp using tools and a man using tools. Do animals commit suicide? Of course, there are cases of dogs and bulls which could not remain alive after their masters died. The problem is whether they knew what they were doing. The phenomenon of alienation is equally intriguing. Think of this case, A man thinks he is not himself. A certain man thinks that he is a woman. A certain woman wants to get her sex transformed. Strangely there is also a case reported of a class of fish which changes its sex. But it is doubtful whether we could strictly say

that it is a conscious act on the part of the fish. Communicating seems to be the main principle by which one is able to decide about self-consciousness. One may, for example ask how is it you know that plants have no self-consciousness ? My feeling is, had they had it, it would have been conveyed to us. I am of course, pre-supposing that only two self-conscious creatures are able to communicate and then we expand this thought to fairy tales or mythological stories where they talk of language of animals and birds. If they had any such language just as two people speaking different languages can also communicate similarly birds and animals could have communicated with men. I am not saying that this is altogether impossible. In a way we do communicate with our parrot and our parrot also communicates with us. Similarly we can communicate with a dog. But this kind of communication is extremely rudimentary, limited in the case of animals. And so one would have to say that the animal behaviour is largely instinctive whereas the human behaviour is largely self-conscious. His self-conscious behaviour gives him the ability to control his behaviour. I am again not interested in saying whether this control is identical with self-consciousness or whether it is a factor different from self-consciousness. Most probably it is only when instinctive drives are modified by our conscious behaviour or self-consciousness that we get the concept of will. I may however say that this control cannot be separated from self-consciousness. In fact, I am inclined to think that it is this control, which acts like a pituitary gland and controls all conscious acts. I am further inclined to think that this control part in self-consciousness is the essence of what we call human freedom. It is by this alone that one is able to choose, will, intend and desire. Patanjali in the Yogasutras talks of Yoga as Cittavṛtti-nirodha. It will be interesting to find out the difference between Citta, Cittavṛtti and Cittavṛtti-nirodha. First we must contrast the Citta from something which may not be Citta. Pure matter where consciousness is not manifested in any way we may regard as acitta. All the three states Citta, Cittavṛtti and Cittavṛttinirodha are of course, the states having consciousness. But here Citta is different from Cittavṛtti. The plant kingdom may be said to have Citta (life) but not Cittavṛtti. In plants there do not seem to be varieties or variations of conscious states

like anger, passion, instinct to mate etc. This is found in animals but the animals are at the mercy of these states. There is no control of the animals over these states. This control is signified by the word Nirodha. A hungry man may ordinarily like to eat anything that is offered to him. But if his ego is hurt he may decide to fast. When Mahatma Gandhi used to fast it is not because he was having indigestion. Similarly, even if I am not interested in taking anything, as a polite behaviour I may take a cup of tea. Both these are cases of primary Nirodha. I, thus, feel that the concept of will or the concept of control and the self-consciousness cannot be regarded as two different things although their functions can be distinguished. It will be interesting to point out that Aristotle also made a similar distinction when he talked of the human world, the animal world, the plant world and the mineral world. It must be understood that this is a classification of things and not of concepts. Barring the material world every other world has got consciousness and matter in one and so this is in fact a *physical division* and not a classification, as one made by Descartes where he regarded matter and consciousness as two separate substances. But if there are no two substances independently existing, then it would be merely an abstraction.

From what has been said above, it is clear that we could distinguish three orders of human experience, and with these three orders are connected three types of consciousness, although they would be manifestations, of only one consciousness—the biological consciousness. The first is when a man has experiences of the external world without he being consciously aware of the same, the second when he is consciously aware either of his internal states or of the external world. Of course, his being aware of the external world and his being aware that he is aware of the external world do not make any difference in so far as both of them refer to this awareness. The case of dream is more intriguing. At the time of dream we appear to be aware of—fragment of the dream or may not even remember anything. But in a dream-state either the external object gives some inadequate response or it may not be present at all. However, it could be said that in the dream state the ‘knower’ and that which is known are only states of consciousness. We get the third type when a man is conscious in the sense that he is living but not conscious either in the sense

that he is living able to perceive the external world or in the sense that he is able to have internal experience. In the case of a living man such a state probably arises either when he is in deep sleep or when he is unconscious. I am not interested here in finding out the genesis of these three different states, it is sufficient to know that there are these three states. Again although they are manifestations of the state of affairs they are dependent on body for their existence. If all these three states are negated there would be no difference between a living man and a dead man. And in short, conditions of any possibility of knowledge would be removed. There would be merely a state of affairs but not a state of knowing. The states of knowing would wither away in the state of being.

In the light of what we have discussed hither-to let us consider the following propositions :—

- ( 1 ) This is a flower.
- ( 2 ) I know this is a flower.
- ( 3 ) I desire / I wish to have this flower.
- ( 4 ) I will, this to be done.

The proposition 'this is a flower' if true represents a knowledge situation. Corresponding to this situation there must be a case or a state of affairs—there being a flower. This situation would exist whether or not the knower knows that there is a flower. When someone says there is a flower, some kind of imprint is made on the canvas of the knower's mind. But one thing seems to be clear "there being a flower" or the case that there is a flower is different from a statement that "there is a flower". This difference indicates the difference between some kind of physical or ontological situation and the epistemological situation. When some one says that this is a flower there is indeed a truth-claim. This truth-claim is dependent on the ontological situation i.e. on the state of affair. But is it not also dependent on some one who knows ? Granting that some one who knows is not aware of what he does, can there be knowledge unless we grant that the knower '*does*' something ? It is not the case that the knower's doing something is responsible for this knowledge situation ? Even if knowledge is just a passive imprint of the ontological situation, knowledge of an object has to be distinguished from the object. If there had been just a co-existence of the object and the

knower, would there be knowledge ? The imprint of the object somehow must go into the knower, must become a part of the knower. A man who is in deep sleep or who is unconscious, co-exists with the object, but we do not say that he knows the object. Although knowledge may be controlled by the object, if this object is photographed on a photographic lense or plate, it does not become knowledge. We cannot say that our knowledge is in the camera. The knower's part in the whole situation however small, cannot be eliminated. Without some specific '*activity*' from the knower, there cannot be knowledge. He must be at least attentive to receive the impressions. Without attention an object cannot be connected with the knower and unless the object is so connected there cannot be knowledge. This attention of the subject or the knower is not a quality or predicate of the knower. It is the knower itself. It is the awareness. In what does this awareness consist ? It appears to me that there is some purposiveness, some goal, some direction involved in this act, although one may not be aware of this awareness. Attention in this respect means choosing to do one thing rather than the other, and this, I think, is the essence of will or freedom. Although one may not be aware of what one does, some activity, some doing, some will, in some rudimentary form is definitely involved even in the bare act of perception. What happens when one thinks ? There may be a subject-matter for thinking. There may be memory images and concepts. But memory images and concepts in themselves will not make thinking. If there is a proper choosing and selection then there is thinking, otherwise it will be merely a dream, merely a presence of trains of ideas. Of course, I am not suggesting that either the trains of ideas or dreams are merely passive events without there being any direction and if they are not passive, it would in fact, strengthen my thesis.

What happens when one is aware of either one's knowledge or oneself ? Let us suppose that, I know that there is a flower. In what does this self-awareness consist ? It does not seem to be an accident that I am aware that there is a flower. This awareness seems to be a positive instance of my attending. We may distinguish between attending and consciousness. But attending and consciousness cannot be separated from each other. And in self-consciousness it is attending which becomes conscious. That

is, we are so to say attending to our knowledge that there is flower. This attention part, to my mind, is the will-part or in other words will or the consciousness of the self cannot be separated. When one talks of the self this aspect of the will cannot be left aside. Let us see what happens when I say I desire something. In this the truth claim is totally absent. I can only be aware that I want to get something whether that something exists or not. Some claim is made here, but the awareness claim or the attention claim is not made. The subject has made a selection. In such situations there is a conscious selection claim. One can compare this situation with a belief situation. In a belief situation, there seems to be a selection claim but the claim seems to be unconscious. If this belief claim is supported by truth claim then this belief claim may not be unconscious. And one would have to make a room for rational beliefs or presuppositions. It will be desirable to contrast a desire situation with an appetite situation. In an appetite situation you are aware of your hunger and the object of your hunger, but there does not seem to be a room for selection. This selection is made for you by the instincts or primitive motivation. (The judgement situation of the idealists is something like this appetite situation. According to Idealists when you judge, you have no alternative except to judge in a particular way.) Desire situation seems to be different from this. When I desire something I am aware of what I desire. I am also aware of other things and I am to compare my object of desire with other things. I am also evaluating, that is, regarding in so far as I am concerned that the object of my desire is good for me. Only there is no universalization of all these things. However, when I desire something my desiring something may be determined by the time and situation. And we could roughly say that my desire is not myself. They could be regarded as external to me. Desires are not permanent desires. If there is any permanent element in desire then I say it is my will. A dying man makes a will. It is a document of his permanent desires. In short, there seems to be some continuism between will, desire and awareness and although in pure objective knowledge situation this awareness or the part of the will is not manifest. I presume it will have to be accepted there too. It is this will part which distinguishes a man from animals, plants or inorganic matter. Although I am not asserting that this

will or awareness is a separate entity existing in its own right independently of matter, I feel that it is to be distinguished from other elements of personality and I further think it is this consciousness or will or awareness which is termed as 'I' or Atman in the Upaniṣad.

It is unfortunate that this 'I' is "I" mystified by philosophers by regarding it as an altogether independent entity and dubbing it as metaphysical in nature. This mystification arises out of human ignorance and is immediately accepted by the religiosity of man. Atman and spirit for example, are regarded as having such metaphysical existence. We thus begin to think that there is life after death and rebirth and our Karma determines this rebirth. We also begin to think that this Karma and Atman form a unity and is called Lingadeha and it is punished or rewarded after death. All sorts of stories about such punishment are, for example, concocted by Garuda Purana or are attributed to Chitragupta. But when we talk of Atman even from the texts it can be found out that the usual reference<sup>3</sup> is to self-consciousness and as such it *belongs to epistemic sphere*. An instance from Br̥hadāraṇyaka would be very useful for illustrating my point. In the dialogue between Yājnavalkya and Maitreyi, it is pointed out, “Ātmanastu Kāmāya patīḥ priyobhavati, natu patyuh Kāmāya”. This is usually translated as 'husband becomes dear for the fulfilment of our spirit's desire'. (Thus Ātman is translated as Spirit). I wonder how the ghost of the spirit comes here. Ātmanah is clearly the genitive case of the reflexive pronoun Ātman and it cannot be regarded here as a noun at all. The translation of the passage should be the following : The husband is loved for the fulfilment of one's own (or our own) desire. Of course, there is a difference between Ātman and Asmat. I could not translate 'ātmanah' in the above passage as 'the husband becomes dear for the fulfilment of my desire' I have to translate it as 'for the fulfilment of her desire' or our own desire. *This is the difference between Ātman and Asmat in Sanskrit.* Ātman is a first person pronoun it refers to I but this I is not a particular I it can be any I, on the other hand Asmat refers to I, a particular I. But the status of Ātman is that of a pronoun and by regarding it as a noun we simply mystify the notion and regard it as metaphysical entity. In our language we use several words

like Jīva, Caitanya, Ātman, Sākṣin, Viṣayi, Puruṣa, Ānanda, Rasa, Consciousness, I, spirit etc. If we have to avoid confusion it is necessary to determine their status and find out which words have epistemological significance and which words have not. To me it appears that the words Caitanya and Jīva do not have any epistemological significance in themselves, although it is on account of Caitanya and Jīva, that the other concepts like Ātman or Sākṣin or self-consciousness etc., become significant in the sphere of knowledge.

I think, this notion of 'I' or some kind of awareness plays a very important role in all human activities like believing, knowing, judging, asserting, liking, seeing, expecting, valuing etc., and I feel, pure sciences like Logic and Mathematics, and Aesthetics and Ethics are also very intimately related to this very notion of 'I' or self awareness.

Let me summarise. In this paper I tried to discuss the status of awareness of self-consciousness as it is traditionally called. I proposed that self-consciousness or awareness is not just a name for one state, it is an evolving concept and it is different both from biological consciousness and consciousness as it is ordinarily termed. Though it presupposes consciousness in both these senses. In one sense of the term both self-consciousness and consciousness would be a function of certain organization called the body and so both self-consciousness and consciousness would depend on body. This is clear when a man dies, for it is a state where neither self-consciousness nor consciousness seems to be present but the body is definitely present. But at every other point of life it appears that consciousness and self-consciousness are steering the activities of the body. Perhaps it is this phenomenon which makes people think that consciousness is a substance just like body, and although consciousness and self-consciousness are distinguishable people begin to think that in a sense self-consciousness is not different from consciousness. The fact that I distinguish consciousness from self-consciousness and also distinguish both of them from the body which is their support need not make people think that I regard them separate from one another and independent of one another. Neither consciousness nor self-consciousness may exist without body but that does not mean that consciousness,

self-consciousness, and body do not make a whole which is controlled by self-consciousness. That there is a self-consciousness is a fact, which I think no one can deny. When a knower begins to think of himself, he is self-conscious. But he is also self-conscious when he begins to think of knowledge. In fact one could ask the question whether there could be knowledge without the knower being self-conscious. Of course, one could also argue that sometimes his self-consciousness may become a hinderance to at least some kind of knowledge. But this could only prove that self-consciousness is not of one type.

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#### NOTES

1. On the basis of these we may distinguish men, animals and plants. Men have all the three, animals predominantly have the two and the plants have only one. Of course, what I say would be only vaguely so. Some rudimentary self-consciousness may be possibly present even in the case of animals.

2. For example, dog's fidelity to his master is known, similarly the cow may not allow to be milked, and a horse may decide not to run. But these exceptions do not disprove my point. It only proves the point that some animals also are so (developed) evolved that they have some kind of awareness.

3. Of course, for various reasons the words may be used in different senses. Thus Ātman is sometimes used as a synonym of Brahman in Gaudapāda.

## BOOK REVIEWS

I. Edmond L. Erde : *Philosophy and Psycho-linguistics*,  
Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, The Hague, 1973, pp 237.

The book under review is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of literature which have a unifying theme of bringing out the philosophical implications of recent linguistics. It makes a larger, generalised claim about the compatibility between science and philosophy, and a smaller, particularised claim about the compatibility between the linguistics of Chomsky and the Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. At the outset, the unity between them is achieved with a particular interpretation of *a priori*.

According to the author's interpretation, both Katz and Vendler have viewed *a priori* as containing the possibility of uniting science and philosophy. This it seems to be too generalised a view to evoke sympathy. Because, to a great extent it is true to say that they use scientific data obtained in linguistic studies to solving philosophical problems, it requires a methodological clarification as to whether their use of *a priori* seems to converge at all. Interpreting Katz as using two senses of the *a priori*, he says that certain scientific theorising about experience obliterates the distinction between science and philosophy. Not satisfied with their views, he proceeds to clarify his own view based on *a priori*. His thesis here is that *a priori* enters into both the activities of science and philosophy, and this stands without theoretical support. His drawing additional support from Kuhn and Hanson, not though entirely out of place, is not altogether satisfactory. However his parenthetical remark that Chomsky is doing good science and good philosophy may be taken seriously for further consideration.

There seems to be a confusion between innatism and *a priori* in his view. It arises on account of looking at innatism as a kind of *a priori* which does not seem to be true. Again he thinks what lends scientific credibility to innatism doctrine is the notion of *a priori* when it is elevated to the status of science. The same applies to the notion of grammar. Consequently, this is shown

to give the definition of linguistics as a twig in the philosophy of science. The relation between the general linguistic theory and the theory of a specific grammar is symbiotic.

His efforts to harmonise science and philosophy comes to near fruition when he takes up the issue of ‘unifying’ the opposing paradigms of mentalism (Chomsky) and behaviourism (B. F. Skinner, Bloomfield, A. W. and C. K. Staats, and M. D. Braine). Chomsky’s commitment to mentalism however has not been explored fully though it seems to promise something of a parallel framework which Karl-Otto Apel gives for the analytical philosophy of language.

Further, he endorses Lee’s opinion which holds that Chomsky’s theory has all the characteristics of a scientific theory. He also accepts the criticisms made by Chomsky on the conceptual confusions of Skinner’s *Verbal Behaviour*. In that he brings to the fore the principal force behind Chomsky’s criticisms as relevant to the understanding of their respective commitments. After discussing the ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘internal’ differences, he goes on to claim that Chomsky’s theory is so systematised as to include what has been dismissed by other linguists as ‘mere commonsense’. Here he seems to express a point. The disciplinary considerations seem to be the most interesting part of the book.

Having said that innateness has an *a priori* status in the science of linguistics, now he proceeds to say what constitutes that science. Using science in the ordinary sense and the ‘assent of the scientific community’ are the two main features he mentions here. The latter, he says is the essential and final criterion of the correctness of science (155).

In his comparison between Descartes and Chomsky, he concentrates on the idea of infinity and tries to explain the idea behind the production of infinite sentences in Chomsky. Apart from this he mentions two other issues; one is about private language and the other is about the analytic-synthetic distinction. He claims that if Chomsky were right, his argument would support a private language hypothesis, which apparently goes against every grain of interpretation of Wittgenstein. This may also be understood as seeking support for the innatism doctrine. But this seems to be too hasty a conclusion to reach.

He worked out the compatibility between Chomsky and Wittgenstein in the following way. First he defends Wittgenstein both from the attacks of Chomsky as well as from the attacks of Katz, Fodor, and Chihara; positively, he tries to prove that both Chomsky and Wittgenstein as 'logical behaviourists', the former is because of his 'use theory of language' and the latter is because of the relation between a novel proposition and its underlying competence. He also points out the obvious similarities between Wittgenstein and Skinner.

Secondly, he avers that Wittgenstein is not an anti-mentalist as Chomsky has understood him. Besides he mentions three similarities, concluding that there is an implicit acceptance of nativism in Wittgenstein. He compares them again by enumerating five features of the phrase 'forms of life'. Here he seems to make a relevant point when he says something about 'agreements in forms of life'. He winds up his discussion by considering how philosophical questions attain the status of science.

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A. Kanthamani

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II. Martin P. Goldig : *Philosophy of Law*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1975. Pp. x+133 \$7.95, \$4.35 paper.

The author of *Philosophy of Law* is with the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York and the book, which is one of a Prentice-Hall *Philosophy Series*, is oriented toward the study of criminal law; it is a work dealing with legal philosophy rather than with the philosophy of law. The law as defined by Golding is law that covers offences against public order, decency and safety. But criminal law is surely only one aspect of the totality of law, occupying as it does a borderline position, although certainly an important one, which encroaches upon both private and public law and which trespasses upon case and statute law.

The place of ecclesiastical law is not elaborated, and there is no detailed account, for example, of the importance and development of *contract* in law nor of the origins of international law as we might find it given in painstaking detail in Sir Henry Maine's work on *Ancient Law*. If we think that authors such as Maine and Fredrich overemphasize the historical approach to law, Golding has traced the historical development of the various aspects of law hardly at all. The medieval classification of law into eternal, natural and human law is touched on only slightly; there is no mention of the sixteenth century political philosophers Hooker or Bodin, nor of Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist whom Maine held in such high regard.

The first chapter opens with a discussion of the nature of law and its problems; we might wish that the topic were not so narrowly met and given a wider interpretation. In any event, it is shown that not only does society require rules but that laws require a good society. From this the terms of reference for any legal system should follow naturally enough : first a society, second an agency to make the laws, followed by further agencies to enforce the laws and to settle disputes.

Compensating somewhat for the slender beginning made in the first chapter, the second chapter contains a treatment of some of the more important theories about law in general. Centering upon the two traditions of legal positivism and natural law, various

approaches are given in condensed version, and it is only by virtue of a clear and precise style that the author is able to cover so much so adequately. Legal positivism, by its very positivistic nature is able to offer little in the way of a genuine philosophy. By contrast, the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas gives to law a moralistic and even a theological basis, bringing into play an entire system of metaphysics. Hans Kelsen's 'Basic Norm', taken by Golding to suggest a 'pure' theory of law, is criticized as involving circularity. There follows a discussion of H. L. A. Hart's interpretation of a legal system as one that rests on recognized rules, in turn based upon accepted practices. A section is given over to Lon L. Fuller and his advocacy of a legal morality as the condition for lawmaking in the tradition of natural law, a condition that we nevertheless do not expect to find written directly into positive law. The chapter ends with an account of Philip Selznick's emphasis on legal authority, exercised and given weight through a clarification of ends in the light of both tradition and reason. All in all we have what appears to be an acceptable summary of mostly current developments in law theory together with a brief evaluation of each and some well-integrated comparisons.

In discussing the limitations of law, it is well noted that in a modern free society a fine line must be drawn between legal compulsion and the individual's right of choice. In contemporary legal philosophy this whole area is seen to be one of keen concern. Where we acknowledge natural moral law we admit to certain moral rights at least in principle, but no government can legislate morality nor is legal punishment necessarily provided for moral wrongs. On the other hand, however, where immorality threatens to become a public menace, the question of private morality can give cause for concern, and if it is our aim to improve the quality of life rather than simply to endure life, wholesome moral living should be of consequence to all citizens.

There is a final chapter describing methods of settling disputes, such as adjudication and conciliation, but prior to this we have Golding's discussion on the pros and cons of punishment, which takes up fully thirty percent of *Philosophy of Law*. Punishment as a deterrent, it is said, is carried out and justified with the idea of effecting a balance, as it were, to protect society, or to protect the offender against himself or to justify the law to itself as law that is

enforceable. This may to some extent be true, but we might add that where measures that are preventive are not instituted, violence is done to the developable potential in human resources, and moral principles are dishonoured to the extent that there soon eventuates the need for remedial measures among the very populace that these principles were supposed to benefit. A look at the problem in perspective should show that punishment is a belated reaction to a largely preventible situation, and it might be pondered that most societies since early Greek times have given slight heed to Plato's stress upon the educative function of law.

There is much in *Philosophy of Law* that appears to center around what may be said to be current discussion in law theory. A great deal of the literature cited is of recent origin; of all the reference and source material listed, amounting to 142 titles, eighty percent of it is dated as recently as 1950 or later. It would have been instructive even to have drawn a comparison between the laws that are freely made and obeyed by man, and those laws of nature which operate among non-free agents; both kinds would seem to require a society to formulate the laws as well as one or more agencies to administer the laws. If the concept of law could be seen in a rather wider context than Golding has placed it, could it not be considered that, while law may be taken as society's declared vengeance upon what it deems to be wrongdoing, law may also be viewed as science's standard to which all its observational facts must conform. Philosophically speaking, law may be said to constitute reality's formal principle to cover the changes that go on in all existing worlds, possible as well as actual.

London, Ontario, Canada.

A. W. J. Harper



III. Nihar Ranjan Ray, *An Approach to Indian Art*, xii + 299 pp., biblio., index, Panjab University Publication Bureau, Chandigarh, 1974, Rs. 40/-.

A rather unassuming title, *An Approach to Indian Art* is indeed more than an approach. It is in fact an exciting journey into the Indian way of life through the ages, in which art has always prominently figured both as creature and creator of the Indian *clan*. Himself inspired by A. K. Coomaraswamy whom he pays fulsome tribute and whom the book is dedicated to, Professor Ray questions some of his basic assumptions about Indian Art. Coomaraswamy as well as Havell present in their scholarly works an idealised and intellectualised version of Indian art, an abstraction which does not do full justice to the profound inter-action of art and living. Indian art, the author lucidly demonstrates, is an integral part of the total way of life, and never enjoyed autonomous status. Despite some writers like Visvanatha and Rupa Gosvamin who "raised the study of art and art experience to the level of philosophical discipline", Indian art never opted out of the vital work-a-day life of the people. Its impact was felt in the home, temple and market place no less in the court of the rulers. In contemporary society when art, like technology, has a tendency to withdraw in the name of freedom from its moral and social responsibilities, it is well to ponder on what the author has to say on this point. The traditional Indian view, he explains systematically, is that the whole art activity is, in the final analysis, a moral striving, an attempt at "cultivating the soil of life". Art as such is an indissoluble part of the integral *yoga* of life.

The author devotes quite some space to the writers on Indian aesthetics, who have explained some fundamental principles of art experience, and whose rich contribution he quite acknowledges. However, he himself, I believe justifiably, makes a bold attempt to de-intellectualise Indian art, and to restore to the body and the senses, to begin with, their rightful place in the scheme of life. Thus he provides a corrective to the perspective of Indian life, which represents it as ascetic and life-denying. This may shock many idealists who thought they had successfully disposed of the body metaphysically from Indian thought.

As for art experience, the author refers to, among others, Bharata's *Natya Sastra*, which "introduces for the first time the concept of *rasa*...as the central and most significant theme in art experience". Yet another vital element in art experience is *chhanda* i.e. rhythm and balance which like *rasa* is a common denominator of all aesthetic experiences. The consummation of art experience is reached when through concentration and distancing—physical and psychological—the dichotomy of the subject and object is obliterated giving a foretaste of the spiritual bliss.

Through profuse concrete illustrations from painting, plastic arts, architecture, music and the rest, the author gives us an intimate peep into the creative process : how from the variegated material and contents the artist, by virtue of his mind's eye and artistic skill, carves out an object of art pregnant with meaning. At some stage of the creative process, the author maintains, the artist is lost in the object and there is no subject-object duality. The experience of the artist at its best, even as of the perceiver is not in the form of the categories of thought but that of being. Even such a pronounced pragmatist as John Dewey concedes that no experience including, to be sure, the intellectual and the scientific, is complete unless it is topped off by aesthetic experience. Which, to my mind, implies something akin to the aforementioned experience of being. Arthur Koestler's *The Act of Creation* which is about the best book on the nature of the creative process I have come across, may be, I believe, considerably enriched if insights gleaned from the Indian art by Prof. Ray were suitably incorporated in it.

The youthfulness of Indian art, the author convincingly proves, is to be found in the 'dynamic naturalism' of the whole range and variety of its expression in line, colour, tone, volume and so on, which have the root in the senses and the sensuous and yet leap out to transcend them without any tension or conflict. As a further proof of this he maintains that "in traditional Indian art there is no portrayal of old age". And all the gods and goddesses are depicted as young, not all too godly but quite overtly human too. The unity of the senses-sensuousness and the transcendental, of the divine and the human, of the subject and the object as portrayed in Indian art could not have been achieved without a long tradition of maturity in aesthetic experience and in

creative expression. The treatment of this quality of Indian art at the hand of the author history-wise, example-wise and concept-wise makes a highly insightful reading.

Nor is the unity to be missed in the relation of one art form with another. All the arts from painting to music are closely inter-linked, with common denominators. From the most abstract music to the most bodily and all-embracing architecture, there is the central unity of *elan*, purpose and meaning. To be sure, Indian art is integral. In this age of specialisation and fragmentation even in the area of art, the Indian concept of integral art both poses a vital question and offers a profound answer so well articulated in the book.

The book, so meticulously scholarly in detail and explanation, is, to my mind, much more than scholarly. It has all along the touch of the creative, for no one could have written this book on the force of pure scholarship alone, for as the reader will be able to sense, I hope, that the book has been written by one who himself has lived for the good part of his life the experiences and contemplated over them, made them a part of his own being and becoming before putting them across. This is evident from the way he explains the classic art objects in Indian history. He seems to live authentically the experience of the artist himself and equally authentically perceives the object with his mind's eye, all of which he seems to have rehearsed in his mind many times over. The result is a refreshingly original book on Indian art which is helpful not only to those interested in Indian art but also to those who are interested in Indian heritage in general and in aesthetics in particular. If I can trust my judgment, the book, I am sure, will join the classics in Indian art and heritage pretty soon in its career.

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#### IV. When A Great Tradition Modernizes—*Milton Singer* :

Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1972. pp. 403.

Milton Singer's new major study '*When a Great Tradition Modernizes*' is, in many ways, a uniquely important work, for it consolidates almost two decades of research in an attempt to formulate a theory of cultural change. Singer's central problem is to illuminate the type of innovative adjustments to which India's 'Great Tradition'—Sanskritic Hinduism—is put in the life of an urban centre and how out of this process, there comes about a modernization of the tradition itself. One of the special features of Singer's study is that its context is not village India, but an urban city—Madras. Even at the most superficial level, his study clearly demonstrates that the sociological rural-urban contrast has little application to India, for he shows how within the context of an urban setting, the cultural elements of the Great Tradition operate and how the industrial elite uses this very tradition in its path to modernization.

But there is a more important theoretical implication in Singer's choice of setting. As he himself points out, in studying a complex civilization such as that of India, there is a great danger of an exclusive concentration upon a textual, culture—historical study. The work of Indologists, Culture Historians and Philosophers illustrate this textual approach to the study of Indian civilization. On the other hand, the usual approach of the social anthropologist has been purely contextual; he has tended to concentrate upon a tribe or village or a simple community as an isolate and study its form and functioning, ignoring the fact that the group he is studying is embedded in a larger context. Hence there has come about an opposition between the textual and contextual approaches to the study of civilization and Singer's choice of an urban centre is an attempt to integrate the two approaches, for his study is informed by Redfield's theory of the functions of a city with regard to its cultural tradition. As is well known, Redfield distinguishes between the orthogenetic and the heterogenetic functions of the city as well as between primary and secondary urbanisation.

According to Redfield there are basically two different roles that cities play in the process of cultural change—the ‘orthogenetic’ role of carrying forward and systematically elaborating long established local cultures and the ‘heterogenetic’ role of introducing or creating modes of thought and behaviour which go beyond local culture. In Redfield’s theory, a city is seen as a locus in which cultural change takes place. Hence Singer’s study of modernization within the context of an urban background like that of Madras is not merely a departure in terms of field study; it is also informed by a theory of cultural change. His book offers us an invaluable attempt at documenting as well as theoretically interpreting the process of modernization in India.

But the study of an alien culture and society poses certain methodological as well as theoretical problems. At the initial level itself, there arises the problem of ethnocentric bias and Singer carefully documents the distortions brought about by common western stereotypes about Indian society and culture. In his opening chapter, ‘Passage to more than India’, he traces the historical origin of two fundamental western images of India—the image of India as the White Man’s Burden, and the more recent, but equally distorting complementary image of Indian spirituality. Little need be said about how such images and stereotypes prevent any real understanding of the country. But what is more interesting for us to note is the methodological safeguard usually taken against the harmful effects of such stereotypes. Ever since Malinowski, social anthropologists have realized that the best way to get rid of ethnocentrism in the study of an alien culture is to look at it in its own terms, from the natives’ point of view. It is believed that however difficult it may turn about to be in practice, the adoption of such an insider orientation is the only effective and ultimate safeguard against ethnocentric bias.

No doubt, insofar as the task of social anthropology is to achieve an understanding of the meaning of social behaviour, an insider orientation becomes necessary but there is a subtle danger in such a perspective for the insider point of view is very often a justificatory perspective. The way the people see themselves and relate themselves to their action is also the way they justify or legitimise their behaviour and hence a reliance upon their

modes of perception and belief may subtly end up as a covert justification of what they do; in other words, there is a drift towards conservatism in such an orientation. But more seriously, at the level of interpretation also, an insider-perspective may have its own distorting effect. For instance, a piece of behaviour or social action may appear to be identical in terms of subjective meanings and purposes. Nonetheless, it may be an altogether different type of action when it is performed by different groups of social agents. For example, 'Sanskritization' means something altogether different when it is performed by an elite group than when it is performed by a rising jati. In the latter case, it functions as a tactic of mobility, while in the former it serves as defensive operation. However, in both the cases the same appeal to traditional norms and values is made. Hence an exclusively insider orientation is likely to miss or minimise the differences between the two forms of 'sanskritization'. Furthermore, from the point of view of a theory of cultural change, an insider approach has a serious limitation. In terms of the agents' own beliefs and intentions, any change or innovation is likely to be regarded as an adjustment or at the best an adaptation; the actors are not likely to look upon themselves as harbingers of fundamental structural change. An approach which relies heavily upon the actor's point of view is, therefore, likely to miss the note of fundamental change in social processes. In short, what I am suggesting is that the adoption of an insider perspective has its own dangers and secondly that for the purpose of a theory of social change these dangers become serious.

The understanding of an alien society requires not merely the careful perception of facts; it also involves interpretation in terms of a theory. It is a theory or conceptual scheme which can confer intelligibility upon the observations of social behaviour. And here again, there arises a peculiar dilemma-either one uses a theory of social systems developed in a different context or one tries to use an indigenous conceptual scheme. The first alternative has its own problematic aspects; it may for instance create dichotomies and contrasts that are inappropriate to the situation one is trying to understand. As Singer and others have emphasized, the radical opposition between tradition and modernity may well be an artificially generated problem. On the other hand if one were to use a

native conceptual scheme, there is the risk that one may be relying on an ideology rather than any viable theory at all. For example the fourfold varna scheme is more an ideology rather than a sociological theory. The problems posed at the theoretical level are especially serious for the attempt to study processes of change. As we still lack an adequate theory of social change, one's theoretical beliefs may stand in the way of one's study of social change and transformation.

Generally speaking, most of the American sociological and anthropological studies of India have more or less a functionalist frame of reference. Singer, of course, qualifies his commitment to functionalism in certain important ways which we shall shortly note, but just now I wish to emphasize the overall functionalism of his and most other approaches to the study of Indian society. It is a trite criticism of structural functionalism to say that it is static, that it ignores change etc. Certainly, such criticisms are theoretically naive for, as Francesca Cancian has recently argued, functional analysis can easily treat of change and indeed the charge of static bias is misapplied when we remember that functionalism as Parsons uses it, is specifically designed to explain processes. However the charge may be reformulated so as to have greater pertinence. In replying to the charge of static bias Parsons writes 'structure does not refer to any ontological stability but only to a relative stability—to sufficiently stable uniformities in the results of underlying processes so that their constancy within certain limits is a workable pragmatic assumption'. Parsons has conceded that the next step in analysis is the search for the dynamic elements in the social structure but it is precisely here that there occurs the crucial mistake of functionalism. The dynamically variable elements are related to the structure by means of the concept of function. In effect, this means that only those dynamic factors which serve to maintain the structure, only those elements of change and process within the system which have a functional significance for the system are singled out. This precludes the possibility of theoretically accounting for structural change. Hence the real criticism of functionalism is not that it is incapable of dealing with change but that it de-emphasizes the possibility of structural changes of the system itself, only allowing for changes within the system.

But as I said Singer's theoretical scheme introduces certain major modifications of structural functionalism. In discussing industrial leadership in Madras City, for instance, he observes 'By proceeding from observed concrete innovative behaviour and beliefs of particular individuals and groups to the more abstract levels of conceptualized 'systems' and 'structures', I hope to by-pass a number of dilemmas that have confronted Indian anthropology and social anthropology in general. Instead of trying to draw conclusions about individual behaviour and belief and empirical persistence and change from structural definitions and a priori assumptions, why not begin with the ways in which particular individuals and groups make use of their family, caste, religious affiliations and networks in particular fields of activity such as the city, and industry and consider what the facts imply about the congruence or incompatibility of structural types?' I consider this comment and methodological procedure highly important for it is in terms of working out from individual concrete behaviour that Singer is able to raise serious doubts about Weber's thesis that Hindu ritualism is an unsurmountable obstacle to industrialization and modernization. Singer shows how there is a subtle discrepancy in the concrete working out of Weber's argument. While dealing with the West, Weber takes account of the cultural creed of the Protestant ethic as well as the ways in which it was used and adapted by the rising entrepreneurial groups, but while dealing with India, Singer points out how Weber largely neglects this contextualistic dimension and concentrates heavily upon the presumed ethos of the Hindu texts themselves. But Singer's own study focusses upon the adaptive behaviour of individuals and groups who make use of their religious tradition in their strategies of modernization. He thus avoids the usual sterility of much of the ideal-typical method. His procedure places the individual strategies much more in the foreground and hence one would expect his method to be more capable of generating a theory of change.

But although his method is much more 'individualistic', I find the absence of a psycho-dynamic dimension rather strange. Singer's method recalls the classic 'Culture and Personality' methods of Kardiner, Linton, and Dubois. As is well known, this approach seeks to interpret social behaviour as a response to

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the frustrations and anxieties created in the individual by what Kardiner calls the 'primary institutions'. The individual's cultural beliefs and ritual action is seen as a projection system which allows him to cope with the frustrations induced by the primary institutions. The essence of the approach is to interpret social behaviour in psycho-dynamic terms. While the application of such a psycho-dynamic analysis to a complex society may involve much more sophistication and refinement yet, in principle, I believe that such a psychological context is necessary, especially for a study such as that of Singer, which aims at the level of individual concrete behaviour and indeed there are a few places in his work where one misses the psycho-dynamic perspective. In his highly interesting account of the rise and popularity of bhajana cults especially of the Radha-Krishna bhajana in Madras City, Singer records two significant facts :

(1) that the bhajana movements are essentially the response of Smārta Brahmans. For instance, Singer notes that more than 55 per cent of the contributors and participants in these bhajanas are Smārta Brahmans living in Mylapore. As Singer himself notes, the popularity of such emotional displays among Smarta Brahmans who are in general followers of Advaita Vedanta is perplexing.

(2) Furthermore, in these emotion-charged bhajans, the male devotees identify themselves with love-lorn Gopis and although women are present at the meetings, they have no part to play; here again, the fact that Tamil Brahmans who generally are rather inhibited and repressed should identify themselves with Gopis and give vent to stylized erotic feelings, thoughts and sentiments is rather significant. But lacking a depth psychological analysis, Singer contents himself with merely the participants' own remark that in relation to the Lord all souls are feminine. But this does not even begin to explain the extreme passivity of the actual women present at these meetings. In such contexts, one needs a psychological perspective which would attempt to relate the ritual practices and beliefs to the psychic frustrations and ambivalences of the individuals concerned. Lacking such a psycho-dynamic theory, Singer's account appears over intellectualised and formal; for instance, he emphasizes the spread of the Radha-Krishna bhajans as a sign of innovative response. He looks upon the

cult as the means by which the Brahman community seeks to integrate itself against the rise of anti and non-Brahmins movements and more positively as a ritualized means of expressing equalitarian sentiments. While such conscious purposes may have a role to play in the final account, they cannot be regarded as the exclusive motivations for the simple reason that, as Singer himself notes, the euphoria induced by such bhajans is very short-lived; the feeling of fellowship hardly outlives the ritual itself. Furthermore, even within the bhajana itself the expression of such feelings takes the very artificial form of rolling on the floor and taking each other's dust. This suggests that there is a strong element of ritualization involved and I suggest that the exhibition of such tender feelings is more a ritualization of guilt feelings than a genuine upsurge of democratic sentiments. Living as they do in a sophisticated realistic context, exposed as they have been to a type of liberal education, is it too much to postulate that the Brahman participants would have begun to feel uneasy about their own exclusiveness and claims of ritual purity and that these rituals of tenderness and love therefore act as safety valves against such latent guilt feelings ? Max Gluckman has introduced the concept of ritualization of protest by which divisive and hostile feelings are ritualized and thereby contained. I suggest similarly that we may use the concept of ritualization of social guilt. Another indication of the overly formalistic nature of Singer's psychology is revealed in his discussion of industrial leadership in the city. In his critical examination of Weber's thesis, Singer reports that the Brahman industrial elite of the city expressed no sort of conflict between their traditional religious sentiments and their modern life-patterns. No doubt, Singer's critique of Weber is important and effective, but it is surprising that a conscious denial of conflict should be taken as conclusive proof of its absence, especially in the light of some of Singer's own findings. For instance, he reports that the new industrial elite are staunch devotees of the Sankarācāryas of Kanchi and Sringeri and also records how these gurus have given them repeated re-assurance that they are true Hindus in spirit, even if not in daily ritual observance. Singer also explains how the new industrial elite compartmentalize their home and work-worlds so that they could preserve their dual identities. Singer regards such compartmentalization as an

innovative response, but the psychological overtones of living under double standards escape him. Here again the frustrations and ambivalences created by the cultural institutions, the projections and fantasies of such divided psyches need to be integrated into one's final picture of the modernization of a great tradition. At a more abstract theoretical level too, this neglect of the psychological context makes its presence felt. Following Redfield, Singer is concerned with the way in which an urban city functions as an adaptive center in which the cultural tradition is adjusted to the strains and stresses of modernization. Singer's study of the social and cultural organization of the bhajans cult as well as his study of the strategies adopted by the new industrial elite is an attempt to show how a great tradition gets modernized; this adaptive function of the city, Redfield calls the homogenetic function but besides this there is also the stressful, traumatic role of the city which is responsible for the rise of new patterns of behaviour—the heterogenetic function, as Redfield calls it. In Singer's study of modernization in Madras, only the first, the adaptive role, gets emphasized. Partly this may be due to the fact that Singer is concerned with a highly educated and accomplished group of Brahman leaders; on such individuals, the city is not likely to have a traumatic effect but if one were to consider for instance, a group of immigrant tribals in the city, one would be forced to deal more emphatically with the heterogenetic and conflict generating impact of the city.

The neglect of the psychological dimension makes its presence felt in various places and unfortunately makes his portrait of the modernizing process unrealistic. for above all, modernization is something that starts in the minds of men.

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#### NOTES

1. Milton Singer : When a Great Tradition Modernizes. p, 173.

## NEWS

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is very happy to record the Institution of a chair in Jaina Logic, Philosophy and Culture in the University Department of Philosophy, University of Poona. A formal function of presenting a generous donation of Rs. 5 lakhs towards the endowment of a chair took place on 17th July, 1976 at Poona. Eminent Jaina Philanthropists like—Shri Lalchandji Hirachandji of the Walchand Group of Industries, Shri Ratilalbhai Nanavati of the Nanavati Trust, Shri Navalmalji Firodia of the Firodia Trust, Poona, and Shri Bhagwan Mahavira Nirvana Mahotsava Samiti Pune and Jaina Sangh Mandira Pune contributed towards the munificent donation which was accepted on behalf of the University by Professor D. A. Dabholkar the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona. Eminent Scholars and patrons of Jaina studies emphasised importance of such a chair and also suggested possible lines of study and research in the field.

Although, India has a rich treasure of literature and philosophy both in Sanskrit, Pali and Ardhamagadhi, we are gradually being deprived of this rich heritage; alienation is gradually increasing. For example, Nyaya literature is gradually becoming ununderstandable as the tradition of Nyaya learning is being broken. The same is the case with Jaina treatises in Logic and Metaphysics. If this process continues, we might be required to go for learning the Jaina texts, particularly when they are technical, to places like Harvard and Berlin. We might ourselves become foreigners to our heritage. If this is to be stopped one of the ways is to establish a Jaina Chair in some University, where studies of Jaina Philosophy would be carried out and modern thought would be made richer on account of its integration with Jaina learning and core.

The Chair will be named as “Seth Hirachand Nemchand Chair in Jaina—Logic, Philosophy and Culture.” It is proposed to institute a Professorship and two Research Fellowships initially under this scheme. The Professor will be incharge of the Research in the areas of Jaina Logic, Epistemology and metaphysics as well as social and cultural thought. The Research projects would be in

the form of a philosophical analysis of fundamental problems of Jaina Thought as well as translations and commentaries on selected texts. There is also a proposal for periodical lectures by eminent scholars and thinkers. Seminars and symposia also would be provided for.

It is hoped that such an endowment for a Chair in Jaina studies in a place where logical and analytical studies are being rigorously pursued would create an ideal research environment for the cultivation of Jaina tradition and also for bringing out the relevance of Jaina thought in modern times and problems. It is therefore gratifying to note that such a centre of Jaina logic, philosophy and culture is being instituted in the University of Poona. The proposed chair would have all the support and sympathy and good-wishes of patrons of philosophical studies in India.

—Editor

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## ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is proposing to devote a special number of the Journal to Aesthetics. Articles and studies dealing with philosophy of art and literature are invited.

—Editor

## INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Indian Philosophical Quarterly feels privileged who gratefully acknowledged the generous help of its patrons and well-wishers who have encouraged our efforts by means of their valuable Life-Subscriptions. We are also grateful to the various Institutions of High Learning and University Departments of Philosophy which have given us their patronage by way of Institutional Membership. We publish here-under list of our Institutional and Individual Life-Members.

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## GILBERT RYLE

It is with a profound sense of sorrow and loss that we have to record the passing away of Professor Gilbert Ryle on the 6th October, 1976. With his death, a memorable land mark in recent philosophy has vanished. Although Professor Ryle had not been to India, his works have been a rich source of ferment and fruitful controversy in recent philosophical thinking in India. Both directly and indirectly his thought especially his book "The Concept Of Mind", and the essays "Systematically Misleading Expressions" and "Categories" have stimulated some radical rethinking in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. These works have introduced elements of novelty and provocation and have evoked a serious concern with philosophical issues in recent Indian discussions, such that it may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that Professor Ryle has been a vital presence in much of the recent discussions of philosophy of mind in India. But apart from his philosophy of mind, his contributions to platonic studies have also had their own share of impact and have made possible a new philosophical interest in Plato's later dialogues in India.

Born in 1900, Professor Gilbert Ryle was until recently Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford. He had taught at Christ Church and Magdalen Colleges, Oxford, and in 1947, he became the Editor of *Mind* after the retirement of Professor G. E. Moore.

Transcending the manifold dissent and disagreements his thought has provoked, his writings have served as a model of sophisticated elegance and have set a new standard in philosophical prose. Above all, he has given us a new awareness of the manifold conceptual complexities of our language of the mind and has thus stimulated new kinds of philosophic inquiry in philosophy of mind. On behalf of the community of Indian Philosophers, the Indian Philosophical Quarterly records its grateful tribute to the memory of Professor Gilbert Ryle.

EDITORS



NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF NUMBERS  
(SANKHYĀ)

Numbers according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are not subjective fictions but objective realities. Just as entities are seen to be in possession of different kinds of qualities like colours, tastes, they do possess numbers as their qualities (*guṇāḥ*). When we perceive a certain object as red, corresponding to our perception of red, there is red colour in the object. Similarly when we count realities belonging to different categories as one, two, three, such numbers exist in them. Replying to the objection that “Oneness” (Number one) is not a separate reality but only a specific form of the object, Śrīdhara observes that in that case the use of two words viz. “one” and “Jar” will become superfluous since they refer to the same object.<sup>1</sup> Uddyotakara argues that we have cognitions of “one” and “many” and they must have causes just as we have colours in the objects for our cognition of colours. Our cognition of “one” and “many” are different from our cognition of a jar. Hence they must have causes other than the jar and the causes for our cognition of “one” and “many” is the quality “number”<sup>2</sup>. Numbers are the qualities inhering in the substances and they are the basis for our usages “one” and the rest.

The followers of the old Vaiśeṣika school held that number as a quality belongs to and inheres in substances only.<sup>3</sup> But then they have to explain such usage that “this picture is painted with four red colours” wherein number belongs to qualities which suggests that number four as a property of four red colours should inhere in the red colours (qualities). The followers of the old Vaiśeṣika school, however, maintain that this usage should not be interpreted to mean that number (four) inheres in qualities (red colours) for it contradicts the Vaiśeṣika dictum that a quality cannot inhere in qualities.<sup>4</sup> They contend that when one says that “this picture is painted with four red colours” it has to be understood that the substance painting (picture)

constitutes the substratum for both the number four and the red colours to inhere in and thus adhere to the rule that "a quality cannot inhere in a quality." Raghunātha does not accept this view. According to him when one says that "this picture is painted with four red colours", our awareness here is that number four belongs to the quality (red colours) and not to the substance picture. Hence, he contends, that it is reasonable that we link number four to the quality red colour as such. He observes that number four resides directly in the quality red colour by inherence (samavāya).<sup>5</sup> Raghunātha, however, respects the old Vaiśeṣika view that "one quality cannot inhere in another quality" by accepting number as a distinct category.<sup>6</sup>

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, first we have to distinguish between the eternal and the non-eternal numbers and second among the latter between (1) those that are produced by the respective numbers of their cause and (2) those that are produced by the enumerative cognition (apekṣābuddhi). Number oneness (ekatva) is eternal in eternal entities such as souls, minds etc. and non-eternal in products such as cloths, pots and the like. Oneness of an entity such as a cloth is produced by oneness of its inherent cause viz. yarn. Kaṇāda holds the view that the quality of the cause-substance produces the corresponding quality of the effect substance.<sup>7</sup> The colour of the cause substance, yarn, produces the colour of the effect substance, cloth. Similarly the quality oneness of the effect substance viz. cloth must be held to be produced by the oneness of its inherent cause viz. yarn. But all numbers from duality (dvitva) onwards are produced by our enumerative cognition. It is the contention of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that numbers from duality onwards do not exist in objects always. When we, for instance, say that a cloth is red, here we perceive the red colour of the cloth produced by the red colour of its cause (yarn). Similarly when we claim to perceive the quality oneness in the cloth we perceive a quality originated by the corresponding quality of its cause viz. yarn. In both these cases we perceive qualities that had already been ex-

isting in the objects. But when we perceive two objects e.g. two jars as two, here our perception of the quality duality is not one of perceiving a reality which had already been there, but it is a case of perceiving a reality which is produced in the two jars for the time being by our enumerative cognition.

This however, should not lead us to think that numbers from duality onwards are not as much objective as number one or other qualities. They are equally objective and independent of our cognition, but there is this difference — whereas number one in a product is produced by a similar number of its cause, numbers from duality onwards are produced by our enumerative cognition. Hence the duration of the former is likely to be longer (existing as long as its substratum exists) whereas the duration of the latter is relatively shorter. But whether they last longer or disappear after a few moments, there are ontological correlates corresponding to our notion of all numbers.

We have indicated above that numbers from duality onwards are produced by our enumerative cognition. Let us ponder over the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of emergence of numbers from duality onwards. We should not however confound the processes involved in the origination of numbers from duality onwards and our perception of them. The number duality, for instance, originates in the two jars in the very moment when the enumerative cognition operates as "this is one" and "this is one". But our perception of duality does not take place immediately.

When we perceive any two objects (jars), we do not cognise them immediately as two. We first perceive each jar as "this is one", "this is one". This is called enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*). This enumerative cognition gives rise to the quality, duality in the jars in the second moment. The duality which has originated thus, is not perceived at once. In the third moment after the emergence of duality, we perceive the universality of duality (*dvitva*) for in the absence of our perception of the universality of duality we cannot account for our determinate

perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) of duality. In the fourth moment we perceive the quality duality inhering in the two jars. This is how the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika explains the origination and our perception of all numbers from duality onwards.

Several issues crop up at this stage. *First*, when duality originates, where does it 'reside'? Does it 'reside' in each of the two objects? If it 'resides' in each of the two severally then we must be able to say 'two' when we perceive even one of them which is absurd. *Second*, after the destruction of one of the two objects we must be able to say "two" when we perceive the remaining one alone. *Third*, duality produced by the apekṣābuddhi of one man (Mr X) must be perceptible for another or for any other person (Mr Y) who looks at them without themselves producing it again. In other words, Mr Y must be able to perceive the already existing duality produced by the apekṣābuddhi of Mr X without himself producing it by his own apekṣābuddhi again and for that reason any one who looks at those two objects must perceive them as two immediately for it is a case of simply perceiving what exists already. The followers of Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika were alive to these problems. Realising these anomalies the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers contended that on account of the absence of the ususage that "one is two" and because of the usage that "one is not two", duality is supposed to reside in both objects taken as a group by the relation called "collective extensity" (par-yāpti).<sup>8</sup> Paryāpti is a relation by which numbers from duality onwards reside in the objects taken together and not in its members.

The assumption of paryāpti as a relation by means of which numbers reside in groups of objects and not in any member of the group steers clear of all our doubts. First in as much as number two (duality) resides in the two objects taken as a group and not in any of the members of the group of two objects, we are free from the apprehension that we may have to say in respect of one of the two objects as "two". The second anomaly that we must be able

to see duality even in one of them after the destruction of the other, also vanishes on the assumption that duality resides in the two objects taken as a group. The answer to the third objection requires the discussion of the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of origination and destruction of the numbers from duality onwards. As we have stated already first our enumerative cognition in the form "this is one" and "this is one" comes into operation. Second this results in the emergence of the duality in the two objects. Third we perceive the universality of duality. Fourth we perceive duality as such. But this duality will not continue to be present in the jars for long for being a product of enumerative cognition, it gets destroyed after the destruction of the enumerative cognition. The Naiyāyikas hold the view that this enumerative cognition being a transient psychical phenomenon gets destroyed in the fourth moment and with its destruction its product duality also gets destroyed in the fifth moment. Thus duality will not be present in the two objects (jars) after the fifth moment. However the person may continue to possess the knowledge (jñāna) of the objects as two even after the destruction of duality and knowledge of duality should not be confounded with our perception of duality. Thus if we understand the implications involved in the production and our cognition of duality, the anomaly that one man must be able to perceive the duality produced by the enumerative cognition of another does not simply arise.

S. V. University  
Tirupati.

C. Ramaiah

#### NOTES

1. Nyāya-Kandali, p. 62.
2. Nyāya-Vārttika, p. 210.
3. Praśastapāda bhāṣya, p. 111.
4. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.1.16.
5. Padārthatattvanirūpanam, p. 86.
6. Ibid.
7. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.1.19, 1.1.10, 2.1.24.
8. Muktavāsi on Kārikā, 108.

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## PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA (An Examination)

The controversy over the truth (prāmñāya) of knowledge in Indian Philosophy is well known. The main participants in this controversy (whom I have considered here) are the Mīmāmsā and the Nyāya schools of thought. The whole discussion centres round two questions: (1) what are the conditions generating truth? and (2) how is the truth of a knowledge known? For the Mīmāmsā, both the generation and knowledge of truth are intrinsic (svataḥ), while for the Nyāya, both are extrinsic (parataḥ). So far as falsity is concerned there is no disagreement between the two. Both agree that both the generation and knowledge of falsity are extrinsic. I do not propose to re-state here the arguments and counter arguments of the rival schools in defence of their own views, for such an exercise would be fruitless. I intend to analyse the positions of the contending schools and attempt a re-evaluation of their doctrines. I propose to consider in this regard the following questions: (i) What is the nature of knowledge? (ii) Is the classification of knowledge into true and false legitimate? (iii) Is the question about the generation of truth meaningful? (iv) Can the knowledge of truth be intrinsic? and (v) Are the two theories of truth totally defective, or there is some element of truth in both which may be combined to formulate a more defensible position?

### I

We may begin with the consideration of the Mīmāmsā theory of intrinsic truth of knowledge (svataḥ prāmānyavāda). True knowledge is defined by the Mīmāmsā as that which has for its content something which is not already known (anadhigata) and is not sublated (abādhita). Thus truth of a knowledge consists in 'newness' and 'unsublatedness' of its content. Truth thus defined is, according to the Mīmāmsā, intrinsic, i.e. it is generated by the conditions generating knowledge without requiring any additional con-

dition, and it is also known along with the knowledge to which it belongs, without requiring another knowledge. I would consider first the latter part of the theory concerning the knowledge of truth. It is held that a knowledge arises along with the knowledge of its own truth. Now, if 'newness' and 'unsublatedness' of content are the criteria of truth, how can its knowledge arise along with knowledge? Obviously the knowledge of truth would depend upon another knowledge with reference to which the 'newness' and 'unsublatedness' of the content of a knowledge would have to be determined. Hence, if the above characteristics are regarded as the criteria of truth, there arises an incompatibility between the Mīmāṃsā definition of true knowledge and the theory of intrinsic truth of knowledge advocated by it. The criteria would in fact support the rival theory of extrinsic truth of knowledge.

To save its theory the Mīmāṃsā maintains that knowledge is true by nature. Truth of knowledge is nothing but its character as knowledge (*jñānatva*). To be knowledge is to be true knowledge, and *vice versa*. This would mean that false knowledge is a contradiction in terms; it is not knowledge at all, though it masquerades as knowledge. Thus the knowledge of truth would be intrinsic, for if I have knowledge and I know it, I also know that it is true.

The above view of knowledge also accords with our usage of the words 'know' and 'knowledge'. These words are never used to refer to false beliefs. For instance, one cannot assert without absurdity that 'I know that it is raining outside, but it is false'. If I am mistaken about something, I cannot be said to have knowledge about it, although I might have thought or said so. Thus knowledge is intrinsically true, for truth is its essential nature. If I know that I have knowledge, I also know necessarily that it is true. Knowledge is never proved false; but the character of what is not knowledge, and yet poses as knowledge, becomes exposed.

If the Mīmāṃsā accepts the above view of knowledge, then it must reject the classification of knowledge into true

(pramā) and false (apramā). But the Mīmāmsakas (except the Prābhākaras) accept such a classification and consider both truth and falsity of knowledge under the theory of truth (prāmāṇyavāda). Besides, the Mīmāmsakas use the term 'true' in two different senses. The first when they say that all cognitions as cognition are 'true' and the second when they say that some cognitions are 'true' and some false. In the first sense even error is 'true', while in the second sense it is not. These anomalies can be removed if error is excluded from the category of knowledge.

Thus the theory of Intrinsic truth of knowledge would have to maintain that all beliefs appear to be knowledge in the beginning, though some of them are false from their very inception and are, therefore, not knowledge at all, and their falsity is known later on when they are put to practical test. So far as the knowledge of truth is concerned the theory would insist that knowledge is intrinsically true and is always known in its essential nature. There is no criterion of truth, though there is one of falsity. No criterion can prove truth, but it can prove the falsity of what was taken to be knowledge and was not knowledge at all. Thus 'newness' and 'unsublatedness' of content are not the criteria of truth, but the nature of truth; they, however, function as the criteria of falsity when some belief is found lacking in one or the other of these two features. It is however important to ask whether knowledge is known to be true (or known as knowledge) without any reference to other knowledge which confirms or justifies it. I shall return to this question in a subsequent section.

## II

The traditional opponent of the theory discussed above is the Nyāya which advocates the theory of extrinsic truth of knowledge. Knowledge, according to this school, is of two kinds: true (pramā) and false (apramā). True knowledge is defined as that which has as its feature what is also the feature of the object (tadvati tatprakāraka). In other words, truth is correspondence with reality. In the case of false knowledge this correspondence is lacking, at least in

part. Truth thus defined is, according to the Nyāya, extrinsic, that is, both the generation and knowledge of truth depend upon external factors. The generation of truth depends upon an additional excellence (guṇa) associated with the normal conditions of knowledge. Similarly, the knowledge of truth arises when our knowledge is confirmed either by some other knowledge or by fruitful activity. It is clear that the Nyāya distinguishes between the conditions of knowledge and conditions of truth and falsity. If the former alone is said to generate truth, there would be no false knowledge. Hence it is necessary to admit that generation of truth involves an additional factor. However, this does not mean that, according to the Nyāya, knowledge, when it is born, is neither true nor false. It is from its inception either true or false. But whichever of the two (truth or falsity) be the feature of knowledge, its generation involves a factor (excellence or defect) in addition to the normal conditions of knowledge. I shall consider the merits of this view in the next section.

As regards the knowledge of truth the Nyāya maintains that it is extrinsic, otherwise there would be no place for doubt about any knowledge. Does it mean that truth of a knowledge, with regard to which there is no doubt, is known intrinsically? The Nyāya does admit some species of knowledge in the case of which there is no doubt, such as inferential, introspective and familiar knowledges, and knowledge of fruitfulness of activity. If the truth of these is admitted to be known intrinsically, there would be no logical ground for denying the same in the case of other knowledges which are free from doubt. And if their truth is also said to be known extrinsically, there would be an infinite regress. The Nyāya position in this regard is that the truth of inferential knowledge etc. is known intrinsically. However if there is any doubt regarding their truth, then it has to be ascertained with reference to some other knowledge. But the question is, can the Nyāya consistently regard the truth of any knowledge as known intrinsically? It is true that knowledge of fruitfulness of activity, inferential

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knowledge, etc. are accompanied by certainty, but so are other forms of knowledges also, even error is not an exception to it. Then why not regard the truth of all certain knowledges as known intrinsically? In fact, for the Nyāya, truth of no knowledge can be intrinsically known. The question here is not about certainty, or absence of doubt, but about the truth as defined by the Nyāya. Although inferential knowledge etc. are accompanied by certainty, their truth is known only extrinsically. 'Being certain' must be distinguished from 'knowing truth'. Only such a position would be consistent with the Nyāya doctrine.

### III

The dispute between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā concerning the knowledge of truth is quite intelligible, but the dispute regarding the generation of truth passes comprehension. The question is, can we talk meaningfully of the conditions of truth as we do talk of the conditions of true knowledge? Truth is the common feature of all true knowledges. It has to be admitted by both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā as a universal (sāmānya) which, in their view, is eternal. It is not a temporal event as true knowledge is. Hence the dispute between them over the generation of truth is not only meaningless but also inconsistent with their positions. The Mīmāṃsā admits that truth is not generated separately from knowledge. But it should consistently maintain that truth is never generated at all and this is why it is intrinsic to knowledge. A self-consistent theory of intrinsic truth of knowledge would refuse to entertain the question of generation of truth altogether. Even for the Nyāya truth cannot be generated, as it cannot be any thing else but universal. It cannot be a quality of knowledge as knowledge itself, in the Nyāya view, is a quality of the soul and there can be no inherence of quality in a quality. Besides, quality, according to the Nyāya, is a particular feature of a substance, while truth, as defined by it, is a universal feature. Hence the dispute between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā over the conditions generating truth has no significance.

However, if the dispute is understood to pertain to the conditions generating true knowledge, it becomes quite meaningful and points to a deeper difference between the two contending schools. For the Nyāya, knowledge is of two kinds: true and false. Hence it is necessary for it to admit positive conditions, in addition to the normal conditions of knowledge, that make a knowledge true or false. But for the Mīmāṃsā, knowledge, by nature, is true, and false knowledge is not knowledge at all, though, somewhat inconsistently, it distinguishes between true and false knowledge. If knowledge is by nature true, there is no necessity of admitting a condition, in addition to the normal conditions of knowledge, that makes it true. But so-called false knowledge which, in fact, is a pseudo-knowledge, does necessitate the admission of an extrinsic factor, viz. a defect (*doṣa*), which by its association with the normal conditions of knowledge vitiates them and generates what is called 'false knowledge'. Thus the dispute over the conditions generating true knowledge points to a fundamental difference between the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā concerning the nature of knowledge.

#### IV

The question about the knowledge of truth is more important from the point of view of epistemology. According to the Nyāya truth of a knowledge is known extrinsically, i.e. on being confirmed by a subsequent knowledge or on the basis of fruitful activity to which the knowledge leads. Two main objections are raised against this view. (1) If truth of a knowledge is known by another knowledge, or by the knowledge of fruitfulness of activity, there would be infinite regress. And (2) if truth of a knowledge is not known intrinsically, it would fail to inspire unwavering activity. Fruitfulness of activity, it is contended, cannot give us the knowledge of truth, for the very possibility of motivated activity depends upon such knowledge.

Clearly there are two assumptions underlying the above objections. (1) That no knowledge can give us certainty about its object unless its truth is known. It is on this

assumption that the charge of infinite regress is made against the Nyāya theory. And (2) that a knowledge can give rise to unwavering activity only when its truth is known. The Nyāya rejects both these assumptions as unfounded. A knowledge does give us certainty about its object even when its truth is not known. Also for unwavering activity knowledge of truth is not necessary; absence of the knowledge of falsity is sufficient. Later on if there is doubt concerning a knowledge, ascertainment of its truth becomes necessary, otherwise not.

The Nyāya raises two main objections against the theory of intrinsic truth. First, if the truth of a knowledge is known intrinsically, i.e. along with the knowledge, then it cannot be proved false subsequently. This objection seems to be very sound. It would be absurd to say that "I knew that 'p' was true, but it was false". I should instead say that "I believed or thought that 'p' was true, but it was false. My belief can be false, not my knowledge." But if the Nyāya accepts this position, it implicitly admits that knowledge is true by nature, though its truth is known through another knowledge. Consequently, the distinction of true and false knowledge would have to be abandoned. As a matter of fact the term 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) is used by the Nyāya in a very loose sense; it is used in the sense of 'belief'. In its strict sense it can only mean 'true knowledge'. However, there is no radical difference between knowledge and belief. When a belief is proved true, it is recognised as knowledge or 'true knowledge'. Even if the Nyāya accepts the strict sense of the term 'knowledge', it need not abandon its theory of extrinsic knowledge of truth. For there is no inconsistency in holding that though a knowledge is true by nature, its truth is known subsequently when it is justified by another knowledge.

The second objection of the Nyāya against the theory of intrinsic truth is that mind cannot know the truth of a knowledge by itself, for it is incapable of knowing external facts independently. Mind can apprehend knowledge, but it cannot know latter's truth or falsity by itself, for it can-

not know whether the latter corresponds to facts or not without the help of another knowledge. But this objection would be invalid against the view which holds that knowledge is true by nature. If mind apprehends knowledge (as knowledge) it necessarily apprehends latter's truth also. But the important question is: can the mind know introspectively that a particular state of it is a case of knowledge? It seems that the question cannot be answered in the affirmative. Some states of mind, such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, belief, repentance etc., can be known introspectively, not knowledge. If I claim to have knowledge of something and I am challenged, I cannot know by introspection that I have knowledge. I will have to find evidence for it. It follows that even though knowledge is true by nature, its truth cannot be known without reference to some other knowledge which justifies it. This is the nature of all empirical knowledge. The charge of infinite regress levelled against this view is not serious. There need not be an endless series of justifications. The justifying knowledge may be taken as relatively basic and posited as true for the time being. This however is only provisional and open to revision. So far as certainty about the object or unwavering activity generated by a belief is concerned, knowledge of truth, as shown by the Nyāya, is not necessary. It is enough if the belief is not known to be false.

## V

The conclusions reached by our investigation may now be summarised as follows: (1) knowledge is by nature true; it cannot be distinguished into true and false. Its truth is intrinsic in this sense. (2) The dispute between the Nyāya and the Mīmāmsā over the conditions generating truth is without significance. However, the question about the conditions generating knowledge, or true knowledge, is intelligible and important. And (3) truth of a knowledge is always known extrinsically, i.e. by reference to some other knowledge which justifies it, though it is intrinsic to knowledge in the sense that it constitutes the very nature of knowledge.

While considering the theory of extrinsic truth of knowledge I had remarked that the Nyāya uses the term knowledge (jñāna) in a loose sense and the proper term for it would be 'belief' (buddhi), for belief can be false while knowledge cannot. I had also indicated that it was necessary to distinguish between knowledge and certainty. It would be worthwhile attempting here a brief analysis of the natures and mutual relationships of the three — knowledge, certainty and belief — for it would help in clarifying my position on the problem under consideration.

It has been held above that truth is an essential feature of knowledge. But this by itself does not reveal the nature of knowledge completely. In addition to truth certainty or definiteness is also an essential feature of knowledge. It would be absurd to assert, for instance, 'I know it is raining outside, but I am not certain.' However there is an important difference between 'knowing' and 'being certain'. I may be mistaken about something even though I am certain about it, but not so if I know about it. Thus 'knowing' entails 'certainty', but not *vice versa*.

However, it is possible that even when my belief is true and certain, it is not a case of knowledge. I may draw a true conclusion by invalid means from false premises, or believe a truth on the strength of a dream. In such cases as these I do not really know the things I believe, although what I believe is true. Hence, knowledge involves something more than truth and certainty; it involves justification, i.e. there must be sufficient evidence in its favour. Thus there are three essential features of knowledge: truth, certainty and justifiedness.

Let us now consider the nature of belief. If I believe that 'p', where 'p' stands for any proposition, two things seem to be necessary. (1) I must be prepared to say 'yes' to the question 'p?'; and (2) I must have some evidence for 'p'. If the evidence is relevant my belief would be rational, otherwise irrational. If there is total absence of evidence, it would not be a belief. For a belief evidence is essential, although what is taken to be evidence may not actually be evidence at all.

When there is definite and conclusive evidence for a belief, it is accepted as knowledge. Thus knowledge is not radically different from belief; it is the limiting case of the latter. When for a true belief there is sufficient justification, it is called knowledge. About one and the same thing we might first have belief and then knowledge. Normally this is the order; we begin with belief and later, usually if not always, arrive at knowledge. When belief is justified, it becomes knowledge.

Now, how are we to decide between belief and knowledge? Two-fold tests seem to be essential. The first is concerned with what is believed or known. If 'p', which is believed or known, is proved false, it is belief. But if it is proved true, we cannot decide by this test whether it is belief or knowledge. A second test would be required, which is related to the person having belief or knowledge. If I am certain about 'p' on conclusive evidence, it is knowledge, otherwise it is belief. I may have a true belief on wrong or inconclusive evidence. It would qualify for knowledge only if evidence in its favour is right and conclusive.

If the above account of belief and knowledge is correct, then the position I have held regarding the problem of truth (*pramāṇya*) becomes justified. I have held that knowledge, though true by nature, does not come into being declaring its truth. In other words, knowledge does not certify itself as knowledge. There is a difference between knowing something and knowing that we know it. I can know that something is the case without knowing that I know it. Nevertheless, knowledge is invariably born with certainty about its truth. But such certainty may also accompany a belief. It is for this reason that all beliefs, true or false, generate unshaking activity as knowledge does. The *Mīmāṃsā* assumes the certainty of truth to be the knowledge of truth. But if the two are not distinguished, it would have to be admitted that knowledge can be false, which, as we have seen, is logically impossible. It is also opposed to the basic tenet of the *Mīmāṃsā* that knowledge is by nature true. The only way out is to admit that truth of a knowledge is known

extrinsically. The Mīmāṃsā, however, would not admit this, because, if it does so, the validity of scriptural knowledge (śruti) would be endangered, as its truth would not be established independently and absolutely. Thus at the root of the insistence on the intrinsic knowledge of truth lies the resolution to safeguard the validity of scriptural statements. The Nyāya, on the other hand, rightly maintains that knowledge of truth is extrinsic, but it fails to distinguish between knowledge and belief. If it recognises this distinction (which recognition would not give rise to any inconsistency in its theory), its doctrine of extrinsic truth of knowledge would be more logical and can claim greater acceptability.

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### COMPTES-RENDUS — BOOK REVIEWS

## ON REMEMBERING

"There is a sense in which we can remember *p* when we have known *p* before".<sup>1</sup>

"When I remember that I wrote the last page just now, this does not involve that I shall have known *p* before".<sup>2</sup>

"To know *p*" is different from "to know that I wrote *p*"; and "remembering *p*" is different from "remembering that I wrote *p*". According to Moore, remembering *p* involves knowing *p*; but remembering that I wrote *p* does not presuppose that I *know* that I wrote the last page.

Moore, in his second assertion, remarks that to remember that I wrote the last page does not involve that I know that I wrote the last page. What he says is that there is a sense of remembering when the first condition, namely, to remember *p*, prior knowledge of *p* is required, is not satisfied.

What do I mean when I say that I know that I wrote the last page? Is it different from saying that I know *p*? My answer to these questions would be that when I say that I know that I wrote the last page, I know writing of that page to be true in the same sense in which I say "I know *p*". It is not different from saying that I know *p*. The only distinction we can think of between the two is that in the case of knowing of writing a page, knowing of *doing* is involved, whereas in the case of "I know *p*" knowing of *things* is involved. When I say that I know *p*, what I mean is that *this* is the case; but, to say that I know that I wrote the last page means I did something it involves doing whereas to say "I know *p*" involves no doing.

Remembering involves knowing; rather it must entail knowing. In the positive sense of the term, to say that I remember *p* entails that I have known *p* before. Negatively, it is not possible to say that I remember *p* unless I have known *p* before. But, Moore in his second assertion "to say that I remember that I wrote the last page just

now" says that no prior knowledge is involved. Let us reformulate his example in order to substantiate the claim that it is not possible to remember the writing of the last page without knowing the same before. Consider

- (a) I wrote something.
- (b) I know that I wrote something.
- (c) I remember that I wrote something.

Moore maintains that (c) entails (a) but not (b). But, can (b) be omitted? Or, does not (c) entail (b) also? My answer to these questions would be that (b) cannot be omitted and also that (c) must entail (b) as well. The evidence for the truth of these assertions comes from autobiographical statements like "I am thinking", "I am painting a landscape", and an infinite number of similar examples. Such autobiographical assertions must involve knowing. To say that I remember that I painted the landscape entails that I know that I did that. Similarly, to say that I remember that I wrote the last page must imply that I know that I wrote the last page.

To say something about one's own experience or behaviour is different from making assertions like "There is a chair in this room". To say that there is a chair in the room would not entail that I know that there is a chair in the room. But, to say that I know that there is a chair in the room entails that there is a chair in the room. Thus, there can be seen a distinction between the assertions about my own experience and behaviour and those which are about things outside us.

There is something more interesting which can be cited at this point. Consider the proposition "I remember my dream". The analysis of the concept of remembering requires us to say that the assertion "I remember my dream" entails the assertion that I know my dream. This, however, does not get support from common usage. We never say that I know my dream but we always make such assertions as "I remember my dream" or "I had a dream". This raises

a problem. Since to say that "I remember that I wrote the last page" entails that I know that I wrote the last page (which is an assertion about my own experience and behaviour); similarly to say "I remember my dream" must imply that I know that I had a dream, since this assertion that I remember my dream is also about my own experience. Is it the case that when I say that I remember my dream, I am not using "remembering" in the sense in which it involves knowing? Is it being used in the sense in which when I say "I remember my dream" means only that I had a dream? But, if I mean by "I remember my dream" that "I had a dream", then how is it that I can recall what I had dreamt without having known that I had dreamt? Thus, it should be that to say "I remember that I had a dream" would entail that I know that I had a dream.

We have said earlier that remembering does *entail* knowing. When I say that I know  $p$ , it implies that  $p$  is true. Similarly, when I say that I remember  $p$ , it also implies that  $p$  is true, because "remembering  $p$ " entails "knowing that  $p$ ". Briefly the position is this: To say "I remember  $p$ " entails "I know  $p$ ". To say "I know  $p$ " entails " $p$  is true". Therefore, to say "I remember  $p$ " entails " $p$  is true". The argument follows the law of transitivity; hence it is valid. Thus, the thesis "I remember  $p$ " entails "I know  $p$ ". So, to the question "Does 'I do not know  $p$ ' entail that 'I do not remember  $p$ '?" the answer is that "not knowing  $p$ " does entail "not remembering  $p$ ", and also "I know  $p$ " does not entail that "I remember  $p$ ".

From the above analysis of the concept of remembering, one is inclined to think that Moore's second assertion that "I remember that I wrote the last page" does not involve prior knowledge seems to go against the logic of the concept. One really wonders whether Moore was justified in making such an assertion.

NOTES

1. Moore, G. E., *The Common-Place Book 1919-1953* (Edited by Casimir Lewy). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962, p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 9.

BUDDHI-MANAS, DEHA & MOKṢA  
 (A note about a puzzle)

*I: Introduction*

Among the problems related to the central metaphysic of Hinduism is the following: if *buddhi* (man, as discriminator, judger, motivater, intender, &c.) is ontologically prior to *manas* (man, as thinker, reasoner, feeler, emoter, perceiver, imager, &c.), and *manas* is ontologically prior to *deha* (man, as physical body, whether enlivened by *prāṇa* or not being irrelevant here), why must the former — that is, what I will henceforth call “the *buddhi:manas complex*”, which, with the rest of the *antah-karana*, roughly amounts to what the West calls “the mind” — be re-incarnated, be associated once more, or even more than once, with *deha*, to achieve *mokṣa*?<sup>1</sup> Put simply, the puzzle is: how can it be that a higher level of being must continually be associated, and yet re-associated, with a lower level of being, to achieve that “level” which is so “high”, that it defies even this language of “levels”? And this perhaps perplexing puzzle is our quarry in this note.

Before beginning, I should perhaps say that I am speaking *within* Hinduism, and addressing a certain problem which arises at a certain stage in the development of its metaphysic. Accordingly, I am assuming the development to have reached that point, and am *only* addressing this puzzle *at* that point. Certainly, the ontological hierarchy from which the puzzle flows is not, at least to the Western mind, self-evident. But it remains the puzzle, within this context and with this established, that I am approaching, none other: and the ground upon which it stands, and out of which it has grown, is not presently my business.

*II: Elaboration: A First Kind of Being.*

The puzzle before us is of course an issue within philosophy about *karma*, and it is in this wider context I will take it. Accordingly, I intend to take much as granted by all students of *karma*-theory; and most notably, that the

fact of *karma* is beyond dispute. “*Karma*” is used in a number of ways, but here I refer to something very simple—namely, those hindering traces left in the *buddhi:manas* after doing at least most actions. “At least most”, for another much ignored puzzle within *karma*-theory is whether *all* deeds give rise to these traces. But this is another\* puzzle, for another time.

Now this marginal assumption asks very little, and would be questioned by very few; for few would see any fault in saying that most deeds affect us inwardly, in our “mind”, leaving remainder-traces which influence future doings of a similar kind, which, that is, *incline* us, sometimes almost compel us in certain directions. These *karmic*-traces are called “*vāsanās*”, and sometimes “*samskāras*”. I will in future refer to them as “*vāsanās*”.

So then, our initial assumption, one pretty well beyond dispute, is that we have a *buddhi:manas* crowded with *vāsanās* which *influence* or *incline* us in certain ways. Which ways? And here emerges another fact often ignored by *karma*-theorists: that *vāsanās* in fact incline us in one of two ways, and not one only. They incline us either away from *mokṣa*, or towards it. Nobody ignores the first kind, but many tend to overlook the second. *Vāsanās*, then, though maybe mostly, are not always “bad”, but sometimes “good”, for sometimes they lead us *aright*, towards *mokṣa* and not away from it. These, very simply, are the inclinations promoting *dharma*.

All the same, even these, the right-leading ones, must in the end be overcome. For *mokṣa* involves being conditioned by nothing, and hence an end — a total end — to *attachment* (*sanga*), the very heart and soul of inclinations. “Inclinations”, that is, are always *towards* something to which they endorse attachment. As it were, *vāsanās* are advocates who cannot help themselves but thrust us on attachment: they simply in their nature urge a “grasping after” upon us. They drive us on attachment, and hence, every one must be overcome. But still, whilst we are still searching, and not yet delivered, some inclinations are, in a relative way,

"good". For some do urge us to grasp in the right direction, towards *mokṣa*; and these, meanwhile,—whilst, that is, we are still searching and grasping—should be encouraged and developed. Anything serving a good purpose should be allowed to do so; or, simply put, good habits are ones we should foster—even should they be, as most certainly they will, "conditionings" (*upādhis*) which, like all "conditionings", must in the end be abandoned (<  $\sqrt{tyaj}$ ).

But not even this much can be said for bad-*karma*, *karma* involving *vāsanās* which incline us away from *mokṣa*. To these, there can only be one response—an effort to get rid of, or to change (into good-*karma* by, say, altering habits), or transcend. I don't suggest these terms are synonyms, but their differences need not worry us here. They are, for our purposes, simply three, inter-related terms for ways of doing the same thing—overcoming the workings and influence of bad-*karma*.

But how do we do this? Well, let us get clear about two things first of all. Firstly, if we have knowledge of the "that", "how" and "why" of these *vāsanās*, our *buddhi-manas* is then in a position, though maybe no more, to find out *how* to change, transcend, or rid ourselves of them. But secondly, if we haven't even this knowledge—knowledge that our inclinations are indeed *vāsanās*, so at least often wayward-leading—we are not then even in this very beginning position. And to look, now, at the plight of this deeply ignorant man, our first kind of being.

If someone doesn't even know his inclinations to be *vāsanās*, he will not know them as urgings, sometimes leading him to, and sometimes away from, things of lasting substance, so things more real than other things, which depend for their substance upon these lasting things. In this extreme ignorance, nothing could seem to him reason enough *not* to follow his inclinations, whatever, and take his pleasures, wherever they lead. Perhaps most are like this, or almost, these days, for these days most do appear to believe life should be led in pursuit, primarily, if not only, of physical and other fleeting things (especially "plea-

sure"). To such a person, one inclination is as worthy, or otherwise, as another; since, to him, all are *merely* inclinations, having no special weight, or lack of it. They all simply present themselves to him as equally leading, or not, to things real: so that, which he follows, and which not, will largely be a matter of how *strong* they are, or of how they relate to the *strongest* inclinations of all, to what he quite simply *wants* most of all.

The real world for him will accordingly be the world he is inclined to, the one he takes his pleasures in, or, simply, *wants*. Nothing else could determine realness for him, since, all inclinations being equal, the objects they incline him to will be seen as equal too; as equally worthy of quest, that is. In which case, since nothing distinguishes them as things to be *craved* and things to be *grasped*, nothing is likely to distinguish their ontological acceptability. They are, that is, pretty certain to be seen as *equally real*. "Pretty certain" only, because nothing *in logic* makes ontological acceptability follow in the wake of desirability. But the plain fact is—and most of this can be advanced only as plain fact—much in the ways of *psychology* links these two very closely. In the minds of men, what they find *desirable*, or a suitable object for attachment, will almost always also be what they believe to be *real*. Indeed, mostly the belief will be nothing articulate, nor anything arrived at, but something very deeply assumed. What we go after in following our inclinations will very rarely, if ever, be other than the stuff of realness for us. In fact, were we shown to be questing something unreal, most of us would stop. For most people don't like chasing chimeras; and certainly most, if not all, believe they are not doing so in following their inclinations.

So then, the real world of these, the first kind of being, will be the world of physical, and the world of mental things: at least this, and perhaps this only. If all his inclinations are of apiece, if all—or even most—are thought equally to lead him aright, nothing could be more real to him than the object of them, which will be at least things

physical and mental. It's possible, I suppose, that he might incline to things apart from these—like, say, things Spiritual; as, perhaps, do many confused people in the West who dabble with the same zest in "the Occult" as they do in sex, or the latest thought-movement. But if he does, they will have the same status as these: inclinations which are fostered or not simply in terms of how they interest him, of how much he simply happens to want what he thinks they're about. Their objects will be as real as physical and mental things: indeed, it's very doubtful that, to such a person, these inclinations which may seem to him different from physical and mental ones, do truly differ. Certainly many, and I suspect most, who in the West now dabble in "the Occult", clearly only get a different kind of physical or mental thing in doing this, and not something different altogether. They get, that is, only a new kind of physical sensation, or mind-content: they do not get something *beyond* these.

From this, then, an important conclusion follows: that, ignorant as this, our first being, is of the true nature of his inclinations (their nature as *vāsanās*), and taking reality to be their object, or what they lead him to, the only deeds possible for him will be those guided by them — *deha*, or physical-body deeds, and *buddhi:manas*, or mental doings. And I shall from here assume these the only kind, as they mostly will be; and certainly there will always be *at least* these, for at least inclinations of this kind must be had by a man who accepts all *humanly natural* ones as equal. Accordingly, he is, whatever else, always a victim to inclinations which attach him, when he follows them (as he will—some, at least), to the physical, assumed to be real and beneficial for its own sake. Just revelling in the physical, and being attached to it, will be its own reward: and certainly he will have no question about how real it is. This simply is his world, and so, will be where he lives. And if it is where he lives, it must be where he moves: and so, he must have a body. "*Deha*"-movement, in other words, is incumbent upon him for "being".

In other words, though *buddhi:manas* is ontologically prior to *deha*, this *buddhi:manas* doesn't know this; and no one can act, or motivate action, except within the bounds of what he knows, in the sense of what he *believes*. And since to him all inclinations are of apiece in leading him to realness, though differing perhaps in getting him what he wants, reality is as much physical, and hence his own reality as much bodily, as otherwise. Probably more so, indeed.

In which case — and with this we answer our question for this very ignorant man — the only movement or behaviour which, in his case, *could* lead to *mokṣa* would be behaviour, part at least of which was bodily; since, if he is even to continue *to be*, his behaviour must at least be this. So, for this kind of being, and regardless of any ontological hierarchy, approaching *mokṣa* involves *punarjanma*, or "again-birth", involves that is, re-incarnation of the trans-migrating *buddhi:manas* in question. And because, we can now further say, "All inclines to, or groans after *mokṣa*, no matter how dimly", is a cosmic truth or law,<sup>2</sup> *punarjanma* becomes not only needed for approaching *mokṣa*, but, in simple fact, a cosmic necessity. All beings like this, therefore, must, so will be born again in flesh.

We should, I suppose, note that this kind of being would be very rare, and perhaps not in fact occur at all. This case may be merely a logical limit to a spectrum of possibilities. And certainly, a person to whom all inclinations seem *really* of apiece, so that none, not a single one, was thought intrinsically more, or less, misleading than any other, does seem more than unlikely. And I suspect that, among real people, everyone has some form of hierarchy determining acceptability or not of his inclinations other than merely their brute strength. And if so, every real person is at least a little, though perhaps, in some cases, not very much (and perhaps less and less, these *Kali-Yuga* days), aware that his inclinations are *vāsanās*, that they can, of their *nature* and apart from his wants, lead him aright or awrong. But

still, people who go very close to this are common enough: and they must incur re-incarnation.

### III: A Second Kind of Being

But what if, beyond any doubt, a person, or a *buddhi:manas*, has the knowledge in question, what if he does know that his inclinations are *vāsanās*, and how and why they are? Well, firstly this knowledge will naturally be more or less according to his degree of enlightenment upon this matter. He will know this more or less clearly, and about more or less of them. But let us take the case of a man who has a high degree of such knowledge, who at least knows very clearly that most of his inclinations are wayward *vāsanās*. Everything said about him will apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to those of lesser degrees.

Such a *buddhi:manas* is enlightened in part already, even before *deha*-death; he bespeaks an approach to *jivan-mukti*. Being possessed of this knowledge, he will, to whatever degree, already understand — that is, before *deha*-death — the central message of the *Bhagavadgītā*: that, “approaching” *mokṣa* involves *niskāma karma*, involves behaviour detached from all desire for its fruits (*phala*). “Approaching” only from his less-than-fully-enlightened side; for *mokṣa* is not an object, state, or situation, or anything else which can be said to have boundaries, so nothing which, from its viewpoint, can be said to be “approached”.

To explain this a little, as follows. Since “approaching” *mokṣa* here on our earth involves being rid of the influence of unwanted *vāsanās*, it must also involve the detachment of *niskāma karma*, for only this rescues us, not only from producing more misleading *vāsanās* — by rescuing us from inclining to possessions other than *mokṣa*<sup>3</sup> — but also weakens the hold of those present ones which are in essence urges, hardened into habits, for such possessions. Bad *vāsanās* are none other than this: habitual urges to centre attention *away from mokṣa*, none other, in other words, than hard and fast *desires* for things, no matter what, which are not *mokṣa*. Hence, any person who

cherishes or craves after things for what they are in themselves, or for some reason other than that they lead to *mokṣa*, is one enslaved by *karma*. Accordingly, the only appropriate attitude is one of detachment, for all things, craved for their own sake, are mere slaves. And though in passing it is well to note a point too often overlooked—that sometimes it is possible to “desire” some end because it truly enhances *mokṣa*, or its possibility (e.g., silence, or self-knowledge)—the plain fact is, “things”, in the sense of “objects with boundaries”, are alike in being essentially dangerous to the quest, since, being finite, the only nature they have in themselves is “other-than” *mokṣa*, which, at the very least, is deliverance from all limits. Hence craving them for anything to do with what they are must lead a seeker wildly astray, and only delude.

And so, a person who knows his inclinations to be *vāsanās*, or that most of them are, who knows the how and the why of them, *eo ipso* understands that *mokṣa* must involve dissociation from all desire to possess, so must involve behaviour motivated by an attitude of detachment.

Now this is well understood by our second kind of being, less ignorant as he is of himself and wordly enchantments; and he will either be trying for *niskāma karma* in all behaviour, or not. If he is not, this cannot be from ignorance of what must be done, as it may be of the first being spoken of, so must be from laziness, weakness, or plain wickedness.

Now let us preclude wickedness, clearly the case of a being more deeply ensnared by *vāsanās* than he knows, so an advance on the first kind only in knowing that at least many of his inclinations are *vāsanās*, and that *mokṣa* lies in overcoming them. The only explanation for refusing to do what he can to overcome, and indeed doing some other conflicting thing, can be the hidden influence of *vāsanās* he doesn't know about. For the wicked man is a being who believes he can get some benefit by doing what he vaguely sees he should not do: and if he really shouldn't do it, this means it *leads away from mokṣa*, so away from the only

goal which could bring benefit of any real kind. This man doesn't know this, so is being misled by *vāsanās* he neither realizes he has, nor has mastery over — by inclinations he doesn't realize are *vāsanās*.

A lazy or weak man is of course more enlightened, since failing to overcome his *vāsanās* is no longer because he believes doing something else will bring him benefit. He is at least not so ignorant as that. Ignorant, however, he nonetheless is; at least, a little. Since once more, nothing can explain his malingering weakness or clutching lethargy other than that, despite his "best intentions" — which I am assuming he has, since if he did not, he would be closer still to the first kind — hidden *vāsanās* lead him astray by exerting a secret *Tāmasic*-influence.

For these beings, then—those who understand the need for *niskāma karma*, but don't always try for it—we can say as before: because they are prey to yet hidden *vāsanās*, as well as to unhidden ones they prove too lazy or weak to tackle, *punarjanma* in a form of flesh, in "a tunic of skin", to borrow a phrase from early Christendom, remains essential for *mokṣa*.<sup>4</sup>

#### IV: A Third Kind of Being

But let us go a step further and examine a third kind of being, a man still more enlightened to his own nature and that of the world (and especially how the latter leads to *vāsanās*). What if this partly enlightened *buddhi:manas* is in fact always trying to effect *niskāma karma* in everything he does? What then are we to say?

Firstly, it is very important to note that such a high level of constant trying is wildly rare, achieved indeed only by a very few saints, or nearly-saints; and that most of us, most of the time, will be one or the other of the two kinds already dealt with. Which means, for most of us, the question has been answered: that, for the reasons given, and despite ontological heirarchies, re-incarnation of the *buddhi:manas* is necessary for *mokṣa*.

But just the same, what of this rare case — is it of one for whom *punarjanma* is no longer needed? Two things must be said. Firstly, if *punarjanma* proves needed, it will likely be other than *re-incarnation*, and “*janma*” into “a higher state”. As I’ve hinted with my choice of words, the term “*samsara*” is treated loosely by translators — most of whom, though good linguists, are poor thinkers, if “thinkers” at all — and depicted by all of “re-birth”, “re-incarnation”, “trans-migration” (which most nearly conveys its literal meaning), and the accurate but ugly “metempsychosis”. Each of these mean different things, and to avoid this confusion I have in preference chosen the quite explicit “*punarjanma*”, which means “re-birth” (compare the common Buddhist term “*punarbhava*”, “again-being”), and introduced these other terms only when I mean what they say. For “re-birth” of *buddhi:manas* need not be “re-incarnation”, so need involve no further commerce with *deha*. Re-birth which is not re-embodiment clearly is not re-entry into body; and a being of this third kind, if reborn, would likely be “born” — and we should really now say “manifest” — in some non-fleshy way. But I’ll return to this later, and move now to another point.

This kind of being — and this is the second thing I said I wanted to say — though a kind of limiting, highly enlightened case of the second kind (knowers of inclinations as *vasanās*), really should be further divided into:

- (i) those who try unceasingly for perfect *niskama karma* and succeed;
- (ii) those who try unceasingly for perfect *niskama karma*, and don’t succeed.

Incessant triers for *niskama karma*, in other words, are themselves of two kinds: those who make the grade and achieve perfection, and those who don’t. As simple as that. Now the first, those who are made perfect, we can swiftly dismiss; not because they are of no importance, but because they are paramountly so. For such Beings are the rarest of gems among the rare, being true *jivan-muktas*.

These are Ones Who, being perfectly detached, are *ipso facto* in *mokṣa*. "They" are, as the term implies, the paradox of being at once "living" (*jīvan*), yet "released" (*mukta*), as Christ was at once "the Son of God" and "the son of man".

I am aware that much might be said about whether a perfect *attitude* of detachment, such as we find with (i), means that the being is perfectly detached; and many writings do speak about those who have reached the rare pinnacle of this perfect attitude, having nonetheless to suffer re-birth to expunge excess *sancita karma* (that is, bad *vāsanās* left over from a prior life). To many it seems, that whilst one may lead a life which doesn't multiply *vāsanās* — achievement enough, indeed — this doesn't guarantee that all one's accumulated *vāsanās* have been gotten rid of. And nor does it. But this is not a problem I want to enter now, for whilst I would argue that a *perfect* attitude of detachment does entail "perfectly detached", since it does entail positioning oneself *at a remove* from *any and everything* (ultimately even this "attitude"), let me arbitrate those I am talking of as successors *are* the perfectly detached, or, to put it another way, let me say that by "perfect *niṣkāma karma*" I mean "perfect detachment", (and I frankly can see it meaning no other), so that those who, seeking perfect *niṣkāma karma*, fail, are at least *among* those whose detachment is less than perfect. And let me now pose our questions of this certainly highly enlightened kind of being: Is any kind of *punarjanma* needed for *mokṣa* here, and if so, does it involve re-incarnation? This last question will be dealt with, and answered with a qualified "No", when we return to *punarjanma* in "higher states", so I leave it till then.

This, the second of our third kind of being, tries, and tries unceasingly for *niṣkāma karma*, but fails. From this it is clear—for there could be no other reason for his failure—that he has not achieved a perfect "burning away" (*dāha*) of *vāsanās*. Some clearly malingering yet to hinder his attempts at perfect detachment by, simply, influencing

him to attachments he knows not how to avoid. *Deha*-death for such a man cannot bring "release" (*mokṣa*), since he still exists at a *buddhi:manas*-level at which certain *vāsanā*-influence continues to be thought of as "real". To the moment of death he continues to take as wholly, unflinchingly "real" the struggle to overcome *vāsanā*-influence through detachment. And so, since behaviour (no matter what) must be within the confines of one's understanding of Reality, *any and all* behaviour for this *buddhi:manas* must still involve being at that level of manifestation where he *can* continue so to struggle. Hence, even for him, a highly enlightened being indeed, *some* form of re-birth is necessary for *mokṣa*: so that, even for him *punarjanma* is a cosmic necessity, straining after *mokṣa* being so for all.

#### V: What "Form"? A Codicil

Some form, yes—but, what? The answer is simple. We have, in all this, and excepting the *jīvan-mukti*, been speaking about re-embodiment, which I've argued to be necessary for "approaching" *mokṣa*, due to the continued activity of a certain class of *vāsanās*, namely, those which lead us to doings which *attach* us to physical things. But these are by no means the only class of *vāsanā*, or inward inclination. And at least as prevalent, perhaps more so, are those which lead us to doings which don't necessarily attach us to physical things, but rather to mental ones; which, in other words, attach us, jealously, to mind-things, like, for instance, "our own views".

I am talking of those dispositional inclinations we have, or develop, to, for instance, "take a certain position" about some matter, and especially those which lead to mental-fixations, those neurotic fanaticisms which have been the scourge of all human history. These things, as one example, but also simpler, less dramatic things — like the "tendency" always to see things in a certain way; and not just "see" mentally, in the sense of "hold views", but also "see" physically, in the sense of, "perceive the world in a certain way, because our mind is so disposed".

Now, if all *deha-vāsanās* have been banished, so that, in matters of the body, indeed, of physical things generally, there is perfect detachment, there no longer can be call for *punarjanma* of one kind, namely, enfleshment, or re-incarnation. But if, on the other hand, *only* these have been burnt out, so that *buddhi:manas-vāsanās* remain, perfect detachment has not been achieved altogether, for binding-*karma* lingers. In which case, whilst *re-incarnation* no longer presents a real possibility, *re-manifestation* certainly does: *re-manifestation* at that level of understanding at which the fight to conquer at least *buddhi:manas-vāsanās* is still very present and real.

This, then, is the form, certainly non-physical, so of no worry to the poser of our original question, in which *punarjanma* must occur, for occur it must, for those so highly enlightened ones mentioned above. We might call this, as it has been called, *punarjanma* on the "Heavenly level", or the *deva-lokas*. For in substance, and though we might make grades and distinctions even here, this is the place of *devas*, *asuras*, *gandharvas*, *apsarases*, and other supraterrestrial, though not entirely "fulfilled", for not entirely "released", beings. To close with a wisdom from the *Bhagavadgītā*:

devān bhāvayatā nena  
te devā bhāvayantu vah  
parasparam bhāvayantah  
śreyah param avāpsyatha. (*Bhagavadgītā*; III:11)

"With this, comfort and protect the gods,  
And let the gods take care of you:  
Each cherishing the other,  
You will obtain the Supremely Excellent."

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#### NOTES

1. I am indebted to my student, Peter Fenner, for putting this problem to me in this form, and for valuable discussion about it.

2. Needless to say, I have not proven this: though the way one might would be to show, from the vantage of Enlightenment, that the *Saguṇa* Nature of That which Transcends is such that It must draw all "things" to It; which, in the case of us humans, It does through *avidyā*, as recognized "ignorance" of, coupled with a "hunger" (*aśanāyā*; see *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1.2.1) for, this Nature. But even this, thought it seems to me true, needs a wealth of explaining. And for now I am adding this principle of cosmic straining after *mokṣa* as a maxim of the faith, acceptable to anyone who might pose the puzzle in question. For this maxim, a highly reasonable maxim I might add, puts the final touch of completeness to the picture. With it we can argue that, where needed at all, *punarjanma* is not merely desirable, but cosmologically necessary: it not only should happen but always will.

3. Insofar as *mokṣa* can be called "a possession", which is clearly only for the moment, from, one side, and by metaphor.

4. It may be objected that a being of this kind could be ensnared merely by *buddhi:manas-vāsanās*, so be in no need of re-incarnation. But this is false. Remember, we are dealing with a being, already enfleshed, with *vāsanās* he must work-out ( $\checkmark$  *dah*, or "burn out", in the *Gītās* parlance), who both knows that he must, and how he must, and yet has at least these *deha-vāsanās*. Accordingly, he must be still has them; and being the case of a being who's lazy or weak unto death, he's the case of a being who, on death, still has at least these *deha-vāsanās*. Accordingly, he must be re-incarnated.

## THE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORICAL JUDGMENTS

History studies the past. Anything past, and only a past thing, can be made the subject of a historical study. We can have histories of ideas, events, planets, nations, persons, etc. In all historical ventures the reality of the past is accepted as a postulate, and it is bound to remain a postulate because, by its very nature, it is incapable of being ever demonstratively proved to be true or false. It is true by definition that the past cannot be presented. It cannot be given in experience because, if it is, then it ceases to be past and becomes present. Hence, just on logical grounds, it is impossible to have about the past any knowledge by acquaintance or direct experience.

It may be said that certain gifted individuals, in virtue of being endowed with some super-normal powers, can actually see or experience the past; as if they have in their possession some sort of a time-machine which can take them from the present to the past. But even if all this is true, it does not solve the problem of the past. Our inability to experience the past is not just a psychological or physical inability; it is not simply the fact that our eyes are not powerful enough to penetrate into the thick cover of the past in order to see what is concealed therein. What we can see (or experience) is not, by definition, the past but the present, and therefore any attempt to prove the presentability or observability of the past amounts to transforming the past into the present, and thus to denying the reality of the past. If there is no past, there is no problem about the past, and therefore to hold that the past is observable in some supernormal experience is not to explain but to explain away the problem of knowing the past, and also to make all history not only unnecessary but impossible. It is a queer truth, and certainly a limitation for God, that if he is omniscient, he cannot be a historian and he cannot overcome this limitation because it is a logical one.

It is clear from the above that the attempt to make the past observable is a misguided one because it is based on

misconstruing a logical difficulty as a psychological or physical one, and also that if the attempt succeeded, it would not make historical research any easier; rather, it would make it impossible. If there is no past, there cannot be any study of the past.

Another important presupposition of history is that our present thinking about the past does not and cannot alter it; i.e., it is the historian's firm faith that his *present* thinking about a past event does not modify the character of that event. Every historian, as a historian, therefore, is a realist in so far as it is an article of faith for him that the past is independent of our present thinking about it.

An important characteristic of history is the uniqueness, or the unique individuality, of its subject-matter. It is not concerned with discovering what *usually* happens, or what always happens, under certain conditions; its aim is not to discover general laws, or to arrive at generalised truths about some natural or social events or occurrences. It is concerned with what actually happened at a particular time and place, and its aim is to describe it in its concrete particularity in as detailed a manner as circumstances permit. A historian may try to *explain* the occurrence of an event by attributing it to certain antecedent circumstances and may also state, or speculate about, the effects it had, or is likely to have, on succeeding events. But he still remains confined to concrete, particular, events or entities, and what he does is very much different from what a social or natural scientist does. The latter is interested in concrete events or entities not as concrete particulars but as *examples* of certain types, and his objective is not fulfilled just by describing them or even by explaining their occurrence or existence. His objective is to discover, or infer, some general laws about the class of which these particular events and entities are members. When I say all this, I mean neither to disparage history, nor to elevate sciences; I only wish to state how, in fact, the former differs from the latter.

By its very nature a historical study is bound to be selective because it is not possible for any historian to write

the complete history of *everything*. It is not possible even to write the complete history of *anything* because no event is completely isolated. Every event is related to many other events which may precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with, it, and it is not possible to describe all of its relationships. Therefore, the historian has to make his description or narration selective by deciding to describe only some aspects of the event in question.

Every selection essentially involves the use of some principle, or criterion. This principle is almost always given to the historian by the *present*. Some present needs, ideals, policies, or purposes, motivate the historian to write the history, say, of a certain period in the life of a nation or society, and he arranges the facts in a manner determined by his understanding of the course of important events which took place during the said period. He cannot avoid using his sense of importance, and his sense of importance is largely determined by the needs and values of the present, the age in which he writes the history. He also has to use certain conceptual tools, or some conceptual frame-work, to get facts ordered and organised in a consistent whole, since history is not just a collection of facts. He cannot avoid using his own judgment as to what is worth including and what is not in giving a historical account of his subject. In fact, what distinguishes a good from a bad historian is not the amount of facts or data collected, but the organisation of the data in a well-structured whole. It is this trait of the historian which also distinguishes him from a chronicler or gazetteer.

A good historian is one who puts life into dead facts. By the nature of his calling, his endeavour is restricted to collecting information about the past, but in presenting and organising the various bits of information in order to make out of them a readable story, he gets ample opportunities of using his creative and imaginative talents. A successful historian recreates the past and presents it in such a lively manner that it starts telling its tale, as if in its own words.

It is only in such works of history that the historical genius finds its adequate expression.

Just from the fact that the writing of history essentially involves selection, it cannot be inferred that historical judgments must be subjective. A subjective judgment is one which states something about the mental state of the speaker or writer himself, the truth or falsity of which can be conclusively certified only by him. A historical judgment, on the other hand, is not about any mental state of the historian, but about some objective past event or entity. It may reveal, but it does not assert, some preference, or something else, about the mind, of the historian, but that does not make it subjective. What I am trying to emphasize is that selectivity does not logically imply subjectivity.

Selectivity does not even logically imply arbitrariness. A set of historical judgments will be arbitrary if the criteria responsible for their assertion are constituted solely by the likes and dislikes, or personal preferences, of the historian. If any history is written in this manner, there is no denying the fact that it would only be spurious and not genuine history. But the fear expressed here need not disturb us because it very seldom happens that the principles of selection used by a historian consist solely of his own preferences. It is worth mentioning here that the value of a historical work very largely depends upon these principles. What the historian selects must not only seem important to him alone, but also to a good number of his professional colleagues as well as to non-professional, intelligent, members of the society. This means that the historian must possess a very balanced sense of importance or evaluation. There is nothing unusual in requiring him to fulfil this condition because it is a general but necessary condition which must be fulfilled by any researcher or explorer whatsoever. Every scientist, rather every inquirer, has to be selective in more than one way, and his inquiry has any worth only if the principles or criteria of selection used by him are

publicly defensible on impersonal grounds and acceptable to the community of inquirers.

But if selectivity does not imply subjectivity or arbitrariness, it does not follow from this non-implication alone that historical judgments are objective; if a judgment is not subjective it does not *ipso facto* become objective because it may be neither. Therefore, whether or not historical judgments are objective still remains an open question.

Historical judgments are essentially about something which belongs to the past, and for logical purposes it makes no difference whether it is immediate or distant past. Therefore, it is not possible to have a direct verification of any historical judgment. This implies that the correspondence theory of truth is completely out of place in history. We cannot require of a historical judgment that it can be accepted as true only if it corresponds to a fact, for the simple reason that it is logically impossible to fulfil the conditions which must be fulfilled in order that we may test whether or not the judgment in question corresponds to the fact in question. For example, if F be the fact to which the historical judgment H claims to correspond, and the correspondence to which is necessary to make its claim to truth valid, we can ascertain whether or not H corresponds to F only if F is given or presented, but this is logically impossible. F cannot be given or presented because it is a past fact; it is logically impossible to present a past fact. Therefore, no historical judgment can be said to be objective if by a true objective judgment we mean one which corresponds to a fact. It is important to take note of this point because it may seem quite naive to say that historical judgments are objective because for each one of them there is some fact to which it can be said to correspond or fail to correspond and, it is *true* if it does and false if it does not.

This theory of historical objectivity, besides being infected with the well-known short-comings of the correspondence theory of truth, is unacceptable because it ignores the logical peculiarity of the past. Historical judgments are

factual, in the sense that they are *about* certain facts, that they do describe certain facts. But they are different from some other factual judgments in the sense that the facts they are about cannot, being past, be reproduced. They can only be pictured, recreated, or reconstructed, out of present data.

Though it is too obvious to be emphasised, still it is worth mentioning that the evidence for any historical judgment is always some present datum. It may be documentary, archaeological, or memorial. A historian reconstructs a certain past out of the data presently available to him. He may get them out of the documents available for his scrutiny, or out of the materials obtained from some excavation, or out of the account given by an eyewitness. But in each case the evidence is something presented or given to his cognition, and the process by which a historical judgment is arrived at on the basis of the set of evidences given is not one of deduction but of reconstruction. That is why, however strong, the (present) evidences for a certain judgment are, it is still possible that some day some other evidence is discovered which makes it questionable. The peculiarity of historical reasoning is that neither the evidences entail the conclusion, nor the conclusion is verifiable in a direct manner.

When a historian intends to describe a past event, since the event has vanished and is not repeatable, he cannot deal with it in the manner in which he can deal with a present event. He can only depend upon the evidences for or against the belief that it did occur. The description which he presents on the basis of these evidences can be more or less appealing, acceptable, or appropriate, but cannot be *shown* to be true or false. He may even say, on the basis of his evidences, that he knows that the event took place. Normally, when we truly say that we *know* that X is A, it means that X is A. To know that X is A entails that X is A. But this is not true of the use of 'know' by the historian. If we want to restrict the use of 'know' only to such contexts in which to know that P entails P, we shall be forced

to say that we do not know the past, or that there is nothing called historical knowledge. This will not only quite justifiably, be very vehemently opposed by the historian; it is not even necessary to recommend such a restriction on the use of 'know'. Like many other words, 'know' also may be ambiguous. It seems to me that when we say of a past event that we know it took place, the use of 'know' here does not entail that it did take place, and, that by saying we know it took place we mean primarily that we can give adequate or satisfactory reasons for saying that it took place.

The clue to the problem of historical objectivity lies here. A historical judgment has a claim to objectivity in the sense that it makes a claim to be justifiable on satisfactory grounds. It makes sense to say that it is or it is not justifiable, that we can speak of its having or not having adequate reasons. The processing of the data or evidences for or against a historical judgment can be done in a very rigorous manner. With the development of precise techniques for interpretation of documents, archaeological remains, and cross-checking of different records, very compelling reasons can be given for or against a historical judgment.

Historical judgments are objective, therefore, in the sense that they admit of being reasoned or argued about; in short, in the sense that they admit of good and bad reasons. This sense of 'objective' is not at all Pickwickian. The paradigm of subjective judgments, namely the judgments of taste, are considered to be subjective mainly on ground that we cannot argue or reason about them. It seems to me that on the adoption of this criterion, all judgments which we normally call objective remain objective and all those which we call subjective, subjective. This sense of objectivity also seems to accord well with the ordinary uses of 'objective' and 'objectivity'.

'Objective' and 'subjective' are not purely descriptive words; they are also emotive. The application of 'objective' to a statement expresses the user's favourable, and that of

'subjective' an unfavourable, attitude towards it. Therefore, to define 'objective' in such a way that all historical judgments cease to be objective may function like a persuasive definition aiming at a general disparagement of the calling of the historian. That will also be against the ordinary uses of both 'objective' and 'history', because, according to their ordinary uses, it is correct to say that historical judgments are objective.

Regarding the problem of the truth-values of historical judgments, it seems to me that the only criterion of truth which is relevant is the one of coherence, or agreement, of the various evidences available. If all or the majority of the evidences available affirm that a certain event X took place, it is reasonable for the historian to conclude that the judgment 'X took place' is true. It is still possible that the confirming evidences were concocted to prove the occurrence of X when nothing like X really took place. But to show that those evidences were concocted, he must have another set of equally, if not more, compelling evidences to the contrary. That is, he has to depend upon some other evidence even to reject an evidence; he cannot transcend the world of evidence, and meet the subject of his investigation face to face. For him only that is (or is to be accepted as) true which all, or at least the majority of the important, evidences commonly affirm to be true. If somebody says that even then what he thinks to be true may be false, the sense in which it may be false, he may retort, is not the contradictory of the sense in which he considers it to be true. He may even say that this latter sense of 'false' and the sense of 'true' corresponding to it as its contradictory have no place in history.

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## REFERENCE FAILURE AND TRUTH-VALUE GAPS\*

After the publication of Strawson's compromising article "Identifying reference and truth-values"<sup>1</sup> the issue of truth-value gaps seems to have lost the interest of philosophers, and the compromise seems to have been tacitly accepted by both the parties in the controversy. But really the problem is still with us because the consolation which the parties in the dispute derive from Strawson's compromise seems to be false and illusory.

Strawson uses two types of considerations to make the compromise, but without distinguishing them. Both can perhaps be shown to be pragmatic in technical sense, but they are sufficiently far removed from each other to be distinguishable. One of these is found when he points out that both the positions — that propositions like, say, "the present monarch of India is generous", where there is radical reference failure, are neither true nor false, and that such propositions are false — are "reasonable" because they have different (and presumably fairly good) reasons for denying and asserting falsity to such propositions. Here he unknowingly implies that there are two senses of 'falsity', depending on two different criteria or modes of falsity, and that in one sense attribution of truth-value gaps in cases of radical reference failure is justified, whereas in the other sense the attribution of falsity is justified. Since which and how many concepts of falsity one uses in one's logical system is a question of semantics and logic proper, one may well say that if the abovementioned distinction between the two varieties of falsity can at all be shown to be implied by Strawson's remarks, this basis of compromise is purely logical and semantical. An argument to show that this implication holds, will be given shortly.

The other consideration, which is undoubtedly pragmatic and far removed from the logical and semantical phenomenon, concerns the reasons of varying intuitive appeals for or against truth-value gaps theory. While

inquiring into these reasons, Strawson talks of different interests of the two parties, and gives a strong impression as he thinks of the dispute as only a disagreement of attitudes, emphases or interests. If so, this will clearly trace the grounds of the controversy in something non-logical, and rather subjective and psychological. In fact, the very question of different intuitive appeals sounds socio-psychological. He says, "What we have, in the enthusiastic defence of one theory or the other, is a symptom of difference of direction of interest. One who has an interest in actual speech-situation, in the part that stating plays in communication between human beings, will tend to find the simpler falsity theory inadequate and feel sympathy with—though, as I say, he is under no compulsion, exclusively or at all, to embrace—its rival. One who takes a more impersonal view of statement, who has a picture in which the actual needs, purposes and presumptions of speakers and hearers are of slight significance—in which, as it were, there are just statements on the one side and, on the other, the world they should reflect—he will naturally tend to brush aside the truth-value gap theory and embrace its simple rival."<sup>2</sup> And then he goes on to show how different types of statements, all having reference failure, carry different intuitive appeals for being classified as the cases of truth-value gaps. In general, his principle is that if we have a statement consisting of two referring expressions, one of which is "guilty" of reference failure and the other is not, then we have two ways of carving up the statement: (1) the guilty referring expression may be treated as absorbed into a predicate term which is attached to the innocent referring expression to make the whole statement; (2) the innocent referring expression may be treated as absorbed into a predicate expression, and may be attached to the guilty referring expression to make the whole statement. When treated in the first way, the statement seems to be worth categorising as false; when treated in the second way, it seems more natural to say that the statement is neither true nor false. Strawson deals with the cases like "the present monarch of India is generous",

which have only one referring expression, and that the guilty one, by referring to the context in which they are asserted. Thus, the statement "the present monarch of India is generous" can be an answer to the question "who are the eminent contemporary figures who are generous?" If so, the present monarch of India is cited in this statement as an example of a previously introduced class, and since the class in question surely does not contain anything like the present monarch of India, we may say with certainty and plausibility that the statement in question is false. But, when seen out of any such context, we may find it more natural to say that the question of the statement's truth or falsity does not arise, as there is nothing which is the present monarch of India.

However, despite this incisive analysis of our use of the statements having referring expressions and the concerned logical appraisals, the old question may again pop up. We may ask, if we take the statement in question under the formulation in which its subject term comprises of the guilty referring expression, will it be more *reasonable* (not only more natural or appealing) to say that it has no truth-value or that it has the truth-value 'false'? Perhaps Strawson will say the former despite his efforts to act as a compromiser. This is strengthened by the fact that the considerations as to how the statement is to be viewed in terms of its construction and whether it is an answer to a certain question or a report of facts, and so on, are regarded by Strawson as revealing the conventions governing and affecting the *meaning* of the sentence in question. Because this will have the consequence that the *statement* or *proposition* expressed by the sentence under one of the abovementioned formulations is different from that expressed by the sentence under the other formulation. And then the result of Strawson's inquiry remains not much different from the one with which we started initially, viz., that there are some statements or propositions which are neither true nor false. The supporters of the classical two-valued logic will surely not be placated by any of the preceding con-

siderations of the second type, and will take issue on this matter with the gap theorists. In fact, as earlier pointed out, the question of truth-value gaps cannot reasonably be viewed as resting on any difference of interests or difference of personal and impersonal perspectives of statements. Both the positions here can be formulated in objective and impersonalistic terms and both are interested, it seems, in statements or propositions as distinguished from stating.

Thus, it appears, the real issue we are ultimately left with concerns the two criteria or modes of falsity, which were hinted at in the beginning of the paper. So, let us return to what we found to be seemingly logical consideration by which Starwson tries to make the reconciliation. Trying to show that both the positions in this controversy are reasonable, he produces arguments for both of them, and maintains that both the arguments are right in their ways. The argument for truth-value gap theorists is that presumably a statement like "the present monarch of India is generous" is not true. But as it is not also a case of mischaracterisation, it cannot be called false either. Thus, here is a variety of statements which, because of radical reference failure, are neither true nor false. The argument for the opponents of this theory is that despite the lack of truth and mischaracterisation both, we can still call this statement false, because the state of affairs which, if existent, would have made this statement true, is in fact non-existent. That is, in order to call a statement false, we need not seek some mischaracterization in it; the lack of the truth-guaranteeing situation is enough to call it so.

Now, what these arguments show is that the two parties are adopting different criteria for applying the notion of 'falsity' on the case in question, and actually the case is such that the disagreement on criteria gives a reason for believing that there are two varieties or senses of 'falsity'. In general, the argument to show this can be thus formulated.

Let us take any predicate, say, F, and ask for the criteria for its application. Suppose, two criteria A and B are

provided. As long as these two criteria are satisfied together, there is no problem. But suppose that we have a case x which satisfies A but not B. Again, if there is a rule or agreement of usage in the community of the language users which clearly decides whether here x is F or not, there is no problem. But if there is no such rule or agreement or even decision, and if one says that both the views — that x is F and that x is not F — are correct in their own ways, then we have no alternative but to conclude that that person is admitting two *varieties* or *senses* of 'F'. In our example, it is the word "falsity" which is in question, and the two criteria used by the two parties are: (a) statement being a case of mischaracterization, and (b) the truth-guaranteeing situation being non-existent. The statement "the present monarch of India is generous", which is presumably not true, does not satisfy the first criterion, but satisfies the second one. And in this situation Strawson says that both the parties saying that this statement is not false and that it is false, are 'reasonable'. This implies, on the foregoing argument, that Strawson will have to admit two types of falsity, which we shall henceforth call 'denial-falsity' or 'DF' and 'contradiction-falsity' or 'CF', as subsequently we will be defining these types in terms of another distinction, 'denial' and 'contradiction'. In fact, although Strawson himself is not very much willing to accept this implication of his argument, this distinction of the two senses of falsity is sometimes maintained by his supporters themselves.<sup>3</sup> And his job of reconciliation seems to be best done by some such sort of distinction.

Before we proceed to compare the two senses of falsity, let us elaborate this distinction a little bit more. 'Denial-falsity' (DF) of a statement means the falsity of that statement in virtue of the truth of its denial, and the 'contradiction-falsity' (CF) of a statement means the falsity of that statement in virtue of the truth of its contradiction. In other words, a statement is DF if and only if its denial is true, and it is CF if and only if its contradiction is true. The denial of a statement p means that statement I.P.Q...<sup>4</sup>

which negates what is said in p to what is said about in p. The contradiction of p is that statement which negates p on the whole. Thus the denial of "the present monarch of India is generous" is "the present monarch of India is non-generous (or, ungenerous)"; and its contradiction is "not that (or, it is not the case that) the present monarch of India is generous". We propose to symbolise the denial of a proposition p by 'p\*' and its contradictory by the usual tilde sign as ' $\sim p$ '. In functional calculus we propose to use either of the two symbolisms: to express the denial of 'Fa' by 'Fa\*' and its contradiction by ' $\sim Fa$ ', or to express the denial of 'Fa' by ' $(\sim F)a$ ' and its contradiction by ' $\sim(Fa)$ '. A statement of the form 'Fa' will be a case of *mischaracterization* if a does not have F, i.e., if a exists but lacks F, and this means the truth of a proposition attributing ' $\sim F$ ' to a, which is in fact the denial of 'Fa'. Thus, the first criterion of falsity previously traced in Strawson's argument, is subsumed under what is here called 'DF'. What the contradiction of any proposition 'Fa' asserts is simply the *non-existence of the state of affairs intended to be reported by 'Fa'*. Thus this tallies with the second abovementioned criterion of falsity. It will be immediately clear that these two types of falsity are not completely independent from each other. DF is stricter and narrower than CF, and the former entails the latter. The reverse entailment does not hold. Therefore, a statement may fail to be either true or DF, and yet be CF. It is exactly this which preserves the laws of Bivalency and Excluded Middle in the situations of radical reference failure.

As soon as the abovementioned distinction is made, an objection is raised. The distinction DF and CF is formulated in terms of the distinction of 'denial' and 'contradiction', and this is a distinction of two types of *negations*. In fact, it seems quite reasonable to say that every sense or variety of falsity corresponds to a sense or variety of negation, and the different modes of falsity are actually defined in terms of the corresponding negations. DF and CF correspond to internal and external negations of

Russell. The objection is that the internal negation or denial cannot be taken to be a logical operator. In “x is ~F” which is the denial of “x is F”, a quality opposite of F is attributed to x, and the opposition between F and ~F is known not by any logical considerations, but by having a grasp of the nature of the qualities F and ~F. But this objection actually confuses between the cases like ‘red’ and ‘blue’ on the one hand and those like ‘red’ and ‘non-red’ on the other. A case can be built for maintaining that the incompatibility of the former set is known by knowing the nature of the properties red and blue, but it is not so in the case of the latter set. Any uniform and sensible substitution of the word “red” in the pair ‘red’ and non-red’ will leave the opposition of the pair unimpaired. Thus, ‘non’ here can legitimately be treated as a logical operator. Of course, it qualifies only a part of a sentence, not the sentence as a whole, but this is no reason why it should not be regarded as a logical operator or even as a propositional operator. Whether qualifying a part of the proposition or not, it changes the truth-value of the initial sentence in a *logical* manner, and this is enough reason to call it a logical propositional operator.

Now, if we do not take the law of excluded middle on either of the two interpretations — in terms of DF and in terms of CF — as defining the notion of proposition or statement as well, we may conceive of two abstract possibilities of a proposition’s having a truth-value gap: (i) when it admits of being negated in the relevant sense, that is, the relevant notion of negation applies to the sort of propositions it is, and yet neither it nor its negation is true; (ii) when the proposition is not true, and the relevant sense of negation does not apply to the sort of proposition it is, so that the question of its negation’s being true does not arise. If the principle of excluded middle is interpreted in terms of DF, then and only then a proposition like “the present monarch of India is generous” will be a case of truth-value gap. Because there being no monarch of India at present, neither this proposition nor its denial “the pre-

sent monarch of India is ungenerous" holds true. But there is a difficulty in interpreting the principle of excluded middle in terms of DF, viz., that it seems to create truth-value gaps in the second manner which neither tick well with the ordinary usage nor are likely to be accepted by the Strawsonians too. For example, existential propositions provide an apparent case on which the application of the notion of denial seems to be impossible. If an existential proposition is interpreted as saying something about an indefinite subclass of a class, no genuine denial of it seems forthcoming. Because on this interpretation, an existential proposition like "some x are y" says something about some unspecified members of x. Its denial should say of *precisely the same* objects or subclass that they are not y. But the original reference being essentially indefinite, catching it in any other proposition and then attributing the opposite quality to it is not possible.

Another, perhaps more convincing, example of this type is offered by externally negated propositions. Every denial of a proposition has a contradiction of its own, but it is not clear how the denial of an externally negated proposition is to be formed. The original proposition and its denial retain the same topic of talk, and share the same referential presuppositions, if any. But when we frame the contradictory of a proposition by externally negating it, we do not retain any 'topic of talk' or 'subject' of the discourse; the contradiction eschews all the presuppositions of the original proposition, and simply disclaims any correspondence of the contradicted proposition in reality. That is, it is clear that the contradictory of "x is red" is "it is not the case that x is red" and the contradictory of the denial of "x is red", viz., "x is non-red", is "it is not the case that x is non-red". But reversing the application of these two negation-operators is not so easy. It is not clear what the denial of "it is not the case that x is red" will be. So, one disadvantage, and a serious one, of interpreting the principle of excluded middle in terms of DF is that either one has to give up using the notion of contradiction in language, and thus to eliminate

all the externally negated propositions, or to accept that all such propositions lack a truth-value. Both of these alternatives are equally artificial and awkward.

Thus, it seems, the proper interpretation of the principle of excluded middle should be in terms of CF or the notion of contradiction. And in that case a proposition like "the present monarch of India is generous" does not present any truth-value gaps. In case this proposition is not true, its contradiction is, and it is this, not the truth of its denial whenever it itself is untrue, which is needed by the principle of excluded middle on the second interpretation.

Let us see how the foregoing discussion helps in saving the law of excluded middle, and yet does justice with the fact of presuppositions in ordinary language. Keeping in mind that  $p$  and  $p^*$  always share the same referential presuppositions, and taking CF as a basic truth-value besides 'true', we can form the following truth-tables for  $p$ ,  $p^*$  and  $\sim p$ .

CF/-		
P	$\sim F$	$P^*$
T	CF	CF
CF	T	T or CF

Here the fact of the indeterminacy of  $p^*$ 's truth-value in the second row reflects the possibility of a truth-value gap if we are thinking in terms of DF and not CF. If we take into account only  $p$  and  $\sim p$ , there is not much difference in the logic, specially semantics, of Russell's analysis and the present analysis. But, first, the addition of the denial operator helps in picturizing the situation of what is called truth-value gaps in fully logical terms, and, secondly, it keeps a place for the fact of presuppositions in the pragmatics of the analysis. The indeterminacy of  $p^*$  in the second row is to be explained by the possibility of there being some presupposition in  $p$  and thereby in  $p^*$  too, and the possibility of that presupposition's being false (DF or CF). Russell's analysis, or that of Ayer who agrees with Russell

on this point and regards the whole question of truth-value gaps as that of policy, includes whatever goes by the name of presupposition in the very content of the sentence, and thus does not give them their proper place in the discourse. Russell's analysis, in other words, is regimenting language for the sake of regimenting, whereas the present analysis combines regimentation with the facts of ordinary language.

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#### NOTES

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1. *Theoria*; xxx (1964) Part 2; pp. 96-118.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.
3. See Odegard: "On closing the truth-value gaps" *Analysis*; 25 (1964-65), pp. 10-12.

## PHILOSOPHER SCIENTIST—WERNER HEISENBERG:

The boundaries between philosophy and science have undergone radical changes during the course of the development of human knowledge. In antiquity, natural philosophy merged with natural science. A number of natural sciences, initially mechanics and mathematics, were separated from natural philosophy in the 17th century. In the course of its development, natural science has passed from the stage of immediate contemplation of nature to the stage of synthetic reconstruction of nature in its universality. The philosophic enterprise of our times is framing a 'world view' based on the results of natural scientific investigations in which both the philosopher and the scientist have to co-operate.

Modern Physics, particularly quantum theory has raised a host of problems, going far beyond the confines of physics itself. These relate to the nature of matter, the method of exact sciences, the concept of causality etc. Not only philosophers but outstanding physicists of our times have also reflected upon these philosophical problems. Almost all physicists who contributed to the growth and development of quantum physics also took active part in the debates over its philosophical implications. Planck (1858-1947), Einstein (1879-1955), Bohr (1885-1962) and Heisenberg (1901-1976) are foremost among those who have contributed to both science and philosophy.

The quantum physics originated as a result of discoveries made at the turn of the century by Planck and Einstein. In 1900, Planck postulated that the emission and absorption of radiation takes place in discrete quanta. This contradicts the spirit of classical physics and shakes one of its most fundamental premises; that energy transfer is continuous. In classical physics any given quantity of energy was taken to be consumed continuously in the same way that water continuously and indivisibly filled a vessel. Einstein made Planck's idea of energy quantum more revolutionary than was originally imagined by postulating that

radiation too consisted of bundles. In 1913 Neils Bohr, a Danish physicist applied the quantum hypothesis to furnish an explanation for his atomic model. To overcome difficulties in this model Bohr also put forward the famous correspondence principle according to which in the regions where a quantum of action is small and negligible the laws of quantum theory are the same as those of classical physics. Inspired by the spirit of the correspondence principle, Heisenberg at the age of 24 wrote his famous paper on 'Quantum theoretical reinterpretation of kinematic and mechanical relations' published in 1925. Heisenberg's matrix mechanics formulation of quantum physics, constitutes a discovery which places him among the foremost scientists in the history of mankind.

For a layman quantum physics is identical with, what is generally but erroneously known as Heisenberg's indeterminacy Principle. For him Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, according to which it is not possible to specify or determine simultaneously both the position and velocity of a particle as accurately as is wished, appear to endow the microparticle with a free will. To many scientists and non-scientists this 'free will' of the material particle constitutes the material basis for an idealistically conceived 'free will'.

Naive philosophers have understood Heisenberg's discoveries as a proof of the validity of the most obscurantist ideas. It is true that the investigations in the micro-world have changed our conceptions of causal relationships as obtained in Newtonian mechanics, and Heisenberg's uncertainty relations do put a limit on the application of the classical ideas. In quantum mechanics mathematical determinism is valid but Laplacian determinism is not. If the micro-world were a chaos of absolutely random phenomena devoid of any law-governed relationships, then under any given conditions it would not be possible to predict the future course of any micro-process even statistically. But in quantum mechanics the behaviour of micro-entities is governed by well defined statistical laws reflecting that the behaviour of micro-entities is law governed. Philosophers,

scientists and laymen, have been engaged in unravelling the meaning of the far reaching discovery made by Heisenberg in 1925. Heisenberg himself had been a very active participant in these fierce debates till the end of his life, displaying tremendous versatility and a deep concern for all matters that related to the growth and development of mankind.

Associated with Niels Bohr from 1924-27 at Copenhagen, he untiringly developed the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. He wrestled with very general questions "dealing not only with the narrow problems of physics as such but also with the nature of matter and with the method of exact sciences." Uncertainty relations expressive of the irreducible disturbance due to the process of observation reflect the fact that the very process of observation results in a significant participation in the mode of existence of what is being observed. This according to Heisenberg has focused our attention on the significant epistemological question "of the extent to which it is possible to objectify scientific or any sensory experiences — the extent, in other words to which one can go from observed phenomena to an objective conclusion independent of the observer."

The Copenhagen School of quantum mechanical interpretation led by Bohr and Heisenberg provided answers to the question in the positivistic spirit. In brief, the Copenhagen Interpretation would amount to the assertion that "objective reality has evaporated" and that quantum mechanics does not represent particles, but rather our knowledge, our observations or our consciousness of particles thereby reducing the task of science to a study of our sense impressions — their structure, ordering, co-relation and regulation. This subjectivist approach reduces man — the active agent of change to the role of a passive ordering device in a world where the laws of nature are not objectively existing but happen to be a result of a coincidence — divine or otherwise. Being an active and a great scientist that Heisenberg was, he had to veer away from such a posi-

tion. As a researcher in one way or another, he acknowledged the objectivity of the laws of nature.

Heisenberg during the 30s and 40s devoted himself to various problems related to quantum mechanics and nuclear physics. During the third Reich, he came frequently under attack from Nazis for his support for Albert Einstein. He along with other physicists decided to stay in Germany during this period on the advice of Max Planck. At the end of the war he was captured by American troops and taken to England. In 1946 he returned to Germany and reorganised Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for physics in Gottingen. Since 1948 this institute is known as Max Planck Institute. Since the early 50s he had been working on a comprehensive theory of elementary particles.

Apart from numerous articles in the journals of Physics, he has contributed a great deal to the debate on the philosophical implications of quantum theory. His major philosophical works are *Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Physics* (1952), *A Physicist's Conception of Nature* (1958), *Physics and Philosophy* (1959) and *Beyond Physics* (1971).

Lately he had been adopting a position which is close to the objective idealism of Plato and Kant. He maintained that the notion of reality, that there are objective occurrences which somehow take place in time and space independently of whether or not they are observed has gone by the board. Instead he thought that "there might be a mathematical structure in nature the formulation of which the Greek philosophers had looked for. The existence of the atom, far from being a final, irreducible fact, might as Plato had thought, be traced back to the operation of mathematically conceivable laws of nature—to the effect of mathematical symmetries." And thus he actively engaged himself till the end of his life to work out a system where one could replace the concept of a fundamental particle with the concept of a fundamental symmetry.

Quantum physics, when sought to be reconciled with the theory of relativity, presents insurmountable problems.

These and other problems have led many scientists to seriously question the interpretation given to quantum mechanics by Bohr and Heisenberg. Doubts about the completeness and finality of quantum mechanics as interpreted by Bohr and Heisenberg are being expressed with renewed vigour. The apprehensive attitude of Einstein and Schrodinger regarding the Copenhagen Interpretation is being echoed by many more leading scientists and philosophers. The interpretation propounded by Bohr and Heisenberg may be superseded but there is no modern physics without the name and work of Heisenberg.

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## THE STATE OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOME SUGGESTIONS

In what countries of the world is Philosophy as an academic discipline flourishing to-day? We do not think an honest reply to this question will include India among such countries. India had a tremendous philosophic past, but to-day academic philosophy is a peculiar mixture of contrived scholarship, empty rhetoric and more or less unsuccessful attempts at entering into the philosophical debate in Europe, England and America. Perhaps this isn't peculiar to Philosophy, but is a much more general phenomenon. And there must be all kinds of reasons — historical, socio-logical, economic — why this should be so. A study of these reasons would not only be fascinating by itself, but it would also form a necessary preliminary to any sound rethinking on the mode and content of University teaching in this country. What we wish to do, however, in this short paper is *not* to go into these reasons, but to spell out some of the elements which to our mind constitute a vigorous tradition of philosophical thinking.

One constituent of such a tradition in any culture is the quality of its relation to its own recent and remote past. We can describe this only by saying rather vaguely that this relationship is one of a creative understanding of the past, in relation to problems which seem to be most pressing at present. By creative understanding we mean, perhaps among other things an understanding which, on the one hand is able to resist an overbearing (sometimes mechanical) presence of the past, and, on the other hand, sees the past not as something dead and finished, but as something which must contain insights into problems which have peculiarly arisen in the history of that culture. We can illustrate this by referring to the practice of philosophy today in some of the Western countries. Much of contemporary British and American philosophy has been ridiculed as sophistical, pedestrian, unconcerned with the "real" problems of life. Some of this criticism is justified, but much of it is born of

misunderstanding, and maybe, prejudice. One needs only to visit a University like Oxford or Cambridge to see the seriousness and sincerity with which philosophical problems are pursued, a seriousness and sincerity which can spring only from a deep concern for life. And a substantial part of British philosophy consists in attempts to gain fresh insights into the great western tradition of philosophy. These attempts are inspired by problems which have cropped up in course of the philosophical debate of our own times. A striking feature of any serious philosophical conversation about, say, Plato, Aristotle or Kant in a University like Cambridge or Oxford is that these philosophers would be talked about as though they were alive to-day, and contributing to the solution of philosophical problems of our own times. The result is a lively — one might say — spontaneous sense of belonging to a great tradition and furthering that tradition. We also had a tremendous tradition of philosophical thinking in this country, but what we lack — it seems to us — is this spontaneous sense of belonging to it and furthering it.

Another element of a vigorous tradition of philosophical thought seems to us to be the existence in the main stream of academic life, of a sufficient number of individuals who are engaged in a corporate discussion of crucial problems. This, of course, requires an ability which seems rare in our country to take one another seriously and a capacity to level as well as bear criticism with a deep sense of responsibility. Journals of course are a natural medium for such discussions. But for one reason or another, philosophical journals in this country have not done well. May we make a suggestion? The suggestion might sound elitist but when we are concerned with improving the level of philosophical thought in our country some form of elitism is unavoidable. Nor is elitism, understood in what we take to be its correct meaning, incompatible with democratic values. In any case, the suggestion is that we make a deliberate and determined effort to get together, in a select number of Universities, say, two or three, — people with recognizable talent for

vigorous and resolute pursuit of philosophical problems. We do not think we lack such people in this country. They are, however, scattered all over the country with enormous geographical distance separating them. The mere fact of being together and working together will be a source of inspiration and enhance their sense of responsibility to their own individual intellectual pursuits. The suggestion will naturally bring in memories of the ill-fated centres for advanced study in philosophy. But unfortunately these centres were not conceived with adequate clarity and imagination, and, we hope, by now we know the mistakes made and are ready to learn from them. If our suggestion is successfully implemented then the problem of a good philosophical journal will, in all probability solve itself; for the interchange of ideas within the group of philosophers, should naturally lead to the emergence of such a journal. And once there is an on-going high level philosophical debate in the country, we shall no longer be faced with problems such as the U.G.C. and the Universities are facing to-day e.g. the problem of changing syllabi to make them "relevant" or that of "modernizing" the degree courses. To our mind no amount of changes of syllabi and modernization can make any substantial difference unless these could draw upon and are actually based on a serious and on-going contemporary concern with problems.

But what problems, one might ask. We have to say three things about the choice of problems: Firstly, to a great extent the choice of problems in philosophy as well as in other academic disciplines is a matter of fashions. Somebody writes what is thought to be a good book on a particular problem, and thereby gives a particular direction or slant to subsequent debate in the discipline. I think, this is something unavoidable. Secondly, philosophical problems from the very nature of the case, have a certain degree of generality and universality. This is because philosophy is concerned in a very large measure, with the general structure of human thought. And that there is such a

general structure cannot, we think, be doubted. There are certainly variations within this structure; but they are variations and not total differences. But—and this is our third point—if philosophical problems are general in this way, what about philosophy being relevant to our times and to our society? This is generally supposed to be the most important question facing the practitioners of philosophy in this country. While we do not doubt its importance, we find the question extremely difficult to answer. Part of the difficulty, of course, springs from the difficulty of the notion of relevance itself. What is it for an intellectual discipline to be relevant to its time and society, or—what is perhaps the same question—what is it for a *problem* to be relevant? The answer generally given is that given the state of our society there are pressing problems of reorganization and re-orientation of society which it is the responsibility of all academic disciplines to make a concerted effort to solve. And these are the relevant problems. But agreement here implies a more general agreement in fundamental social, political and moral assumptions. And philosophy here is in a peculiar position, because part of the traditional task of philosophy is to expose and spell out these fundamental assumptions and to engage in a discussion of them. But this is where perhaps we have our answer. Philosophy does not engage itself in the actual solution of practical social problems, nor does it attempt a first order description or explanation of social phenomena. But what it can do—and must do—in the context of the intellectual life of our country to-day is to discuss with great care and responsibility the theoretical frameworks involved in all such description, explanation or solution. As a result of such discussion it might conceivably discover that these theoretical frameworks distort rather than enlighten—that the hold which they have on our, say, social scientists is ultimately harmful to both our spiritual and social life. To be able to come responsibly to this conclusion would be to do something which would be of radical relevance to all our contemporary problems. We need not of course necessarily

come to this conclusion. But its possibility cannot be denied and this raises a problem which, if anything, is the relevant problem for philosophy in this country.

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## POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY

“If some discussion is actually provoked by the book, that would be the best reward for the labour it entailed”. Preface, *What Is Living And What Is Dead In Indian Philosophy?*, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya; People's Publishing House, New Delhi; 1976.

Like the perceived continuum of waterfowl ranging from geese to swans, there is an unperceived continuum of Indian philosophers writing on Sanskrit darshan extending from *Lipsetian* Daya Krishna to *Leninist* Chattopadhyaya. If the variations in the continuum are due to the differences in the preferences for paradigms or frameworks to be grafted onto Sanskrit darshan from European philosophy, the coherence of the continuum is a consequence of its futility. Futility — that is the word, and that is the symptom. What else could attempts, to purloin a limpid phrase of Auden, to see the fate of Buddha in the face of Christ be! And contemporary Indian intellectuals are intrinsically incapable of living without inheritance; they are equally incapable of being unique — all the more so if they happen to be “professorial schoolmasters”. By happenstance they might be rightists or leftists or pink-thinkers with faculty positions at the JNU, being bourgeois they have two tremendous psychic necessities. These are, first, to invoke the three millenia old native tradition to delude themselves and others into the belief that they are very much in its sphere (at least somewhere on the fringe of its ever expanding edge), and, secondly, to deceive themselves and others into the conviction that the two millenia old European tradition intersects the native one precisely at the point where they stand. Their entire eschatological lucubration is about the point of intersection and their locus there. This is my succinct summary of the spiritual exegesis of contemporary Indian philosophers writing on their counterparts of a bygone age. However, on occasional but momentary return to normalcy these philosophers become aware

of their self-identity. That is how, by now, it has become a part of our conventional and collective wisdom that this sort of exegesis is symptomatic of our coolie-complex which we developed when we were "subjects". Now that we have become "citizens", *what is to be done?*

To this five word fundamental Leninian question Chattopadhyaya gives an answer in six hundred and seventy five pages. Dreary it might sound — dismally dreary it must have been to fill in all those pages — worse is that at the end of the torturous task of reading through this hard-bound and highly-priced triviality, the tired and bored reader is forced to repeat: Yes, what is to be done? Providence, it seems, has not ordained each instance of the Leninian question to go with the Leninist answer.

Having had inutile interaction with our unreflective scientists and irrelevant philosophers, I was almost in a state of despair when I noted Chattopadhyaya's earlier work, which seemed to me equally unreflective and irrelevant. Yet, as a born optimist with an inveterate belief in the growth of knowledge — individual and collective —, and being never sure of my convictions, I was tempted to open this volume, to realise, in due course, that a part of it — namely the fifth chapter — was known to me since 1970. It was written a year or two earlier than that and was to go into an ill-fated *festschrift* of which I happened to be the editor. That, I believe, is the pre-natal story of this book despite Chattopadhyaya's assertion that he construed it to meet Mohit Sen's demand for an ideological weapon, unless Sen launched his armament programme earlier than that and to meet the demand Chattopadhyaya kept his factory on production in 1968.

That chapter is central not only to Chattopadhyaya's global and protracted research programme, but also for an evaluation of it. Indeed, it is seminal to his programme as, the rest of the volume can be construed as supporting evidence (*not analysis*, as the author claims in his preface) to the thesis extended in the fifth chapter, and secondly it contains an assertion, about ancient philosophy, of Lenin

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who never had pretentious claims for classical scholarship. Chattopadhyaya makes a mountain out of his mole-hill by turning it into a paradigm for surveying the whole of Sanskritic philosophical literature. This paradigm is embedded in a pithy remark of Lenin which Chattopadhyaya quotes on p. 212. "(T)he contending parties", it reads, "(in philosophy) are essentially... materialism and idealism. *The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism,...*" It is not clear whether the emphasis is Lenin's or Chattopadhyaya's. "What does Lenin mean by all this?" Chottapadhyaya asks and answers: "Fideism is the cult of faith. Fideists are those that deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. This, as Lenin says, is the tendency and the social function of philosophical idealism."

I am *not* at all disturbed by the fact that an evaluation of "our philosophical tradition" — the personal pronoun in possessive case is Chattopadhyaya's — had to be carried in "their" framework. But I am disappointed to note that Chattopadhyaya could not find out a suitable title for his thanatological evaluation on his own and without lifting it from the unpublished proceedings of the UGC seminar held at the Andhra University in 1975 (see f.n., p. 579).

In his preface dated the 31st of March 1976, Chattopadhyaya writes: "In these anxious days through which we are passing, an analysis of the Indian philosophical tradition is much more than a matter of antiquarian curiosity. Without it we are helpless pawns in the grim political game now going on". This is confusing, for someone else — I could not check whether he was an astrologer or a social scientist with a research grant from the ICSSR — told me that the period of anxiety came to an end soon after the 1975 summer solstice. It is easy to isolate truth from error, but it is impossible to discern it in a confusion. Perhaps Chattopadhyaya thinks that the anxiety started since then; if so, he ought to have paid attention to a diagnosis of it before prescribing his traditional tablets. He seems to take it for granted that the disease has been correctly identified, either by "us" or by "them". As a result a gullible reader like me

feels "like a helpless pawn in the grim political game" of Chattopadhyaya as he himself seems to feel in the game which he conjures to be the making of a neo-colonialist conspiracy.

There is a theme which constantly occurs in Marx from *Paris Manuscripts* onwards. It is that a great idea (event) appears (occurs) in history twice, once as a tragedy and again as a farce. That philosophy is the most powerful weapon in the arsenal of the class which is to be the vehicle of progressive social change is an extremely important idea of Marx. That, indeed, is the legacy of enlightenment whose last child, perhaps, was Marx. And what is meant by philosophy is *philosophie* in the sense in which the French used the term, that is — as Marx understood it — the ideology of the class in question and is appropriate to the tasks that class has set to itself. It is *not* a rehash of incondite, vague, and obscure ancient thought. That is why after his doctoral dissertation Marx did not return to classical philosophy. (This does not mean that mature Marx developed a distaste for classical philosophy. He fixed its relevance differently. Now that Marx studies have become a heavy industry I need not concern myself with it here.) It was he, more than anyone else, who contributed towards exploding the myth of historically invariant philosophical truth. I had to state this explicitly for, if Chattopadhyaya is to be believed, it is shocking to note that such a senior and seasoned marxist like Mohit Sen ought to have informally commissioned this volume with the intention of using it in his and Chottopadhyaya's "ideological struggle today" (italics added). My issue is not either with or about Sen; he is quite capable of looking after his interests, and hence evaluate whether this volume is of any use to him in his struggle to realise his goals. But people with similar goals and endowed with inferior capabilities are likely to be duped into Chattopadhyaya's archaic trap to end up in the prison of inauthenticity, irrelevancy and non-contemporaneity.

"This book", Chattopadhyaya writes, "is intended to be an analysis of our philosophical tradition from the stand-

point of our present philosophical requirements. These requirements, as understood here are secularism, rationalism and science-orientation". True, these are our requirements, our immediate requirements. And as philosophers we are expected to be rooted in contemporary life and be its lucidities. So this professional demand should naturally lead us to reflect on to analyse, and articulate to legitimise, these concepts. All this is what Chattopadhyaya proclaims, and what he does *not* do. What he does is to take a dip in the tank of tradition and come out crying that it is a filthy pool. He does not even show an awareness that the three concepts at hand are not mutually independent, but constitute a nested triad. To be scientific entails to be rational, and to be rational in the realm of human affairs implies to be secular. Thus our greatest philosophical need boils down to an explication of the concept of science, and a legitimisation of its role in our life-style. Chattopadhyaya could have served the cause which he says he is serving with a single format leaflet consisting of such an analysis rather than by a sixty format semi-scripture on tradition. How could he do that in contemporary India where science is scarce and history abundant!

Tradition! whose tradition? The insidious pronoun in the passage quoted above is invidious. The "false philosophies" which dominate our academies, Chattopadhyaya seems to think, belong to *their* tradition. But why is it theirs and not ours? Is it because our location is not spatially contiguous with theirs? Then, is it not the case that our time and "our ancestors'" time are not simultaneous? It is at least possible to enter into a dialogue with persons at a different location; what prospect do we have of doing the same with those who flourished when the world was young! Genetic continuity of a stock of people does not guarantee cultural continuity. Even if does in the case of "our tradition", it should not be allowed to continue. That is precisely where the battle has to be waged. The sooner the intellectuals of this country today realise that they do not have any pride of pedigree, the better the prospect of credit-worthy

progeny. And if one is overburdened with tradition, one will have to either unburden oneself or be crushed. If tradition is, as Chattopadhyaya says it is, infringing our freedom, and impinging our progress, the choice left to us is clear. We are either to disown tradition or else sacrifice our freedom. The issue of remoulding it to suit our needs does not arise at all. A secularist will have to treat Sanatanists and Aryasamajists alike. But Chattopadhyaya thinks differently; so he indulges in the sysyphian activity of re-interpreting tradition so as to make it meet "our present requirements". One cannot mend his torn trousers infinite number of times; some day he will have to go either for a new pair, or else without them. But, commonsense is not everybody's infirmity.

Chattopadhyaya digs up a whole mountain beneath which is buried "the general fund of traditional philosophy"; he does this with two aims, namely first to expose the myth that spiritualism (idealism) is "the quintessence of Indian wisdom", and secondly to show that entwined with, and entangled in, it are "ideas and attitudes at least with potentials of secularism, rationalism and science-orientation". First, I will attend to the first. I am not a methodomaniac; nor is Chattopadhyaya. From his writing it appears that as yet he has not internalised marxian methodology. Yet, I cannot take-in his declaration that he wants to carry out the holy task of demythologising by turning to facts. "Fact" is a loaded concept, and the concept of fact in the present context is an overloaded concept. So we have to be quite clear and careful about it. This is not a cartesian demand, as I believe with Pascal that complete clarity darkens not to mention that it can be achieved only at the cost of intelligibility. Yet, the facts which Chattopadhyaya is invoking are *not* of the type as those like Chattopadhyaya lives in Calcutta and Rao lives in Jaipur. They are, first, of the type to which facts like Calcutta is to the east of Jaipur belong. This is a fact within the context of a geographico-astronomical theory. Further the nature of facts in question — i.e. the socio-historical ones — is much more complex. For all these

hundred years since Marx we know that there are no bare, brute, and objective facts in the realm of human affairs, so that we may be able to pick up one set of those creatures to suit our taste. Like Chattopadhyaya I too believed in objective social facts until I seriously studied Marx. But then like Saul on his way to Damascus I was struck by the blinding light of Marx and started seeing differently. Each of us, I know now, with our respective given class roles have our respective aims and aspirations, such that each of us apprehend — *not* different set of facts, but — facts in a characterisation determined by that role, and choose among the facts so apprehended according to our respective roles. (To note how Marx is a bit of Kant and a bit of Hegel see below.) That is why, though there is nothing unknown in the material with which Chattopadhyaya has filled a ton of paper, Sanskrit darshanik tradition was seen differently, and evaluated variantly, by the "mystifiers" "with or without the patronage of the neo-colonialists". This explains why Chattopadhyaya and Daya Krishna envision the effervescence of darshan differently. Their differences, however, do not tantamount to a contradiction, even if they do, the resultant contradiction is only secondary. At the primary level they are complementary, like two sides of a coin. One can have here a glimpse of the nature of ideology. Ideology *per se* is a bourgeoisie phenomenon. It is the most powerful weapon which they had appropriated from the progressive forces frustrating their hopes. Science could have proved to be a substitute; but the bourgeoisie have appropriated that too, and condemned the aspirants of universal progress and liberation to an eternal impotence. Prometheus, it seems, is chained for all times to come.

This brings me to Chattopadhyaya's second aim. I have, earlier, indicated the psychic necessities of a bourgeois intellectual. On the one hand he had to retain his traditional armour, and on the other he had to find a place for the newly acquired — nay, appropriated — ones. So there is a need to rearrange his armoury. Chattopadhyaya is giving here one of the several alternative plans, and Daya Krishna thinks that no radical rearrangement is needed. To fling

Chattopadhyaya's sentences on his own face, "people are urged" by Chattopadhyaya "to believe that" what he says constitutes "the quintessence of Indian wisdom". "This is a myth and it has to be exposed." Myths, however, are hard to explode; no single argument can knock them down. Long-drawn battles are needed for that. So, contented I should be by indicating how Chattopadhyaya is trying to mystify, how he is trying to pass off an internal need as an external compulsion, how he is inverting the subjective and the objective, and how he is trying to trade-in a particular for the universal.

If I am wrong, Chattopadhyaya would not have used important conceptual terms in the way he did use. He uses most of the philosophical terms *not* to convey something, but, as it appears, to make the readers behave in a way he intends them to behave, just as a tribal witch-doctor uses sounds to make the patient behave in a certain anticipated way. In this respect Chattopadhyaya is paving the way for new barbarism. He never tells us what he means by 'science-orientation', or 'rationalism', or 'secularism'. Who is science-oriented? — a doctor of science, a dialectical materialist with a subscription to the *Scientific American*, or who! And who is secular? — one who attends namaz on Fridays and mass on Sundays, or one who can treat a person as a person irrespective of his religious affiliations. I am not trying to find fault with Chattopadhyaya for not doing philosophy; after all, his is a work on, and in, traditional philosophy! But then there is no excuse for his not telling us what he means by rationalism. In not articulating his concept of rationalism he has failed to discharge his professional obligation to his readers. This is the duty of the author for he uses that term more frequently than any other, and he uses it in what he thinks to be knock-down arguments. By not discharging his duty Chattopadhyaya reduces readers like me to a state where they had to constantly worry, and continuously wonder, as to who this rationalist is. Is it:

- i. one who believes that "reason" alone has access to "reality", or
- ii. one who thinks that "reason" has privileged access to "reality", or
- iii. one who, like the ideal dialectical materialist, is committed to a fixed set of presumed-to-be-true principles, and goes on mechanically stipulating them like an IBM computer, or
- iv. one who believes that a phenomenon can be explained only with reference to that phenomenon (thus that physical phenomenon can be explained in terms of physical "entities", or that poverty can be explained in terms of socio-economic variables without resorting to the notion of *Karma* or positing a *Daridranarayana*).

Indeed one can write a book on: who a rationalist is? and another on: why be a rationalist? But Chattopadhyaya thinks that all this is immaterial, for what matters to him, it appears, is what is dead in Indian philosophy! As a result, for him, rationalism becomes a new *theos*, science another, and secularism a sacred cow. So his "quest for truth" is only an attempt at a new theology.

\* \* \*

So far I have been responding to Chattopadhyaya's strategy and design, now I turn to his execution. (English is a beguiling language, but my meaning ought to be clear to the reader.) It is formidable task to comment upon Chattopadhyaya's writing, not because he is a formidable scholar or a subtle thinker, but because his execution is *not* neat. Originality, sobriety, modesty, meticulousness, careful reasoning and the kindred virtues are not to be counted among Chattopadhyaya's forte. Being known as a vociferous and vocal defender of reason, he seems to have overcome the need to reason out his thesis. Argument by assertion — if not by insinuation — is for Chattopadhyaya a valid *pramāṇa*; and anecdotal material is sufficient to go as substantial evidence. I am not suggesting that the book is totally devoid of arguments which satisfy the professional

demands of a philosopher. There are many, in chapters three and four, and again in chapter seven. But these are in others' heads. After all, in a country where living is observing traditional rituals, thinking is bound to be a repetition of traditional arguments. Moreover these arguments and counter-arguments offered by the classical Indian thinkers are re-presented better by several other contemporary scholars of Sanskrit darshan writing in English.

To preclude the possibility of my evaluation of Chattpadhyaya's work being reflective of his way of dealing with extremely important matters, I will be highly selective. So I pick a micron from the range of his writing, which, nevertheless, is cardinal to his thesis; in fact he has expended much labour and time on it, namely that idealists despise reason, and that they defend faith against reason. The idealist defence of faith legitimises the law-givers' spreading superstition, which in turn provides them a powerful tool to oppress the "toiling masses" (= sudras; that is Chattpadhyaya's equation). The destiny of the fifth caste is as irrelevant to Chattpadhyaya as it has been to "his" intellectual ancestors; so it does not figure anywhere in the bulky volume of Chattpadhyaya. There is no need either to be shocked or surprised at this for if Samkara is a sacred brahmin, Chattpadhyaya is a secular brahmin.

That apart, who are these idealists? I searched the entire text for an answer, but in vain. He keeps this term as vague and multivocal as he does with the other terms mentioned earlier. Chattpadhyaya seems to do this on purpose. By keeping his terms imprecise, he gains the freedom to use them according to the dictates of expediency. This methodological trick is commonplace. Let the crucial terms be vague, then any hypothesis can be confirmed, and any sort of evidence can be allowed to go to support a given thesis. One can even use them as terms of abuse. Perhaps, Chattpadhyaya thinks that we do understand what he means by his *terminus technicus*. As he is assuming zero-disturbance in the communication channel, let me pretend that I get his message, and not demand any clarification

even if I am not happy with his definition by enumeration and lumping. Thus from Chattopadhyaya's census register of idealists I select Śamkara the arch-priest. I am isolating him for the purpose at hand because Chattopadhyaya himself thinks that he is the *rustum-e-Hind* of idealists.

My charge against Śamkara is that he performed the śrāddha of Indian Buddhism by appropriating its fundamental tenets, and thereby provided the base required for Hindu revivalism. (I have other charges, but they are extraneous to the present context.) I consider this to be his crime, and, I hope, Chattopadhyaya would agree with me. He rejects the thesis that Samkara is a crypto-Buddhist, but what I am suggesting is not equivalent to that. However, my characterisation of Samkara as a criminal is *my* characterisation and evaluation of *his* act. Samkara himself was, I suspect, unaware of the consequences of his own action. Self-knowledge seems to have eluded the preacher of self-knowledge. Paradoxical, though, it is, it is precisely on this count I absolve him from any responsibility for what I characterised as his crime. He mystified because he was mystified; he spread superstition because he himself was superstitious. In short, Samkara is at most stupid. But Chattopadhyaya thinks that he is vicious. Here I want to differ with Chattopadhyaya, and differ radically. In my defence I appeal to human nature and commonsense. If Don Quixote knew that he was fighting windmills, he would not be quixotic. And I am tempted to believe that Samkara was a Don Quixote. Chattopadhyaya cannot entertain that possibility; he is the last person to give a benefit of doubt to an idealist.

This makes it obligatory for Chattopadhyaya to show that Samkara accepted the divinity of reason, but camouflaged it to appear as devil with the intention of keeping the masses scared of rational truth. But that is an impossible task as Samkara corpus goes against it. Then in order to show that Samkara is vicious, Chattopadhyaya is left with the only option of maintaining that Samkara belonged to the class to which the law-givers belong, and in

the division of labour which that class required to perpetuate its power, despising reason fell into his lot. Chattpadhyaya seems to be suggesting this when he writes on p. 202: "*Conscious of importance of superstitions for the purpose of controlling masses the law-givers do their best to condemn reason.*" Now, as a rejection of reason is difficult, and as "such a task is beyond the law-givers and can best be undertaken only by philosophers. But who among the philosophers can oblige the law-givers with a theoretical defence of faith against reason? Obviously only those for whom such a defence also suits their philosophical purposes . . . They are our idealists and idealists alone. *Driven by the basic need of their metaphysics*, they are obliged to condemn reason . . ." (italics added).

From the second of the two italicised passages here it can safely be assumed that according to Chattpadhyaya, Samkara despises reason for philosophical reasons. This means that it is his personal conviction and *not* a public posture which he has put up to keep the masses away from rational truth. If so his proscribing the masses to acquire rational truth tantamounts to stupidity and not viciousness, for he himself did not indulge in that acquisitive game. Then to show that he is vicious, Chattpadhyaya will have to harp on the fact that Samkara spread superstition. In so far as he is a fellow-traveller of the law-givers (cf. Manu) he is, on the strength of the first of the italicised passages above, conscious of the utility of superstition. So Samkara took superstition as venerable truth: Chattpadhyaya would agree. Further, Chattpadhyaya remarks that for the law-givers "these venerable truths" are ones that are "revealed in scriptures" (p. 184). Then in prohibiting the masses to come into contact with the scriptures Samkara did great service to them — unknowingly though! Thus if Samkara is to be accused, he is to be accused of being treacherous to his fellow-travellers, that is the law-givers. Samkara thus turned out to be too smart a convict for a poor prosecutor like Chattpadhyaya.

But Chattopadhyaya will not rest. In his untiring attempts to debunk the idealists he is like the Schoolmaster in Goldsmith's *Deserted Village*; so he comes out with another attack. I shall try to meet that. There is no specific name for this type of argument in the extant logical literature. Nonetheless it is a fallacy, and is typical of colonial intellectuals. It is too common at least in this country, which is, and which has been, a logical wilderness. To capture the formal structure of that argument relativising it to the present context, I may venture to state that it reads like: if *foreign* Plato could do it, *desi* Samkara must have done it. Plato did it, so Samkara did it. Did what?

In reply Chattopadhyaya points his finger towards Plato's "noble lie". I am not a Plato scholar, though being placed in a situation which is similar to the one described by Plato or his forger in the *Seventh Epistle*, for quite some time now I have been browsing through the *Plato Corpus*. And, though Greek, to me, is Greek, being sufficiently audacious, I would like to say that, perhaps, this "noble lie" is a scholarly error. There is no last word in Plato studies, just as there is no final argument in philosophy. So one cannot take the "noble lie" either as an axiom or else as a myth propagated by professors of philosophy to meet their promotional needs. Hannah Arendt (see her *Truth and Politics*) for instance, thinks that the belief that Plato invented the "noble lie" rested on a misunderstanding of a crucial passage (414) in the *Republic*, where Plato speaks of one of his myths — a 'Phoenician tale' — as a *pheidos*. Since the same Greek word signifies "fiction", "error", and "lie" according to the context — if Plato wants to distinguish between error and lie, the Greek language forces him to speak "involuntary" and "voluntary" *pheidos* — the text can be rendered with Cornford as "bold flight of invention" or be read with Eric Voegelin ... as satirical in intention; under no circumstances can it be understood as a recommendation of lying as we understand it. Plato, of course, was permissive about occasional lies to deceive the enemy or insane people — *Republic*, 382; they

are "useful . . . in the way of medicine . . . to be handled by no one but a physician", and "the physician in the polis is the ruler (388)." I quoted at length not because I want to make a point in defence of Plato (a genius like him does not need that), but to show that Chattpadhyaya, without due regard for scholarly suspension of judgements, refers (p. 179) to a passage on the stephanus page about which Arendt is commenting to make Plato mean things which he needs in his low-down on Samkara. Thus Chattpadhyaya's premises is in doubt, so his conclusion will have to stand on its own.

This does not mean that Plato and Samkara do not have anything in common. They agree on several important points, and their respective roles have structural similarity, as Chattpadhyaya himself shows in chapter ten. He is absolutely right in holding that both of them are elitist, and propose to keep the masses away from what they consider to be important. But he misses their crucial difference. If Plato wanted to keep the masses in dark about rational truth, Samkara wanted to keep them ignorant of the scriptures. They also differ in their respective ways of defending themselves. Plato wanted to keep rational truth to himself as he was scared about the prospect of its being diluted into mere opinion when the ignorant masses get hold of it. (That is the message of Cave Allegory.) Thus Plato's defence is philosophical. Samkara on the other hand wanted to hold the scriptural truth in his own fist due to *dharmaic* reasons. Hence his defence is unphilosophical. This goes to support my assessment of Samkara rather than the assessment of Chattpadhyaya.

There is, I am afraid, an in-built tension in Chattpadhyaya's attitude towards Samkara. This tension, however is not Chattpadhyaya's idiosyncracy; it is the generic trait of comparative philosophers. What Tom did, they tell us, Ram did; that shows their inferiority complex. And what Tom did, they labour to establish, Ram did better; that indicates their compensatory superiority complex. Though Chattpadhyaya, on the count of sophistication,

gives A+ to Plato, D to Kautilya, and a poor F to Samkara, he had to admit that if Plato was uncharitable to the slaves, Samkara was inhuman to the sudras. But this is inessential either to his thesis or to my evaluation of it; yet, I would like to suggest that it would be better to measure Samkara in terms of his own context, rather than take either Plato or Isocrates as measuring rods. That brings me to Isocrates.

On the authority of Farrington, Chattopadhyaya brackets Isocrates with Plato. Why Farrington lumps Plato and Isocrates together is better known to him; I do not have any chance to check as Penguins must have by now pulped Farrington. However, I am certain of the importance of Isocrates to Chattopadhyaya as both of them are progressive thinkers. Isocrates was the first to question the elitist and utopian political attitude of Plato, and propagate, contra Plato, the idea of a moderately wide participation of the generalists in political decision-making. I am mentioning this to bring to Chattopadhyaya's notice the dangers involved in paperback scholarship.

As far as Chattopadhyaya is concerned all this is "much more than a matter of antiquarian curiosity", as, according to him, an understanding of the techniques adopted for controlling the masses *then* is a *sine qua non* for understanding the techniques that are being used in controlling the masses *now*. He may be right. But understanding *per se* requires an ability to see differences. Philosophers, I always thought, should — like the old King Lear call out: "Come, I will show thee differences". That is why it is disappointing to note that Chattopadhyaya does not even make an attempt to move in that direction. Oppression then may be structurally isomorphic with oppression now. Despite that, the nature of oppression is not historically invariant. Plato and Samkara obliged — that is Chattopadhyaya's term — the establishment in its hobby of oppressing the masses by keeping them away from rational truth and scriptural secret. Today the establishment is not scared of the masses getting hold of these species of truth. Today, as far as the establishment is concerned, rational

and scriptural truths are dumb, mute creatures. On the other hand it sees danger in numerical truths — statistical secrets. (Even in the USSR after the historic logic-debate of 1950-51 research in mathematical logic and non-dialectical philosophy of science have become tolerable pursuits.) But ask any government on this globe as to the number of persons which it has condemned to incarcerate without anybody else knowing what their crime was. Either replies will be withheld, or statistical lies will be put forth. Governments are giant power girds, so let us leave them to take a more familiar example. Ask any powerful professor in our universities about the *number* of sycophants he engages to gather information on, and spread scandals about, his junior colleagues who question him. You will know, the power of numbers and the bewitchment of statistics. Times have changed, and along with them techniques of tyranny. Chattopadhyaya ought to know; he ought to realise that what Manu said or what Samkara did and all that is there on a parchment. If we are capable of taking it into our cognisance without being affected by their thoughts and actions, let us cherish them; and if we are not mature enough to do that let us bundle them in a loin-cloth and consign the bundle to an attic.

Chattopadhyaya is so obsessed with tradition and is so sensitive about idealism, he does not see that oppression is not a monopoly of the idealists; materialists have a share in it — perhaps, lion's share. That is why I am induced to believe that through his writings Chattopadhyaya is not enlightening the masses; he is mystifying them. He is contriving a new myth. To use his own trick, this trick has been suggested by Plato himself — not at 414 *Republic*, but thirty two stephanus pages earlier. "We do not", he wrote there, "know the truth about the past but we can invent a fiction as like it as may be".

I wonder where Chattopadhyaya picked up those curious notions of dialectic as practised by the Greeks on the one hand, and Hegel and Marx on the other. As a consequence — as a disastrous consequence — of those notions

he comes to think that the style of philosophising we find in Sanskrit darshan is dialectical. Now this is so if coitus interruptus is coitus *per se*. As far as I know, in the Sanskrit philosophical treatises discussion is carried to end neither in an *impasse* (as in the elenctic dialogues of Plato), nor in *Aufhebung* (as in Hegel and Marx). The *uttarapaksha* does not "negate" the *poorvapaksha* in its bare individuality for being only a partial reality; the negation and rejection here is total. So the *uttarapaksha* does not "conserve" the essential being of the *poorvapaksha* and "elevate" it into the higher realm of whole reality. Without negation, conservation, and elevation there is not a thing anywhere to be called dialectic. All that needs to be said about Chattopadhyaya's understanding of the Greek dialectic is that he thinks that *rakovakya*, that is "the art of debate by questions and answers" is something like the Greek dialectic! When it is nationalism, who can afford to lag in chauvinism! It is improbable that Chattopadhyaya does not know what "political-economy" is; he at least must have heard of Marx's critique of it. Yet, he had to call code de Kautilya a treatise in political-economy.

Finally a word about Chattopadhyaya's Marx scholarship. Inspite of being a marxist, and a teacher of philosophy since 1943 (see the dust jacket), he seems to be totally ignorant of the immense contribution to Marx studies since then. "(I)n Indian philosophy", Chattopadhyaya writes on p. 496, "the two (i.e., materialism and dialectic) remain disjoint and do not coalesce into materialist dialectic or dialectical materialism, as they do in the *philosophy of Marx and Engles*" (italics added). This Tweedledee-Tweedledom interpretation of Marx-Engles, which originated at Moscow, is too simplistic and naive to convince non-believing Marx scholars. It is now fairly well established that dialectical materialism is Engles' folly, and not of Marx, who is philosophically too mature to commit such a blunder. He, being too familiar with German idealism, and being desirous of overcoming its limitations, could not afford to commit what he thought to be the mistake in Kant and Hegel. That is

why Marx refrains from the Hegelian mistake of tucking in reason (dialectic) with reality (material world) and the Kantian mistake of tagging it to individual human mind. Consequently dialectic had to be telescoped into social dynamics. This is how Marx — as it emerges from the current state of scholarship — tried to overcome the limitations of the Kantian duality of "the moral law within" and "the starry heavens high above", and also the disastrous unity of reason and reality which Hegel projected. As a result Marx had to bridge the gulf between man and society on the one hand, and society and the physical world on the other. Most of his time and energy was spent on the first, and his attempts at the second leaves several loose ends. He never thought that he said the last word; nor did he believe that his was the last philosophy. On the other hand, as if he was anticipating Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, Marx in *German Ideology* holds that philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its importance only when reality is depicted.

At any given time the possibility of such a depiction is to be measured in terms of the available scientific knowledge. The present state of scientific knowledge (I beg for a margin of a few years, for I do not have access to a good library) enables us to assert with confidence that brain is a material entity. But it does not enable us to affirm with equal confidence that there exists a description of the functioning of the ultimate material constituents of the brain, which is equivalent to a description of the functioning of the brain itself. That being so, unless I am absolutely out of date in my information and thoroughly faulty in my reasoning, in chapter eight Chattopadhyaya is indulging in gratuitous poppycock. To substitute Marx-Engles for science is not only to betray one's belief, but also to show disrespect to all the three.

To wind up this essay in the politics of philosophy,

"When I have heard small talk about great men  
I climb to bed; Light my two candles; then  
Consider what was said; and put aside

What such-a-one remarked and someone-else replied.  
 They have spoken lightly of my deathless friends  
 (Lamps for my gloom, hands guiding where I stumble),  
 Quoting, for shallow conversational ends,  
 What Shelly shrilled, what Blake once wildly  
 muttered...

How can they use such names and be not humble?  
 I have sat silent; angry at what they uttered.  
 The dead bequeathed them life; the dead have said  
 What these can only memorise and mumble."

—Siegfried Sassoon

Jaipur-4

A. P. Rao

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## MAO TSE TUNG: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF HIS THOUGHTS

The Chinese Revolution of 1949, like its precursor the October Revolution (1917), was a significant event. It led to the emergence of China as a great power, and tilted the balance of power not only in the Far East, but also in the World as a whole.

Mao was the principal architect of this Revolution. It is his ideas which dominated the Chinese scene for the last forty years and although the death of Mao is likely to change this position in the near future, his ideas would continue to play a significant role in China. His philosophy exercised some, though now declining, influence even in other countries where Maoist Groups have been formed leading to split in the Communist movement.

Since 1956-57 Maoists have been drifting away from the socialist and people's democratic camp and now they consider the Soviets as their main enemy and the Socialist countries and the Communist parties following Soviet Union, as also the communist leaders in China who differ from Maoists as 'revisionists' and 'capitalist roaders'.

In India two widely different schools of thought tend to accept Maoist Thoughts. The Naxalites, now split into over half a dozen groups, accept Maoist revolutionary philosophy of armed guerilla struggle. Similarly some Gandhians are attracted by Mao's emphasis on egalitarianism, decentralisation, moral incentives, and anti-bureaucratism.

It will therefore, be interesting to study Mao's thoughts. Mao's thoughts have been influenced by a number of factors such as the environment of the family and the country, history and tradition, Western thought, personal experience, and the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.

Coming from a poor peasant background in the province of Hunan, Mao had an understanding of the rural people among whom he had worked and whom he con-

sidered as the most important element for the Revolution. It is said that through hostility to his father who was opposed to his studies beyond the primary level he developed a rebellious temperament. Mao had studied Chinese history and classics. In his writings he often makes references to them. He drew inspiration from peasant rebellions and stories of great men and robin hoods. Although according to strict Marxist stand robin hoods cannot be regarded as the proper element for the Communist Party Mao did not hesitate to take advantage of their courage and experience and enrolled them in the Red or the People's Liberation Army. Mao had studied books on the Chinese art of war and had joined the army during the Revolution of 1911. While he was still a student Mao had become nationalist and like Sun Yat-sen he regretted the loss of Chinese Empire and its semicolonial status. He took part in the May 4 (1919) students' demonstrations against the treaty of Versailles which conceded the Japanese claims to German concessions in China.

Even though Mao was against Western imperialism he was influenced by the Western Liberal, idealist and anarchist thought. In his advocacy of freedom of thought allowing the hundred flowers to bloom and the different schools of thoughts to contend one finds the liberal ideas of Mill and Spencer and his call for decentralisation, attack on the party and state and in his emphasis on subjective activity one finds influence of individualism, anarchism and idealism.

But the most important factors which influenced him were the October Revolution and its underlying philosophy — Marxism-Leninism — and the Chinese environment of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Mao openly admits the debt which he owes to the October Revolution the salvos of which roused China from her slumber. In the Semi-colonial conditions of China it was not easy to obtain Marxist Literature. Hence for a long time Chinese communists were not able to understand Marxism correctly or apply those ideas even though the

Communist Party of China had formally accepted the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. This has been admitted by Mao who also made many mistakes in his class analysis or in assessing the respective roles of the proletariat and the peasantry. But the fact that October Revolution was proletarian, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist and that it stood for the freedom of colonies and had abrogated the unequal treaties which the Czarist Russia had concluded with China had tremendous impact on China. Further, the Young Soviets came to the rescue of Chinese nationalism which they supported with men, money and material. Similar assistance was rendered by the Soviets to Chinese Communism at different stages since its very birth. Mao admitted that the existence of revolutionary rear was a significant factor which contributed to the success of their Revolution. Even after the Revolution it is the Soviets which helped China in her reconstruction and even diplomatically. In fact at one stage Mao had visualised a situation in which the Chinese Soviets could join the Soviet Union.

Mao and his comrades had to apply Marxism-Leninism to China where conditions were different from those obtaining in Russia at the time of October Revolution or in India. Whereas Czarist Russia was an independent Centralised Empire State in which some capitalist development had taken place, China in the latter half of the 19th and first half of the 20th Century was a semi-colony dominated by a number of imperial powers in their respective spheres of influence. Hence the Central Government in China was weak and the provincial war lords supported by their respective imperial powers tended to be autonomous. This situation did not allow the growth of a strong national bourgeoisie which remained weak. Chinese feudal and compradore bourgeois classes betrayed the national interest. Under the circumstances the Chinese Communists emerged not only as custodians of social and economic reforms but also of nationalism. In their fight for liberation from the Japanese yoke, the Chinese could take advantage of the inter-imperial

contradiction and get support from some imperial powers and their bourgeois supporters in China specially during the anti-Japan War. Since China did not have much industrial development the industrial working class formed only five per cent of her population. The Chinese Communist Party was, therefore, dominated by the Urban petty-bourgeois and rural peasant element which coupled with its ideological backwardness influenced its character and the method of achieving the goal by means of armed guerilla struggle. This explains the important part which peasantry played in the Chinese Revolution.

The Maoists hesitated to characterise the ideas of Mao as Maoism because these are not so systematic as those of Marx and Lenin who had enough time for study and for organising their ideas. Mao had time for study only at the end of the Great March in 1935 when they had settled in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border district with its capital at Yenan and when he had been elected the leader of the Party. But of late the Macists have gained confidence and regard Mao's thoughts as even more important than those of Marx or Lenin and the present period since 1935 as one dominated by the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung. According to them the era of Marx which began in 1848 came to an end in 1898 and that of Lenin in 1935.

It may also be mentioned that whereas until 1956 Mao was in general adhering to and was interpreting and expounding orthodox Marxist-Leninist thoughts, in 1957 he came out with certain new formulations which are in conflict with Marxism-Leninism as it is understood and practised in the Soviet Union and in other Socialist countries which follow her lead. Two factors appear to have influenced Mao. In 1956 the Communist Party of China dropped the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung which had been declared as the basis of its ideology along with Marxism-Leninism in 1945. They retained only Marxism-Leninism. This signified the weakening of Mao's hold on the Party which controlled the Government also. In the international sphere also he came to have differences with the Soviet

Communist Party and other Parties which followed the Soviet lead. This was in 1957 when he challenged Khrushchev's ideas which he called as 'Revisionist'. Thus Maoist leadership was being challenged at home as well as in the international field.

The thoughts of Mao Tse Tung are defined as "the Marxism-Leninism of the age of the Universal collapse of imperialism and the triumph of socialism throughout the world." It is also defined as Marxism-Leninism of the age of declining imperialism and People's Revolutions. This is not very different from Stalin's definition of Leninism. Stalin had defined Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Lenin had defined imperialism as moribund capitalism. Thus the adjectives 'Universal Collapse' or 'declining' before 'imperialism' do not mean anything more than "moribund capitalism" because if capitalism dies imperialism as defined by Lenin cannot survive and as a necessary corollary the Liberation of the colonial world would follow. Proletarian revolutions which are to bring about this collapse are nothing but socialist revolutions. But Mao and his followers seem to lay emphasis on "people's revolutions" which are not the same as the proletarian revolutions though they may lead to socialism as an ultimate goal. People's Revolutions are primarily bourgeois democratic revolutions which are achieved by the United fronts of different classes including the national bourgeoisie though they are under the leadership of the proletariat and are directed against imperialism. Thus Maoists lay less stress on the proletarian and more on the national, i.e., bourgeois democratic revolutions which are to take place in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and are to precede the proletarian (socialist) revolutions in the developed countries of the West. Thus they propound the view that the world village, i.e., the predominantly rural developing countries by achieving the Bourgeois Democratic and later Socialist Revolutions would surround the world city, i.e., the developed countries which will then follow the socialist revolutionary paths.

It has already been pointed out that, as Communists, Maoists accept Marxism-Leninism, and even though along-with Khruschev they too had denounced Stalin for his personality cult, they include the study of Stalin's works as well. But as before 1949 Marxist Literature was not easily available in China and only a few of these works had been translated there into Chinese (Chinese was the only language which Mao knew) and also because Mao was busy with active political and military affairs most of the time before the Head Quarters were established in Yenan in 1935, he did not get enough time to have grasp of the Marxist Literature and his understanding of it has never been adequate. He has admitted this fact. For instance, in the earlier period he thought the whole population of China is divided between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the rich including the feudal Lords being capitalist and the rest Labour. Similarly, before he studied the agrarian situation in Hunan in 1926 he did not realise the significance of the role of the peasantry in a Bourgeois Democratic or proletarian revolution; and, thereafter, he underestimated the role of the proletariat.

Mao borrowed most of his ideas about Marxism from the Soviet Sources but his understanding of these ideas is rather different. As a Marxist he believed in Dialectical Materialism and associated Dialectics with materialism and metaphysics with idealism while idealism and materialism can both be dialectical as well as metaphysical. He thought that the roots of idealism lie in the division of Labour between manual and intellectual; but this division existed in all class societies and may stay even under socialism. This is responsible for the development of productive forces which enabled the growth of culture. The origins of idealism lie not in the division of labour but in the splitting of the primitive society into class societies and emergence of the exploiting classes which needed idealist theory to defend their privileged position. At another place Mao says that the ancient times were dominated by the materialist, the medieval times by the idealist and once again modern age

is dominated by the materialist thought. This is a very simplistic sort of statement. Similarly Mao confuses mind and matter with subjective and objective, but not all objective reality is necessarily material and not all those who accept objective reality are necessarily materialist. Even some idealists accept objective reality. Only those who accept the existence of material reality can be considered as materialists.

"Being determines consciousness" is the basic law of dialectical materialism. From this it follows that the base, the economic structure in society determines the superstructure such as morality, politics, religion, law, etc. Further, it is the forces of production rather than the relations of production (which are dependent upon the former) which play the major role in production. Similarly, it is the objective laws rather than the subjective activity of man which determine the nature and pace of change.

On all these questions Mao came to have wide differences with other Marxists.

It is true that under socialism subjective activity begins to play a greater role because under it the leadership becomes conscious of the scientific and objective laws of social development and it consciously plans development which is not possible under bourgeois system of individual and private ownership in which profit motive is the spur of production. But it is the consciousness of the objective laws of production which heightens the role of subjective activity and not the subordination of objective laws to subjective activity or the ignorance of or indifference to those laws. There is no contradiction between the objective laws and subjective activity but the latter cannot change the objective laws; it has to conform to them.

Mao thinks that it is man and not the inert matter which plays the decisive role in production. From this he concludes that atom bomb is a paper tiger. Instruments, weapons of war or tools, machines and techniques and skills of production are not as important as man. Hence his

emphasis on the dominant role of ideas, superstructure, politics and leadership rather than that of the economic base or technology, specialist or expert. For him it is relations of production rather than the forces of production which matter in Socialist production.

Marxism does not deny the role of man, it only points to the limits of his power. Man himself is a part of the forces of production and has to work within the limits of the development of the instruments and technique of production available at a certain stage of social development. Man could not make the atom bomb or go to the moon in ancient times because at that time technology was not so developed.

Because of the emphasis on subjective activity and on the role of man Mao lays greater emphasis on super-structure, role of politics and moral values than on relations of production. He thinks that material reality can be transformed into spiritual and the latter into the former. Thus he gives undue emphasis on the role of man and of the leader which leads to personality cult. He lays very great stress on the power of education and propaganda. Over-emphasis on the subjective factor and role of the leadership to the neglect of objective laws is responsible for the adventurist policy of the Great Leap and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at home and of Armed Guerilla Revolutions abroad. Thus, he ignores the role of objective factors even in bringing about revolutions.

In the encouragement of personality cult Mao has surpassed Stalin. Mao is being called as the greatest general, the greatest teacher, the greatest helmsman, the greatest genius the like of which appear only once in centuries in the world and only once in several millenia in China. Even certain magical and supernatural powers such as healing diseases or achieving success are attributed to chanting of Mao's quotations.

It may be noted that even though Mao and Maoists talked of the atom bomb as 'paper tiger', in reality they

have been producing it in ever larger numbers. They are opposed to the banning of the production of this 'paper tiger'. Similarly, while they attacked the specialists and educationists in the name of "politics in Command" and subordination of 'expertness' to 'redness', they did not touch the scientists and technologists, specially those who were engaged in the production of atom bomb and military equipment.

I have said above that these ideas were developed by Mao after he was reduced to a minority at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. These along with his views on "Contradictions" form the theoretical background of his struggle against the Party Leadership which was entrenched in the Government. This struggle assumed the form of "The Great Leap Forward" in 1958-59, and The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969.

The Law of Contradiction is an important law of dialectics in Marxist thought. There are two aspects of a contradiction which co-exist and are, therefore, in unity; but they are, at the same time, in conflict and in a process of constant change. These two are the positive and a negative aspects of the contradiction and through their constant struggle and through gradual quantitative changes a new stage is reached when there is a qualitative change. A synthesis emerges which in its turn becomes thesis and comes to have two aspects. Thus, the process continues. Contradictions are the source of all development. In class society they assume the form of class struggle through which changes take place, finally leading to classless society and communism.

While accepting this law of contradictions Mao and the Maoists accept almost any concept with an antonym as two aspects of contradiction such as good and evil, war and peace, landlord and tenant, or bourgeoisie and proletariat, etc. On this basis, they consider war as inevitable concomitant of peace and as such inevitable. But these are two different types of inter-state relationships. World war is not necessarily followed by peace but may continue in the

form of minor or limited wars. This happened after the First World War and again after the Second. To Mao and the Maoists war is the most important form of class struggle whereas in fact it is one of the outcomes of contradictions in capitalist society.

Similarly, Mao thinks that in accordance with the Law of interpretation and interchangeability of aspects peace gives place to war; landlords become tenants while the latter become landowners, the oppressors become the oppressed and the latter the oppressor. Here he misses the evolutionary aspect of things and treats them as interchangeable. To him movements amount to change of places of things and not the emergence of a new quality through quantitative changes. This is the concept of circular motion or of cycle Theory of Change. Under Socialism exploiters do not become exploited nor oppressors become oppressed but the system of exploitation and oppression is put an end to. Similarly, dictatorship of the proletariat is not something permanent but it too, evolves and when exploitation and the exploiting classes are eliminated the State becomes a State of the whole people. It is also possible to have bourgeoisie without proletariat such as the existence of the commercial or compradore bourgeoisie in backward countries without industrial working class; or, the existence of the proletariat in socialist countries without the existence of bourgeoisie.

The Law of 'Contradictions' is a complex one. It is possible for the two 'contradictory' and opposed aspects not only to co-exist but also at times to co-operate on a short term programme basis for a limited purpose. That will not change the nature of contradictions. Thus though bourgeoisie and proletariat are two antagonistic hostile classes yet in the struggle for national liberation against foreign imperial power they may co-operate until the objective is won. During the Second World War Western imperialism and the Soviets joined hands against Fascism. This was possible because of inter-imperial contradictions.

One of the classifications of contradictions is as antagonistic and non-antagonistic. Maoists say that contradiction with the enemy is antagonistic, but one among the people is non-antagonistic. With the State power in the hands of the people, non-antagonistic contradictions among people can be resolved peacefully by means of education, persuasion and propaganda while resolution of contradiction with the enemy requires force. Maoists consider contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the People's Republic of China as non-antagonistic which can turn antagonistic in case bourgeoisie refuses to be amenable to reason. According to the Marxist view contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can never be non-antagonistic because their interests are basically opposed to each other. Whereas bourgeoisie will be interested in retaining the Capitalist system the opposite of it is true of the proletariat.

The term "people" is also vague and does not signify the Marxist class approach. According to Mao all those elements who support Socialism in the Peoples' Republic of China are in the Camp of the people and those who are opposed to it are the enemies. According to this definition the national bourgeoisie, as long as it supports the People's Republic of China is to be treated as friend and is to be included in the peoples' fold, but all those who differ with Mao are regarded as enemies even though they may be old and tried communists. This is a sheer arbitrary approach.

Mao has come out with a new theory of contradictions according to which even under socialism there are contradictions between the Government and the masses, the Communist party and the people, the Leadership of the Party and the Cadre, etc. This view was propounded by him in 1957. This theory was his excuse for starting the Great Leap and later the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with a view to reasserting his leadership in the Party and the Government. These contradictions can become antagonistic in case they are not handled properly. On this basis during the course of the cultural Revolution

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he asked the Red Guards and the People's Liberation Army to intervene and to bombard the Party Headquarters.

Contrary to the Soviet view Mao contended that the stage of Socialism was a prolonged stage of transition in which the capitalist elements could usurp power unless people showed wisdom and vigilance. This, according to him, has happened in the Soviet Union where during the period of transition from Capitalism to Communism the Bourgeois element has become dominant. According to him the same thing has happened in all the other countries of the Socialist block which follow the Soviet Lead. The Soviets are considered as imperialist. Thus while Mao treated the national bourgeoisie as a part of the people with which the contradiction was non-antagonistic, he treated the whole of the Socialist Camp including the Soviet Union, with the exception of Albania as revisionist, Capitalist roader and enemies.

The main arguments of the Maoists for taking up this stand are: The Soviet Union and the Countries of the Socialist Camp following the Soviet lead believe in material incentives and profit motive for encouraging production. This has caused wide disparities of income. This they consider as the capitalist way. Further, they charge the Soviets with expansionist and hegemonic motives. They think the Soviets exploit other Socialist and developing countries through trade and investments. Thus they are imperialistic.

To avoid a situation which would turn a Socialist Country into capitalist Mao advocates continuous watch, continuous right to revolution and rebellion to fight out revisionism and capitalist roaders, and a prolonged period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat until Communism is achieved. This forms the basis of his Cultural Revolution.

According to classical definition of Capitalism what determines its nature is the private ownership in the means of production which causes recurrent economic crises, unemployment and social unrest. During the last two or three

years, Capitalism on the World Scale was passing through such recession when the growth rate in a number of countries had come down to zero or even minus. During this period, or earlier during the Great Depression of 1929, the Soviets had no such crisis. The Socialist World is not afflicted with it. In the Socialist countries there is no private ownership in the means of production such as land, mines, mills, factories and banks or even shops. Payment in accordance with the amount of work done leading to differences in incomes under socialism does not make the socialist countries capitalist. That is the principle of payment under socialism.

In the classical Leninist sense which the Maoist accept there can be no imperialism in the Soviet Union because it has been defined as the highest, the moribund, the monopolist or the finance capital stage of capitalism. Since there is no capitalism in the Soviet Union there is no need for it to seek markets for its surplus production to keep the economy going or to earn profits. No country can do without trade and commerce because none is completely self-sufficient; but the Soviet terms of trade are not disadvantageous to other countries and are usually mutually beneficial. In fact the possibility of this alternative of trade with the Soviets has enabled the developing countries to resist the pressures of the imperialist countries, a fact which is made clear by the resistance which has been put up by the OPEC countries. The Soviets have also enabled the developing countries to develop such basic and heavy industries as lead to a country's economic independence. Such is the case with India's own development of industries like steel, machine tool and heavy electrical. There are only a few countries in the recent past which have become independent and which had not been helped by the Soviet Union. She has helped China, at first in its struggle against imperialism and later against Chiang's corrupt Koumintang dictatorship supported by U.S. She has helped her reconstruction as well.

One might ask the question: when did the Soviets become capitalist or imperialist? The basic principles of her home and foreign policy have not changed almost ever since the October Revolution. Mao did not brand her as capitalist or imperialist even until 1962. How did they turn capitalist and imperialist overnight during and after Mao's Great proletarian cultural revolution? If the Soviets have emerged as a stronger imperial power and she and the countries of the socialist camp have become capitalist how is this the period of declining imperialism and socialist revolutions as Mao suggested elsewhere? It should rather be the period of rising social imperialism and capitalist counter-revolution.

Lenin had propounded the view that in the period of imperialism the imperialist chain will break where the link is the weakest. Thus it was not necessary that the Socialist revolution should take place only in the industrially advanced countries. Further he said that in industrially backward and predominantly feudal countries the two revolutions — the Bourgeois democratic and proletarian (socialist) — can be more or less simultaneous. In the age of imperialism when the feudal and capitalist orders are in a process of decay and the working class socialist ideology and movements have come to stay the bourgeoisie will not be the leader even of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution which too will be under the leadership of the proletariat. Lenin also said that revolutions in the backward countries may precede those in some of the advanced countries. In opposition to Lenin's theory Mao developed his own theory of Bourgeois Democratic Revolution.

He accepted the theory of proletarian leadership of the nationalist (people's) revolution and the contemporaneousness of the proletarian revolution; but in practice, he laid more emphasis on the role of the peasantry. Secondly, he seemed to absolutise the theory of revolutions in the developing countries preceding those in the developed countries, when for example he said that the world village will surround the world city. This has also meant the adoption of a

different method of achieving revolution,— viz., the prolonged armed guerilla struggle and creation of bases in the remote hilly and forest areas. In Russia, it was the method of insurrection in the cities followed by rebellion in the country-side. That failure to resolve the economic crisis, leads to war for the sake of markets is, according to Lenin, the main feature of Imperialism. Mao therefore insists that war is inevitable and that this is the most important form of class struggle which would lead to revolutions and end of capitalism and imperialism, and victory of socialism.

Other Marxists do not think that the Armed Guerilla-method is of universal application which can be practised in all situations or that it is the only or the most important method. They also think that in this period of the Crisis of world imperialism, strengthening of the socialist block, strong progressive and proletarian movements, war-weariness and the dangerous nature of the nuclear war, war is not inevitable. And while emphasising the need for class struggle they do not think that use of violent revolutionary methods is the only way to bring about revolutionary change, especially under present circumstances when people's movements have grown strong. The object can be achieved through persistent class struggle. This along with Mao's criticism of material incentives form the main basis of differences between the Soviet Union and her communist supporters on the one hand and the Maoists on the other.

It may be noted that while China has been talking about war she has not fired a shot after the Korean war and has not gone to war even to liberate Macao and Hong Kong not to speak of Taiwan. It is imperialism which needs war to overcome its crisis; this is not in the interest of the people. Hence, the Soviets, ever since their inception have stood for a policy of peace, of peaceful co-existence and for disarmament.

The ideological differences between the Soviets and the People's Republic of China have led to split in the Communist movement and its mass organisations such as the World Trade Union, World Teachers and World Students

movements. Whereas the Soviets still treat China as a member of the Socialist Camp and want to keep differences at the ideological level, the Maoists denounce her as capitalist and imperialist and have found a theoretical justification for the split which they consider as inevitable and healthy.

They take advantage of the Law of Unity and Conflict of opposite, and splitting of a single whole or the law of split of an entity. Lenin confined its operation to the period of class society in which there is exploitation and class struggle. In Socialist Society, here is no exploitation, no classes, and hence, no class struggle. Maoist view on the other hand is that even under socialism classes and class struggles continue for a prolonged period under the dictatorship of the proletariat until the stage of communism is reached, and hence, this law is applicable to the period of socialism. Therefore splits are natural and inevitable and are to be welcomed. Thus, they not only do not mind split in the socialist camp, they consider it as healthy. On the other hand, the Soviets consider these differences as non-antagonistic to be resolved by mutual discussions and understanding. They think that within the socialist society or among socialist communities (States) there is no basic conflict of interests and hence differences can be resolved peacefully and the Unity of the Socialist Society, Socialist States and progressive movements can be maintained. In fact, the Maoists go to the length of saying that even the scientific and revolutionary Marxist thought engenders its opposite, *viz.* the unscientific and counter-revolutionary doctrine and that the Socialist Society also splits. Marxists rule out such a possibility. There may be splits in the socialist movements only when the enemy ideology penetrates a section of it or when counter-revolutionaries capture the leadership of these movements; but there is nothing dialectical or progressive about it; nor it is inevitable because of the absence of any basic contradictions.

Marxists attribute these deviations of Mao from the path of Marxism-Leninism to lack of understanding of the philosophy and to influences foreign to Marxism such as

anarchism, idealism and nationalism which have worked on him. His ideology according to them is basically petty-bourgeois, Jingoistic, hegemonistic and sinocentric.

Mao's understanding of Marxist philosophy too appears rather weak. For example at one place he says that the understanding of Marxist philosophy requires hard work whereas no such effort is needed to learn idealist philosophy. On the other hand, at another place he expresses a contrary opinion saying, it is easy for workers to understand Dialectical Materialism because they work on matter with machines, and they observe change. Contrary to Mao's view it is possible to say that workers are interested only in the economic improvement of their living conditions and acquire revolutionary consciousness through education in revolutionary philosophy. Again Mao thinks that practice (without subjecting it to scientific analysis) leads to theory. Yet at another place he says that Marxist literature—books of Marx, Engels and Lenin—are difficult to understand and are remote from Chinese life.

There is no doubt that Mao's achievements are great and that he would be remembered along with Marx and Lenin. Similarly the technique of Guerilla war which he and his Comrades developed is indeed unique. However, it is difficult to consider Mao as a consistent Marxist. The use of Charisma and Spread of his personality cult and the counter-revolutionary practice in the international field are a clear proof of his non-Marxist attitudes.

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## ANNOUNCEMENTS

WE are happy to announce that Mr. Rajendra Prasad, D-81 Defence Colony, New Delhi-100 024, has been appointed a Correspondent for the Student Supplement of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly from Vol IV, No. 2 onwards.

(5) Meaning and Necessity by R. Carnap.

Contributions may also be sent to him at the above address.

Dr. A. K. Chatterjee, the Author of "Depth Structures in Recent Philosophies of Language" published in Volume IV, No. 1 of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly has now requested that the following information may be appended in continuation of his article.

The article was based on the ideas contained in the following papers and books :

- (1) The Philosophical Relevance of Linguistic Theory by J. J. Katz.
- (2) What is wrong with Philosophy of Language by Fodor and Katz.
- (3) Philosophical Analysis and Structural Linguistics by Alston.
- (4) Linguistic Philosophy by J. J. Katz.
- (5) Meaning and the Necessity by R. Carnap.
- (6) The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger by J. L. Mehta.
- (7) Four Modern Philosophers by Arne Naess.

*Editors*

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## INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

### INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS (continued)

(17) S. V. University, Tiurpati, (A.P.). (18) Delhi University, Delhi.

### INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS (continued)

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Vidarbha  
Mahavidyalaya,  
Amaraoti.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

D. P. Chattopadhyaya . . History Society and Polity, The Macmillan Company of India Limited, Delhi. 1975 pp. xvi + 281.

T. J. Blakeley (ed.) . . Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrechet-Holland/Bostan — U.S.A. 1975, pp. vii + 224.

Juha Manninen and Raimo Tuomela (ed.) . . Essays on Explanation and Understanding, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrechet Holland/Bostan — U.S.A. 1976, pp. VI + 440.

Peter Mittelstaedet . . Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics, D. Reidel Publishing Company-Dordrechet-Holland/Bostan — U.S.A. 1976, pp. x + 221.

J.L. Mackie . . Problems from Locke, Clearendon Press, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W. 1, 1976, pp. ix + 237.

Helle Lambridis . . Empedocles — A Philosophical Investigation, The University of Alabama Press. University of Alabama U.S.A. 1976, pp. xv + 154.

Archie J. Bahm . . The World's Living Religions Dell Publishing Co. Inc. U.S.A. 1964, pp. 384.



## **PRITI BHUSHAN CHATTERJEE**

With profound sense of grief we mourn the loss of Dr. P. B. Chatterjee, B. N. Seal Professor and Head of Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University, Calcutta.

He had recently gone to Canada on a Lecture Tour, where he was taken ill by a sudden heart-attack. But he was permitted to return home and was recovering. So his sudden and premature death on 4th January 77 was bound to come as a shock to hundreds of his friends, colleagues and well-wishers.

Born in 1924, Dr. Pritibabu had a good educational career. His book on Comparative Religion is one of the best recent publications in India on the subject. He had a versatile mind and intellect. He wrote widely and profusely and although Marathi was not his mother-tongue he contributed a number of articles even to Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. He was treasurer and Joint Secretary of Indian Philosophical Congress for a number of years. His passing away is a sad loss to the philosophical community of India.

—Editors

The present number of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly is mainly devoted to problems in Aesthetics.

We record our thanks to Dr. S. K. Saxena, of Delhi University for editing this number.

—EDITORS.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SAMA  
IN  
HINDUSTANI RHYTHM<sup>1</sup>

For those who know rhythm, it is easy to identify the *Sama* when it comes. Many can even anticipate it. But hardly any one ponders at length what *Sama* does in its setting of rhythm and melody. It is this gap which I here seek to narrow—in respect of rhythm.<sup>2</sup> My findings and interest are here both limited. But this is unavoidable. For, how exactly we *sense* the *Sama* depends on numberless details. What precise pattern it completes is one of these. How it itself is played is another. No study can exhaust these differences of manner and context. The phenomenal is never quite captured by the grasp of theory.

But one *can* light up the area of enquiry, and do some basic thinking. This is exactly what I here essay :

To begin with, *Sama* may be understood as simply the first or focal beat of the rhythm-cycle<sup>3</sup>. Under 'rhythm' we include both the basic cycle and rhythmic patterns. It is true that every kind of pattern does not *highlight* the *Sama*. A *Quāiyedā*, for instance, is noted more for its inner shapeliness; and, in some cases, for its inclusion of a subtly varied syllable. But, even where the 'twist' seems wayward, the *Sama* is not *forgotten*. One *has* to hold onto the basic flow of laya as marked by, and in the *theka*<sup>4</sup>; otherwise, the *bul*<sup>5</sup> will only be heard, but not *seem wayward*. In judging that a phrase or an accent is 'displaced', we always view it in relation to *a set flow*. And *this* we here observe by remembering the *Sama*.

The *Sama*, I maintain, is always a determinant of rhythmic arrangement or beauty; and it is often quite striking because of its regional quality, that is, by virtue of what immediately precedes it. We can look at it or make for it, as in a manifest *āmad*<sup>6</sup>. Or we may merely remember it, as in following an intricate *quāiyedā*. The first is an act of conscious orientation. The second is quiet, but continual fidelity to a source.

We turn next to the word 'phenomenology'. Here, it stands for a point of view which is quite different from the merely grammatical one. But let me explain :

After which *mātrā* does the *Sama* appear, and on which durm ? What precisely is the *bol* ( or mnemonic syllable ) which marks it ? By what calculative method has a pattern been composed,—through a division of its total beats into three equal extends, or by fixing its three folds at varying speeds ? Questions such as these relate to the grammar of rhythm and to details of its technique. They are *not as such* the subject of this essay. In the main, I deal rather with the question :

How, in relation to the *Sama*, does our rhythm *seem organized* to the trained ear ?

It may here at once be added that I only wish to distinguish, not to separate ‘ *seems organized* ’ from ‘ *is organized* ’. And this restraint is forced on me not by mere theory, but by a matter of fact. During actual composition one must of course organize the beats ( or *svaras* ) in a particular way. But, at the same time, he has also to ‘ look ’, quite often, at the part so far organized, just to check how it *seems* ?

I may now state the different ideas that I propose to discuss in respect of *Sama*, organized as follows :

*Sama* is the first or focal *mātrā* ( or beat ) of the rhythm-cycle as treated musically, spoken or merely contemplated in idea. In principle, it is to be kept in mind continually as the major accent of an even flow of *laya*; and is, in fact, often sought designedly to work up effects of occurrent order and direction.

Here, we must forthwith notice a difference. As played on the drum or as merely recited, *Sama* is at once a *bol*, or a mnemonic ( yet spoken or speakable ) syllable. But, this is *not necessary* when we mark the *Sama* merely in the mind. *There*, one is *not bound to speak* the *Sama*-syllable : the marking may occur as an extremely light and merely ideal pecking of *laya*-flow<sup>8</sup> by the mind.

Next, I may set out to explain our proposed definition of *Sama* by attending to its key words individually :

### I. Sama as source of Rhythmic Design

( a ) As the first *mātrā*, the *Sama* is a *stimulus*. It impels and enables the mind to get tuned to what is to follow.

(b) But, we must note, it is the first beat not merely numerically, but as the pace-setter. The time taken in playing (or speaking the *Sama*-bol itself directly fixes the speed of the flow that follows. And this, I believe, is important aesthetically. We often speak of a work of art as an *organic whole*. One meaning of this aesthetic concept is that the part actively determines the character of the whole. Now, of this *part-whole* determination, the rhythmic detail we have just spoken of is a better—because a more easily identifiable—illustration than can be found in the region of any other art.

Putting the two ideas together, we may speak of *Sama* as the source of rhythmic *design*, in case we take this word to mean, as we should, also the evenness or *laya* of rhythmic movement. The flow of the cycle not only begins from, but is *determined by Sama*.

## II. As Focal Beat

But, the *Sama* is not merely the first, but the *focal beat* of a cycle. From it we set out, and to it we return<sup>9</sup>. This is quite common knowledge. But we are prone to forget this, and often say merely that the *Sama* is the first beat, ignoring the necessary complement : ‘of the cycle’. In truth, *Sama* is the name of an accent of a flow or rhythmic stretch. The single beat which marks it is not the full meaning of *Sama*. The flow which it initiates and completes is implicit in what we mean by *Sama*. Therefore, when later in the essay we turn to study the *Sama*-beat in relation to its context, it will only be doing what the subject itself demands.

It is, I may add, *Sama* as the focal point of a cycle which lends to rhythm, and to music which repeats a cycle visibly<sup>10</sup>, a suggestion of self-completeness. This is quite missing in *ālāpa* where we only have *laya, no tāla*. *Alāpa* (of the traditional *dhruvapada* singers) works up an atmosphere which may well seem infinite, but it never appears self-complete.

## III. A Beat or a Mātrā ?

Yet the *Sama* is a beat or *mātrā* too. As such, it enables us to measure the flow, to steady or vivify the *laya* whenever necessary<sup>11</sup>—as after the execution of intricate patterns—and to keep it generally under control.

Such talk, however, is a little glib; and I must make it clear what it means to say that the *Sama* is a or a 'mātrā'. A *beat* is a recurrent stroke, or its sound or moment. Repetitiveness, so clear in rhythm, is implicit in the very meaning of the word. A *mātrā*, on the other hand, is a measured quantity. This word is closer to measure than to recurrence. But it does not signify utter separateness. In fact, to speak of a measured quantity is at once to imply the complement—'of something'. The *mātrā* here is a measured accent of a chosen stretch of *laya*.

To sum up, as a beat, the *Sama* means that it is to be repeated as the end of the cycle—a point that we have already emphasised; and considered as a *mātrā*, *Sama* is the measure of a flow.

The second idea is, in my view, important. The essential function of the *Sama*, I insist, is not merely to mark or divide, but to measure. I do not deny that it serves as a mark *too*. Failure to notice it would weaken our awareness of both the character and the speed of the cycle. Also, it may serve to *divide* one rhythmic pattern from another. What is more, it must freely be allowed to appear doing this. This is indeed important. In order to enable a rhythmic pattern to have its full impact on the listener, and to appear self-completed, it is often essential not to begin the second pattern immediately on the finish of the first one, when the *Sama* reappears. Here the brief silence which follows it allows the *Sama* to flower as desired; and it seems to sever, not of course the flow of *laya*, but certainly the form of one pattern from that of the following one. This is often ignored in *Kathak* dancing with the result that the presentation becomes excessively flowing, and deficient in clarity.

Yet, I repeat, the full and basic function of the *Sama as mātrā* is to measure, not only to mark. This can be argued as follows:

(a) The marking or dividing just referred to is no radical splitting. The proper awareness of rhythm is, so to say, bifocal. Immediately, of course, we notice and follow the patterns presented directly. But this mere confluence will itself be quite unrhythymical if we loosen our hold on the underrunning *laya*. So the *Sama* which divides patterns as spheres of *rhythm* does so only as long as it serves to measure and steady, as a guide-beat, the flow which

it itself articulates<sup>12</sup>. What is divided, in truth, is not the basic *laya*, but only the patterns; and the *Sama*'s activity of marking or dividing still remains subject to its *function* of measuring.

And this, I believe, is important aesthetically. Art *articulates*. Its parts are not merely mixed, like paints rubbed indistinguishably into oneness. Nor are they only put together like pebbles in a heap. They are of course distinct. Yet they also nourish, and are rooted in some common significance. Now, in the region of rhythm, what keeps the 'mātrās' at their proper places—and so truly distinct from, yet also rightly related<sup>13</sup> to one another—is their common grounding in *laya*; but, if only implicitly, *laya* itself rests on awareness of *Sama*. So I conclude : the essential articulateness of rhythm as art is *in part* due to *Sama*.

(I say 'in part', advisedly. For, besides *Sama*, there are many other factors which ensure articulation in rhythm. What is articulate is clear. Clarity, in turn, presupposes the righ technique of executing *bols*; their proper arrangement in relation to one another, for *any* two *bols* cannot be played close and properly; and it also forbids very quick playing. The late Ustad Natthu Khan of Delhi, it is said, never played at hectic speed. This, along with his other positive excellences, made his drumming aesthetically winsome. Our drummers, today, on the other hand—almost all the best *known* ones—mostly generate mere excitement.)

(b) Again, suppose we require the *Sama* only to mark, not really to occupy the *laya*-flow. In that case, in order to meet the requirement, the *Sama* as played will have to be maximally fine. But then it will be a very brief and light stroke. This, in turn, will require the following *bols* too to be played quite quickly<sup>14</sup>, making all leisurely (*vilambit*) rhythm improper in principle. No one can approve of such an attitude to *vilambit* playing. So we have to accept the alternative,—that is, the suggestion that the purpose of *Sama* is to *measure* the *laya*-flow. This view provides quite fairly for both reposeful and lively rhythm. Whether the subsequent *bols* are to be played slowly or briskly depends on the temporal length of the *Sama-bol* itself<sup>15</sup>.

Even apart from the point just argued, rather negatively, it is easy to see why 'measuring' has to be regarded as the *full and basic* function of *Sama*. Measuring includes marking and dividing in a sort. To measure is at once to insert distinctions into what

is measured; and the latter is one unit distinct from the rest. This is, however, a bit too general, though certainly true. What is important here is to mark the special nature of the measuring involved. To measure rhythmically is not to portion what is visibly given as mere inert extension, as in plotting a stretch of land, but to hold into *laya* which is, in the main, grasped by the mind. What is more, in fixing and keeping to this flow—or even in just following it<sup>16</sup>—one has to remain steady, sometimes even to try to do so, may be with some actual felt discomfort. The inter-*mātrā* interval must be kept<sup>17</sup> throughout even. The measuring here is at once a *self-steadying*. If, in his attention to rhythm, the listener wavers in this balance even for a second, the *mātrās* may wobble, unhinging the very basis of rhythm's flowing fabric. The steadiness here demanded, we have seen, is helped greatly by *Sama*. Hence I insist that measuring of the kind just indicated is The *sama-bol's* basic function.

Yet, it would be wrong to suppose that the function of *Sama* is never essentially to mark. I say so with an eye on the use of *Sama as destiny*, in opposition to *Sama* as the source of rhythmic design. Where it begins rhythmic work, the *Sama* may well seem definite; and, as played, deliberative. But I wonder if here it can ever appear sharp. We aim, in such cases, at fixing a speed; and the *Sama* is therefore admittedly a measure, suggesting by its own extent the *laya* to be followed. But where it occurs as the climax of a shapely rhythmic upsurge, its function is, as a rule, quite plainly to mark. And it can hardly be otherwise. For, as we follow the rhythmic movement approaching its terminus, we only *think of* the *Sama*; and, as thus apprehended, it cannot seem extended. The unfoldment that we here watch is that of the pattern. And when it ends at the *Sama* accurately, we just nod at the fusion rather than judge how long the *Sama-bol* lasts. It does in fact occupy some time. But it seems instantaneous, like all actual reaching at and as the end of a journey. *We do not measure time when a tension is relieved, or a target just attained.*

#### IV. *Sama as 'Bol'*

In both forms however—that is, as source and target of rhythmic arrangement—the *Sama* as played has an audible quality which not only receives, but deserves attention. In case its *chānt*

(or border) is used properly, and if the playing is 'drut', a well-tuned 'right one' can quite soon work up a kind of serial sweetness that helps concentration, our holding onto *laya*; and so also the proper observance of the details of rhythm.

The *Sama as uttered* too deserves separate mention. I say so not because of the general importance of *parhant*<sup>18</sup> in our rhythm and dance, but with an eye on the following consideration :

The fact that the *Sama* directly fixes the speed to be followed—and this by its own temporal length—can, in my view, be *better* illustrated by speaking than by playing the *Sama*. And in so far as such fixation is probably the most easily identifiable instance of a main feature of works of art—I mean the determination of whole-form *by parts*—the importance of *Sama* as recited should seem quite obvious.

#### V. *Sama is Contemplated*

With regard to the *Sama* as merely *contemplated* something has been said already. But whereas there I spoke of the *Sama* as *thought of*<sup>19</sup>; now I prefer the word 'contemplated'. The latter is, I think, truer to how *Sama* in fact appears—as an accent (in a flow) which, with all its importance, is *never isolated*<sup>20</sup>. What is *thought of* may well be explored merely on its inside, ignoring outer context. But even the simplest awareness of *Sama*, as the centre of a cycle, demands even counting, and so a continual ideal hold (at least) on what precedes the *Sama*.

It may be objected, quite properly, that what is *here* regarded as (outer) *context* can be accepted as such only if the *Sama* be thought of as just one beat, however important; and that if, as I earlier insisted, by *Sama* we mean the focal beat of a *rhythm-cycle*, what I now speak of as considering the context should really be deemed as mere internal attention. To this I would rejoin :

first, that if the *Sama* is thus understood as the recurring centre of a cycle, we still mean to stress<sup>21</sup> the centre, whereupon the remaining cycle at once becomes the context of what is emphasised; and

secondly, that if this way of understanding—and its tendency to abstract—be rejected, and an appeal be made to the *Sama*-beat as appearing enwreathed in, and integral to a cycle,

'contemplation' still remains the right word. For, the experience here cited is quite undivided, though awareness of an outside is of course here absent.<sup>22</sup>

To conclude, if we understand the *Sama* as the centre of a cycle, we have to think also that the context is in fact not left out; and if we experience it as occurring in a cycle, the *Sama* directly appears as both making and as made by the cycle. The right word for our experience of *Sama* is therefore in either case 'contemplation'.

How the *Sama* as contemplated may serve, in the main, to mark the *laya*-flow has already been seen. But the linkage of this one idea with our rhythmic practice is so rich and variform that I feel impelled to say something more about it :

(a) First, it fixes an ideal for actual playing. The *Sama* which marks the *laya*-flow merely in idea is maximally fine. As already brought out, it does not seem to occupy time. Therefore, drummers whose minds are steeped in the habit of keeping *laya* steady, and who no longer depend on the ear for noticing *Sama*, often affirm it but ideally, by refusing to play *Sama* where the design of the prior patternings yet makes us expect it. What is more, in conformity with their merely ideal—and often reverential—attitude to the *Sama*, they prefer to adopt a quiet, steady and mellow style of playing generally.

I may here invite attention to two opposite ways of opening a recital. Today, when the *vilambit gat* begins, the accompanist normally takes off with a longish pattern that ends climatically and quite loudly at the *Sama*. The aim here is at winning the applause of the listeners. But some rare drummer who delights in the contemplation of *laya* may behave quite differently. He may unwind a pattern that is subtly arranged—but is gentle in accents—so softly, yet surely, that the *Sama* can do without sound, and is here vivified only in idea, and replaced, may be, with a mere nod which is in such cases involuntary. The purpose here is obviously not to elicit approval, though that often comes from the knowledgeable; but just to imbue the mind with the spirit of a particular rhythm. The *Sama* which shows itself, even to the poorly trained, is often quite different from the one which induces and enables us to dwell in the region of a particular rhythm.

(b) Secondly, in our rhythm, ideal emphasis on the *Sama* also occurs in terms of *ateet-anāgat* patterns. These are marked not by withholding the *Sama-stroke* entirely, but by making it fall purposely a little<sup>23</sup> after or before the fixed location of the *Sama-beat*. In so far as the *Sama* as played is here in both cases 'displaced' from its place in the cycle, these patterns are classed as *visham*. All this is fairly well known. But the following remarks, here, may well seem necessary;

Merely to stop a little before, or just to nod a little after the *Sama*—which practice is popularly called *jagah dikhānā*<sup>24</sup>—is only to show that one can deviate purposely from the focal beat. It does not become an *aesthetic* act unless it is done according to a design. That the *musician* emphasises a mere *mātrā* before or after the *Sama* is one thing. That a pattern itself—because of the expansive or self-gathering quality of its own inner arrangement—spills the *Sama*, or fades out blushingly a little short of it is quite another matter.

Rhythm, it is true, is not the only art to insist that form is essentially a matter of internal organisation, and not of mere observance of outer rules. But, the subtlety of falling designedly short of the line is nowhere so clearly manifest as in the sweet self-shortening of our *anāgat* arrangements.

(c) Thirdly, and this is still another way of affirming the *Sama* merely in ides, a pattern packed with *bols* in three clear *āvṛtis*<sup>25</sup>, may be so played that at its first two places the *Sama* is deftly withheld. Here, if the moments of quiet are just of the right extent, and if the 'bols' that they punctuate are close yet clear, the pauses will appear as integral to hearing. What happens here is—and it is a clear operation of the Gestalt law of good design or common destiny—that the design of the pattern is so coercive and the filling so intense that we are at once enabled to fill in the narrow gaps ourselves.

Mark that I speak here not of the silence that precedes and follows the pattern, as aestheticians speak of sculptures organising the 'emptiness around'<sup>26</sup> them, but of pauses interwrought. In the art of sculpture of course, parallels can be easily found. I do not know how far the Gestalt laws enable us to understand the organization of heterogeneous elements. But art certainly helps. Just as rhythm turns moments of quiet into seeming accents of repose

in an audible flow, a Henry Moore bronze may reveal, with a purpose, an oblong aperture which lends life to the figure not only by letting some light, but by inviting the eye to look through it recessively, so that the space therein seems to be showing us the inside of the figure<sup>27</sup>.

## VI. Sama and Laya

In spite of all its importance, however, the *Sama*-beat or *bol* is by no means independent. It is but the major accent of *an even flow of laya*. Let me clarify this in terms of the following individual remarks :

(a) Awareness of the true character of the *Sama*-‘*bol*’ means neither that we know it, merely in theory, as the first of the beats that a cycle comprises, nor that we notice it when it comes—say, on being struck by its mere loudness—but that *we follow how it occurs as the centre of an even cyclic flow*. The ability to anticipate, locate and deviate voluntarily from the *Sama*-beat depends essentially on one’s ability to keep steady *laya*. *Laya* is the basic thing.

(b) Yet, the *Sama*-beat itself may help one in checking whether *laya* has been moving with sure step. It is the chief point where we steady ourselves. Yet, it is *not the only* accent where we *speed or lessen the laya*. That can be done by the drummer *anywhere*, through judicious quickening or elongation of any detail of playing<sup>28</sup>. But whenever this is done, the temporal distance of the *Sama* is also, in idea, duly adjusted. Where, on the other hand, a change of *laya* is involuntary, the ideal hold on the *Sama* too slackens forthwith; and the whole playing totters.

## VII. Sama as Destiny

I may turn, in the end, to what is perhaps the most widely admired feature of *Sama*, that is, its *advent* as the end of a shapely rhythmic flow. I choose, to begin with, the word ‘advent’ because it can be used *both* where *Sama* comes as the climax of *what seems to be a rhythmic ascent* and where it is just gently touched as the end-term of a movement that *appears refluxive*. The former, in particular, is quite easy to illustrate. But here I only want to make some remarks of theoretical value :

(a) In the case of a melody what is most easily noticeable is its up and down movement. This is so because the music here follows (in part) the ascent and descent of a scale. In rhythm there are no graded tones. Yet if, during the process of playing a shapely pattern which seems to move clearly towards the *Sama*, the drummer *also* gradually increases the intensity of the *bols*, the additional suggestion of an *ascent*—not of mere reaching, but of an upflow or a kind of *āroha*—will be noticeably worked up. Two factors are here built upon : intension and orientation of the terminal *bols* towards the *Sama*. The *Sama* is therefore of some help in bringing the character of rhythm a little close to the felt and organized character of a melody. To speak of melody *and* rhythm, or to say that a *bandish* and a *tala* can have the same *Sama* is, on the other hand, relating them only from the outside. Being together is surely not the same thing as seeming similarly organised.<sup>29</sup>

I may here add that in such cases—that is, where a pattern delights us by aiming at, and by hitting the *Sama* as its target—the principles at work is the Gestalt law of good contour. But the law itself—as explained in books on psychology—says nothing about the increasing intensification of the *bols* which is really the drummer's own independent doing.<sup>30</sup>

But my precise meaning here should be clearly understood. I suggest only that the laws of perception are *not quite adequate* to art. They do not *exhaust* the creative possibilities of rhythm. But I do *not* say that the laws in question are *not* at all relevant to rhythm. Relevant they truly are. Let me illustrate this positive point. Just think of the principle of contrast, and then attend to the following cycle of seven beats :

तिन॑ इत्त॑ ति॒रकि॑ट धि॑न उ॑ घा॑र्ग ति॒रकि॑ट

The *Sama*—bol here is ‘tin’. It *seems* one,<sup>31</sup> elongated, steady and closed. The preceding tuft of *bols* is *tirkit*. This appears internally diverse, marked by succession, relaxed and lively. Now, the *contrast*—of the diverse with the one, of the lively with the firm—is essential to bring out the distinctive effect of the *Sama*—bol *tin*. This contrast—and with it, the distinctive

effect of *Sama*—will both disappear if we introduce an element of successiveness in the ‘*sama—bol*’ itself, by turning the steady *tin* into a quicker two-in-one *tin-tin*.<sup>32</sup>

It would, however, be wrong to suppose that the actual, heard character of *Sama* depends on its relation to the immediately preceding ‘*bol*’ alone. In the case of a bigger rhythm, it may in fact be found to depend on the inner organization of the entire cycle. This is specially so if the *Sama-bol* is not exactly repeated anywhere else in the cycle; in which case it appears as a distinctive figure against the whole structure of the *thekā*—quite in accordance with the Gestalt law of figure and ground.

But, whether the cycle be big or small,, the actual heard character of the *Sama* is different from the *Sama* as merely *thought of* as being the centre of the cycle. The phenomenological is one thing; the merely theoretical, quite another. Also we must remember that the Gestalt laws are no intellectual construction merely imposed upon experience. They stand for ways in which experience itself appears organized. One does not have to be an intellectual to use the Gestalt laws. This partly explains the fact that many beautiful rhythmic compositions have been created by such masters of *tablā* and *mridanga* as had no formal education at all.

(b) Care should also be taken to distinguish where and how *Sama* comes as the climax of an *ascent* from its occurrence as the rightful end of a rhythmic *reflex*. In its second form, specially, *Sama* calls for some thinking. It is common to speak of it as the beat from which the rhythmic flow begins, and to which the flow returns, accurately and winsomely. But, let us ponder the idea of *return*. What exactly is that which comes back to the *Sama*, the counting of (say) the drummer—or the rhythmic flow itself? We may recall, at this point, that a similar question is often put with regard to a vocal *bandish* that claims to be good. Does the composition *itself* appear to move towards the *Sama*? Is it so designed on the inside? Or is it only the singer who is able to come back to the focal beat, just because he knows where it is? Arriving at the *Sama* should seem an impulse of the *bandish* itself. Similarly, the rhythm *itself* should appear to lapse back to the first beat. Rhythmic patterns, on the other hand,

appear either simply to reach the *Sama*, or ( also ) to end climactically thereat. My own experience is that the suggestion in question is clearly worked up :

If a symmetrical rhythm-cycle, say *tritala*, is chosen for playing—I say ‘symmetrical’ because then alone can a rhythm easily *seem circular*, as against appearing only quickly repeated :

If the *thekā* is played neither very slowly—in which case it may be difficult for us to perceive the rhythm as a continuity, and impossible to find it circular; nor very quickly, for then the recoil, the turning-back, will not be visible,—but at *madya laya*;

If further, the cycle is so played that the work of the two drums seems blended as one, *the left drum enveloping*, and so unifying the articulate *bols* of the right one, with its own breathing depth, called *sans*; whereupon the listener’s attention will remain gripped by the playing, and the experience seems self-complete in the manner of a circle;

and, finally, if the retouching of *Sama* is prefaced with a flourish—of gently diminishing loudness, such regulation being a demand of the grammatical idea itself that the beat in question is also the point of return.

A flourish, I may add, is briefer and lighter than a regular pattern. It does not crowd or burden the listener’s attention. And here it helps by making for a facile return to the *Sama*.

This is the only convincing instance that I am able to suggest, of rhythm’s really seeming to go back to the *Sama*. A *chukkurdār paran* is of course said to be circular. But it does not seem circular, if that be taken to mean a visible return to the focal beat.

I may repeat that I draw a distinction between the *listener’s returning to Sama* and the *rhythm as itself appearing to turn to its source*. The former is a matter of only knowing and finding where the first beat is or occurs. The latter, on the other hand, is at once some ordering and seeming—a suggestion psycho-aesthetic.

By ‘seeming’ here, however, I mean not only ‘being presented to attention’, but ‘false’; or, in aesthetical language,

'virtual'. For how can one in fact return to a moment which has gone? This one fact, incidentally, should be enough to expose the error of roundly speaking of rhythm as division and arrangement of time, without specifying that though, like every other event, rhythm as a whole does occur *in time*, the time that it deals in is its own virtual time, the image of time that itself works up, with its created elements of simultaneity, repose and seriality.<sup>33</sup>

(c) Patterns where *Sama* is merely attained—neither as the point of directed return nor as a climax—are aesthetically barren. But it is instructive to consider, in two possible playings of the same pattern a point of contrast, between the *Sama* that comes as a mere ending—weak and cheerless—and the *Sama* that emerges as the *climax or destiny* of a shapely and powerful movement. In both cases, the playing has to be correct—grammatically. But whereas in the first case the playing will be only correct, not effective—due to lack of proper accents, and the *Sama* will just occur without being winsome, in the second case, because the pattern is played with *due inner accentuation*, and a controlled and increasing intensification of the *bols* as they approach the *Sama*, the *Sama* will duly appear as the highest point of the flow.

Another distinction may here be drawn. To say that *Sama* is central because it both initiates and completes a rhythmic round is one thing. To see it so appear is quite another. One way to make it seem central is to play such patterns as move towards it, and end at it by virtue of the very manner of their inner design. The *Sama* here appears as the target<sup>34</sup> of their flow, and therefore, central; providing, I may add, a very clear operation of the Gestalt idea of 'common destiny'. But this 'appearing' is there only when we can follow the flow; which in turn requires that the rhythm-cycle be not very narrow and quick. This is why the manifest suggestion of a shapely and directed access to the *Sama* cannot be ordinarily worked up within the narrow confines of the rapid rounds of *sool tāla*.<sup>35</sup>

The simplest illustrations of the point in question are provided by the patterns known as *tiyās*. A *tiyā* has three distinguishable, yet similar sub-sections. These may either be equal in respect of length, or may carry a common content of syllables

at a methodically rising speed. In either case, the *Sama* appears as the climax where the pattern seems completed, and towards which it all along moves in a way which is clearly designed. The point where the movement originates may occur anywhere within the fabric of the cycle; but most commonly this point of activation<sup>36</sup> is either the *khali* or the *Sama* itself. There is hardly any limit to the number of such patterns. But what they all do in common to show the *Sama* as destiny and as climax, specially if the last few strokes that herald its advent show a deepening intensity.

But the *Sama* can assume a still different form. It may come neither with the force of a climax, nor as the mere exhausted ending of weak playing, but as the gently satisfying self-completion of a rich, elaborate and well-organised pattern that unfolds itself steadily and is internally distinguished by such a subtle variation—called a *bul* or *badal*—that attention is here held by the whole inner fabric of the movement, and is not dominated by the advent of the *Sama*. The *Sama* in this case satisfies like the natural conclusion of a logical movement of thought. It does not dazzle us with the force of a climax. And the delight is, on the whole, fairly evenly spread out, with the *bul* or variation as its mainspring.

The *Sama*, I conclude, is not merely the straight target of rhythm, but is often seen to share its manifestness with other accents, without ever giving up its role as a *check point* for the evenness of *laya*.

University of Delhi.

S. K. Saxena

#### NOTES

1. The present essay is an attempt to work out the philosophical implications of my Paper : *Sama in Hindustani Rhythm—A psycho-aesthetic study* presented to the Sangeet Natak Akademi Seminar on music (in Poona) on January 12, '75, when almost all the points of aesthetical theory made in this essay were 'illustrated' by Prof. Sudhir Kumar Saxena (College of Indian Music and Dance, Baroda University) in terms of actual *tabla*-playing. The illustrations were all 'recorded' by the Akademi.

2. My study is limited in one other way. It directly relates only to the rhythm of Hindustani or North Indian music.

3. Such a characterisation of *Sama* is very incomplete. But it is convenient as a starting-point. And, later in the essay, it will receive due supplement.

4. Which is at once to remember the *Sama* too. *Thekā* is the rhythm-cycle.

5. *Bul*, in Hindustani, means a brief twist.

6. On the relation of *Sama* to 'āmad' in vocal music, see my essay : *The Fabric of Āmad—A study of Form and Flow in Hindustani Music*, Sangeet Natak, 16, April-June, 1970.

7. I may cite here the view of Coleridge that, as engaged in composing, the mind suffers 'alternate pulses of active and passive motion'.

Owen Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought*, O.U.P., London, 1972, p. 78. Our emphasis.

8. *Laya* is the controlled, yet not necessarily beat-measured, flow of musical duration.

9. In many cases, certainly not in all. A *sthāyi* or rhythmic pattern may take off from any *mātrā*. But when we indicate the character of a rhythm-cycle we begin from the *Sama*. As for 'returning', one may end the patterning a little before *khāli* (or offbeat) from where the *āmad* may build up its access to the *Sama*. Nor is it proper, as we shall later argue, to assume that every pattern *appears to return to the Sama*.

10. This happens most clearly when a simple *drut sthāyi* or *gat* is presented repeatedly.

11. For instance, when the main performer is weaving a specially intricate pattern, the *tabla* accompanist may try to be of help by playing the *Sama* and the approach to it specially clearly.

12. This, however, is only half the truth. For *laya* too determines the proper location of *Sama*.

13. The relation here—though also one of perceptual difference, if the *mātrās* be regarded as *bols*—is basically an interval of time.

14. This is here the demand of internal consistency. A 'thekā' which begins with a quick *Sama*—stroke cannot be allowed to become leisurely in its very next step.

15. The overall *laya*, however, where rhythm is 'accompaniment', has to be fixed with an eye on the rhythmic demands of the composition chosen by the main performer.
16. As in merely listening correctly to a rhythmic recital.
17. We cannot truly say : it is even. It is continually *kept* thus, may be quite without conscious effort.
18. *Parhant* is the (proper) recitation of mnemonic syllables employed in rhythm.
19. The reference, here, is to the concluding part of section III.
20. Except by those who do not really know rhythm, and enjoy only the loud, and often vulgar sound of the *Sama*.
21. Though not to isolate.
22. By 'contemplation' I understand the undivided awareness of the details of a whole.
23. Yet quite identifiably.
24. Or, rather crudely, *moonh-mārnā*.
25. An *āvrti* is one round of the basic rhythm.
26. Cf. S. K. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 4th Impression, 1967, p. 88.
27. I refer here to the eleven inches bronze done by Moore in 1939. It is a bronze cast of lead original in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London; and is on display at the Exhibition of the artist's photographs and bronzes organized by Lalit Kala Akademi and British Council, New Delhi, in 1973 (Dec. 6-15).
28. In practice, this requires the instantaneous co-operation of an understanding *lahrā*-player. *Lahrā* is the set tune played steadily and repeatedly along with drummers or dancers to keep the rhythmic measure quite clear to them.
29. The point will become clearer if we here think of the right kind of rhythmic 'accompaniment' or *sangat*.
30. Yet, in so far as it heightens the suggestion of orientation, such intensification will be quite in accord with the Gestalt law of common destiny. I failed to say this while presenting the Paper.
31. Though it in fact has two aksharas or letters.

I.P.Q. . . 2

32. Without, of course, exceeding the permitted length of a *mātrā*.

33. For explanatory remarks on these 'virtual elements' of Hindustani rhythm, see my article : *The Concept of Laya in Hindustani Music*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, University of Poona, Vol. I, No. 2, January '74, pp. 137-140. Also see my essay : *Aesthetic Theory and Hindustani Rhythm*, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer, 1976, pp. 257-58.

34. Not merely outer, but inwardly affirmed.

35. Which is, as a rule, played quite quickly.

36. Sometimes, this point may well be a quite unsuspected recess of the cycle, providing a delightful rhythmic version of what Mrs. Langer means by 'subtle activation' in our felt life. See her *Feeling and Form*, op. cit., p. 27.

## THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN

I want to begin my paper with a quote from Hermann Hesse's Novel *Demian* : "I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings which came from my true self. Why was this so difficult ?"

The intent of this paper is to provide a basis and justification for the contention that it is through the aesthetic education in its most extensive, comprehensive meaning that man can be truly himself and become fully man. Why is this, as Hesse laments, so difficult and why is the problem so urgent in our own age, an age that has been called the age of alienation, complexity and anxiety ?

Alienation is by no means solely a contemporary phenomenon. It has long been the subject of philosophical and sociological study. Hegel, who introduced the term, conceived the history of man as the history of man's *Entfremdung* or alienation. Marx treated the concept of alienation in economic terms and introduced it into sociological theories. Alienation, complexity and anxiety have always been part of the human personality and the human condition. Man has always been dissatisfied, searching for truth, beauty and freedom, and longing to realize his vision of a fuller, more authentic life.

But it is the intensity and urgency of the feelings of alienation and anxiety that distinguish our age from others. The twentieth century is indeed a century of crisis. Technology, whatever its degree of development may be, has brought into sharp focus characteristics of the human condition that have always existed, but never in the same measure and intensity as to-day. The explosive pace of technological development and its growing complexity have brought about an increasing mechanization of our work, our leisure time, our very lives, and led to the atrophy of man's sensibility and creative instincts.

In addition to mechanization, the constant and rapid change of our institutions, our customs and our values caused the breakdown of our traditions and an encounter with nothingness. A loss of faith is manifested in all areas of human endeavour : in physics and mathematics with the discoveries of Heisenberg and

Goedel; in religion and philosophy; in art and literature. Man himself has become dehumanized. His creative, imaginative powers, his sense of freedom and dignity, his appreciation of beauty and truth are rapidly being destroyed. The value of his very existence is being questioned in a society which is dominated by economic concerns and needs and finds no place for millions of people who are considered marginal, useless and superfluous.

The problem we face to-day with a most immediate urgency is the question : How can we restore the integrity of creative life which is threatened by the danger of automation ? How can we bring about a renaissance of that image of man to which Pico de Mirandola dedicated his famous "Oration on the Dignity of Man" ? How can we revitalize the vision of the good life of which Plato speaks in his ideal society ?

The claim I put forward here is that the development of our aesthetic sensibility and our creative impulse can contribute significantly toward such a renaissance. The aesthetic education of man is of utmost importance for the creation of a culture in which man will play a more vital role than is the case to-day.

I am, of course, not proposing a return to a pre-technological age. No one can question the immense benefits that science and technology have conferred upon mankind. What we must challenge is a technology that is detached from human needs and values and disregards man's spiritual, moral and aesthetic concerns. Science and technology must not be abandoned, but controlled and directed, for as Dr. Johnson warns : "Science without conscience is the ruin of the soul".

To bring about a change in the direction of our sciences and technology, or rather in the way they have been used and taught, we must first redefine the goals of liberal education and re-awaken those human qualities which have long been neglected in our educational tradition. This tradition was based on the conception of man as *homo sapiens*. Man's essential nature was held to be reason and therefore, the primary function of education was to develop the rational faculty to the fullest. This educational attitude, fundamentally anti-sensual, anti-vitalistic and anti-aesthetic in character, was formulated in the Middle Ages under the influence of the logical tradition of Aristotle. It was

continued in the Renaissance in spite of the flowering of Renaissance Platonism and its humanistic spirit, and in spite of a revival of aesthetic activity.

The educational tradition which gives rational judgment the highest place in the hierarchy of human values continued to dominate Western culture and is still the guiding principle in our schools, our colleges and universities, and in our educational thinking. In its emphasis on the development of the intellect it neglects to take into account the fact that the image of man as *homo sapiens* is no longer undisputed and clear. The supremacy of reason is being questioned by the acknowledgement of the paradoxical in physics and mathematics and the discovery of the irrational and unconscious by depth psychology.

*Homo sapiens* is replaced by *homo faber*. Man is no longer the rational animal, but a creature of drives and practical needs. Modern psychology rediscovered our feelings and wants; it delved into the hidden levels of the self and revealed its instinctual side and the power of the unconscious. New insights into the essence of being and the complexities of life were gained, insights that had been closed to the categories and abstractions of reason. And yet, our educational system holds on to the medieval logical tradition that over emphasizes the power of reason and glorifies abstraction and theory. It disregards the enormous advances made by modern depth psychology; it fails to remember the wisdom of the ancients who well knew the many-sided aspects of the human personality and the dark, mysterious forces that invade our dreams and guide our waking hours.

An educational system that is almost exclusively intellectual and overlooks the other faculties of man must be abandoned. Education must involve the total human personality—his reason as well as his senses, his emotions, his instincts and creative impulses. It must integrate all human faculties, and this can best be done by assigning a more central role to art and the aesthetic experience. There is no better way than through the aesthetic to educate our sensory responses, to involve our feelings and creative instincts and reach the innermost depth of the human psyche. The great German philosopher, Kant, states in the *Critique of Judgment* that it is in the feelings of aesthetic pleasure

that sense and reason, intellect and will, cognition and desire are brought into relation by means of the free play of the imagination.

If we are to experience harmony and wholeness both in our personal and social life, if we are to create a civilization in which all our potentials are functioning to the fullest possible degree, we must educate men to feel and act as well as to think. We must remove the false dichotomies that exist between the cognitive and the affective, between the scientist and the poet.

What I am advocating is not an abandonment, but a revision of our educational tradition. I want to stress the need for an education that is complete, an education that does not neglect the cultivation of the intellect, but stresses equally the development of our non-rational faculties. What we need is a revaluation of values wherein the hierarchical system, in which intellectual values assume a higher place than aesthetic ones, will be replaced by a system of equality. Here art and beauty will no longer be considered mere ornaments and entertainment or a mode of escape from the hardships of life, but they will take their rightful place in the scale of values together with reason. Our responses to beauty and form and our creative imagination will be held to be as essential for the quality of our lives and the level of our culture as are our reasoning powers. Only thus will we become truly whole and remove the deep tensions between the rational and the non-rational, between reason and will, between reason and instincts.

In fact, by removing these false dichotomies, we will discover the intimate connection that exists between the activity of art and that of science. Both the scientist and the artist search for truth and order. The scientific theorem, like a work of art, involves an act of discovery, a leap of the imagination and a desire for meaning that goes beyond the mere record of facts. Art and science alike must be instilled with that "instinct of relationship" of which Whitehead speaks when he says in *The Aims of Education*: "You may not divide the seamless coat of learning: what education has to impart is an intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge."

He speaks of a "sense of style in art, in literature, in science, in logic, and in practical executions. They all have aesthetic qualities .... Style is the ultimate morality of the mind".

The creative, instinctive powers of man are not only at work in the arts, but also in the realm of knowledge and science. To Plato, intuition was the highest form of knowledge; and Aristotle, who criticized Plato's theory of Forms on empirical grounds, was in the last analysis led to conclusions similar to Plato's, recognizing the intuitive character of the apprehension of the first principles of all reasoning. Kant, in addition to sensible intuition, introduced the concept of pure intuition which came to constitute the germ of contemporary intuitionism. Bergson interprets intuition as that kind of "intellectual sympathy" by which one is transported into the interior of an object. And Husserl, reviving Platonic and Aristotelian essentialism, speaks of an intellectual intuition that gives us "the vision of essences".

Although scientists and mathematicians interpret the equivoval term intuition differently than philosophers, they too, acknowledge its importance in the scientific enterprise and connect it with the invention of hypotheses, the designing of experiments, the introduction of new concepts and new techniques. But they stress the fact that these intuitive, imaginative insights or "hunches" do not arise ex nihilo, but depend upon previous experience and require empirical verification.

Thus imagination, intuition and creativity, our sense of style and form play a major role not only in the arts, but in all fields of human endeavour. They are essential for the well-being of man and represent a deep and basic need whose neglect may destroy the most fundamental aspects of the human personality. They must be stimulated and developed by an education that is based on aesthetic principles.

In speaking of the aesthetic experience and its essential qualities and function, we must be aware of the fact that we are dealing with concepts that are open and fluid and do not possess a set of necessary and sufficient properties. Any attempt to state their defining characteristics must fail, since only approximate validity can be attached to them. But in spite of the absence of defining

properties, in spite of terminological vagueness and the constant emergence of new art forms and new movements, we cannot dispense with a search for clarification and understanding.

The aesthetic education of man should, I believe, provide two kinds of experiences : first, the aesthetic experience in a wide sense which can be part of any general experience—theoretical or practical, individual or social, scientific, philosophical, religious—in short, every experience that makes up our lives. Second, the aesthetic experience in a more restricted sense which is connected with the making or the contemplation and appreciation of a work of art. Both types of experiences, in so far as they can claim to possess aesthetic qualities, variously interpreted as unity, harmony, clarity, expressiveness, are not different in kind but in the degree of intensity and purity.

The aesthetic in a wide sense can be attached to any experience that is meaningful and enriching. Wherever material is given shape, wherever movement possesses direction, wherever thought and action aim at ends and purposes, life has, as it were, form and color and composition. The making of a vessel or garment, the framing of laws and constitutions can be creative just as is the moulding of a piece of clay into a sculpture, the writing of a poem, the composing of a fugue. In its most essential aspects, life has aesthetic qualities. Life is aesthetic when it is lived fully and deeply, free of narrow utility, commercialism and mechanization; when it is lived intensely and passionately, yet with control and proportion. Life is aesthetic in the awareness of its creative potentialities; when it has style and unity, a unity that is dynamic, imbued with tension and passion, yet integrated into a coherent whole.

Since art provides our aesthetic experience with the highest degree of intensity, it plays an all important role in the aesthetic education of man. The artist, in creating, endows an ordinary experience with depth and meaning and the highest degree of intensity and feeling. In contemplating his work, we relive the suffering and ecstasy, the whole gamut of emotions that went into the making of a work of art. We share the artist's sense of liberation and wholeness, his delight in the lawfulness and perfection of harmonious proportions and his heightened sense of humanity. "Art", as Whitehead says, "gives an elation of

feeling that is supernatural. A sunset is glorious, but it dwarfs humanity and belongs to the general flow of nature. A million sunsets will not spur on man toward civilization. It requires art to evoke into consciousness the finite perfections that lie ready for human achievement."

Because we are dealing with a fluid concept whose nature and function cannot be clearly defined, a variety of different, often contradictory answers have been given to the questions; what is art? What is its meaning and function? I want to mention one school of art, namely the formalists who claim that art is *sui generis*, existing for its own sake, needing nothing from life. Like the pure mathematician, the artist—they claim—is concerned only with formal relations that have no connection with actual existence.

Indeed, I agree with the formalists that art transports us into a "sphere of highest exultation", but I question their contention that this exulted state does not affect our lives. The formalists, influenced by Kant, further state that art must be "disinterested" and possess no purpose that is in any way connected with life. But I believe that Kant who, according to Hegel, spoke the first rational word in aesthetics, meant something different by the "disinterestedness" of art and its "purposiveness, without purpose". Art is indeed disinterested in the utilitarian, the practical, the merely subjective and narrow sense, but it does not lack the intensity and vitality of the creative power of life. It serves no purpose and function in our struggle for survival or material gain. But it possesses prurposiveness, an inner principle of rightness and harmony, found alike in the object of art and in the creative individual in whom the "unconscious activity of nature breaks out in the consciousness of man".

True art transcends the narrow barriers of the individual and personal. It puts upon the immediate present the stamp of the universal. To seek the universal in the particular, the ever-enduring in the transitory is the clue to the very nature of all great art. Perhaps therein lies its most profound meaning and its moral and social significance that it evokes in us feelings and emotions that transcend the narrow limits of the personal. In moments of deepest contemplation, we are no longer individuals,

but gain access to what Jung calls "the collective psyche". We are caught in a common rhythm and share the feelings and striving of all mankind.

According to Jung, the creative impulse arises from the unconscious; not from the personal unconscious of the artist, but from the collective unconscious, the sphere of mythology whose primordial images or archetypes are the common heritage of mankind. In the creative process of art, these archetypal images, which are inaccessible to the conscious will, are translated into the language of the present. They enter our consciousness and lead us back to the deepest sources of life. Indeed, when we look at Giacometti's disembodied, elongated figures and antediluvian faces, we see behind the imagery of art the primordial image of mankind. We are transported back to the beginning of time and seem to enter the abyss of primordial ages, where the voices of all men resound. The experience of art is not individual and subjective, but truly universal.

In the aesthetic experience the Platonic identification of the beautiful with the true and the good is realized. Knowledge and truth, free of fragmentation and narrow specialization, gain meaning and significance. The good, based on a sense of style and form and proportion, represents an ethics that transcends the traditional concepts of morality. It is an ethics not identified with utilitarian principles or categorical imperatives, but with the use of man's powers and the harmony of his soul. We act not for the sake of expediency or duty, but out of the fullness and richness of our true selves. We transcend the narrow limits of subjective motivations to what Nietzsche calls "a love above oneself....whose manifestation is a work of art".

The influence of art is all pervasive. Its questions and problems are intrinsically bound up with the idea of humanity. While giving expression to the human drama and its dilemmas and despair, art demonstrates the tragic sense of life and its belief in the indestructible creative will of man to achieve his humanity and affirm life in all its forms—its height and abyss, its suffering and exultation. Art and the aesthetic become a source of the power to form and shape and enrich our experience and conduct. They produce a feeling of strength and vitality, of heightened sensitivity and joy. In the aesthetic dimension we find those regulative

principles by means of which the unity and harmony of the human personality is achieved. The fractured being of modern man becomes whole and integrated. His creative power, which was frustrated by the dehumanizing effects of our technological mass society, is restored. And if we agree with those philosophers who like Spinoza, hold that the creative will in its striving toward self-realization is the essence of man, then it is indeed through the aesthetic that we become truly ourselves and fully man.

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## VAMANA'S PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY

Vāmana is one of the very early writers on the philosophy of poetry. He seems to have lived after Bharata and Bhāmaha, but was definitely earlier than Abhinavagupta, Ānanda-Vardhana and Mammata and may be roughly assigned to 8th century A.D.<sup>1</sup> Though some of the recent writers try to bring him under the influence of *Rasa Theory*, on account of his aphorism, ‘*dīpta rasatvāṁ kāntih*’, he seems to be far away from such an influence. Tradition regards him as an advocate of *Riti* theory and makes him a follower of Bhāmaha so far as his views on *Alaṅkāra* are concerned. But such a view also is based on certain superficial consideration of words like *Guna*, *Riti* and *Alaṅkāra* which appear in his writing as also in the writing of Bhāmaha. I, however, think that these words have a different significance for Vāmana. In this paper, I shall try to bring out the peculiar significance of these words in the writings of Vāmana and shall, thereby, try to show that Vāmana's philosophy of poetry is very different from what tradition ascribes to him.

For this end, we should contrast his views with those of his predecessors. Bhāmaha, one of his predecessors, defined poetry (or literature) as a whole consisting of words and meanings. *sabdārthau sahitau kāvyam*.<sup>2</sup> Bhāmaha himself seems to be aware of the limitations of this definition. So he adds that mere composition of words should not be sufficient for poetry. It should also be beautified or made attractive with figures of speech. ‘A composition’, he writes, ‘is like the face of a woman who may be herself beautiful but who does not become attractive without ornaments’.<sup>3</sup> ‘Figures of speech’ are embellishments of literature. Though Vāmana also gives explanation of ‘these embellishments of literature’ in his work, he does not seem to agree with Bhāmaha in defining poetry in these terms. According to him, Bhāmaha's definition of poetry is too wide. Poetry is not a whole,<sup>4</sup> composed of words and meanings. It is a whole where *Gunas* (qualities) and *Alaṅkāra* (beauty) also enter as components.<sup>5</sup> It is only by secondary usage that one speaks of literature or poetry as made of words and meanings alone. Vāmana is aware that if the value or beauty<sup>6</sup> factor is omitted from the definition of

poetry, certain rules of grammar and logic will also come under the definition of poetry or literature.<sup>7</sup> Thus Vāmana was aware of the two dimensions of literature; (i) The stuff of which it is made and (ii) the value or the beauty for which it is made. The second provides the definition or *lakṣaṇa* of poetry. Literature, however, is not the only art which has these two dimensions. It is a common characteristic which literature shares with other arts. Almost every art ought to be studied in these two dimensions. We may take, for instance, the case of sculpture. When one observes and appreciates a statue as a piece of art the appreciation can be expressed in one word, 'beautiful or ugly'. But the statue is also made out of some material like stone. In a training school for sculpture if some person is to be trained in making a statue it should not be irrelevant to consider such questions as : (1) what should be the kind of stone used for making such a statue ? (2) what should be the necessary proportion between one limb and the other ? All such questions become relevant when we are concerned with the making of a statue. But a statue will not become a piece of art unless the statue also becomes beautiful 'somehow'. The cases can be multiplied. But the crux of the problem is that the study of this element, 'Beautiful' cannot be neglected in any philosophy of Art or Poetry. It is this principle of beauty which is clearly emphasised by Vāmana in his first sūtra or aphorism in his work *kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛttiḥ*. The value of his theory lies in co-ordinating this principle with the other dimension of art. He writes, *kāvyam grāhyam alaṅkārāt*; a poetry becomes acceptable as poetry on account of '*Alaṅkāra*'. It should not be irrelevant to emphasise that the word *Alaṅkāra* does not mean here a 'figure of speech' like simile or metaphor. The word *Alaṅkāra* as used in the philosophy of poetry is rather ambiguous; it is used in two different senses. In common usage it stands for 'figure of speech'. And this common usage makes men turn a deaf ear to the fact that unlike Bhāmaha Vāmana does not use it here for 'figure of speech'. In his second sūtra Vāmana clearly defines the word *Alaṅkāra* as *saundaryam alaṅkārah*—In this context *Alaṅkāra* means beauty.

That the word, *Alaṅkāra* used in the first and second aphorisms does not denote the 'figure of speech' becomes clear from

the third one. There he again uses the word ‘*Alaṅkāra*; but now it signifies the traditional meaning. It is a means for the attainment of Beauty. He uses the pronoun ‘Sa’ for denoting *Alaṅkāra* which is identical with beauty. Thus, the two uses of the word *Alaṅkāra* are obvious in one aphorism. The sense in which it is a synonym of ‘figure of speech’ is a means, the sense in which it is synonymous with beauty is the end. Vāmana writes : this beauty can be attained through avoiding poetic faults and through the introduction of *guṇas* and ‘figure of speech’.<sup>8</sup> The figure of speech, is not an essential characteristic of poetry; nevertheless it adds to the beauty of poetry. The *guṇas*, on the other hand, are essential characteristics of poetry because it is in and through them that the beauty in poetry becomes manifest. Vāmana clearly writes that *guṇas* are absolutely necessary; for, without them the beauty in poetry cannot emerge. On the other hand, though “figure of speech” adds to the beauty, there can be a beautiful poetry without a figure of speech. Therefore, whereas in the philosophy of poetry a discussion of beauty and quality becomes necessary, a discussion about figures of speech is not necessary. Vāmana writes; just as a beautiful lady looks beautiful even if she is without ornaments so also pure poetry becomes agreeable to the appreciators.<sup>9</sup>

It ought to be clearly understood that for Vāmana, poetry or literature is a kind of a whole made up of parts. The two parts of this whole again are wholes in their own way viz., a (sub)-whole made up of words and a (sub)-whole made up of meanings. The whole thus formed out of these two, so to say, is the body of the poetry. Just as a substance or a thing has got qualities so also the two wholes have got *guṇas* like *Ojas*, *Prasāda*, *Mādhurya* etc. (Perhaps for the sake of brevity Vāmana gives identical names to qualities of words and meanings.) Thus though the poetry seems to be formed out of the two wholes, the whole of words and the whole of meanings, a more critical analysis will reveal that it is composed of four parts; (1) words, (2) the qualities of the words, (3) the meanings and (4) the qualities of meanings. When a whole is formed out of these four parts, it becomes a poetic whole and poetic beauty or value emerges out of it as its effect, quality or fifth part.

As stated earlier, Vāmana clearly distinguished the two dimensions of poetry, (1) the physical and (2) the value. If a person is to be trained in composing poetry and if he is to be taught the different elements that make poetry then certainly not the value, but the composition aspect will have to be emphasised. I have made a reference to this point earlier. But let me substantiate my point in greater detail. An illustration will make my point clear.

We grow flower plants because we are interested in beautiful flowers. But it is not the beauty that we plant. We have to plant a seed or a seedling and when we plant it we have to know what soil and climatic conditions are required for its growth; we should also like to know the quantity of water that will be required for watering and things like this. When the plant shapes properly it flowers and results in splendour. So also is the case with poetry. If the general conditions of 'poetry making' are to be taught one cannot start with beauty. One must be acquainted with the 'seeds' or 'seedlings', the 'soil' 'water' and 'manure'; for poetry the seed or seedling, water or manure consists of words. A person will have to be trained in making a whole of words or words and meanings. The meanings, so to say, would depend on words or sounds, and the beauty of the poetry would depend on these both. The beauty-factor in poetry will, thus, depend on word-factors. Being aware of this fact, while emphasising the element of value in poetry, Vāmana equally emphasised the positive or structural aspect of poetry, and named it as *Rīti*. He says, that poetry becomes poetry on account of beauty and still asserts that *Rīti* is the "Soul" of poetry—it is that without which the poetic substratum (composition) would not come into existence. It is very clear from Vāmana's writing that he regards the *gunas*, which emerge from patterns of sounds and patterns of meanings, as the cause of the value element, beauty. He defines *gunas* as the causes of poetic beauty. He does not define them as the cause of poetry. The cause of poetry ought to be distinguished from the cause of the beauty of poetry. These *gunas* are the effects of the two sub-wholes which lead to a poetic composition. Thus both the *gunas* and the poetic composition are the effects of the sub-wholes of sound and meaning, though one of

them is a quality and the other the substance. This poetic composition and the *gunas* give rise to poetic beauty. Thus, the poetic beauty has two causes; (1) the poetry itself and (2) the poetic *gunas*. This reminds one of the *Samavāyi* and *Asamavāyi* causes of the Nyāya system. In order to understand this particular tenet in Vāmana's philosophy of poetry it is necessary to say more about the theory of causation as presented by Indian Logic.

According to this theory something that is an effect is jointly caused by (1) *Samavāyi* cause and (2) *Asamavāyi* cause which itself is of the nature of effect. Let us take an instance of a cloth or *pāta*. Cloth or *pāta* has two causes amongst others. The thread is supposed to be one such cause of a piece of cloth. But if thread alone were to be there, a piece of cloth would not be made. The conjunction of threads must also enter as another cause in the making of cloth. The threads are supposed to be the material or *Samavāyi* cause and the conjunction of threads the *Asamavāyi* cause. Now, according to the theory put forward by Vāmana sound-patterns and meaning-patterns which make a poetic whole are the causes of the *poetic whole*, in the same way as thread is the cause of a cloth or as two halves of the pot are causes of a pot. The combination or conjunction of threads cannot be the material cause because (according to Indian Logic) it is a quality and quality cannot be a material cause. It can either be an effect, e.g., the colour of the cloth is the effect of cloth, or it can be an *Asamavāyi* cause, e.g., the colour of the threads is the cause of the colour of the cloth. On the other hand, a substance alone can be a material cause whether of a quality or of a substance. From this, it is clear that the sound qualities and the meaning qualities of Vāmana cannot be the material cause of a poetic whole though the sound and meaning patterns are. They cannot also be the *Samavāyi* or material cause of the poetic beauty. Just as the cloth itself is the *Samavāyi* cause of the colour of the cloth, so also the poetic composition is the *Samavāyi* cause of the poetic beauty. But just as the colour of the threads is the *Asamavāyi* cause of the colour of the cloth so also the poetic qualities of the sound and meaning are the *Asamavāyi* cause of the poetic beauty.

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Since a poetic whole, for Vāmana, is a real entity, the parts of which it is made are also real entities. The qualities of sound and meaning exist only in these parts. Therefore, these parts are also entities. Thus, in the world of poetry sounds should be regarded as substance. Otherwise, there would be a danger of a quality inhering a quality. Though it may be doubted as to whether sound is a substance or a quality, as Indian Logicians do, no study of poetry can be made unless a status of substance is given to sounds. Sound or *Śabda* is the basis or substratum of any literary piece. Again, in the context of poetics the word *Artha* which is another part of the poetic whole, is to be understood in the sense of meaning and not in the sense of object. But meaning is a kind of knowledge and this again is a quality of the self (*Ātman*) according to Naiyāyikas. So the poetic whole is likely to be thought as made of qualities, pure and simple. But as has been stated above, in the context of poetics both the sounds and meanings jointly and separately should be understood as a substance and not as qualities. Otherwise, the study of poetics would become impossible or would lead to the violation of the rule of logic, namely, qualities cannot inhere qualities. There will be again another difficulty. If these are the qualities then the beauty-poetic beauty cannot arise; for it would require some substratum. Hence, though poetic whole cannot be regarded as a substance in the ordinary sense of the term, it will be desirable to regard it as a substance—a whole made up of parts and exhibiting the nature of effects. As has been pointed out sounds and their meanings would be the material cause of such a poetic whole. From this point of view, I feel that though Vāmana has used the terminology of Indian Logic he must have accepted like the Sāṅkhya and grammar philosophers that sound was a kind of substance. Similarly he must have accepted meaning also as a substance in a way the grammarians accept it as a cause or effect of sound. Though in the context of poetics, the words and meanings have to be considered separately still the meanings do not have an existence, separate and independent from sounds. In the ordinary usage meaning cannot be regarded as things. Sound alone is their substratum. So a poetic whole is made up of parts some of which are perceptible while the others are unmanifest or *Avyakta*. The poetic whole, therefore, is to be

regarded as an unusual, peculiar kind of entity. Since a poetic whole is an extra-ordinary kind of thing, beauty, the final part of this whole also cannot be regarded as 'quality' in the ordinary sense of the term. Beauty, therefore, cannot be regarded as a quality like yellow or green. It can be felt but it cannot be perceived. Its causes can be known but it cannot be described. It is, therefore, to be regarded as a second order quality. I feel it is this kind of thinking which was in the mind of Vāmana when he wrote aphorisms III,1.26, III,1.27 and III 1.28. At the end of the chapter on Śabdaguna, Vāmana, asks for the proof of the existence of the *Gunas* of sound and in the last three aphorisms he gives that proof. These qualities, he writes, are "not non-existing like the son of a barren woman, nor illusory like shell-silver. That they exist can be inferred from the fact that they are felt". I feel that the argument of Vāmana can be extended to the qualities of meaning and also to the poetic value or beauty.

It has already been pointed out that though a poetic whole comprises of sound, meaning, qualities of sound and meaning and beauty as parts still all these depend upon sound alone for their existence. Neither meanings nor beauty can have an independent existence apart from the substratum which, in this case, is sound. The poetic whole is like a twin engined jet plane, where one engine is dependent on the other for its being put into action and control. The engines, however, act simultaneously and independently and pass out the jet gases which eventually mix up and form one long tail. To an outside observer, it is not the plane alone, but the plane along with the gaseous tail which is the object. However, if the plane is to be controlled, it will have to be controlled by controlling the engine which has a control switch. Similarly, in the case of the poetic whole if any refinement or *samskāra* is to be made, it will have to be done on sound or *śabda* alone. For, sound alone is the vehicle of meaning, which in itself is without form and cannot be physically felt. Thus sound becomes of primary importance in any theory of poetics. This, however, requires an *arrangement* of sound or words which can be of different varieties; each arrangement for example, may represent its own peculiarity or *viseṣa*. It is this very special arrangement or peculiarity of arrangements which is called *Rīti* by Vāmana. According to him this arrangement or

*Rīti* is of three kinds. But whether it is of three kinds or of less or more is a matter of details and not a matter of principle. The 'peculiarity' of arrangement in composition is identical with what Vāmana calls *Guṇas*. This is clear from his aphorism, I.2.8. It is because of this that a discussion of *Rīti* (or style) and *Guṇas* become significant in a thesis on poetics. Having all this in his mind he must have written the aphorism I.2.6. The arrangement of composition (*padaracanā*) is the body of poetry and its peculiarity (*viśiṣṭatva*) the style. This again could be analysed in terms of *Guṇas*. Thus the aphorism I.2.6 should not be studied in isolation but ought to be studied with I.1.1 and I.1.2. If the relation of the aphorism I.2.6 with I.1.1 and I.1.2 is not taken into consideration, the whole thesis of Vāmana will be misunderstood as he has been generally misunderstood now. It goes without saying that Vāmana's being dubbed as a philosopher of style or of figure of speech is due to such misunderstanding. But as a matter of fact, he is neither an advocate of style for its own sake, nor of figure of speech or *Guṇa* for its own sake. He is not just the advocate of figure of speech alone as Bhāmaha perhaps was. He does in fact, talk about them. But that is because they are means to the attainment of poetic value or beauty and because there is no direct way of creating poetic beauty. *Guṇa* and *Rīti* (and *Alaṅkāra*, i.e. figure of speech) are, for him, only the causes which progressively lead to poetic beauty. To dub Vāmana as a fanatic advocate of *Rīti*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Rasa* or *Guṇa* is to do a great injustice to this great philosopher of poetry.

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#### NOTES

1. His date is immaterial for the present purpose.
2. *Kāvyālaṅkara*, I. 1.6.
3. *Ibid*, I. 13, na kāntam api nirbhūṣam vibhāti vanitānanam.
4. *K.A.S.V.*, III.1.4.
5. Cf. kāvya śabdo yam guṇālaṅkāra sanskr̥tayoh śabdār-thayoh vartate. *Kavipriyavṛtti* on *K.A.S.V.*, I.1.1.

6. It may be noted that he uses *Alaṅkāra* in the sense of beauty. See *ibid.*, I.I.2.
7. E.g. ko yaṇci; yathā gauḥ tathā gavayah.
7. *K.A.S.V.*, I.I.1.
8. This is clear from Vāmana's sūtra III.1.3 and his own commentary on it. There Vāmana clearly points out that it is the gunas (poetic qualities) which necessarily produce poetic beauty. His own commentary on the sūtra, pūrve nityāḥ, III.1.3 makes the point still clearer. He writes : purve gunāḥ nityāḥ; tairvina kāvyaśobhānupapattiḥ. Also see III.1.1. and III.1.2.
9. Vide commentary on *ibid.*, III.1.2, yuvateriva rūpamidam kāvyaṁ svadate śuddhaṇam tadapyatīva.



## ART AND EXPERIENCE

One of the many perennial problems of aesthetics is the interaction of art and experience. The aesthetic aspect of the problem lies not so much in the artist's modes of experiencing as in his modes of dealing with his experience in terms of art.

All great artists, all creative geniuses, have only one aim and purpose, namely to express the actual sensation of life as they themselves experience it. They are beings who convey through their art the felt intricacy of their existence and who know that no part of life must need be barred as inartistic, that nothing in mature experience is too sublime or too sordid, too remote or too commonplace to serve as material for art. And so, their achievement lies in their ability to expose their sensibility to all experience, not only to emotions, and to convey their genuine whole of tangled feelings. The artist's sensibility is of a special sort; it is, as T. S. Eliot says in another context, a "finely perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty to enter into new combinations."<sup>1</sup> For poets possessing a unified sensibility, Eliot continues, a thought is an experience which modifies their capacity of feeling. Consequently they can "feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose" and devour and absorb any experience, "so that in their poetry passages of philosophical speculation stimulated by Montaigne or Seneca throb with as living a pulse as their own direct accounts of human passion. Indeed, one has only to turn to Montaigne and *Hamlet* and *Measure for Measure*, or to North's *Plutarch* and *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Cariolanus*, for complete examples of how readings as well as thought could be absorbed as vital experience."<sup>2</sup> It is the poet's special sensibility as well as the unifying power of his imagination that enable him to amalgamate disparate experience and distinguish him from ordinary men. Whereas the ordinary man's experience, says Eliot, is chaotic, irregular, and fragmentary, the poet's experience is not. When the former falls in love, or reads Spinoza, the two experiences do not combine with each other, nor with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking. In the mind of the poet, Eliot continues, these experiences are always forming new wholes.

This seems to me completely accurate and full of perceptive insights into the creative process. Of special importance in this context is Eliot's belief that "impressions and experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those which become important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the personality."<sup>3</sup> Though what Eliot says may not be true of all the arts, it is certainly applicable to painting and poetry. By the time the painter and the poet complete their work, the experience represented in it may be "so different from the original experience as to be hardly recognisable."<sup>4</sup> It may be a medley of numerous feelings fused together in a lucid artistic pattern, in a statue or a song or a painting. The artist sees to it that the undisciplined squads of emotion fall into a timeless order, the kaleidoscope of sensations into an eternal pattern. His floating impressions are all fixed in a divinely lucid pattern of letters and sounds.

What then is the relation between art and experience? James Joyce gives a reasonably acceptable answer when he defines art as "the human disposition of sensible or intelligible matter for an aesthetic end."<sup>5</sup> What he calls disposition is, generally speaking, of three kinds corresponding to the three functions the arts fulfil in various degree. When disposing the sensible or intelligible matter—or experience—the artist interprets life. Poems like *Paradise Lost* and *The Divine Comedy* are commentaries upon the whole human scene, its nature, its destiny. But Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, Rembrandt's pictures of old rabbis, or El Greco's of Spanish grandees are all interpretations of experience like the plays of Shakespeare or like the statues by Michelangelo or Rodin. "These works are the language of men who not only saw and heard with the external eye and ear, but put into sound a hearing, into canvas a vision of what life essentially meant to them."<sup>6</sup>

Interpretation of experience is not the only function of the artist. "The amazing capacity of his (the poet's) for ordering speech is only a part of a more amazing capacity for ordering his experience." The artist not only transmutes ideas into sensations and experience or "takes in more every minute than his duller companion," he also clarifies his sensations through some conscious and explicit pattern and gives them a sequence and a development.

Our phantasies and dreams, our love and hate, are all brought under the discipline of some deliberate, logical and practical pattern. The ordinary man's sensations of colour and form are inchoate, irregular, fragmentary. "Things are experienced," writes John Dewey, "but not in such a way that they are composed into *an* experience. There is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and what we think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other. We put our hands to the plow and turn back; we start and then we stop, not because the experience has reached the end for the sake of which it was initiated but because of extraneous interruptions or of inner lethargy."<sup>7</sup> We cannot, like Cezanne or Vermeer, for instance, organize our experience into something lucid and harmonious. Most of us have experienced the blindness of human ambition, or the fatal possessiveness of pride. But it required a Shakespeare to show us the tragic meaning of the first in *Macbeth*, a Milton to exhibit to us the second in *Paradise Lost*.<sup>8</sup> While Lucretius turned his vague intuitions into a monumental work of philosophy, Dante turned his floating impressions into a magnificent epic.

In the *Partial Portraits* Henry James observed :

"Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spiderweb, of the finest silken threads, suspended in the chamber of consciousness and catching every air-borne particle in its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and when the mind is imaginative—much more when it happens to be that of a man of genius—it takes to itself the faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of the air into revelations.... The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implications of things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern; the condition of feeling life, in general, so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it—this cluster of gifts may almost be said to constitute experience.. If experience consists of impressions, it may be said that impressions *are* experience, just as (have we not seen it?) they are the very air we breathe."<sup>9</sup>

Experience is never limited, because, as John Dewey has put it, it "occurs continuously..the interaction of live creature and environing conditions are involved in the very process of living". Experience for James is also ability and power, such cluster of gifts as the power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implications of things to judge the whole piece by the pattern, etc. Experience, in this sense, is just another word for imagination, but it is not with this 'never limited' experience that the artist is concerned. He has to unify this cluster of gifts into *an* experience, into vital, creative experience. In like manner, impressions *are* experience but not all impressions are a creative experience. Only a creative impression—a sight, a sound, a thought, or an emotion—can rouse the artist's subconscious into action. But once the subconscious is roused, other impressions mingle with the creative impression and give it complexity,<sup>10</sup> its individuality. Experiences are therefore harlots; an experience is a virgin, fecund, innocent. Experiences are diffuse, but an experience is concentrated, intense, creative. The ordinary man's senses are practical, often myopic; the artist's, if they are the artist's, are not. That is why he intensifies our experience by arresting our sensations.

Where then does this 'an experience' come from? From the myriad objects of the world, the falling leaves in virile autumn, the delicate bud of fragrant spring, etc. Indeed, a work of art is created "not in isolation but in relationship."<sup>11</sup> The artist, according to Archibald MacLeish, struggles with the meaninglessness and disorder of the universe until he can subdue it to order: until beauty is born of ugliness, form of shapelessness, and Being of Non-being. MacLeish gives the impression that the traditional conception of the artist as "a solipsist, a candle flame consuming its own fat", is wrong and that the act of art is *not* a passive waiting for the symbol to emerge from the depths of the unconscious. For MacLeish—and for Lu Chi whose view of art has influenced him—the artist is not the attentive watcher and waiter brooding above the silence of himself, but a man taking a position at the hub of things. What MacLeish forgets is that the mystery of the universe does not exclude the depths of the unconscious, the ocean of the artist's own self, and that the artist can—and he often does—derive the aesthetic experience from the depths of

his own being. If he feeds his emotions and his mind on the great works of the past or on the myriad objects at which he gazes, he has also been feeding them on his own passions and memories which he often objectifies in his art. "The poet's labour", says MacLeish, elucidating Lu Chi's view, "is to struggle with the meaninglessness and silence of the world until he can force it to mean..."<sup>12</sup> The silence of the world does not, I think, exclude the silence of the inner world of the poet's self. Moreover, no work of art is created *ex nihilo*. "The 'Being' which the poem is to contain" does not derive from 'Non-being'. The creative act is essentially finite and grounded and the artist does not produce something out of nothing. If his art is to have meaning and relevance it must draw on the artist's impression of life. The world must be there before "the poet can set out to interpret it, discover it, or represent it symbolically."<sup>13</sup> The artist is also to a greater extent dependent on literary and linguistic traditions and conventions of genres. "Language is something which the poet can hope to modify or purify at a certain high level of literary—*Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu*—but not even a Mallarmé or an Eliot has been able to construct a language *ex nihilo*".<sup>14</sup>

The expression, artistic or aesthetic experience, is often used ambiguously. While for some the aesthetic object *arouses* emotion, for others arts are, from the point of view of content, expressive of emotion. As regards the first proposition it can be said that specific emotion is only an accidental outcome of aesthetic apprehension, for the same aesthetic object can—and it really does—arouse different emotions in different persons or even in the same person in different circumstances. Nor is the second proposition readily acceptable. How exactly does the 'object' express emotion? Some art critics—like Prall, for instance—who have tried to answer this question, have only repeated that objects do in fact express emotion.<sup>15</sup>

Psychological investigations in the last seventy years have amply demonstrated that art need not always arouse emotion in every spectator. The emotional response to a work of art depend on the art, the spectator, and the quality of his attention. The aesthetic experience is often said to be "the satisfaction of the 'play' impulse in a peculiar sense of play as a happy harmony of the sensuous or appetitive impulses with the rational and moral."<sup>16</sup>

This is a deliberate rejection of the Kantian view that distinguishes and even opposes morality and inclination. According to Schiller, the greatest good is not the fulfilment of duty in the face of difficulty and temptation but "the lucky coincidence of attraction with duty or what we take to be duty." It is, however, wrong to think that this coincidence was realized only, or even mainly, in aesthetic experience. Reading poetry or visiting Switzerland may in certain circumstances be my pleasant duty, but all pleasant and obligatory actions—such as lying late in bed or dining with the woman I loved—are not aesthetic.<sup>17</sup>

It seems that aesthetic experience is more than mere feeling. It is certainly not like the feeling of warmth or boredom, but "an experience of rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings and values in their full presentational immediacy."<sup>18</sup> It is significant of, or an experience of, an aesthetic object and makes that object of the greatest interest, so that it is "grasped in such a way as to give rise to an aesthetic experience."<sup>19</sup> The aesthetic object need not be a life-like statue or picture; nor is it imperative for it to give us any new information about man or nature. Though a beautiful sonnet, Keats's 'On First Looking into Chapman's Homer' gives, on the contrary, a piece of wrong information in the following lines :

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies  
When a new planet swims into his ken;  
Or like stout Cortez—when with eagle eyes  
He started at the Pacific....

It was Balboa, and *not stout Cortez*, who with eagle eyes started at the Pacific. Yet, as I have said, the sonnet is undoubtedly an excellent piece of poetry which also, by the way, sheds considerable light on the nature of aesthetic experience. Keats's experience on first looking into Chapman's Homer was an aesthetic experience, an experience of 'realisation'. When enjoying the 'pure serene' of the original, Keats became a Greek himself and his mind "possessed the weird power of being in two places at once".<sup>20</sup> Aesthetic experience is the experience of this power, the power of 'real-is-ing' other places, people or objects. My experience becomes aesthetic when the object I am contemplating extends my sense of reality as far as the ripples. Then I find

myself in one of those moods of the 'glory and the freshness of a dream', of feeling far more awake than usual :

....that serene and blessed mood,  
In which the affections gently lead us on,—  
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame  
And even the motion of our human blood  
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep  
In body, and become a living soul :<sup>21</sup>

What Wordsworth is describing in these lines may be called a mood of 'intransitive attention', a mood in which emotion is not at all present and there is no motion inside, an autonomous mood indeed. Aesthetic experience is nothing if not autonomous. When it is *fully* in the grip of the object all other experiences are debarred. But our perception does not give up its role of 'relationality'; it continues to be related to the object which, as Eliseo Vivas rightly points out, "remains in complete monopolistic possession of consciousness."

It is not necessary for all sensible objects to yield an aesthetic experience to every spectator. Individual differences of nature and temperament play a vital role in all art-valuations and our response to beauty. While our imagination is at once stimulated by such words as 'megha' (clouds) and 'Savitri' these words will arouse no images and associations in the mind of an Englishman. Owing to one's exclusively Indian culture the writings of Joyce may not evoke any objective response in one's heart. Similarly, owing to his nationality, an Englishman may not find anything worthy of appreciation in Indian erotic sculpture. It appears therefore, that nothing in itself is beautiful; what may be expressive to one man may not be expressive to another. There are, however, many traits—of nature, of behaviour, etc.—common to all of us alike and so there is much of mutual agreement too. Most of us would, for instance, admit that the imaginative mind is essentially different from the ordinary mind; the imaginative mind is child-like, converting 'the very pulses of the air into revelations.' In *Psychology and Effective Behaviour* James C. Coleman comes to an identical conclusion. He saw in the artist's openness to new experience "a childlike quality, for the young child is a natural explorer and experimenter who embraces every new experience

with open arms and an open mind and who constantly ‘creates’ with thoughts, with words, with pencils and paints.”<sup>22</sup>

Coleman goes on to observe that as people grow older their sensibility hardens and their conservatism prevents them from reacting to new experiences. “By carefully conforming to all the customs and folkways of their society and placing security before curiosity, many adults cut themselves off from new experiences and new concepts and thereby close the door on creativity.”<sup>23</sup>

The artist, then is a man of exceptional sensibility to experience, a man who possesses to an infinite degree the power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implications of things, and to organise his experience more meaningfully, more coherently, more vividly, than ordinary life permits. “Art is experience in its most articulate and adequate form : the union of sense, mood, impulse, and action characteristic of the live creature. It is not differentiated by the predominance of any one mental faculty, such as emotion or imagination, but by a greater inclusiveness of psychological factors. It has no highly restricted subject matter : anything vividly and imaginatively realized, indeed, may be the source of ‘an experience that is *an* experience’—the kind of experience that is art.”<sup>24</sup> Aesthetics is concerned only with this, with *an* experience, with that which, after creating ripples in his consciousness, ultimately results in an experience akin to *samādhi* or to *satori*. Great art is born when the gates of heaven open and the shining billows madly rush at the artist from all sides as they did when the blessed Mother revealed Herself to Rāmakṛṣṇa.

Aesthetic experience, like artistic intuition, is a distinct species differing from experience in general by being something more. But we hardly ever indicate of what this something more consists. It is perhaps more imaginative and more ‘universalized or liberated’. It is, to quote a popular phrase from E. M. Forster’s *The Longest Journey*, ‘full of the wine of life’. The ordinary man’s experience in general is like a cup—let us call it the teacup—while the artist’s is as deep as the ocean. “There comes a moment —God knows when—at which we can say, ‘I will experience no longer. I will create. I will be an experience.’ But to do this we must be both acute and heroic. For it is not easy, after accepting six cups of tea, to throw the seventh in the face of the hostess.”<sup>25</sup>

## ART AND EXPERIENCE

What E. M. Forster is saying applies wholesale to the creative experience which is fundamentally a Zen experience : " I will be an experience." All great art stems from this identification, from nothing short of this identification. When the artist becomes his experience, what is born is nothing less than a *Mona Lisa*, a *Divine Comedy*. When the experience is valuable, complex, rich, and universally understandable the art born of it shares these qualities. Thus the quality of the experience embodied in it determines its overall character and significance. Now, the question is : how can the underlying worth ( or worthlessness ) of an experience be judged ? What can be the criterion ? One can answer this in the words of Professor DeWitt H. Parker, and say that the experience embodied in art gives satisfaction and its value depends on the proportion of satisfaction it gives. The value of art as satisfaction " arises through the appeasement of what in a general way may be called desire."<sup>26</sup> Generally speaking, desire, according to Professor Parker, is not only the motivation of all experience but also its inward drive, and the source of its value. Desires that urge us on in life, reappear in our art. There are, for Professor Parker, " no peculiar elementary aesthetic interests or emotions."<sup>27</sup> What is really interesting in this discussion is his psychologically valid distinction between ordinary experience and aesthetic experience, a distinction drawn *vis-a-vis* desire. Whereas desire in ordinary experience is directed upon real objects and is satisfied through action or actions leading to its achievement, in the case of art, desire is concerned with " imminent or fictitious objects, and is appeased, not through a course of action leading to a distant goal, but in present, given experience."<sup>28</sup>

Arts serve another important purpose in addition to appeasing our desires. They penetrate into new spheres and dimensions of experience and have on that account to create a new reality and develop new forms.<sup>29</sup> Artists like Masaccio, Giotto, Leonardo, Titian, Cezanne, van Gogh, Picasso, or Cervantes, Goethe, the romantics and the imagists, Flaubert, Proust, Joyce, Kafka, or Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, Stravinsky, Schönberg—to name only a few of those artists who have created unquestionably great works of art—did not just let their fancy produce their art *ex nihilo*, they were driven or " guided in a certain direction by the human condition, the stage of perception and experience...<sup>30</sup>

In the words of Kahler, these artists "liberated forms and experiences that were to become *the reality of the next age.*"<sup>31</sup> Their stories, portraits, combinations of sounds, paintings, etc. are important not only because they embody the artists' individual vision of reality but also because they reflect "a human condition in transition." The plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe, the novels of Joyce and Kafka, the portraits of Titian and Durer are important as much for their "deep physiognomical grasp of an individual personality,"<sup>32</sup> as for the new phenomenal vistas they open up, uncovering the new reality of our age.<sup>33</sup>

Another aspect of the problem with which we are dealing relates to the nature of our delight in natural objects. Is this delight an indication of a developed aesthetic awareness of nature? Some of us go to the countryside every morning for exercise, others for physical exhilaration and sensations. The person whose aesthetic awareness is well developed expressly seeks out the forms of nature primarily for the purpose of responding to its sights and scenes as he would respond to a *kathakali* item or to the music of *shehnai*. He does not give himself upto mere sensations; what he does is to let his whole being respond "to the visual scene with a completeness and forgetfulness of all else, as when absorbed in the music."<sup>34</sup> When he succeeds in reacting to form with complete self-absorption, his perception becomes aesthetic. Thus one views an object aesthetically when one "perceives an object which holds the vision in this undisputed possession." By the same token, therefore, the impression created by an object or idea so viewed is an aesthetic impression<sup>35</sup> and works of art are the recorded experiences of the person who responds to an object—of nature or of man's creation—with this all-absorbing aesthetic interest. "They are recordings", says Arthus R. Howell, "which have been born of 'artifice' for the purpose of meaningful expression. This artifice, as constructed form—hence, art form—is the fundamental distinction between works-of-art and natural form."<sup>36</sup>

When one looks at an art form, one does not take long to realize that man must have stumbled on the discovery of art and poetry in the course of his quest for Truth, for there is a mysterious relationship between beauty and truth, between art and life. While the human intellect, through its logical deductions, builds

up that edifice of knowledge properly called science, sensibility helps in the sensuous apprehension of human realities. If the natural intensity of all modes of perception and sensation is to be preserved and co-ordinated, the artist will have to lean equally heavily on both the faculties (i.e., intellect and sensibility). In the rough and tumble of everyday life the human psyche cannot be perfectly unified, in its individual or collective aspect, by any coercion of the intellect or by what William James calls the 'single barrel approach to sensibility'. This reconciliation of discordant impulses is only possible through the medium of art and poetry which are a product or an outcome of a 'treaty between the mind and the heart'. In their objective analysis of the meaning, mystery and function of art most of the Western writers have stressed this very aspect of their reconciliatory impact. "The reconciliation of intuition and intellect, of imagination and abstraction," says Herbert Read, "can only take place objectively, or, I would rather say creatively. It is only by projecting the two sides of our nature into a concrete construction that we can realize and contemplate the process of reconciliation. That is precisely the function of the work of art, and that has been its function all down the ages."<sup>37</sup> Thus it is as the symbol of reconciliation, the verbal form in which our impulses submit to the aesthetic discipline of rhythm and proportion, that poetry occupies a high place in the romantic value-system.

One of the Indian poets whose views on poetry and art square with my own is Mahadevi Verma. She believes that a work of art demands not so much the crutch of a materialist view of life as the positivistic support of deep feeling and intense experience which brings about a harmony between the smaller self of the artist and the larger self of the universe. Though this growth of a comprehensive identity between the smaller self of the artist and the bigger self of the universe may be guided by politics, controlled by social obligations, developed by the new science and enlivened by philosophy, art has nonetheless an autonomy of its own. The result is that in spite of all the barriers the devotee of art form has an independent existence, and poetry has the function of providing a healthful nourishment to his impulses clamouring for expression. Poetry conceived in terms of a means

of redemption and salvation reminds us of Arnold for whom it represented the last refuge of a world sapped dry by science and technology. "More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry."

When in the diversity of nature and in its changeable variety, the artist began to search out the link that connected the one extreme of the infinite consciousness with the other end of the finite heart of man, he found every single particle of nature glowing with a preter-natural presence. Still the artist's thirst was not fully quenched. For, so long as the self does not make a total loving surrender, the mystery of this relationship remains an unsolved enigma. This notion of art as a connecting link between the infinite consciousness and the finite self found a powerful exponent in the German mystical philosophy of Schiller who believed that all art arises out of two impulses : the sensuous impulse (*Stofftrieb*) which presses for the 'reality of existence, for some content in our perceptions and for purpose in our actions, and the formal impulse (*Formtrieb*), the demand of man's free rational self 'to bring harmony into the diversity of his manifestation'.

Poe once said that no writer would have the courage to express the whole continuum of his inner thoughts and feelings, for the very paper would burn beneath them. What he meant was that even the boldest writers tend to suppress those unconscious urges in their nature which are related to violence, cruelty, morbidity, and obscenity. Though many of our primitive barbaric impulses have become quiescent they have not been exterminated by culture, and the artist, however bold a non-conformist he may be, would naturally feel hesitant to remind his readers or spectators of the remnant echoes and memories of our primitive stage. Many artists, therefore, give us evidence of having sharply reacted to Freudian interpretations of dreams, sexual symbolism and neurotic conception of art and artists.

## NOTES

1. *The Sacred Wood* (London : Methuen & Co., 1957), pp. 53, *et seq.*
2. Vide F. O. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot* (New York, O.U.P., 1959), pp. 13, *et seq.*
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 56.
4. *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (1953), p. 138.
5. See Thomas Connolly, *Joyce's Portrait* (London : Peter Owen, 1967), p. 240.
6. Irwin Edman, *Arts and the Man* (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1939), p. 34.
7. *Art as Experience* (New York, Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 35.
8. Vide Irwin Edman, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
9. 'The Art of Fiction', *Partial Portraits*, 1888.
10. Thus art results from the interplay between the conscious and unconscious in the artist, so that in the act of creating he to some extent organises material that has been 'incubating' in his unconscious.
11. Archibald MacLeish, *Poetry and Experience* (Penguin Book, 1965), p. 15.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
13. William T. Noon, *Joyce and Aquinas* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957), p. 127.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Elisco Vivas, *Creation and Discovery* (New York, The Noon-day Press, 1955), p. 94.
16. E. F. Carritt, *An Introduction to Aesthetics* (London : Hutchinson's University Library, N.D.), p. 35.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Elisco Vivas, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Colin Wilson, *Poetry and Mysticism* (London : Hutchinson, 1970), p. 57.
21. Wordsworth, Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey, 11.41-46.
22. See p. 394.
23. *Ibid.*

24. Melvin Rader (ed.), *A Modern Book of Esthetics* (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962) p. 170.
25. E. M. Forster, *The Longest Journey* (London : Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 66 *et seq.*
26. DeWitt H. Parker, 'The Nature of Art' in Morris Weitz (ed.), *Problems in Aesthetics* (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 65.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Erich Kahler, 'What is Art?' in *Problems in Aesthetics*, p. 167.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. Arthur R. Howell, *The Meaning and Purpose of Art* (Ditchling : The Ditchling Press Limited, 1957), p. 15.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, *et seq.*

## AESTHETICS AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

In this paper I want to examine the analogy between aesthetics and psycho-analysis recently put forward by some philosophers. For convenience, I shall take as my main reference John Casey's Book entitled *The Language of Criticism* (Methuen, 1966).

Taking his cue from certain passages in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*<sup>1</sup> and the later works of John Wisdom, Casey argues that aesthetics may be described as reflective thought. Reflective thought is neither inductive nor deductive. Nevertheless "it seems to allow for discovery which consists neither in the finding of new facts, nor in the drawing of logical implications". What is added, however, "is a new application of a concept, a new way of seeing things". (*Ibid*, p. 17.).

Aesthetic reasoning, as we are told, is more like psycho-analysis than science. "A psycho-analytic interpretation cannot be imposed on a patient as though it were a causal hypothesis which has been 'proved' by or 'explains' the agreed facts of the case. Nor is it simply a logical inference from the agreed facts. The patient is induced to see his behaviour in a different way or to take up a new attitude. The argument might take the form of a comparison of the old description of picture, and the new one; and the criteria might be those of economy, explanatory richness, elegance and so on, what it would be by no means far fetched to call aesthetic criteria.". (*Ibid*, p. 19.)

Casey notes that this new way of looking at things, the 'insight' which is the basis of aesthetic reasoning is somewhat like scientific 'conjecture' as Professor Karl Popper calls it. At the same time, he points out that it might be far fetched to suggest that we form hypotheses in aesthetics as we do in science.

Two other points in the analogy may be noted. First, by disagreeing with Popper's<sup>2</sup> view that psycho-analysis and philosophical theories generally cannot be falsified, Casey contends that there is no rigid distinction between hypotheses which are falsifiable and interpretations which can be shown to be far fetched or over-elaborate. Just as the criterion of the rightness of a psycho-analytic interpretation is that the patient accepts it,

so in the case of physical hypotheses we have to accept that they have been verified.

Secondly, the gap between fact and value is not bridged by a decision, as it is in ethics as many neo-positivist philosophers have contended. Casey believes that both in psycho-analytical practice and in aesthetics there is no such sharp distinction between fact and value.

Before explaining this analogy between aesthetics and psycho-analysis in some detail, I want briefly to touch upon the question as to whether, and to what extent, this theory is to be found in Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein refers to this issue, in two places in *Philosophical Investigations*. Firstly in Part I para 74, he speaks of seeing an object in two or more possible ways. You may see a leaf as a sample of a leaf shape. You may see the same object as a sample of a cube. And he points out that you would act differently depending on which sample you take the object to represent. This very brief statement could, however, only indirectly be taken to refer to the process of "seeing as". Secondly in Part II, section xi, Wittgenstein talks of two uses of the word 'see'. You may, for example, see an object; this pencil or that chair. Also, you see likenesses and differences. Wittgenstein calls this experience of seeing likenesses and differences, 'noticing an aspect' or 'seeing as'. But this is a point which I shall develop later in this paper.

The interesting point to note, however, is that Wittgenstein has nothing to say in his reported *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*<sup>3</sup> on this subject.

On the subject of aesthetics Wittgenstein discusses mainly the following :

(i) The term 'beautiful' which philosophers take as fundamental is meaningless; and is, moreover, rarely used by critics in talking about works of art.

(ii) The terms and phrases they use are phrases like "there is something wrong", "something missing" or "it is not quite right" or "just right".

(iii) Appreciation of a work of art has to be within a culture and at a certain time.

In the lectures on psycho-analysis Wittgenstein concerns himself with :

- (i) What is meant by acceptance or rejection.
- (ii) What is meant by psychological explanation. It is not the same as causal explanation.
- (iii) In what sense can a dream be called a symbol.

My intention in the foregoing paragraphs is mainly to show that Wittgenstein himself did not believe that there is any close analogy between aesthetics and psycho-analysis. Be that as it may, let us return to a detailed examination of this analogy.

Firstly, in both cases, for the aesthetic philosopher or critic (I dislike the term aesthetician) and for the psycho-analyst, it is contended that there is a problem which requires solution. For Casey and the linguistic analysts, philosophy is a form of therapy which cures them of state of anxiety which is commonly described as perplexity or puzzlement. A person reads a poem or looks at a painting and cannot make sense of it. The philosopher or art critic comes to his rescue and interprets the work for him and the problem is solved. Similarly, it is argued, the patient has a problem; he is suffering from amnesia, or whatever the case may be. And the psycho-analyst interprets his behaviour, shows him that it resulted from a suppressed wish. And thereupon the problem is solved.

The question arises as to whose problem it is which is solved. In the case of psycho-analysis the problem is that of the patient. Because of his amnesia or schizophrenia, his normal life is disturbed and he is unhappy. The psycho-analyst has to find an answer to the patient's problem. But whose problem are we solving in aesthetics ? If the analogy is to apply, it should be the artist. But is it ? In the psycho-analytical situation the patient is behaving in a strange way; this is the malady, the problem. Perhaps he has dreams or hallucinations. A lot of information comes out as a result of free association. The analyst's function is to look at all these facts, interpret them, convince the patient of his interpretation—and the cure follows. So, it is the patient's problem which has to be solved. Of course, the psycho-analyst may have a problem too, in finding interpretation which satisfies him and the patient. The patient may

go to a second analyst, who may give a different interpretation and this may or may not be acceptable or convincing to the patient. But what I wish to emphasise is that in each case we have to go back to the patient and the success or failure of the analyst's interpretation is judged by its capacity to solve the patient's problem.

But what happens in the aesthetic situation, if I may so describe it? Who is it that corresponds to the patient? It would be natural to suppose it is the artist. But is it? Many philosophers, who could be described as close to the later Wittgenstein if not as his disciples, have argued that works of art are gratuitous, that they are not answers to problems. On this assumption, the artist cannot be equated with the patient, since the artist does not have a problem. On the other hand, it may be contended that artists are faced with problems, and works of art which they create, are solutions to these problems. It seems to me that this is a plausible theory. In architecture the problems may be obvious. A building has to be constructed to serve a particular purpose. Space being expensive, and not easily available, the best utilisation of space becomes a problem. The nature of the soil, the availability and nature of materials to be used, all present problems for the architect. A Gerard Manley Hopkins sees misery and injustice in the world and this is his problem which he presents in his curtal sonnet: 'Thou art indeed just Lord'. And so on.

However, to come back to the analogy with psycho-analysis: who, in the aesthetic situation, corresponds to the patient? As we have seen, it is not the artist. For either the work of art is not an answer to a problem and is gratuitous—in which case the artist has no problem; or it is an answer to a problem, and in this case the artist has solved his own problem. But on both alternatives, it is evident that the critic is not required to solve the artist's problem.

Then who else is there in the aesthetic situation, who could correspond to the patient? This question is not specifically posed or answered by the linguistic philosophers. It is simply assumed that the patient is anyone who attempts to understand the work of art. In this case there is not one patient but many patients and their problems in understanding a work of art may

be different, depending on their background, acquaintance with the culture in which the work of art exists, level of knowledge and so on.

It might be argued that psycho-analysis does not function in this manner. The psycho-analyst does not set out to solve the problems of several patients at one time in a generalised manner. He is concerned with a *particular* individual and his case history. But to this it might be replied that the theory of psycho-analysis has grouped a number of facts, or special cases, under its key concepts. And these key concepts give us insights into various types of psychoses and the principles along which particular cases can be understood. So, it is the function of aesthetics to frame key concepts which help to explain works of art. While this would apply at the philosophical level, the critic working at a clinical level would use these principles to interpret particular works of art.

This sounds plausible enough on the surface but the analogy appears to me to break down. The art critic is not addressing himself to the personality problems of potential or actual appreciators of works of art. He is basically concerned with the work of art. He is seeing, for example, as John Stallworthy<sup>4</sup> does that in many of his poems, Yeats starts with a particular statement or image and then seeks to generalise it. Or Vivienne Koch<sup>5</sup> in her study of the later poems points out that Yeats had undergone the Steinach glandular operation in 1934 when he was seventy years of age. As a result the respectable old man's exterior covered a cauldron of seething sexual passions. You will not understand these poems, she tells us, unless you appreciate this conflict in Yeats' personality. The critic's problem is the work of art, to comprehend it, to see the connection, or lack of connection between its various parts and so on. It is also his function to help the interested public to understand and appreciate the work of art. In psycho-analysis, the problem is to help the patient to understand himself. In the aesthetic situation, the problem is to understand the artist's work, to help others to do so. But emphatically the critic's job is not to help individual members of the public to understand themselves !

The advocates of this theory lay a good deal of emphasis on their contention that, like psycho-analysis, aesthetics or criti-

cism is a matter of persuasion. If you apply concepts of right or wrong in aesthetics, Wittgenstein has said, you will end up in confusion. What is required of the critic or the analyst is described in *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, section xi, page 193, as follows.

"Two uses of the word 'see'. The one : "What do you see there?"—"I see this" (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other : "I see a likeness between those two faces"—let the man I tell this to, be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself. The importance of this is the categorical difference between the two objects of sight....I contemplate a face and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience "noticing an aspect".

I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle—picture. Before there were branches there; now there is a human shape. 'My visual impression has changed and now I recognize that it has not only colour and shape but also a quite particular organisation'.

So the contention is that the function of the critic is to help you to see the painting or the poem or whatever it is, as a quite particular organisation. And this business of "seeing as" is what the psycho-analyst also does with his patient.

This aspect of reflective thought, of "seeing as", it is contended by Casey, does not involve the discovery of facts. And it is held that in this respect reflective thought differs from inductive thinking. But is it the case that in reflective thought, as illustrated in criticism and psycho-analysis, there is no discovery of facts? In science, for instance, you discover a galaxy; it existed for billions of years but was unknown to man. Does not the same thing happen in psycho-analysis? Several events, especially in early childhood, lie hidden in the unconscious. Doesn't the psycho-analyst discover them for his patient? It is possible, no doubt, to quibble as to whether this process is one of discovery or of re-discovery. But whatever the philosophical niceties, psycho-analysts do claim that they bring to light facts unknown to the patient. These new facts are important in helping the patient to see his life history in a new way. And I would suggest that the same happens in aesthetics. True, the painting or the

poem is all there. But facts about the creative artist come to light and it is in the light of these hitherto unknown facts, that a new and different interpretation is possible. I would suggest that the process of discovery is as germane a part of psycho-analysis and aesthetics as it is of science. No doubt the procedures for discovery are different. In psycho-analysis and aesthetics it is rather like history, like discovering the past, whereas in some of the sciences discovery is tied up with prediction of the future.

At this point we come up with the problem as to what counts for success in psycho-analysis and aesthetics respectively. In the former, it is the analyst's explanation, his way of seeing the facts which has to be accepted as the right one. I emphasise the point that there is just one correct way of looking at the facts. Is this so in aesthetics ? If this were so then what happens to a contention such as Empson's theory of seven types of ambiguity ? In aesthetics often the purpose of interpretation is to show the several different ways in which the art object can be looked at, and it is the combination of many meanings at one and the same time that contributes to the significance of the work. I suggest that this is one important difference between a successful and unsuccessful explanation in psycho-analysis and aesthetics.

In psycho-analysis the acid test of an explanation is whether it is accepted by the patient and the malady is cured. Acceptance of the explanation and cure are inter-connected. If the patient appears to accept it and the cure does not follow, the analyst does not reject his explanation. It is the patient who is at fault, who is either consciously or sub-consciously resisting the explanation. This is why it is said that psycho-analysis cannot be falsified. But is this so in aesthetics ? The answer to this question is not simple. Aesthetic theories have been described as irrefutable for various reasons. For example, Bell's theory of significant form is said to be irrefutable on the ground that the test of the presence of significant form in a work of art is dependent on the observer's experience of the aesthetic emotion. But how is aesthetic emotion described or defined ? The answer is that it is the particular emotion one experiences when one is aware of significant form. So the two key concepts in Bell's theory are defined in terms of each other. Basically this theory is subjective and is, therefore, irrefutable. I have argued in my book *Fundamental Questions*

*in Aesthetics* ( Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 1968 ) that this is a weakness which applies also to the work of Collingwood, Susanne Langer and others whose theories are examples of speculative metaphysics. But if getting to know works of art is like getting to know other empirical objects, that it is a process of discovery, then interpretations of works of art are empirically falsifiable. It is the awkward unaccountable fact which falsifies an aesthetic interpretation, as it falsefies a scientific hypothesis. If, in particular cases, aesthetic theories have not been refuted, criteria of preference may still be available. For if the work of art is an answer to a problem, it is possible to enquire whether it is a satisfactory answer. And it is possible further to enquire whether the answer passes the tests of simplicity, of economy of assumptions, and of being fruitful or suggestive of new avenues of inquiry.

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## SUSANNE K. LANGER'S AESTHETICS OF PAINTING AND SOME INDIAN ART

This paper seeks to summarize Susanne K. Langer's aesthetics of painting and to see how, and to what extent it is applicable to a few select actual works of Indian art. I choose these paintings not with a view to assessing their merit generally, but only as illustrations of some points of theory.

### I. Langer's Theory

Langer defines art as "the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling."<sup>1</sup> The key ideas of this definition may be put as follows :

1. Art expresses *forms of feeling*. The term "feeling" here means not any particular feeling or designable emotion—such as joy and sorrow—but rather a general way of experiencing *any* content. The general form—say, the rise and fall of direct experience—cannot *by itself* be ever actually felt. But, it can be made an object of attention or contemplation, as distinguished from analysis.

2. A work of art or created form is symbolic and not symptomatic of human feeling. It is a symbol in the sense that it makes us think of the life of feeling as such. It is a "non-discursive symbol that articulates what is verbally ineffable".<sup>2</sup> In this sense, it is an "expressive form".

3. The third point that follows from the above is that a work of art is an object of direct apprehension or intuition, and that it cannot be understood in a discursive manner.

In addition to the formulation of a general theory of art, Langer turns to distinguish each art separately. And this is done by considering the question : what is the "primary creation" of each art ? In the case of painting, she answers, the primary creation is "virtual space".

#### (a) 'Virtual space' in painting :

"Virtual space", according to Langer, "is what is always created in a work of pictorial art".<sup>3</sup> This at once suggests a difference between the actual and "virtual" elements in a work.

A piece of flat canvas, pigments etc. are the actual elements provided before a painting is created. The space that is occupied by the flat surface of the canvas is also, no doubt, actual. This space cannot be created; it is just ever there. But as the painting emerges, the piece of canvas no longer appears a mere flat surface. What emerges is a new, dimensionless space which is created in and with the painting and is autonomous in nature. To put it in Langer's own words :

"The picture, in short, is an apparition. It is there for our eyes but not for our hands, nor does its visible space, however great, have any acoustical properties for our ears... The whole picture is a purely visual space. It is nothing but a vision."<sup>4</sup>

This directly suggests two distinct ideas. First, "virtual space" is to be found in the painting itself; and, secondly, 'seeing' the painting alone is the only act relevant and necessary for its aesthetic contemplation. The first idea requires us to attend to the nature of "virtual space" in relation to the work, and the second suggests that the concept be considered also from the viewpoint of the onlooker.

The nature of virutal space *in the work* may be considered by turning to Langer's following utterance :

"Virtual space, being entirely independent and not a local area in actual space, is a self-contained, total system. Whether it be two-dimensional or three, it is continuous in all its possible directions, and infinitely plastic. In any work of art, the dimensionality of its space and the continuous character of it are always implicitly assured. Perceptual forms are carved out of it and must appear to be still related to it despite their most definite boundaries."<sup>5</sup>

Three ideas are here suggested : first, that "virtual space" is autonomous in character; second, that it is infinitely plastic or admits of manipulation; and finally, that it is an organic whole.

The autonomous character of "virtual space" means that such space is an objective quality in a painting. It is independent of the fact whether the work is seen or not. Further, it has no relation to actual space. The actual space of the canvas is limited to its physical boundaries. But what is painted on the canvas

could be a mountain that seems vast, nay infinite. The vastness of the painting created has no direct relation to the size of the canvas.

The space that is created in a painting can be made to seem quite variously in different paintings. Space in one painting may seem recessive, while in another advancing. The truth indeed is that virtual space in one painting is in no way related to the virtual space in other paintings. Each painting has its own realm of virtual space which is neither connected with the actual space outside it nor with the virtual space in any other painting.

The third point viz., that virtual space is an organic whole, directly follows from the second one : what is infinite cannot be a mere aggregate. For, if it is an aggregate, its parts can be made out and numbered; which would mean it is finite, not infinite.

#### ( b ) 'Virtual space' and the Onlooker :

Let us now consider the concept of virtual space from the view point of the onlooker. The following words of Langer may here be quoted with advantage :

" Everything that is relevant and artistically valid in a picture must be visual... Everything that is given at all is given to vision; therefore, we must have *visual substitutes* for the things that are normally known by touch, movement or inference."<sup>6</sup>

The simple meaning we get here is this. A painting is to be regarded by the viewer only in terms of its visual impact. The import of a painting, as an art symbol, is to be had from ( or in ) what the painting itself seems and not from anything outside it.

Now, how does the beholder apprehend the various elements or "visual substitutes" in a painting ? The following remark of Langer provides the clue :

" ..for the beholder the work of art must be not only a shape in space, but a shaping of space—of all the space that he is given."<sup>7</sup>

The different elements in a painting are not merely in virtual space. For, were they mere included in the latter, one could point to them apart from virtual space. But such abstraction is not here possible. For, a painting is an organic whole whose very

existence is spatial in character. The various lines or forms (say, human) in a painting have no independent existence apart from and without any relation to the whole painting. A natural corollary to this is that the viewer must see a painting *as a whole* and perceive the *total* import that results from the interplay of the various related elements in the painting.

#### (c) 'Virtual space' and expressiveness :

"Virtual space" distinguishes painting from other forms of art, say music, dance etc. Expressiveness, on the other hand, distinguishes what is art from what is not art. Now, all paintings are not expressive, though Langer seems to claim that the concept of virtual space is relevant to all paintings;

"Even *bad* pictures create a picture space".<sup>8</sup>

We may therefore consider how the two terms, "virtual space" and "expressiveness", are related to each other.

I would like to maintain that Langer uses the term "virtual space" in at least two different senses :—

- (i) In one sense, it just seeks to mark off actual space from the kind of space that is created and treated in a painting. It is in this sense that Langer interchanges "virtual space" with "picture space".
- (ii) In its other sense, "virtual space" at places signifies that picture's space which is *also* expressive.

To my view, the second sense is more important and relevant to the full meaning of "virtual space".

#### (d) 'Virtual space' and its Creation :

The artist's ideas—whatever they be—have to be translated into visual form. And, what is visual must be seen in space. The artist creates virtual space (as opposed to actual space); but "without the organising shapes it is simply not there".<sup>9</sup> The point we need stress here is this. The creation of "virtual space" and the making or organising of the forms in a painting are not two independent activities, although they can certainly be distinguished. From the artist's point of view, the two go together; for the "forms" just cannot emerge as "living form" unless they are created in virtual space. And, as for "making space visible, the artist has to employ forms." In point of fact, therefore,

"organisation of forms" is at once "organisation of space". Thus, as there are numberless ways of organising forms or shaping them, there are also "numberless ways to making space visible".

The crux of the argument is that in any kind of painting the artist has to employ "visual substitute" for whatever he wants to express. It follows that the expressive character of a work of art results from so organising virtual space as to charge it with expressiveness.

#### (e) 'Form of feeling' and Painting as 'art symbol' :

Painting as an "art symbol" must be expressive of the life of feeling or the general "form of feeling". And painting *qua* painting creates "virtual space". What now remains to be seen is, how this "form of feeling" is found in painting, i.e. in virtual space. The way be set out to answer this question is as follows :

The general form of any feeling is characterized by "tensions and resolutions".<sup>10</sup> In painting, "form" is created "through the illusion of 'space-tensions' and 'space-resolutions'".<sup>11</sup> So, virtual space is created by building up areas of "space tension" and resolving them by the arrangement or total composition of these areas.

To sum up, "virtual space" in painting is the total form created by binding into a harmonious whole the "space-tensions" on the picture plane; that is, by creating a "semblance of functional unity"<sup>12</sup> among the elements of painting. How this is actually done may now be brought out by considering some paintings.

## II. Some Indian Arts

Let us choose the following six paintings :

- (1) The Magician ( Gaganendranath Tagore )
- (2) Pranam ( Nandalal Bose )
- (3) Three Pujarinis ( Jamini Roy )
- (4) The Marriage Ceremony ( Krishna Hebbar )
- (5) The Family ( Soiloz Mookerjea )
- (6) Viswamitra ( M. F. Hussain )

### 1. The Magician :

This painting creates a three-dimensional space. Here the monotony of the foreground is broken by a flight of stairs going

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up in the right corner and a flight of stairs going down in the left corner. The use of geometric perspective creates a recessive space of unusual depth which is suggestive of a haunting mystery. Here, the concept of virtual space is easily intelligible. A three-dimensional space is created on the flat surface of paper. It is quite clear that (1) the space we are attributing to this painting is not actual, but only seems to be there—a semblance of space created for the eye alone; and (2) that the "virtual space" in this painting is a totality of depth which is assignable only to the *total form*.

## 2. The Marriage Ceremony :

In the painting just referred to, space or distance is an obvious factor because of the use of perspectival space. But what does virtual space mean in a painting like 'The Marriage Ceremony' in which, instead of a three-dimensional space, an anti-perspectival space is created? The two figures in the foreground seem almost to pop out of the picture plane. Thus a tension field is created which is countered by a slightly recessive space produced by the figures standing on top of the right corner. The virtual space in this painting can only be felt by attending to the total form which binds the 'space tensions' into a harmonious whole.

## 3, 4. Pranam and Three Pujarinis :

These two paintings are different. They do not at all feature the suggestion of depth or recessive space. The figures here seem to be pasted on to the flat surface of paper, thus heightening the effect of flatness in these two works. Now in what manner could these two paintings be said to have created virtual space? Here, I suggest, virtual space should be taken in the sense of a *created autonomous space*. Generally speaking, both the paintings create an atmosphere of unruffled serenity—a felt quality of space which was not there on the plane flat surface before creation.

In *Three Pujarinis*, the sweeping flow of well-defined lines and their rhythmic grace so organise the total form as to be suggestive of a general feeling of other worldliness. Here, the shaping of forms is done in such a manner that the three figures seem closer to one another than they would be in actual space,

and the total form by its close proximity to the eye is able to create a new autonomous space in which the spectator himself feels a participant.

In *Pranam* the rhythmic lines, employed decoratively, create a world of their own. The profile of the figure bowing in reverence and the arch atop hold each other in a relationship that is purely *visual*, and not a matter of everyday fact. The "virtual space" in this painting is not to be taken in the sense of a recessive space; instead, it is here felt as a harmonious whole—an organic structure, created by the ornamental use of lines.

### 5, 6. The Family and Viswamitra :

In these two paintings what at once attracts attention is the composite character of the total form. Here, too, the "virtual space" can be felt as we apprehend the *visual* inter-relatedness of the various parts in the painting.

In *The Family*, the spontaneous and lyrical lines and the use of an unrestricted palette create an unusual *movement*.

In *Viswamitra*, the picture plane becomes alive as the forms drawn with jerky lines and masses of colour cohere into an organic *total form*.

### Conclusion :

The concept of "virtual space" in painting, to my view, cannot be severed from Langer's general theory of art as expressive form. In all the six paintings discussed, "virtual space" becomes intelligible as we apprehend the total form or rather the *felt import* of the work.

Delhi.

**Ranjan K. Ghosh**

NOTES

1. Feeling and Form, p. 40.
2. Problems of Art, p. 26.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
5. Feeling and Form, p. 75.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
8. Problems of Art, p. 35.
9. Feeling and Form, p. 72.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 372.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 373.

TAOIST PHILOSOPHY  
AND  
HEIDEGGER'S POETIC THINKING

In one of his recent works Heidegger explains the meaning of *Tao* in the *Tao Te Ching*, the ancient Chinese Taoist canon :

“The word ‘Way’ ( *Tao* ) probably is an ancient primary word that speaks to the reflective mind of man. Lao Tzu’s poetic thinking is ‘*Tao*’, which properly speaking means the Way.” ( p. 92 : *On the Way to Language* )

Thus we know that Heidegger identifies *Tao* as poetic thinking. When poetic thinking takes place, Being and thinking are one and the same. As Heidegger puts it :

“We might perhaps prepare a little for change in our relations to words. Perhaps this experience might awaken : all reflective thinking is poetic and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking.” ( pp. 136 )

The identity of reflective thinking and poetry is what the Taoists called non-differentiation or “*huan chen*”. The greatest achievement of poetic thinking is the self-awakening of the poet from this aesthetic non-differentiation at the absolute moment. The following Chinese Taoist poem is illustrative of this thought :

“When the moon rises in the heart of Heaven  
And a light breeze touches the mirror like surface of the lake  
That is indeed a moment of pure joy  
But few are they who are aware of it.”

Purity and Joy are the fruits of meditation and for the Chinese poets they are fundamental to poetic thinking. The more they are cultivated the better the poetry. However, the self-awakening of the poet cannot take place until the poet completely identifies himself with the objective reality of things. This identity is not

a concept of the synthesis of man and the universe but the direct, spontaneous, unimpeded interfusion at the absolute moment. Identity here is no longer a statement about identity. It is as Heidegger says "a leap into the essential origin of identity". The origin of identity is the realm of "the event of appropriation", as Heidegger calls it, in which man and Being are mutually appropriated to one another. In the *Works of Chuang Tzu*, we read :

" Haven and earth and I live together, and all things and I are one."

The realm of the one is the realm of identity in which man, the universe and all things are mutually appropriated to one another through the leap into the "abyss" or "to where we already have access" ( pp.32 ) as maintained by Heidegger in his work, "Identity and Difference".

Once T'ao Ch'ien, a great Chinese poet of the fourth century, experienced this identity. He wrote :

" I gather chrysanthemums under the eastern hedge row,  
And silently gaze into the distance at southern mountains.  
The mountain air is beautiful during the sunset.  
The birds flock home together two by two.  
Among all these things there is a real meaning.  
I want to express it, but words fail me."

This inexpressible inner experience is the experience of the origin of identity. In the works of Heidegger this is the "creative preserving of truth in the work." Truth here is unconcealment, the revelation of Being of what is. It is neither the truth of a particular being portrayed, nor is it the symbolic representation of truth. It is the unconcealment of truth of all that is. From the non-differentiated realm the aesthetic feeling of sublimity is obtained. When the poet's mind reaches the purity and transparency of the non-differentiated realm, as Tao Ch'ien did, it is no longer intangled with outer things nor confused by ordinary events. This cannot be achieved through a search for merely

sensuous feeling, or symbolic meaning. The sublimity of poetic thinking is far beyond this. Let us review what Lao Tzu wrote in the *Tao Te Ching* :

“ Gaze at it, there is nothing to see  
 It is called the formless.  
 Heed it, there is nothing to hear,  
 It is called soundless.  
 Grasp it, there is nothing to hold onto  
 It is called the immaterial.  
 We cannot enquire into these three  
 Hence, they interfuse into one.  
 Above, it is not light,  
 Below, it is not dark,  
 Invisible, it cannot be called by any name.  
 It returns again to nothingness.  
 Thus we call it the form of the formless,  
 The image of the imageless.” (Ch. XIV)

In *The Study of Good*, Nishida Kitaro of Kyoto, the leading philosopher of modern Japan, says :

“ The urge to see the image of the imageless, to hear the sound of the soundless lies at the very foundation of Eastern culture.” (pp. 211)

Chinese philosophers do not search for the image within the image, but rather seek to reveal the imageless in the image.

For, there sound is not expressed in sound, but rather through the revelation of the soundless in sound. Thus sound exists to express the soundless; and the image, the imageless. In the words of Heidegger, “ the soundless gathering call by which saying moves the world-relating on its way, we call it the ringing of stillness.” (p. 108) It is this ringing of stillness that opens the mind of man.

In *The Works of Chuang Tzu* we find an illustration of the soundless revealed in sound. Earthly music is described as the sound which emanates from all the crevices of the mountain forests and the hollows of the huge trees. The music of man is described as that of bamboo flutes and pipes. But within these crevices and instruments, there is the music of Heaven. The man of ignorance can only hear the music of earth and the music

of man. But when man has experienced the essence of *Tao* he will enjoy the symphony of the great nature of Heaven through the music of the earth and the music of man.

A Ch'an master of the eleventh century once said :

“ All things in the universe are activities of a subtle reality, who is capable of embracing this? The four seasons follow each other in succession. The sun and moon shine constantly.”

From the four seasons and the sun and moon this Ch'an master hears the music of Heaven and the ringing of stillness. Based upon this understanding we may read the last poem in the *Experience of Thinking* (*Aus der Erfahrung Des Denkens*) by Heidegger :

“ Forests gather  
 Brooks plunge  
 Cliff lasts  
 Rain streams.  
 Fields wait  
 Springs leap  
 Wind dwells  
 Abundance acts.”

What Heidegger sees and hears in this poem is surely not ordinary forests, brooks, rain, wind etc. He hears “ the ringing of stillness ”. Or in Chuang Tzu's words, it is the music of Heaven in the music of the earth and man that he hears. Moreover, this poem illustrates the identity of poetic thinking with the preontological experience Heidegger achieved.

At the eightieth birthday celebration of Heidegger at Freiburg, September 26, 1969, Professor Koichi Tsujimura, a noted Japanese philosopher of Kyoto University and former disciple of Heidegger, compared his own enchantment with this poem to what he had experienced in the rock garden of Ryoanji in Kyoto. Thus, when we reach the source of identity, the worlds of East and West are also one.

In his recent work *On Time and Being*, Heidegger opens up a new approach to thinking, which is different from the traditional Western philosophical approach to thought. It ceases to be rational analysis. To discuss meaningfully Heidegger's new way

of thinking we must ourselves cease to think conceptually and representationally, or else we will never be able to understand Heidegger's new way of thinking.

What is this new way of thinking ? The new way of thinking is poetic thinking or *Tao*. It is to think-back to the origin in order to reach behind "usual and traditional conceptions", it is also "to gain astonishing insights into what has not been thought hitherto," as Glen Grey, the leading follower of Heidegger, describes it. In the *Tao Te Ching* we read :

"The student of knowledge gains day by day,

The student of Tao loses day by day."

We read further :

"Reversal is the movement of Tao."

In Heidegger's words this is the step-back.

Heidegger, instead of establishing Being as the ground, conceives of Nothing as the source, and of Being as its manifestation. Being differs ontologically from beings. He moves from this difference, which is what is to be thought, to what has not yet been thought. What has not yet been thought is Nothing. What is to be thought is Being. This process is a move forward in thought by means of a step-back out of the realm of metaphysics into the previously undisclosed realm of truth. Through this step-back, Being is thought, without being made an object of thought. The step-back takes us out of metaphysics into the essential origin, which is Nothing or Non-Being, or *Wu* according to Lao Tzu.

According to both Heidegger and the Chinese Taoists, this Nothing or *Wu* must be experienced in the sense of a pure finding. It cannot be reached through any process of rational or objective thought, which would only dichotomize subjectivity and objectivity into polarities. Rational, objective thought is what Heidegger describes as calculative thinking, which differentiates between things observed and man as the observer. But what Heidegger calls meditative thinking is "the other way of thought". This "other way of thought" is the origin of the identity of man and the universe, or subjectivity and objectivity. It is the aesthetic non-differentiation or *Tao*, or poetic thinking, which was discussed at the beginning of this paper.

Perhaps we would like to know how one may achieve this *Tao*, or poetic thinking, which cannot be measured by parametric time, but can only take place in the mind of the absolute present. We find the answer in the work of Chuang Tzu. He says :

"The 'this' is also 'that' and the 'that' is also 'this'.... not to determine this and that as opposites is the very essence of Tao....affirmation and negation alike blend into the infinite one. Therefore, the sage disregards all distinctions and sees things through light."

In Taoist dialectic there is no elevating moment towards the goal of a comprehensive, rational absolute. Rather, there is the further step which Nishida calls the self-identity of constant contradiction. In the self-identity of contradictions, the opposites of being and non-being, high and low are identified through themselves and not through any higher synthesis. This truth may also be found in Heidegger's words in *Identity and Difference* :

"From the principle as a statement about identity to the principle as a leap into the essential origin of identity, thinking undergoes a transformation." ( p. 40 )

What Heidegger maintains is also what the Chinese thinkers had in mind when they said that the total identity of the knower and the known cannot be thought by abstract or calculative thinking as we have mentioned above. We find a good illustration of this in the development of Chinese thought in the Neo-Confucianists' search for the real identity between man and the universe. They went through such abstract principles as *Li*, or Reason. But this abstract principle could only serve as objective representations of reality for the mind, and could not be directly and spontaneously identified with the mind itself.

In the *Study of Good*, Nishida says :

"Pure experience is synonymous with direct experience. When one experiences directly one's conscious state, there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object are completely united." ( p. 1 )

This identity of subject and object is the self-identity of contradictions which is achieved "without the addition of the least thought or reflection ". As Nishida says :

"The present of pure experience is not that intellectual present which at the time that one thinks about it is no longer the present." ( p. 3 )

For Heidegger, the event of appropriation is "the belonging together" of man and Being, which is reached by our moving away from the attitude of representational thinking. Thus in *On Time and Being* he says :

"The meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment.... It means unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of stillness, which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with. That is the opening of what is the open." ( p. 68 ).

The well-founded unconcealment itself is thought as the opening. In the East we say that "the study of subtle Tao rests upon the wonder of awakening." With this understanding of thought as the opening and the wonder of awakening in *Tao* we might better understand the essence of Taoist philosophy and a new way of thinking of Heidegger.

In conclusion we may, therefore say that the study of Taoist philosophy, combined with Heidegger's new way of thinking, may enable us to find a bridge between the philosophical worlds of the East and the West.

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## SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

On perhaps no other concept has there been so little fruitful thinking in our time as on the concept of happiness. Traditionally it is bondage or suffering, and not happiness, that poses a problem. Job did not ask "why?" until misfortune struck him. That unhappiness can range from petty irritation to a kind of cosmic *Weltschmerz* was realized by *Sāṅkhyā* no less than by the ancient Greeks. Both the latter and the ancients of this land, familiar as they were with the delights of so-called good living, were aware also of their transience. If the Greeks (with some exceptions) ignored the problem of suffering in their philosophical literature, their dramatists portrayed the whole range of human suffering, and this against the background of Fate indeed human drama played on a stage which was nothing less than a cosmic trap. The inexorability which drove the planets in their courses, which drove Apollo or Surya along their appointed paths across the heavens, was paralleled by an inexorability which governed the destinies of men.

The Greek man of excellence, *kalos kathagos*, was in a microcosmic way, like the sun, effulgent in a manner recognised by the community. Such a man was a good citizen rather than one whose eyes were set on other worlds. To become such a one was a matter of discipline, of *paideia*. Such a man would be the fruit of the good society, and also the type to bring it about. The circularity of this latter point did not trouble the Greek mind. Berdyaev writes that "The ethics of the ancients....considered man a being who seeks happiness, good and harmony and who is capable of achieving this goal."

The Scholastic view presupposed the Jewish. In between came the entire world of Hebrew consciousness, its profound awareness that the good can still suffer and the wicked prosper. Greek *eudaimonia* may be possible for the aristocrat who lives a life of cultivated leisure. But the Scholastic conception of beatitude is that of a state of being won through suffering, and the man who is so 'blessed' is such in virtue of his sharing in the Divine Passion. The Renaissance brought a reaction against the Stoic (Cf. the Buddhist) advocacy of the conquest of desire. The goal was discovery, that is knowledge, and at a lower level

the enjoyment of worldly goods. But there were also those who found in these times an occasion for self-searching. The discovery of new worlds was matched by the discovery of the new-found-land of the inner man. This was nurtured either in the secrecy of the confessional or, as in men like Donne, Montaigne, Pascal and Maine de Biran, expressed through the craft of letters. The Renaissance mentality (of which much of the enlightenment spirit was a continuation), however, had a certain robustness which enabled it to weather the storms of inner brooding. This robustness had a certain come-back years later, in of all places, Victorian England—although no doubt it was a robustness of a different quality.

Things on the Continent were otherwise. When Hegel wrote of the "unhappy consciousness" as one phase of the human spirit he was writing of a continent and of times which he knew well. For him it was one moment in the caravan of Reason, one stop in the deserts of the human heart, something on the whole incidental to the main route of the *Zeitgeist*. But to the romantic, melancholy, "*le mal du siècle*", was in principle incurable. The life of reason has its polarities but these are not the stuff of feeling. The pendulum of feeling is not to be confused with the pendulum of concepts, and, moreover, feeling has no moment of synthesis.

To turn to the utilitarians across the Channel is to breathe a different air. For them to write of pleasure as a numerable quantity as they did, was not a mark of heartlessness. There is nothing to connect them with the raptures and the melancholy of the romantics. On the other hand their public concerns inside and outside Parliament showed a keen awareness of the connection of private well-being with the health of the body politic and a sense that the state, without at all idealising it, can be an instrument for the promotion of public welfare, a vehicle of therapy for the ills which beset society. This was a development of the belief of David Hume and Adam Smith that peace, order and prosperity were the chief ingredients of happiness. The state, then was not merely the focus of power, but a means of bringing about the happiness of its subjects. This on the whole was a more beneficial insight than the one which saw a mysterious correspondence between the real will of the individual and the state's injunctions.

That suffering was ultimately incapable of conquest became the watchword of thinkers with illiberal governments. Dostoyevsky, for example, wrote "Why, suffering is the sole origin of consciousness". (*White nights and other stories*, p. 76). Outside theist circles, the Marxists alone remained optimistic. Happiness, if absent now, will at least be within our reach after the withering away of the state. Transatlantic thinkers (or rather, some of them), proclaimed that states of desire are not necessarily states of unhappiness. Pursuit and risk (even though analysed as states of 'lack' by others) are pleasureable experiences. But the very calculation which the utilitarians saw to be the mainspring of social engineering has brought about a certain joylessness, a monotone, and this is in contrast to the chiaroscuro of earlier times. The fair pursuit of happiness of which constitution-makers spoke is dogged by what John Stuart Mill called the paradox of hedonism. The existentialists, as Maslow has pointed out, stress the "through" experiences and to read their writings is to run the risk of forgetting that man is also capable of elation, joy and exaltation.

Those who are heir to the utilitarian spirit cannot help realizing that there must be something radically wrong with the way men manage their affairs if conflicts still break out in the form of warfare. The problem of war has occupied philosophers as diverse as the Stoics, Kant, Russell and Einstein. It may not be a problem which necessarily drives one to the conviction of human wickedness, but it is surely one where not only the quality of human life is at stake but its very survival. The acquisition of material goods, which earlier seemed to provide an open sesame to happiness in the sense of prosperity (a word which is still, and I think, significantly, used in New Year greetings) is found not only to have a satiation point, but to promote conflict especially in the inter-group, and specifically, the international sphere. This leads some to the solitary quest for personal happiness, often with the aid of drugs and other chemical agencies. Human desire here too encounters the principal of diminishing marginal utility and the search for an extension of the senses may terminate in an ability to respond.

The transcendentalist will no doubt consider that all that has been considered so far falls far short of what he calls *ānand*. I have little doubt that the word *ānada* is different in connotation from the word 'happiness' although the ordinary language usage makes it indistinguishable from 'happiness' (I am thinking of things like joy expressed at the receipt of a letter and so on). About *ānanda* it seems to me that there may first of all be a question mark set against its attainability and one also against its desirability. Discontent is the spur of endeavour and a state where it was altogether absent might well appear to some as an a-human existence. It is reasonable to suppose that if happiness in the common-or-garden sense is unobtainable by direct capture, the same must be the case with *ānanda*. Happiness, of whichever kind cannot be brought about by reason, by strategem, or even by a rigorous *ascesis*. It is a state of grace from which we all too soon fall. I am myself unable to feel the attraction of, let alone the felicific content of, a state of being which separates us from the kaleidescopic world of the senses and from our fellow men. But this may be a constitutional inability on my part.

To the vast majority, to the under-privileged (and we are doing our philosophizing in India) happiness comes in the form of work, of food. Beyond this there may well be a hierarchy of satisfactions, some of which, if not attainable by direct strategy, are yet within the reach of the more fortunate. Of all these satisfactions the one which seems to me to be most sought after to-day is the sense of the meaningfulness of existence and I shall try to show in what follows that this sense has, in many ways replaced the attaining of happiness as the object of human endeavour. Notoriously it is a sense that may be leaking in the well-fed. We wish each other a happy and prosperous New Year. Nothing shows more eloquently than this that the two are not taken as equivalent. The quest for meaning finds scant fulfilment in the unearthing of one's fundamental project, for the task of working out the project in relation to the density of circumstance still remains. Still less is it likely to find fulfilment in self-identification with the march of historic forces, for who knows whither they will lead ?

The inadequacy of the philosophical treatment of happiness to which reference was made in the beginning, as also the sense

of the meaninglessness of existence, stems, to my mind, from a common root—the failure to relate the quest for perfection to the pursuit of others' happiness. The Advaitic alternative (the quest for perfection) stands at the opposite pole to that of the altruistic utilitarian position which advocates the pursuit of others' happiness. An awareness of both and an affirmation of the imperative need to juxtapose them is to be found in the corollary to Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. To the twentieth century humanist, as indeed to the Mahayana Buddhist, to speak of individual bliss in the context of human misery, is a mockery. But merely to juxtapose is not enough. There is a need for a deeper understanding of what the religious man calls human 'fallibility'. The contemporary secular thinker, to whom the language of finitude has become alien, is yet profoundly aware of the limits of our condition—the transcendence of pleasure, the duration of pain, the apparent purposelessness of much of physical suffering, the institutional brakes on progress, the intransigence of personal incompatibilities. Culturally we are citizens of many worlds and this makes for a proliferation of roots horizontally rather than in depth. This gives rise to a consciousness which is not only unhappy but which is bewildered.

The psycho-analyst and the man of religion both speak in terms of a search for personal identity, a rediscovery of the centre, of light in a penumbra of darkness. This is to be won in the teeth of all our experiences, the rough experiences of agony, and the peak ones (the occasional exultation of moods of rebellion, the sudden intrusion of personal joy like the bounty of grace, the stimulus of challenge) as well as along the plateau of everyday living. I here essay a simile. Happiness can be likened to the fragrance of the flower (and it is significant for the purpose of the simile that all flowers do not have fragrance)—a means of identification and a source of joy to others. (This is to put the perspective in an unfamiliar way. It is customary to associate happiness with one's own experience rather than with its effect on others). But what of the flower? Here, to leave the simile, we seem led to the concepts of Being, meaning and love. Of these three I have suggested that it is the concept of meaning (or rather, meaningfulness) that has taken the place

that the concept of happiness had, in the consciousness of earlier generations. But it is because he divorces meaning from Being and from love (in searching for short-term satisfactions) that contemporary man so often finds himself unhappy.

It is in the interdependence of Being, meaning and love that a way can be found of penetrating the ground which underlies what appears as a mere juxtaposition—the quest for perfection and the pursuit of others' happiness. We are at this point close to another mystery, that of the New Testament 'and' in the injunction "Love God and thy neighbour as thyself". To think in such a way, however, is to move away from the treatment of happiness as such. But the variety of contemporary quests for meaning suggests that many have already moved away from hedonism in any ordinary sense, because, foursquare on the ground as he is, man is yet aware of depth and height, of the churning of primeval oceans, of shafts of light.

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## NATURE OF THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL INDIAN APPROACH

The starting point of any theory of aesthetics is the recognition of a distinct aesthetic state which is of a different kind of mental and emotional activity present in what is called aesthetic experience. The exact nature of this distinction depends largely on the type of theory developed but generally among other distinguishing characteristics it is marked by most aestheticians by a non-practical and non-cognitive aim described in such terms as "away from life" "disinterested" "impersonal" "detached" and so on. These negative attitudes do succeed in drawing attention to the basic problem, namely the existence of a separate aesthetic mode, but they generally fail to take into account its distinctive nature.

The question is : is the aesthetic mode actually and fundamentally a kind of experience which is different from others, and if so, what is it that characterises this difference ? Evidently it will not do take refuge behind such blanket terms as Clive Bell's unique "aesthetic emotion"<sup>1</sup> and explain all aesthetic experiences in terms of it, nor to assign it as Kant does, to a special faculty of mind which is distinct from the practical sphere of the will, and from the intellectual sphere of understanding, and is concerned only with the sphere of feeling.<sup>2</sup>

If a case must be made out for the existence of a separate aesthetic state, as indeed it must be, if aesthetics is to claim a value of its own, the exact nature of this state must positively be specified, whereby the distinction becomes substantially real and does not remain one of terminology alone.

The whole problem dissolves into whether a different set of terms such as "aesthetic emotion" or "disinterested pleasure" is in fact being applied to an experience which is substantially similar to another experience, but which is different only in degree or in the connections between their constituents or whether the nature of the aesthetic as against the practical and the cognitive, demands a mode of thinking, willing and feeling, qualitatively and intrinsically different from the other states.

According to Indian theory, aesthetics is not only confined to that limited branch of study which deals with the appreciation and creation of art works and the problems arising therefrom, but is the delineation of an entire realm of enquiry within which all ordinary experiences, including those which arise from pure art activity, become aesthetic, the aesthetic state being not a specific mental faculty, emotion or attitude, but a composite state of consciousness wherein perception, feeling and understanding gain new dimensions. In Indian thought, the aesthetic mode is an experience of the whole man and not of a part of him. Taken in this very wide sense, a mathematician can in the course of his study gain the aesthetic perspective, as also the moralist or the craftsman. The peculiarity of the aesthetic state is not consequently in terms of that which isolates it from other experiences but that which elevates it to a different level. The experience of beauty does not concern the feeling of pleasure alone, no matter how impersonal, disinterested or detached this might be, but that which, with the realisation of truth and goodness, belongs to the intuitive consciousness, a state of being which unified homogeneous (*ekaghana*) marked by a total absence of discursive and relational elements and is thus not available to the rational mode of thinking or knowing.<sup>3</sup>

The aesthetic consciousness thus comes about through a complete identity of the knowing subject with the aesthetic object, giving rise thereby to a pure experience of this, here and now, filtered of all extraneous influences and ingredients. Works of art due to their emphasis on the creation of vital and essential form, are a direct means to this experience. They are, however, only one of the many ways by which it can be attained. The aesthetic state contains the experience provided by works of art, but art is not the only means of evoking it.

The above view forms the basis of medieval Indian aesthetic thought and is best understood in the background of its overall metaphysics, particularly that of the Saiva Philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

In Western idealistic thought, reason is the sole instrument of truth, and experience as a form of knowledge is valid only for the empirical order. The shortcomings of reason, as a means of uniting the individual with reality, were felt by Kant who clearly showed its limitations to penetrate the essence of Being. *Noumena*,

unapproachable and remote, was according to him, forever inaccessible to the knowledge and experience of man.

Indian idealist thinkers however, have never disassociated abstract speculation from a concrete realization of its metaphysical structure which they translate into living reality. This position, at once metaphysical and psychological, leads them to conceive of reality as consciousness, and everything which is around us, as resting in the last analysis on the Self.<sup>5</sup> The Self is known not only through the pure light of knowledge (*prakāśa*) but can be contacted directly in the essence of our innermost being (*vimarṣa*). In other words, reality is approached not by reflective reason alone, but also through pure experience, the two being identical in the ultimate awareness, which is in the manner of a realisation (*janana*) and which has, as its very essence the beatitude of ecstasy (*ānanda*).<sup>6</sup>

Aesthetic experience is a modality of this unbounded consciousness, characterised by the immersion of the subject in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of everything else.<sup>7</sup> It momentarily interrupts every-day experience, presenting itself as a compact, autonomous area of consciousness, unaffected by elements of phenomenal existence.<sup>8</sup>

While the aesthetic experience is akin to the religious state, it being referred to in traditional texts as the twin brother of the experience of Brahman,<sup>9</sup> there is yet a difference between the two. The subject in the aesthetic state while transmuting the occurrences and feelings of everyday life, remains ever conscious of them whereas the mystic state marks the complete disappearance of all polarity, and the contents of everyday life are transcended. The difference here is one of degree, not one of *kind*. Within the horizon of the aesthetic consciousness the empirical and rational order of things (*samsara*) is not eliminated as it would be in the religious state, but transfigured. This transfiguration effects the mysterious conversion of pain into pleasure, of sadness into delight, of mobility and inquietude into rest and the fulfilment of desires.<sup>10</sup>

To return to the question posed earlier, "Is the aesthetic mode actually a kind of experience different from other experiences?" It seems clear from what has just been said that there is a distinct aesthetic mode, distinct in its constitution and status, not merely in its function and method. In other words, the experience

provided by art works is not different from other experiences only as shaving in the morning might be said to be different from working out a mathematical equation, but in a substantial way. The aesthetic experience though composed of the same material as ordinary states, breaks away in the intuitive moment from its empirical base and becomes momentarily a new and different kind of experience.

This view as developed by the Indian theorists rests on a number of assumptions which the modern philosopher may be tempted to challenge.

The first assumption is that the aesthetic state is a thing *sui generis* different from the ordinary state of mind. It might be asked : what is implied by attributing uniqueness to the aesthetic mode ? Is it not a dogmatic assumption, postulated in order to give status and value to an experience different from others only in degree ?

Let us examine some of the views that are frequently put forward for the existence of a distinct aesthetic experience. Richards, for instance, advances the following arguments :<sup>11</sup>

(a) It may be held that there is a kind of unique mental element which enters into aesthetic experience, an element which does not enter into other experiences and which is the "differentia" between them. As Clive Bell maintains, there is the existence of a unique "aesthetic emotion" as the differentia. But the presence of such an inexplicable entity as he points out has no place in modern psychology. If we take empathy as being such an entity, we find that it enters into innumerable other experiences as well as the aesthetic experience.

(b) Another view which is commonly held is that the aesthetic state is qualitatively of "the same stuff" as the others but is of a special form, the special form being described in terms of impersonality, disinterestedness, distance, subjective universality etc. This form, Richards shows however, is sometime no more than a consequence of the incidence of experience, a condition or an effect of communication. Moreover, disinterestedness and impersonality are attitudes which are shared by the scientist, and distance can also be used as a moral principle. Hence they are not unique to the aesthetic state.

The rejection of these and similar views in favour of a distinct aesthetic state, however, should not lead to the conclusion that no particular province can be assigned to the aesthetic experience, it being, as Richards concludes, closely similar to other experiences, at best a further development, a finer organisation of them and not in the least a new and different kind of thing. It only suggests that the approach to the problem is wrong and consequently these views go against the very case they hope to support.

When the Indian theorists hold that the aesthetic experience is different in kind from others they do not assume the existence of an ultimate aesthetic value or any other ingredient which, added to ordinary experiences, gives it the qualitative difference. Nor do they support their arguments by such general statements as : "Aesthetics is a unique activity since it is pursued without an end." These statements may be perfectly correct but are besides the point, since they do not further the case for a distinct aesthetic mode.

The aesthetic state as a thing "apart" must be shown to be opposed fundamentally to other experiences. The *alaukika* state of the Indian aestheticians is unique in as much as it is presented as a unitive, homogenous experience within which the subject merges his identity. It is characterized by a state of compactness which is felt as beatitude. Within this state of self-sufficiency the self does not feel the need for anything other than itself. This type of beatitude cannot be enjoyed in practical life where things external to the subject are always desired. These break the unity of the aesthetic experience with their presence. The point of difference between the aesthetic and other states, lies in the fact that the former is an end in itself, undisrupted by any objective factor whereas in the latter the subject always presupposes an object. The distinction of subject and object which is present in all ordinary experience is obliterated in the aesthetic experience. Such an identification is not only never achieved in everyday life but is within the cognitive framework impossible. Discursive knowledge which forms the basis of our practical and logical state, is always formulated by a subject as against an object. A unified experience consequently marks a definite break with the world, it appears in the horizon like a new entity totally unlike the states of consciousness with which we are familiar.

It might be asked : in what way is such an experience different from an emotive one ? Does not the diffusion of the subject and the object take place in every emotional articulation ? There is a fundamental distinction between the two apparently similar states. An emotional reaction is a sensuous organic experience within which the ego predominates while an aesthetic response is a mental and spiritual reaction, a supersensuous experience within which the ego is transcended. It is a manner of experiencing emotion without ego even as *a priori* knowledge is intuitive insight gained prior to rational categories. It is in the full realisation of the self, the self taken not as a limited narrow empirical ego but as the ultimate unbounded consciousness when there is a full participation of the subject within the aesthetic object, that the marginal conversion of pain into pleasure takes place.

This extraordinary power of transmuting sadness into pleasure may be called the unique element, the *differentia* which belongs to the aesthetic experience, which makes it a different *kind* of experience from others. The sudden transformation of pain into pleasure is not a miraculous phenomena but is the result of the individual consciousness finding its identity within the larger whole of the universal consciousness. This concept, which is fundamental to Śaiva metaphysics<sup>12</sup> forms also the basis of traditional Indian aesthetics.

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#### NOTES

1. Clive Bell, *Art* Chatto and Windus, 1914, p. 28.
2. Critique of Judgement, Transl. by Meredith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, p. 15.
3. *Ekaghana* literally means 'closely dense' 'compact' that which is uniform and without obstacles !
4. Śaivism is one of the important religious systems in India being proto-historic in origin. In its Kasmiri version it flourished around the tenth and eleventh century A.D. There are two systems of the Śaiva doctrine, the Śaiva Siddhānta and the Śaivism of

Kashmir. It is to the latter, of which Abhinavagupta was one of the well-known exponents, that we are referring. The central theme of this system as given in the *Pratyabhijñā*, one of its main texts, is that Śaiva, the only reality of the universe, is infinite consciousness. He is the subject as well as the object, the experiencer as well as the experienced (*spandakarikā*) "As the consciousness on which all this resultant world is established, whence it issues, is free in its nature, it cannot be restricted anywhere. As it moves in the differentiated states of waking, sleeping, etc. identifying itself with them, it never falls from its true nature as the knower" (S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 732).

The world is created through the power (Śakti) inherent in the Supreme Consciousness and all the forms manifested thereof are due to this energy. Śaivism is essentially a monistic doctrine, influenced greatly by the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta.

5. Rainero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, Roma, 1956, p. XXIII.

6. K. C. Pandey, *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol. I, The Chowkamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1950, p. 82.

"Admission of *vimarṣa* or self-consciousness in the absolute by the Śaiva is the point of distinction between the Śaiva and the Vedāntic conception of Ultimate Reality. The latter holds that the Brahman is *santa*, i.e. without any activity..it is self-shining and not self-conscious..The Śaiva maintains that the Absolute is not only self-shining but also self-conscious."

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid, P. XXII.

9. The following is Visvanatha's famous definition of aesthetic experience given in his *Sāhityadarpana*. It is similar to the conception of Abhinavagupta and his predecessor Bhatta Nayaka. "Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons. It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of *satya*. It is made up of full intelligence, beatitude and self-luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the testing of Brahman. It is animated by a *chamatkāra* of non-ordinary nature. It is tested as if it were our very being in indivisibility." (Gnoli, op. cit., p. 54 note 3 ).

10. Gnoli, op. cit., p. XXIV.

11. I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, P. 15.

12. The intimate essence of consciousness or the 'I' according to the Śaiva, is beatitude. The absence or beatitude and suffering are due to a need, privation or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everything else. The 'I' contains all things everything that exists, arises from its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and therefore, of one's own essential beatitude." Gnoli, op. cit. p. 87, note 2.

## THE CONCEPT OF ART : A REVINDICATION

For the last two-three decades, speculations on the nature of art tend to treat the term "art" as an "essentially contested concept"<sup>1</sup>, including in its domain an amorphous phenomena, having little in common amongst its various dimensions. This confusion in the realm of art has led many thinkers to treat the language of aesthetics as an expression of approval and disapproval and hence as outside the domain of meaningful discourse. This brief note is essentially motivated by a desire to counteract this "dreariness of aesthetics" and to revindicate the meaningfulness of the concept of art.

The present trend in contemporary aesthetics has been largely influenced by Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.<sup>2</sup> Wittgenstein has built his argument around his analysis of general concepts, of which the most representative example cited by him is that of the concept of "game". Wittgenstein starts with an exploration into the essence of game which can capture the essential nature of this concept (he gives the examples of definitions like winning and losing and amusement etc.) on realizing the failure of all attempts at formulating such a definition of "game", he concludes that the word "game" has no definite boundaries. Hence it is not possible to arrive at any essential and exhaustive definition which would manifest all its varied dimensions. He further concludes that between the diverse uses of the word "game", all we find are only certain vaguely perceptible resemblances such as those found in the members of a common family. Wittgenstein says :

"I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances", for the various resemblances between members of a family, build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. Overlap and criss-cross in the same way—and I shall say : games form a family."<sup>3</sup>

This analysis of Wittgenstein is very ingeniously applied to the domain of art by Morris Weitz.<sup>4</sup> Quite like Wittgenstein, Weitz proceeds with an enumeration of the various definition of

art viz. art as imitation and as expression, etc. etc. and he concludes that the traditional aesthetics rests on a mistake—it attempts to define art in terms of one essence or another. Analysing the term "art" he says :

" Art as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties, hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult."<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore Weitz holds that the disparate usages of the term art show only "family resemblances" and no common essence.<sup>6</sup> Thus he holds that by ostensive definitions we are able to recognize what is commonly held to be a work of art but nothing more than this. In this context, I wish to submit two points—firstly, I wish to point out that what Weitz holds to be the so-called "properties" of an art object are really only normative definitions of it. If he means by properties these normative definitions (e.g. art is significant form), Weitz' position is undebatable. For if we look upon art as an evaluative term, it is evident that there have been multiple ways of analysing this concept. And these variegated analyses reveal their peculiar modes of fixing the boundaries of the domain of art. But can we really treat them as attempts to seek the ageless essence of art itself? The infinite variety of human creativity shows clearly that different periods of history have unfolded their respective evaluative definitions of art which are varied from an imitative representation of nature to an expression of the latent folds of the human psyche. Wittgenstein and Weitz are undoubtedly right in holding that what one finds amongst these different norms are only family resemblances. But one finds an exaggeration in their analysis when these evaluative definitions are treated as attempts to reveal the possible essence of art.

Secondly, I wish to submit that such an essential definition of art is possible provided we do not confuse normative and descriptive definitions. If we do not confuse the normative definitions of art—the multiple goals of art which furnish the content of art history—with descriptive definitions of the nature of art object, there is certainly a possibility of arriving at a definition that expresses the essence of art.

The clue is given by philosophers from both the East and the West. Abhinavagupta<sup>7</sup> treats the art object as essentially away from the everyday world of reality, governed by a continuum of space and time relations. Neither it is equivalent to illusions, it projects itself in a world of its own. The actor on the stage is neither living in his own space and time; nor is he living in the space and time of the actor for he is never totally unaware of his own being as distinct from that of the character he is impersonating. Thus according to Abhinavagupta "theatrical spectacle implies the negation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing. Indeed, on the one side there is the negation of the real being of the actor, and, on the other, the spectator's consciousness does not rest entirely on the being represented (*pratibhāsa*, the represented image, etc.), whose (representation) therefore does not succeed in hiding completely the real being of the actor".<sup>8</sup>

This analysis of the nature of dramatic presentation marks out clearly the peculiar character of art objects—they remain essentially unassimilable with both illusory and real objects. Bullough<sup>9</sup> has tried to explain this essential "Otherness" of the art object in terms of the category of distance. He holds that the frame of painting, the pedestal of a sculpture and the stage of a theatrical performance separate them from the events in every day life situations. In this unfoldment of the art object in a medium irreconcilable with the real lies the essential nature of art.

It is this discontinuity with the external world which differentiates between art objects and things of utility. This is what is precisely different between Arman's *poubelles* and dustbins used by us in daily life. For when encased in the plastic frames they mark the domain of a different world—not continuous and assimilable into the matrix of ordinary objects directing us towards practical goals of different kinds. Same is true of the *ready mades* of Dada. The "urinal" of Marcel Duchamp when placed in the art gallery ceases to be a urinal and becomes a world by itself, outside both the real and the illusory. This basic character is shared by all arts, whatever be the varied artistic media and the multiple goals pursued by artists in different periods of history.

Undoubtedly this "Otherness" from reality cannot be pointed out and defined in the same manner that we can define "oxygen". But this holds true of a large number of adjectives and common nouns. Moore<sup>10</sup> has demonstrated this in the context of colours —the colour yellow can be defined in terms of its wave lengths but that gives us no clue in our ordinary perception of colour. By ostensive definitions we can conventionalise the usage of the word 'yellow' in terms of a certain set of hues in our visual field. But given a form with yellow and red on two ends with their multiple blends in-between, it will be extremely difficult to point out and objectify where exactly the yellow and red turn into orange. Similarly it will be difficult for us to quantify exactly when we start calling an object aesthetic and when it ceases to be utilitarian. For a large variety of objects swing from one domain to another. And this is not special of the domain of aesthetics, it holds true of all general concepts excepting the concepts of physical sciences which can be reduced to clearcut operational definitions. So there is no reason why we look for cut and dried solutions of the problems of aesthetics, when most of our experience of the external world belies all such solutions.

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## NOTES

1. See P. Gallie, "Art as an Essentially Contested Concept" in *The Philosophical Quarterly* ( 1956 ), pp. 97–114.
2. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe ( Oxford, 1968 ).
3. *Ibid.*, No. 67, p. 32.
4. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts* ( ed. ) Joseph Margolis ( New York, 1962 ).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

6. Weitz says : ‘The problem of the nature of art is like that of the nature of games, at least in these respects. If we actually look and see what it is that we call “art”, we will also find no common properties—only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe, and explain those things we call “art” in virtue of these similarities’. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

7. Abhinavagupta is one of the most important Indian thinkers of the tenth and eleventh centuries. He is very well known for his commentaries on the ancient Indian treatise on drama *The Nātyaśāstra* and the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. These two works are much more than mere commentaries as they represent Abhinavagupta’s brilliant analysis of the nature of art object, aesthetic experience and aesthetic meaning.

8. Translated and interpreted by R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Rome, 1956), pp. 80–81.

9. E. Bullough, “Psychical Distance as a factor in art and an aesthetic Principle” in the *British Journal of Psychology* (Vol. V, June, 1912).

10. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*.

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## POETIC ANUMĀNA AND VYĀÑJANA

While establishing the theory of *vyañjanā* in the fifth *ullāsa* of his *Kāvyaprakāśa* (between 1050–1100 A.D.),<sup>1</sup> Mammaṭa attacks *anumāna* (inference) as a substitute of *vyañjanā* (suggestion). The sense obtained by the *Vyañjanāvādins* through *vyañjanā* is arrived at by the Naiyāyikas through *anumāna*. Mammaṭa, while referring to the Nyāya standpoint in this connection, does not mention any Naiyāyika by name. Govinda Thakkura<sup>2</sup> and some later commentators understand *nanu vācyād asambaddham tāvan na pratīyate*, etc., of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* to refer to the views of Mahimabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* (between 1020–1050 or 1100 A.D.),<sup>3</sup> though ancient commentators Māṇikya-chandra<sup>4</sup> and Someśvara read no such reference. Mahimabhaṭṭa; however, cannot be taken to be the first to propound such views. Even Ānandavardhana (about 860–890 A.D.)<sup>5</sup> knew the Naiyāyikas who fought against *vyañjanā* and included it in *anumāna*. He criticizes their viewpoint.<sup>6</sup>

Mammaṭa first explains in brief the Nyāya standpoint and then offers his own criticism with a view to supporting the theory of *vyañjanā*.<sup>7</sup> The *vyañgyārtha* (the sense suggested) cannot be thought of as having no relation with the *vācyārtha* (the literal sense), otherwise there will be a danger of anything being signified by any word whatsoever. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, one must accept the relation of a *liṅga* and a *liṅgi* between the *vācyārtha* and the so-called *vyañgyārtha*; and the so-called *vyañgyārtha* ought to be regarded as the sense inferred through *vācyārtha*. As one infers a *liṅgi* by means of a *liṅga* or *hetu* endowed with three conditions, viz., *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-vyāvṛttatva*, so one can infer the so-called *vyañgyārtha* by means of the *vācyārtha*. Thus one need not accept *vyañjanā* for this purpose. After this brief introduction of the Nyāya viewpoint, Mammaṭa gives an example so as to illustrate how the Naiyāyikas try to prove the *vyañgyārtha* to be nothing but the *anumeyārtha*. A woman, fed up with a religious person whose presence poses obstacle to her dalliance with her lover, says to him :

bhama dhammad vīsaddho so suṇao aija mārio teṇa  
golāṇaikacchakuḍangavāsiṇā dariasihena<sup>8</sup>

[ Wander ye, the religious one, without any fear; for that dog has been killed today by an arrogant lion that lives in the bower of the marshy bank of the Godāvarī river. ]

From the *vācyārtha* or literal sense it appears that she tells the religious person to wander about near and in the bower fearlessly; but actually what she means and intends to communicate is just the opposite : she wants that the man should no longer come to that place, so that she may enjoy the love of her lover without any hindrance—a meaning that has been regarded as the *vyañgyārtha* by the *Vyañjanāvādins* and *anumeyārtha* by the *Naiyāyikas*. A *Naiyāyika* would communicate this sense inferred to others through the following syllogistic argument consisting of five parts (*avayavas*) :

( 1 ) *Pratiṣṭā* : godāvarīkacchakuñjam<sup>9</sup> bhīrubhramanā-yogyam.

[ The bower on the marshy bank of the Godāvarī is not for a timid person a place to wander about. ]

( 2 ) *Hetu* : bhayakāraṇasiṁhopalabdheḥ.

[ Because it has the cause of fear viz., the presence of a lion. ]

( 3 ) *Dṛṣṭānta* : yad yad bhīrubhramanāyogyam tat tad byayakāraṇābhāvavad yathā gṛham.

[ Where there is no cause of fear that is a place for a timid person to wander about, e.g., a house. ]

( 4 ) *Upanaya* : na cedam kuñjam tathā bhayakāraṇābhava-vat siṁhopalabdheḥ.

[ This bower is not without the cause of fear on account of the presence of a lion. ]

( 5 ) *Nigamana* : tasmād bhīrubhramanāyogyam.

[ Hence not a place for a timid person to wander about. ]

Mammaṭa has the following objections to this syllogistic inference :

( 1 ) Definite inferential knowledge may be accomplished only through a valid *hetu* or *liṅga*. Above, the presence of the lion has been understood as a cause for a fearful person for desisting himself from wandering about in the bower, whereas even a timid person may run such a risk on account of the orders of his elders or master, love for his beloved, or any such reason. This *hetu* is, therefore non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*).

(2) A religious person may fear a dog in order to avoid its contact but may be brave enough not to be afraid of a lion. One has thus in the above syllogistic argument an adverse (*viruddha*) *hetu* also.

(3) The *hetu*, i.e., the presence of the lion, in the *pakṣa*, i.e., the bower on the marshy bank of the Godāvarī, is not beyond doubt; for that religious man has neither ascertained the presence of the lion by perception or by inference but comes to know of it merely through the words of that woman; and one's words might be unrelated to fact. The *hetu* is, therefore, unestablished (*asiddha*) also.

(4) The *hetu* is thus defective. A defective *hetu* (called *hetvābhāsa*) cannot prove the existence of a *sādhya*.

The objections of Mammaṭa may be answered away as under :

(1) The dearest thing for a person, particularly for a timid one, is his own life.<sup>10</sup> A timid person may not carry out the orders of his elders or master, or may not care for the love of his beloved or any such thing if it invites an encounter with a lion and is thus sure to take his own life. Thus the *hetu* here is hardly non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*).

(2) Probably Mammaṭa takes it for granted that the religious person under reference is not of a timid nature; he fears the dog just to avoid its inauspicious contact, otherwise he is courageous enough not to care for the lion. This does not appear to be true. Had it been true, there would have been no point in the woman's telling him of the presence of arrogant lion that has killed that dog; for the man, even after being told of all this, may not keep himself off. The woman appears to be sure of his timid nature as well as of his reaction to know of the presence of a lion. A timid person who fears even a dog will certainly be terrified the moment he comes to know of the presence of a lion and will not dare come to that place again. Thus the Naiyāyikas, and not Mammaṭa, are right in understanding the background of the above verse. The *hetu* is, therefore, not adverse (*viruddha*).

(3) A timid person may not dare confirm the presence of a lion by endangering his own life. Information through the words of some other person is enough to invoke fear in his mind.

It is, therefore, not unnatural that he may believe what the woman says to him. The woman is confident that he will trust her, otherwise she would not have said so to him. We know she is, no doubt, a cunning woman and what she states to the man may be a sheer lie; but we have no grounds to hold that the man knows her nature and intention well. The *hetu* may thus hardly be held to be unestablished (*asiddha*).

(4) The cognition obtained through poetic *anumāna* need not be *pramātmaka* (containing definite knowledge), because its main objective is to afford aesthetic pleasure and not the definite knowledge of a thing. It may, therefore, be well accomplished even through a defective *hetu* or *hetvābhāsa*.<sup>11</sup>

It is obvious from the foregoing lines that the objections advanced by Mammaṭa against the above syllogistic inference hardly hold water. It appears to us that the Naiyāyikas or *Anumānavādins* are nearer the truth.

Mammaṭa refers to the following verse also and tries to show that the Naiyāyikas are wrong in accepting the *vyaṅgyārtha* as *anumeyārtha* (the sense inferred) :

niśśeṣacyutacandanam stanatataṁ nirmṛṣṭarāgo 'dharo,  
netre dūram anañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanuh  
mithyāvādini dūti bāndhavajanasyā jñātapiḍā game,  
vāpiṁ snātum ito gatā si na punas tasyādhamasyāntikam<sup>12</sup>

[ The slopes of your breasts have (their) sandal completely washed off; the lower lip has its redness clean washed out; the eyes are without collyrium at the end; (and) horripilated is this slender frame of yours. O liar, O ye messenger, who have not realized the agony that overtakes (your) friend, you had gone from here to the pond for a bath and not to that wretch.]

“ You had gone from here to the pond for a bath, and not to that wretch ” is here the *vācyārtha*; and “ You had gone from here only to that wretch in order to dally (with him) ” is the *vyaṅgyārtha* which the Naiyāyikas take to be *anumeyārtha*. A Naiyāyika would advance his syllogistic argument as follows :

(1) *Pratijñā* : sā (dūti) tadantikam eva rantum gatāśit.

[ She (the lady-messenger) had gone only to him in order to dally (with him). ]

(2) *Hetu* : tasyāḥ stanataṭādīnāṁ niśśeṣacyuta candanatvādeḥ.

[ Because the slopes of her breasts, etc., have their sandal completely washed off, etc. ]

(3) *Dṛṣṭānta* : yatra yatra nāryaḥ stanataṭādīnāṁ niśśeṣacyutacandanatvādikam tatra tatra ramaṇajanyam.

[ Where there is the complete removal of the sandal, etc., from the slopes of the breasts, etc., of a woman, it is due to amorous dalliance. ]

(4) *Upanaya* : atra ca tasyāḥ stanataṭādīnāṁ niśśeṣacyuta candanatvādikam.

[ Here one finds the complete removal of the sandal, etc., from her breasts, etc. ]

(5) *Nigamana* : tasmāt sā tadantikam eva rantum gatā sit.

[ Hence she had gone only to him so as to dally (with him). ]

Mammaṭa says that the *hetus* put forth for inferring the amorous dalliance by the lady-messenger with the *Nāyaka* are non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*); for they are not definitely related with the dalliance only and are possible on account of other reasons also, as they have been described here in the verse as the effects of a bath (Mammaṭa does not refer to other reasons possible). But we trust no *sahṛdaya* will mistake these for the *hetus* of a bath, etc., for the following reasons :

(1) The sandal on the slopes of the breasts of that lady-messenger may be completely washed off only on account of the passionate close embraces and caresses by the *Nāyaka*. It cannot be due to a bath, as in that condition the sandal from the entire periphery of her bosom, and not only from their slopes, will be removed.<sup>13</sup>

(2) The redness of her lower lip may be clean washed out only owing to the passionate kisses by the *Nāyaka*. One cannot take it as the result of a bath; for in that condition her lips will not be bereft of their natural redness.<sup>14</sup> Ācāryas on *kāma-sastra* (erotics) prescribe kiss only on the lower, and not on the upper one, of a woman,<sup>15</sup> which is generally known as *adhara-pāna*; and hence the washing out of the redness of her lower lip is the *hetu* only of dalliance.

(3) The collyrium might have been removed from her eyes at the ends (*dūram*)<sup>16</sup> through kisses by the *Nāyaka*; for the *Ācāryas* on *kāmasāstra* prescribe kiss at the end of the eyes of one's beloved.<sup>17</sup>

(4) The horripilation on her slender body, too, does not appear to be due to a bath. Even if it is admitted that the water of the pond in which she has taken a bath is very cool, her walk from the pond to the house of her mistress should have given sufficient warmth to her body and hence no horripilation due to cold (and the poet does not specifically tell us that the season is winter!). The horripilation is due to the intense sexual enjoyment which she has experienced and the thought of which is still overpowering her.

(5) The *Nāyikā*'s rebuking her as a liar (*mīthyāvādīnī*) and as the one who has not realized the agony of (her) friend, none other than the *Nāyikā* herself (*bāndhavajanasyājñātapiḍāgame*) clearly shows that she has told her a lie that she had gone to the pond in order to take a bath, and not to the *Nāyaka*. It proves that she does not bear the signs of a bath but only those of dalliance.

Mammaṭa holds that a *Vyañjanavādin* reaches the *vyañgyārtha* by taking the help of the word *adhamā* used of the *Nāyaka*, whereas for an *Anumānavādin* the wretchedness of the *Nāyaka* is not established by valid reasons. The argument is not too solid to be answered away. The *Anumānavādin* may have recourse to *mīthyāvādīnī*, *bāndhavajanasyājñātapiḍāgame* and *adhamasya* to reach the *anumeyārtha*. They lend substantial support for taking the aforesaid *hetus* to be of dalliance. So far as the wretchedness of the *Nāyaka* is concerned, the *Nāyikā* alone is an authority. Had she given valid reasons for establishing his wretchedness, the poetic effect of the verse would have been probably feebled or marred at all. She might have a definite knowledge of the love—intrigue between the lady-messenger and the *Nāyaka*, otherwise she should have never called her a liar. Both an *Anumānavādin* and a *Vyañjanavādin* have to trust the *Nāyikā* for her assessment of her *Nāyaka* as a wretch (who dallies with the maid-servant). If one doubts the *Nāyikā*, the *Vyañjanavādin* will also have no grounds to believe her. Moreover, one must not forget

that like *vyañjanā* poetic *anumāna* also cannot operate irrespective of context, etc. The poetic *anumāna* is an extra-ordinary *anumāna*, which, unlike the stale *anumāna* of logic, affords aesthetic pleasure.<sup>18</sup> In the poetic *anumāna*, one should not concentrate much on whether the *anumeya* is real or unreal, because in both the conditions it affords aesthetic pleasure (*camatkāra*). To tell the truth, the unreal *anumeya* will be able to afford more aesthetic pleasure than the real one;<sup>19</sup> and therefore, it is not necessary that the *hetu* should always be a valid one; even a *hetvābhāsa* is capable of giving rise to poetic *anumeyārtha*. The *anumāna* of logic is *pramātmaka* (containing definite knowledge), while the poetic *anumāna* need not be so. A *Vyañjanāvādin* may distinguish his *vyañjanā* from *anumāna* by holding that in *anumāna* the *hetu* is always correlated with the *pratīyamāna*, whereas the *vyañjaka* is not so being only ordinarily related to it and consequently can provide us with several *pratīyamānas*; but the treatment of the *vyañjaka* by the *Vyañjanāvādins* is such as leads one to the conclusion that there is a correlation between the *vyañjaka* and *pratīyamāna*: the *vyañjaka* associated with a *vaktṛ* (speaker), *boddhayya* (one to whom something is conveyed), *kāku* (intonation), etc., gives rise to a definite *pratīyamāna* and thus assumes the nature of a *hetu*. Thus the poetic *anumāna* can well replace *vyañjanā*. As is obvious from the above lines, Mammaṭa's criticism of the theory of *anumāna* in reference to the verses *bhama dhammia*, etc., and *nissēśacyutacandanaṁ stanataṭam*, etc., does not appear to be justified and speaks volumes of the strained labour he had to put on in finding fault with it.

According to the *Anumānavādins*, there are only two types of meanings : *vācya* (literal) and *anumeya* (inferred), the *lakṣya* (referential) and *vyañgya* (suggested) being included by them in the *anumeya*.<sup>20</sup> The purport understood just after listening to a word or a sentence is *vācya* or *mukhya* and that whose realization needs efforts is *gauṇa* (secondary) or *anumeya*. The *anumeyārtha* is realized through some literal (*vācya*) or inferred (*anumita*) meaning and is of three kinds : *vastu*, *alaṅkāra* and *rasa*, etc., first two of which may also be *vācya* but the last (*rasa* etc.) of which is always *anumeya*. The meanings are further divided according to a word (*pada*) and a sentence (*vākyā*). Of them, the meaning of a word, being without parts (*nirāṁśa*), lacks the *sādhyasādhanabhāva* (the relation of a *probans* and a

*probandum*) and is consequently always *vācya* and never *anumeya*. The meaning of a sentence is twofold : *vācya* and *anumeya*. The latter is obtained through the former and is always *pratiyāmāna*.<sup>21</sup> The literal meaning of a word is the *hetu* of its meaning inferred (*anumeyārtha*) and the literal sense of a sentence, that of its sense inferred. Thus the *Anumānavādins* recognize that the sentence—meaning has its own peculiarity from the word-meaning.

It will not be improper here to take into account the Nyāya theory of sense (*artha*). It appears that according to the Nyāya logic a word has *sakti* and *lakṣaṇa*, while a sentence possesses *anvaya* and *tātparya*.<sup>22</sup> The literal meaning of a word is the one which directly relates the word to its bearer and this peculiar relation is termed by the Nyāya logicians *sakti* (capacity), *sāṅketa* (desired intention), *icchā* (wish) or *samaya* (the relation of one occasioning the other). It almost corresponds to Mill's concept of denotation, or Frege's *Bedeutung* (Reference). The relation between the word and its *sakti* is only arbitrary. The *lakṣyārtha* (secondary meaning) is the *unusual* referential meaning, possible on account of the sense of the word which, through usages, associations or analogies, relates the word to an altogether different object. For example, in *gaṅgāyām ghosah* (There are huts in/on the Ganges) the case-affix *yām* literally conveys the sense of *in* or *on*; but as the situation of huts in/on the Ganges is impossible, we take the locative in *gaṅgāyām* to refer to the bank of the river and thus *gaṅgāyām ghosah* comes to mean that there are huts *on the bank of* the Ganges. The important condition for *lakṣaṇa* is that the secondary meaning should not be directly connected with the direct sense, not that it should not directly follow from that sense. For instance, in *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣatām* (Protect the curds from the crows and other creatures) and *yastīḥ pravesayāḥ* (Permit the men with sticks), the word *kākebhyaḥ* and *yastīḥ* are capable of conveying a sense through their literal meaning.<sup>23</sup>

A sentence possesses *anvaya* and *tātparya*, and not *sakti* or *lakṣaṇa*. *Anvaya* is the literal sense of a sentence. When a sentence offers a sense different from the literal, it is because of the intention of the speaker, determined by context, etc., and is termed *tātparya* (intentional sense or the sense intended).<sup>24</sup> The sentence-meaning follows from the synthesis of *sakti* and *lakṣaṇa*.

of individual words and is thus the product or effect of individual words considered separately. The *anvaya* or literal sense of a sentence is the product of the *sakti* of individual words; and the *tātparya*, that of the *lakṣaṇa* of the individual words.<sup>25</sup> The Naiyāyikas take *tātparya* to form the grounds for *lakṣaṇa*, suggesting thereby that one has recourse to *lakṣaṇa* only when the sense intended by the speaker is not offered by the denotative sense of a word.<sup>26</sup> Similarly when the *anvaya* or the literal sense of a sentence fails to provide the sense intended by the speaker, one resorts to the *tātparya*. *नामस्तेषां वाच्यान् व्याङ्ग्यान् तात्पर्यान्*

The *anumeya* or *pratiyamāna* sense falls within the pale of the *tātparya*. The *tātparya* represents the sense intended by the speaker when the *anvaya* fails to convey it and thus embraces the *anumeya* or *pratiyamāna* sense. It is for this reason that the *Anumānavādins* distinguish *anumeyārtha* from the *vācyārtha*. Since the sense achieved through poetic inference does not preclude the sense intended to be communicated by the speaker with context, etc., in mind, it will not be proper to take, like Ānandavardhana<sup>27</sup>, the *anumeya* as quite different from the *pratipādya*. We certainly do not mean that the *pratipādya* or the sense to be conveyed is only *anumeya*. It is *vācya* only when it is the same as the literal sense; but it will be *anumeya* when it is different from the literal sense, because it falls within the pale of the *tātparya*. Ānandavardhana appears to have devised a well planned strategy against the *Anumānavādins*' approach. According to this approach, the *anumeyārtha* proves, as we have seen above, to be the *tātparya*. The *tātparya* is held by the Naiyāyikas as the intention of the speaker : *vaktur icchā tu tātparyam*;<sup>28</sup> but as is obvious from their treatment, the *tātparya* is not merely the intention of the speaker (*vaktur icchā*) but the sense intended by him to be communicated. Ānandavardhana holds that it is only the *abhiprāya* of the speaker which is inferred.<sup>29</sup> The *abhiprāya* seems to have been confined by him only to the speaker's intention to speak out the (audible) form of a word (*sabdasvarūpa-prakāśaneccchā*) and to express some idea or sense by means of the word (*sabdenārthaprakāśaneccchā*). This intention has been distinguished from the *pratipādya* or the sense which is the subject of the user's desire to express some idea or sense. This *pratipādya* is of two kinds : *vācya* and *vyaṅgya*.<sup>30</sup> It clearly shows that

according to him it is only the intention which can be inferred, and not the idea or sense. Ānandavardhana seems to have used the word *abhiprāya* here for the Nyāya term *tātparya* and mistaken the Nyāya *tātparya* only for the speaker's intention to speak or express,<sup>31</sup> or he presents the Nyāya concept of *tātparya* after distorting and twisting it so as to suit his own view. One cannot delimit the *abhiprāya* only to the speaker's intention. It ought to be taken as embracing the idea or sense which he intends to convey and as equivalent to the *tātparya*. In fact, if we think from the speaker's side, the intention to speak or express is the result of the idea or sense already existing in his mind; for it is for its communication that he embarks upon speaking or expressing. If we consider from the listener's side, the idea or sense communicated is the result of the speaker's intention. Thus if one finds somebody as intending to speak or as speaking, one can easily infer that there are some ideas or sense which he is to communicate. It is, therefore, difficult to admit, in Ānandavardhana's tone, that only the intention of the speaker is *anumeya*, and not the *pratipādya* or the sense to be conveyed.<sup>32</sup> Once the speaker starts expressing his ideas or sense, it is his *pratipādya* and not only his intention that one comes to know of. When the speaker wishes to speak out the *pratipādya*, the listener who understands that he wants to speak *something* knows of it only as *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate); but on its expression he acquaints himself with it and thus knows of it as *savikalpa* (determinate). The *pratipādya* may sometimes be the same as the literal sense and sometimes different from it. In the former state it is *vācya*, being *anvaya*; and in the latter *anumeya* or *pratiyamāna* (or *vyañgya* according to the *Vyañjanāvādins*), being *tātparya*. The *pratipādya* thus need not always be the *abhiprāya* or *tātparya*. It is *abhiprāya* or *tātparya* only when it deviates from the *anvaya* and is thus *pratiyamāna*.

Ānandavardhana distinguishes between two types of *vyañgyas* *abhiprāyarūpa* (the one which represents the intention of the speaker) and *anabhiprāyarūpa* (the one which does not represent his intention).<sup>33</sup> By doing so he probably wants to establish that the *vyañgya* is not always the same as the *tātparya* of the Naiyāyikas but sometimes, when determined by some other factors than the speaker, different from it. But as the meaning of a

word or a sentence in the final analysis is to be determined by the intention of individual who uses that word or sentence and his intention is determined by context, etc., one cannot think of a meaning which is not the speaker's *tātparya*. Even then, if one accepts a *vyañgya* as something different from the speaker's *tātparya*, one would be recognizing a *vyañgya* irrespective of context, etc. Does Ānandavardhana's use of the word *tātparya* in the context of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani*, though interpreted otherwise by his followers,<sup>34</sup> not betray the fact that his subconscious mind is haunted by the idea that *vyañgyārtha* is nothing but *tātparya*? Even the *Dhvanikāra* employs this word in a similar context.<sup>35</sup>

One should not confuse the *anumeyārtha* with the *vācyārtha*; for the *Anumānavādins*, themselves are well conscious of the distinction between them. The poetic *anumāna* may thus well substitute *vyañjanā*.

Probably we should recognize only two meanings : the *vācya* and the *pratiyamāna*. It is curious to note that the *Dhvanikāra* also admits only two meanings.<sup>36</sup> The *vācya* is the literal meaning of a word or a sentence, while the *pratiyamāna* represents the sense which the speaker wants to convey—*lakṣyārtha* in case of a word and *tātparya* (embracing the *anumeyārtha* or *vyañgyārtha*) in case of a sentence. The *anumāna* functions only in a sentence. So the *vyañjanā* of the *Vyañjanāvādins* should also be recognized to function in a sentence and should not, therefore, be accepted as a *padavṛtti* (function of a word). The *Ālaṅkārikas*, no doubt treat of the *sābdī* *vyañjanā* (verbal suggestion); but it is not because *vyañjanā* operates in words but merely because certain words with several meanings functioning as *vyañjakas* are inevitable and cannot be dispensed with, otherwise there will be no *vyañgyārtha* at all. *Vyañjanā* should, therefore, be considered only a *vākyavṛitti* (function of a sentence), and not a *padavṛitti*. In case of the *sābdī*, *vyañjanā*, the sense determined by conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, motive, context, characteristic, proximity of another word, efficacy, propriety, place, time, gender, accents and the like<sup>37</sup> is the *anvaya* (literal sense of a sentence) and the *pratiyamāna* (implied) sense is the *tātparya*.

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## NOTES

1. Vide P. V. Kane : *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 3rd edition, 1961, p. 274.
2. Probably 15th century A.D. *ibid.*, p. 275.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
4. He wrote his commentary in *sāmvat* 1215 (i.e. 1159-1160 A.D. and a manuscript of the commentary is dated *sāmvat* 1215 *ibid.*, p. 274).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
6. Vide *Dhvanyāloka* ed. with *Locana* by Jagannātha Pāthaka, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 1st edition, 1965, *Vṛtti* on III.33, pp. 484-90.
7. Vide *Kāvyaaprakāśa* with Vāmanācārya Rāmabhatta, Jhalakikar's commentary entitled *Bṛlabodhinī*, ed., R. D. Karmarkar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 6th edition, 1950, pp. 252-56.
8. *Gāthāsaptaśatī*, II.75, Sanskrit version :  
 bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhah sa śunako 'dyā māritas tena  
 godānadīkacchakuñjavāsinā dṛptasimhena ॥

Paramānanda Śāstri's edition (Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhāna, Ānandapurī, Meerut, 1st edition, 1965) reads *godātaṭavikāṭa*—instead of *godānadīkaccha*—. Abhinavagupta (*Dhvanyāloka*, *Locana*, p 52) reads *gadānadīkulalatāgahanavāsinā*.

9. Mammata's words *godāvarītire ca siṁhopalabdhiḥ* (p. 254) and *godāvarītire siṁhasadbhāvah* (p. 255) prove the existence of the lion on the marshy bank of the Godāvari, while the poet tells it to be in the bower on the marshy bank of the Govāvari. The woman who speaks the verse to the religious person wants to ward him off the bower, and not off the bank of the river, as she is not concerned with the entire bank.
10. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, II.4.5, na vā are jāyāyai kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavati..... na vā are vittasya kāmāya vittam priyam bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati..... na vā are lokānām kāmāya lokāḥ priyā bhavanty ātmans tu kāmāya lokāḥ priyā bhavanti..... na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati.

11. *Infra.*

12. *Amarasataka*, 105.

13. Commentators try to justify it as the *hetu* of a bath thinking that the lady-messenger could only rub during her bath in the pond the slopes of her breasts on account of the presence of many youths there, and not her entire breasts (vide Vāmanācārya Rāmabhaṭṭa Jhalakikar's *Bālabodhini*, p. 20). The poet tells nothing of this. It is just the stretch of their own imagination and can hardly be taken as authentic.

14. Commentators think that the redness of the lower lip washed out during a bath was due to chewing the betel-leaf (vide *Bālabodhini*, p. 20, *Nāgesvari*, ed. Hariśāṅkara Śarmā, Kashi Sanskrit Series 49, Varanasi, 3rd edition, 1967, p. 6). The poet does not indicate that the lady-messenger did chew the betel-leaf. It is the play of their own imagination, which betrays the pains they put on in their justification.

15. Vide Vātsyāyana : *Kāmasūtra*, III.3.11–12; also Kālidāsa : *Kumārasaṁbhava*, VIII.8–9.

16. Vidyācakravartin in his commentary *Sampradāyaprakāśinī*, takes *dūram* to mean profusely (*atyantam*), (vide *Kāvyaprakāśa*, ed. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Vol. I, 1966, p. 11). Majority of commentators do not agree with him.

Commentators have accounted for the removal of collyrium during a bath at the ends of her eyes, and not from the rest part of her eyes by saying that one closes one's eyes during a bath and consequently collyrium stays therein; but the argument hardly holds water, as during a bath even in a pond one would rub and wash one's eyes and the collyrium applied to them would be washed out also from the rest part of the eyes.

17. Vide on kiss on eyes Vātsyāyana : *op. cit.*, II.3.4; cf. Māgha : *Śisupālavadha*, X.54, vide on kiss at the ends of eyes, *Bālabodhini*, p. 20, *Udāharanacandrikā* (*Kāvyapradipta*, ed. Pt. Durgāprasāda and Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Śāstrī Pañśikar, N.S.P., Bombay, 1933, p. 12); *Nāgesvari*, p. 6, etc.

18. Vide Ruyyaka on Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, *Vimarṣa* I, p. 69, *kāvyānumānam tarkānumānavilakṣaṇam kāvyasya camat-kārasāratvāt. nyāyamukhenāpi camatkāra eva viśrānteh . tarkā-numānam tu karkaśanyāyarūpatayā pravṛttam tarkasya karkaśatām*

udvahati. kāvyatve 'tadvaiparityāt sahṛdayānām adhikārād na vyāptyādimukhenā 'numānapradarśanasamarthanam iti. Śāṅkuka had already hinted at this extraordinary nature of poetic *anumāna* and *anumeya* in the context of *rasa* ( cf. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, p. 90 ).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 76, atra pratītiśāratvāt kāvyasyānumeyagatam vāstavāvāstavatvam prayojakam. Ubhayathā camatkāra-pratītlakṣaṇārthakriyāsiddheḥ. pratyutāvāstavatve yathā sidhyati na tathāvāstavatva iti kāvyānumiter evānumānāntaravilakṣapate 'ty anumānāvādino 'yam abhiprāyah. Vide also Mahimabhaṭṭa's words : tenātra gamyagamakayoh sacetasām satyāsatyatvavicāro nirupayoga eva. kāvyaviṣaye ca vācyavyāṅgyapratītiñām satyāsatyatvavicāro nirupayoga eva 'ti tatra pramāṇāntarapaiśo 'pahāsāyai "va sampadyata iti. tatra hetvādibhir akṛtrimair akṛtrimā eva pratyāyante. tatrai "śām anumeyatvam eva na vyaṅgyatvagandho 'pi 'ti, kutas tatra sukhāsvādalavo 'pi sambhavati. esa eva lokataḥ kāvyādāv atiśaya ity upapadyata eva ratyādau gamye sukhāsvādaprayojano vyaṅgyatvopacāra iti. (*ibid.*, p. 78).

20. Vide Mahimabhaṭṭa : *Vyaktiviveka*, *Vimarsa* I, p. 47; Revāprasāda Dvivedī's gloss on it, p. 48.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 47-49.

22. Vide for details S. S. Barlingay : *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, National Publishing House, Delhi, 2nd edition, 1976, pp. 23-42.

23. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Śabdakhaṇḍa*, ed. Harirāma Śukla, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 3rd edition, 1972, pp. 285-301.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-17; vaktur icchā tu tātparyam, p. 315. Vide for details S. S. Barlingay : " Meaning, Use and Intention ", *Indian Philosophical Review*, 1971, No. 1.

25. Vide S. S. Barlingay : *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, p. 38.

26. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *op. cit* p. 285, lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhaḥ tātparyānupapattitah.

27. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 486-87.

28. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *op. cit.*, p. 315, Ānandavardhana might have been cognisant with the Nyāya concept of *tātparya*.

29. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 487, tasmād vaktrabhi-  
prāyarūpa eva vyaṅge liṅgatayā śabdānām vyāpārah.

30. *Ibid*, pp. 486–87, dvividho viṣayah śabdānām—anumeyah  
pratipādyas 'ca. tatrā 'numeyo vivakṣälakṣaṇah. vivakṣā ca śabda-  
svarūpaprakāśanecchā śabdenā 'rthaprakāśanecchā ca 'ti dvi-  
prakārā. tatrā "dyā na sābdavyavahārāṅgam. sā hi prāṇītvamātra-  
pratipattiphalā. dvitīyā tu śabdaviśeṣāvadhāranāvasitavyavahitā  
'pi śabdakarapavyavahāranibandhanam. te tu dve 'pi anumeyo  
viṣayah śabdānām. pratipādyas tu prayoktur arthapratiṣṭāna-  
samīhāviṣayikṛto 'rthah. sa ca dvividhah—vācyo vyaṅgas ca.  
prayoktā hi kadācit svaśabdenā 'rtham prakāśayitum samīhate  
kadācit svaśabdānabhidheyatvena prayojanāpekṣayā kayācit.

31. Mammaṭa seems to delimit the *tātparya* only to the  
literal sense of words used. Vide *kāvyaprakāśa*, pp. 227–28,  
upāttasyai "va śabdasyā 'rthe tātparyatām na tu pratītamātre..  
He confuses the *tātparya* with the *anvaya*.

32. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 487, sa tu dvividho 'pi  
pratipādyo viṣayah śabdānām na lingitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate,. .  
vivakṣāvisayatvām hi tasyā 'rthasya śabdair liṅgitayā pratīyate na  
tu svarūpam.

33. *Ibid*, p. 487, pratīyamāne tasminn abhiprāyarūpe 'nabhi-  
prāyarūpe ca..

34. *Ibid*, *Vṛtti* on II. 27, p. 282; III. 39, p. 513 (yadā vakro-  
ktim vinā vyaṅgyo 'rthas tātparyeṇa pratīyate tadā tasya prā-  
dhānyam); III. 42, p. 532 (*Saṅgrahaśloka*, yasmin rasovā bhāvo  
vā tātparyeṇa prakāśate). Abhinavagupta interprets the word  
*tātparya* in *Vṛtti* on II. 27 as : yo 'rtho 'bhimato yatra tatparatvām  
sa dhvaner mārga itye 'vamīrūpah. The meaning which is implied  
predominantly and at which words finally aim can be nothing but  
the *tātparya*. One should have no valid objection if the *Vyāñjanā-  
vādins* give the *tātparya* the denomination of *dhvani*, etc.; for it is  
not the different denomination that makes the real difference.

35. *Dhvanyāloka*, II. 22, yas tātparyeṇa vastva anyad vyana-  
kyt uktim vinā svataḥ. It has been explained by Abhinavagupta  
as : svatas tātparyeṇe 'ty abhidhāvyāpāranirākaraṇaparam idam  
padam dhvananavyāpāram āha.

36. *Ibid.*, I. 2.

yo 'rthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyah kāvyātmeti vyavasthitāḥ ।  
vācyapratiyamānākhyau tasya bhedāv ubhau smṛtau ॥

However, Ānandavardhana takes the meanings to be of three types : *vācya*, *lakṣya* and *vyañgya* ( or *pratiyamāna* ), though the last two, *lakṣya* and *vyañgya*, could form a single class, the *pratiyamāna*. [ I am grateful to my friend Prof. S. S. Barlingay for inviting my attention to the above *Kārikā*. ] Does it point out that the author of the *Kārikās* ( *DhvaniKāra* ) is different from that of the *Vṛtti*, i.e. Ānandavardhana.

37. Vide Bhartṛhari : *Vākyapadiya*, II. 317-18,  
 saṁyogo viprayogas' ca sāhacaryam virodhitā ।  
 arthaḥ prakaraṇam liṅgam śabdasyā 'nyasya sannidhiḥ ॥  
 sāmarthyam aucitī deśah kālo vyaktih svarādayah ।  
 śabdārthasyā 'navacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ ॥

Vide for details Mammaṭa : *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Vṛtti* on II, 19.

## AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Does art reveal a world unknown to our everydayish common understanding? Or is it only snobbish and fussy posturing about painted pieces of paper, sounds, shapes, lines or equivocal gestures, movements and the like? Some of our cultural preferences deify, others are denounced as cheap; and when eulogies of connoisseurs, and recognised critics, virtuosos all overwhelmingly reinforce these reactions, are we already handed down a venerated tradition? If one makes an affirmative reply to the first question one is in for some sort of metaphysics of art, and if one says 'yes' to the second one approves of anthropological approach to art or 'aesthetic experience'. Obviously nobody who is least acquainted with the issue could reasonably give affirmative response to both these questions. Yet, one may wonder if the above antithetical pair of questions do really exhaust the issue, or are really so exclusive as they appear.

Some philosophers of the phenomenological tradition have insisted on going beyond these familiar grounds, while taking full look on 'aesthetic-experience'. They simply step aside of rather simplistic dichotomy of psychologism, materialism or cultural relativism on one side and metaphysical essentialism, esotericism on the other. Mikel Dufrenne has written an extended philosophical treatise which was published way back in 1953 by University De France Under the French title : *Phenomenologie de l' expérience esthétique*<sup>1</sup> that was recognised by the scholars of aesthetics as an eminently readable and coherent presentation of what phenomenology could do to explain the perplexities and paradoxes of aesthetic experience and its critical elaboration. As such it has been a great pleasure to read the present English version so diligently prepared by the team of four for North Western University Studies in Phenomenology and existential philosophy led by Prof. Edward S. Casey of Oxford, who also writes a very useful foreword to the translation. He volunteers

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1. The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience—Mikel Dufrenne, English translation Edward Casey and others, North Western University Press, Evanston, U.S., pp. XLVI + 578, U.S., 1973.

the information that since 1960 Mikel Dufrenne has offered to those interested in philosophy of art, around another half a dozen works in which some of the suggested concepts earlier in the phenomenology have been more fully explored and expounded satisfactorily. As it is, this earlier work is the only one which is now made available in English, it is useful to have some debate on few salient issues which are highlighted by Phenomenology. (to be referred as Phe. followed by page Nos., hereafter) regarding Aesthetic Experience.

Within the limits of a short critical essay the present contributor shall of necessity pick and choose only some propositions for detailed comments and exposition cannot but ignore the rest of the bulk of the treatise that covers around six hundred closely set printed pages. Here, a couple of introductory remarks regarding the internal structure of Phe. may lessen somewhat any injustice to it, in our proposed discussion. Phe. opens out to reflect on 'Aesthetic-Object' that covers almost two hundred and forty pages to be followed by second part on the analysis of Work of Art that make some ninety pages, moving on to Aesthetic-perception in the third section roughly of the same size and finally fourth which takes little over hundred and quarter. A critique of Aesthetic Experience. This is the treatise. As Dufrenne declares (see Phe. introduction, p. LXVI) '....we shall pass from the phenomenological to the transcendental and the transcendental will itself flow into the metaphysical; for, in asking how aesthetic experience is possible we shall be led to ask whether and how it can be true', the work opens on a very wide horizon and aspires to give a whole aesthetics with universal metaphysics duly based on genuine art—appreciation. A new Aesthetics of art-experience without any facile theories of Beauty so well trodden in the conventional Philosophies of Art. No, Mikel Dufrenne wishes to offer (see Phe. p. XXIII) 'an aesthetic which does not reject evaluation is yet not subservient to it. It is an aesthetics which recognises beauty, without creating a theory of Beauty, because there is no theory to create : there is stating of what aesthetic objects are and to the degree that they truly are, they are beautiful'.

We may have occasion later to examine what Dufrenne thinks 'real' is, particularly in the context of sensuous experiencing of 'Aesthetic-Object' and the various implications of such experiencing; here, all I have to point out is that phenomenological stancce appears to me to be unclear about its conceptual-framework and equivocates about modes of being of 'what is possible' on the one hand with 'what is plausible' on the other. Regrettably, Dufrenne often ends up by falling into a faceless reification of past, and its intentions and future and 'not yet'—realizations together with presence of other fellowmen making it one global consciousness of sorts. Further well-known fact of Art-History regarding iconic signs (such as those that fuse the token with their 'signification') Dufrenne naively employs as a valid argument for almost spinning out an ontology of sorts; an ontology of art-meaning. Eventually, he also seems to confuse the two notions of 'real' and 'meaning' as he indulges in slipshot use of the term 'world' that we hope to show, here, by and by.

The Phe. avoids the two familiar extremes in aesthetics,—one overmuch logic-chopping and conceptualization usually uninformed of actual art, working of art-processes or even genuine aesthetic-experience, the other submergence of most significant issues and concepts under unceasing descriptions of so-called 'specifics' of particular artifacts, pieces, details of artworks and haggling over authorship, dates and authenticity (so, ironically undependable) effusive minutiae and jargon of genre, style, techniques or quarrels over classifications of periods and evaluations. Dufrenne deserves a good cheer for having deftly side-stepped all this.

On the contrary, Dufrenne had his long rewarding communion with varied 'sensuous-glories' that devotees of Western Muses have offered and collected in Paris (at least this is my surmise on reading his remarks on classical works strewn throughout Phe.). He, as it is, seems to know his Bach, Mozart, Beethoven or Debussy and their classic symphonies, poetry of Rimbaud, Verlaine Valery, Baudelaire, Goethe or Holderlin, classical drama of Racine, Moliere or Sartre, fiction of great masters like Hugo, Stendhal, Balzac, Zola, Proust, or Malraux. Painters such as Matisse, Van Gogh, Rembrandt, Picasso also seem to people his world. Concerts, theatre, choir, opera, and of course end-

less rounds through Louvres, and other galleries quiet humming of lines remembered echoing and re-echoing down the memory lane over decades, unmistakably punctuate his musings first then their critical exposition, here in Phe. They seem to season and flavour what Dufrenne has to say about 'aesthetic-experience'. He offers in his aesthetic theory as much of this intimate tone and collateral images of a notable and genuine *Rasik* (qualified spectator) as his critical reflections on what he has witnessed of this sensuous-depth. In wonder if Dufrenne could agree to Croce's remark that witness nearly relives as he sees the creation that creator had created through his expression, in the first instance, or seer and creator thus fuse and lose themselves in one, single, sure, expression sans time and place notwithstanding.

Still, one may record that Dufrenne's Phe. is from the standpoint of the spectator only (which we shall see could be defended on his central thesis of aesthetic-experience) and one could even show that he ignores, here at any rate, such other and equally relevant concerns as of the creator or that of the critic. Surely, it is not his intention in writing Phe. to supply guidelines to any aspiring artist or poet or to offer a ready-reckoner to an art-critic of some trend-setting learned weekly eager to judge and deal with magisterial solemnity the creator and his insolent creation, for their saucy indiscretions !

To my mind, all that I observe above about Phe. makes it a significant work, of genuine cultural value, precisely because it so well sidesteps the raucous noise of 'party-whips' and ideological commitments or loud declamations about unconscious urges of the poor-things the artists, or some computerised mathematical programme for art—Happily, none of this trendy clap-trap faults Phe. Sartre, Merleau Ponty, Heidegger, Bergson, Etienne Souriau, Husserl and to much lesser degree Roman Ingarden and Hegel seem to have his forebodings. (See Phe., pp. 199-239). To some for instance Merleau Ponty he nods, Sartre he spars with unceasing vigour regarding latter's theory of Unreality of imagination (Phe., pp. 353-54) and to others say Husserl, Etienne, Souriau, Ingarden, Conrad he handsomely acknowledges his debt more than once.

It is useful to state that the core of Phe. revolves round the notion of 'aesthetic-object' which Dufrenne (Phe., Pt. I) has distinguished from that of 'art-work'; by latter he understands the conventional material artifact a physical-being among will-less things. Subject's perceptions, sensuousness and 'aestheticisation' are pre-supposed by all the aesthetic-objects, holds Phe. Although a bare 'art-work' could last (the cave-paintings, ruins or monument like Taj) as a natural object without satisfying one or more of these intentional conditions, but they are not 'art' just as Mayan shrines were just another gold quarry for Spanish conquistors.

At this stage we take note of what Dufrenne says regarding the distinction between the 'in-itself' of art-object and 'in-itself' of aesthetic-object for us' that explains Dufrenne's crucial non-naturalist ontology of art. This is spelt out in Phe. in extended exposition in Part I (pp. 10-13, 223 and passim) as his pivotal position. It is not only that he insists on autonomy of That is not only that he insists on autonomy of aesthetic-being of such Subject-Object correlation in this sort of inbuilt hyphenated 'Experience of Aesthetic-Objects', but goes on to argue that the Real reveals its consubstantial harmony between subject coming to possess the sensuous, and nature rising for the subject only through such temporary alienation that it fully comes to reveal its presence. World of aesthetic-experience brings out expressed world that we of harried work-a-day world, utilitarians alpharisees are apt to ignore. Aesthetic-Object, thus concretises 'real' our consubstantial presence (affective-apriori, see Phe., Part IV, p. 455, and ff p.) that works itself into a sensuous project only through our human perception (see Dufrenne's extended comments on Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, Phe, pp. 6-14 and compare his foot-note on pp. 394-395). Dufrenne's demand of Perceiver's neutralization of the actual to enable the imaginary to express itself and body forth seems to take on the older notion of Bullough's—the Psychical-Distance as well as poetic prerequisites noted by earlier writers in nineteenth century as they insisted on the part of the reader of poetry 'a willing suspension of disbelief'.

To appreciate Dufrenne's major contribution to theory of Aesthetic-Perception as Phenomenology of Sensuous that consti-

tutes the world of Aesthetic-Objects, we see his conditional parallelism of the subject and the aesthetic-object that supersede both the onlooker as well as the material artifact. He argues and emphasizes on double alienation in the course of Aesthetic-experience of the spectator as well as the derealization of the natural object to enable the project or art to form its 'gestalt', which, howsoever problematic it is in its identity incarnates nevertheless the 'aesthetic-object' with all its various material and non-material tiers—such as body, function, sense, form, depth and expression lives through all of them without being given in any of these isolable or analysable single element. Anatomy of this quasi-subject occupies Phe. extensively, its identity and being are sought to be illuminated in terms of material, formal, psychical and interpersonal emotive elements that constitute these tiers of 'Aesthetic-Object'. I must express my disappointment and fear that irrespective of phenomenological subtleties this whole discussion has not advanced in the direction of clarity as to What exactly one should call the Aesthetic Object ? ( See, Phe., Part I, Chapter VI, " Being of the Aesthetic-Object ", pp. 226-230; Part II, Chapter X, when Dufrenne talks about the structure of the work of Art, pp. 316-17, in Part III, Chapter XIV, Feeling and Depth of the Aesthetic-Object, and the whole of the Part IV especially Chapter XVIII, The Truth of the Aesthetic-Object, pp. 530-537 where Dufrenne claims truth to real possibilities as concretised in genuine Aesthetic-Objects. )

The discussion and critical reconstructions that Dufrenne makes of the various classifications of Arts and their objects on the basis of their genre, medium, schematism (representational devices pre-supposing arrangements of temporality and organisations of spatiality) are perceptive and instructive. Parts II and III of Phe. are thus most rewarding. These bring to bear on the subject considerably penetrating new material (possibly, well-worked out in last few generations of Continental Art scholarship). Dufrenne seeks to set the paradigm of Harmony, Rhythm and Melody from the structure of musical compositions, first and then to apply the same to mixed arts like theatre, dancing, film and later even try to subsume painting, sculpture and architecture under the musical paradigm. Dufrenne's views on temporalizing of space in painting and spatializing of time in symphony

to pick on the two representatives of the great divide of aesthetic world deserve critical recognition. He writes : '.....Such time is not a dimension of the objective world but rather a temporal atmosphere which corresponds to a world atmosphere to the world expressed by the Work. The measured time of the temporal arts, a time which we must follow in order to apprehend the aesthetic object, is like an image of the more secret time in terms of which aesthetic-object is meaning. Similarly, the space of spatial arts is like an image of that more secret space which is unique to the temporal Arts and through which the aesthetic object possesses an invincible presence and proclaim its own world.....' ( Phe., p. 299 ).

Similarly, Dufrenne gives far from extended and some what sporadic analysis of literary-arts, too, poems, plays and novels. He makes a couple of deep searching probes into the complex web that these severally differing literary-works create. Here, Verbal meaning, Uttered pattern of sound, collective myths and traditional legends and symbols, structure and schematism of representation, collateral memories of the author, or his reader running parallel to the fabled character and fictive emotions constituting narrative and its style referring to varieties are all taken note of if not fully explored, and Dufrenne is aware that this multiplicity of ingredients does not remain severally discernible in the expression of the literary works latter are rather blended and fused and transformed through several rounds of interpenetrating reverberations. It is this constant recrystallization of elements that marks literary-arts in a way as most subtle and mixed. Perhaps it is this character of poetic expression that it is claimed 'that out of three sounds I do not make a fourth but a star' and the claim at least does not seem to be entirely mad. Dufrenne writes ( Phe., pp. 328-9 ) '....the work as a whole bears expression....these traits are not elements on whose basis we could reconstitute the whole, they are not schemata that is, that is the elements of a structure or the generative elements of a totality. Furthermore, when such traits are collected together and systematically exploited they cease to be effective as a result of this very effort.....'

Surely, literary creations are in language and could hardly exploit spectacular characteristics of the medium as painting,

sculpture do of colour or texture; or music does of melody and dance of the sinuosities of human person, gesture and movements. (Unless, one insists on plays being staged in theatre, and in poetry recitation of verses as prior condition of knowing a poem.) We have to agree with Dufrenne that literary-arts represent the highest triumph of human subjectivity.

Thinking about our own traditions, I am convinced that much of verve and depth of Ghalib's ghazal or Mira's Bhajan or other vaishnav poetry or its commercial reproductions with the coming of standard recitations preserved by Long-playing records, or the convivial atmosphere of a Mushaira or Kavi-sammelan are far from intellectual and literary associations as it seem to owe more plain melliflous tone and melody of voice. Poetry is echo and re-echo of uttered vice.

Role of Language in its primary function of introducing 'significations' has well slipped through Dufrenne's treatment because our author seems too keen to emphasize the multiplicity of modes, manners and varieties in different literary genres, to realize that these all are parasitical to the primary role of words. Further, Dufrenne generally insists that all arts whistfully look and aim at that fusion of their thinghood with sense such as musical expression (Sonata) fully embodies in sound its perfections of sense and thus achieve a complete transfiguration of the world of the creator as that of the listener. But this is too high a demand. We do find gaps in conventional signs such as ordinary language uses or arbitrary symbols in use in several graphic arts, and the vastly different onmotopoeic icons of a few poetic compositions. Dufrenne is just insensitive to problems of complexities of Meaning theory. But don't we have scores for musical compositions? There is the thirst for order and symmetry in empirical sciences as say in astronomy. Cannot one visualize a sort of structural analogue of sound expressed in mathematical language even for a Symphony, true, which will not be performed Music or Aesthetic-Object one lives with in a concert-Hall, it still may bear some isomorphous resemblance to art understandable to those trained in theory of music and accoustics? Then, are all art-works, whether well or ill-performed, equally and uniformly iconic? In other words are there no ways of grading the excellence of performance in intelligible degrees? Must it

be either-or situation ? And Pray how are we to know the success or failure of attempted concordance and correspondence of a poem to a theatrical representation an original play into a ballot composition, a Novel into a film, a Song's illustration on Canvas ? One faces several difficult issues as to how con-substantial correlation of artistic creations could be visualized. Here, how are we to know in such transfers except externally which is the original and the other adaptation ? Of course we are told of colours of tones or Chromatism of musical compositions; of melody and dance of colours Dufrenne hints at some of these facts of art-perception, but despite assurance to stick to ' specifics ' of art Phe. cannot offer much on these beyond familiar common places. Dufrenne recognises ( Phe., p. 411 ), ' ....we may not be able to interperet a particular line of verse such as " Time sparkled and our dreams are knowledge ". We may ask just, what does this mean ? But the moment we become sensitive to the line's enchantment and are led into the poetic state, which may have to be the result of a long familiarity that is hardly comparable to the understanding's effort to seek stubbornly a solution to a problem. Then the question of meaning is no longer at the stake ? 'No, Dear Mr. Dufrenne it was never at stake for you.'

Now, one more point, which is useful to note about Phe., is its analysis of conditions of aesthetic perception. Dufrenne reviews perception, representation, imagination, reflection, feeling, and aesthetic attitude. ( part III, pp. 335-441, Chapters XI to XV ) This is obviously quite consistent with his treatment of aesthetic object for latter exists as claimed in Phe. only as a disposition of generic human-sensuousness. Dufrenne commits humanity to these dispositions, and even calls them ' affective-apriori '. He offers lot of now familiar gestalt-psychology and its explorations into form-completion, imaginative elaboration of perceived ' presence ' and largely maintains organic-totality of all artistic expressions; he writes, ' ..Expression has said everything in a single stroke. I need not anticipate not just because I am in contact with a free agent but also because there is simply nothing to anticipate. Everything is in expression and what is expressed is given to me immediately ' ( Phe., pp. 385-6 ).

Dufrenne has little desire to analyse and seek clarity about constitution of the contemplated art-pieces.; for he deprecates measure and recommends depth which is beyond measurement (Phe., p. 398) and that too should lead to our own transformation. He quotes : to recite the verse : " Oh lake, silent rocks, grottos and dark forests " is hardly to establish a geographical inventory; it is instead to yield to a sort of enchantment. In the end we comprehend such a line just as we comprehend the most difficult of texts, by attaining through the agency of feeling to a world which cannot be defined ' ( Phe., p. 411 ). The mystery of imagined or expressed depth is striven hard to be captured, and it is not to be nailed to an image even, as a shadow being of our subjectivity but as depth or a project which not only negates external world but uses even image to externalise our intentional being into a timeless ' presence ' . Dufrenne thinks that it is not only material sounds, colours, shapes that incarnate the total expression but even the subject as own images and memories ought to help to get to this internal world of the aesthetic-object. ( Form exemplifies this expression ).

When all our conceptual reflection and representation have done to assist this contemplation and have not yet quite got to the atmosphere. He writes : ' .. after I have reflected on a poem by Mallarmé subjected it to grammatical analysis, interpreted its terms, established its subject—in short the work appears to as clearly as possible, I must still say what Mallarmé has communicated and state of only half consciously and to myself the poem's unique atmosphere that rarefied atmosphere between dream and perception where all edges of reality are blunted.... ' ( Phe., p. 422 cp p. 420 ). Art-objects, thus either cause total alienation or bring ecstasy and the two are reinforced by each other for aesthetic-object's perfection is ' .. to be a quasi-subject, but it attains this expressive rigour and security of its objective being a body with an extraordinary developed nervous system, as a man attains the spiritual only by accepting unconditionally his temporal existence ' ( Phe. p. 425 ). That is the material structure and the sense and intentions within the aesthetic-object ought to fuse (?) or do as a matter of fact always fuse ? One does not know : here, what really is Dufrenne after, that is if he is setting this up as the ideal that successful aesthetic experience ought to strive

for; or does he suggest like the romantic idealists of Arts that everything of works like Mona-Lisa is unique as well as existentially necessary, an organic whole an instance of affective-a-priori ? But what one would do to scores of accedents of modes, manners, slips, mishaps, conventions, styles that are part of its history ? Could one not think that even given these conventions and history being what they were, still, the specific work could be wholly other than what it actually is ? If not so where stands the autonomy ? Is art an unfoldment of a cultural destiny, a sort of Hegel's famous cunning of Reason ? How far the sensuous qualities, and affective-apriori, spectacle, themes, techniques and aesthetic intents and their executions could be externalised in a given art-work ? Do they harmonise of necessity in all cases ? If not, so how do we know when they have failed to converge ? We can see for Dufrenne only two options, either to face these questions which he nowhere faces, or reject the ontology and dialectic and end up with relativism, despite his advocacy of affective-apriori and be swallowed up in anthropomorphism (see Phe. p. 538 ff.). Or declare most work of art to be really crafts and that too fairly unsuccessful; real aesthetic object then shall be very rare, indeed, in fact hardly ever to be found in actual art-history. For myself, none of those aesthetic-objects that he has communicated with can be safely regarded as adequate externalization of the 'quasi-subject' of their creator's aesthetic depth. The variety of traits of these works, even if they are what they are cohere as they may, could have also not cohered at all; components and structures in these works could be taken to be no less recalcitrant as in most others that hardly fuse choreography, their temporal order, spectacle, theme, mood, message without residue in their finally transfigured 'presence'. No, all art is far far away from any kind of empty tautology; though even in case of a tautology one could show that the external notation in which it is expressed could be more than one.

Before I end, I would very briefly consider Dufrenne's critique of aesthetic-experience (Part IV, pp. 446-556) which is purely discursive. Here, he states what should be the status of aesthetics, analysis of classification of affective-apriori of the sensuous and throws some suggestions for its satisfactory conceptualization derived from inter-subjectivity or intellegible dialectic of art-

communication—leading eventually to a sort of ontology of Art, Meaning. However, I must hasten to protest, first, against Dufrenne's some what incoherent use of terms that provides some gratuitous base for his sort of ontology. If a sense can be given and it does not belong to material-world, it is taken to be 'real'! 'meaning' in 'aesthetic-world' (?) even if quite incompatible with familiar objects. Yet, Dufrenne's claims truth to 'aesthetic-experience'. In fact this may be good Kantian transcendentalism or phenolmenology but not quite in agreement, of course with our ordinary beliefs about persons and things. Since, there is no objective reality; as well all are posits of alternatively many human-intentions, so none is any less real either argues Phe. Not art—but nature itself could also be taken to be imitating art. This art is expression, this expression is present to this subject before taken from the real. Expression is the truth which is given before the real. In sum expression is the world as Meaning—a world which is given before the objects in it (Phe. p. 531 ff) and rushes Dufrenne on his idealist charger as he writes with metaphysical abandon '... there are as many worlds as there are aesthetic objects and in any case as many as there are artists. The affective-apriori reveals and constitutes these worlds is a *singular-apriori* (underlining mine) which the affective category subsumes only imperfectly.'

But, if the worlds of arts are thus relativised, pray, how do we expect to be in communion with any work of art at all? With all our differentiated training and taste what we would be as true meaning, as that of another virtuoso, how even the creator's own perception or even his intention could arbitrate or clinch such an issue? Even if it is a necessary condition of creator's own work it is not a sufficient condition for the expression that the work is for me; for-itself is for me and through me. Is not so? Dufrenne's singular apriori unless some profundities are added is a bald contradiction in terms. Howsoever, our subjective response in art is a fact, or can be justified, (and this can be done without metaphysical twaddle about Kant and Hegel see Phe. P. 532 and ff). Dufrenne fails to satisfy how his phenomenology has made a new break-through about '... a meaning of the real that art expresses' for all he says just after this is meaning is true because it is affective dimension through which the real may appear

and not the reality of the real which a physical formula could capture' ( Phe. p. 516 and ff p ). This shows that despite grave metaphysical stances ( this whole section ) discursive phenomenology only reiterates some old platitudes of German Dialectical philosophies. A trifle out of date for modern readers.

By massive equivocation alone Dufrenne feels that apriori categories are consubstantial with singular acts of persons, mathematical concepts are conventions or 'snow is white' is felt true as absent, so an aspect of the perceived as 'snow is white' ( Phe. pp. 450-73 ).

No, Mr. Dufrenne if the phenomenology wishes to educate us and desires to rise beyond an exhortatory metaphysics it should not mix its metaphysical categories as it does, here, it takes a step backwards in the direction of philosophies of 'some-how' we have long learnt to ignore. What logic forbids, even expression cannot revamp. Some clear use of key concepts, here, I have tried with deepest humility, to offer to the author of this massive treatise on Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, I hope, he reacts.

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## PHILOSOPHY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING\*

Some philosophers have attempted to bring scientific respectability to philosophy. Though philosophical truths—granted that there are such truths—have not been assimilated to scientific truths, they have been put on the same pedestal. Both varieties of truths are items of universal exhibition. This sort of thinking has sometimes led to the spectators of the philosophical dramatics to talk about the possibility of evolving a world-philosophy, the sort of philosophy which does not suffer from regional influences. Even if philosophy lacks scientific respectability at present, we should not worry about it. Philosophy has a bright future in store. The future philosophers will enjoy the taste of the *same* philosophical truths equally with chopsticks as with forks and fingers. In this discussion I have attempted to argue against this sort of thinking, this sort of optimism about philosophy. I have been persuaded by the force of evidence to believe that philosophy is one of the manifestations of human intellect which is not only originated in an environmental setting, but is also doomed to be restricted to that setting. I am not very sure whether sciences are also so restricted. To destroy the regional colour of philosophy, I believe, is to destroy the flavour of philosophy. And one should not expect that philosophy would survive once its flavour is gone.

For clarification of the issue in question I would like to consider the views of Professor S. S. Barlingay. He shares the ideology of those philosophers who do not hesitate in eulogizing philosophy and putting it on par with sciences, assuming that sciences have already climbed the highest mountain of knowledge. To propagate his ideology Barlingay has recently come to a decision that he should give up the use of the awkward expression ‘Indian philosophy’ for the sort of philosophy being done in

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\*I have picked up this discussion from my larger paper “Quest for Knowledge and Academic Establishment”, read in a seminar organized by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, in the month of September, 1976.

this part of the world. He has evolved a new expression 'philosophy of Indian origin' which, according to him, is neutral with respect to the character of our philosophical heritage. For the benefit of the prospective contributors Barlingay has inserted a note on the back of the cover page of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly which is both edited and published by him :

" Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of philosophy, History of philosophy and philosophy of Indian origin."

So far as Barlingay's ideology is concerned one may find some incoherence in this note. For Barlaingay uses the expression "all areas of philosophy" in such a fasion that it excludes not only the expression 'History of Philosophy' but also the expression 'philosophy of Indian origin'. One would also get the impression that the philosophy of Indian origin has been given a secondary place in the Quarterly. How could this Quarterly claim to be Indian, inspite of the fact that it is edited by an Indian, and depends for its financial backing on India ? However, giving a secondary place to one's heritage—whatever be the strength of that heritage—exhibits the strength of Barlingays convictions. If one clings to the narrow principles of regionalism one would forget about the general health of philosophy. On this count Barlingay has certainly won his point. If the Western journals of philosophy suffer from regionalism, this is no reason why we should also acquire this disease.

What is important for consideration is the assumption which guides Barlingay's mode of thinking. No harm is done to the objective and universal character of a philosophical system simply by pointing out that it germinated in the Indian soil. Newton was a British and Einstein a German. But it would be quite misleading to describe Newtonian physics as 'British physics' or Einsteinian physics as 'German physics'. There are Germans and there are British, and both these varieties of persons are given citizenship rights of their countries. But 'physics' is not the sort of object to which a citizenship right is given. Similarly, according to Barlingay, Hume was a British and Sankara an Indian. But this is no reason why we should describe Humean philosophy as 'British philosophy' or Vedānta as 'Indian philo-

sophy'. To employ such descriptions would give wrong notions about the nature of philosophical systems and philosophical problems, as if they have local significance. No passport or visa restrictions can be imposed on the systems of philosophy as they can be imposed on the movement of philosophers from one country to the other. If no citizenship rights can be given then no visa formality has to be fulfilled. The fact that a philosophical system takes its birth in a certain country does not imply that it has to be restricted to the limits of that country. Birth places are not necessarily the places for mobile objects to settle down.

Would it be a right characterization of philosophy to say that philosophical systems are not restricted to the regions of their origin? I am not referring to the fact that the Soviet Union or China would not give visa to the philosophical system that supports the capitalist society, and the capitalist countries try to smuggle their philosophical literature into the communist countries in the same fashion in which the allurement of any easy life in the Western countries impel the Asians to smuggle themselves into these countries. I am simply referring to the fact that a system of philosophy, like a variety of wheat or creeper, requires certain sort of environmental condition for its birth and survival.

What makes a British philosopher so much devoted to the problem of perception? What makes him so much worried about the problem of perceiving tables, chairs, coins and tomatoes? What leads him to make the distinction between 'sense-data' and 'material objects'? Is there any understandable reason why he should distinguish 'the bulge of a tomato' from the 'tomato itself'? The answer is very simple. The dark-foggy environment of Britain the inability to perceive things clearly, leads a British mind to think more about the philosophical problems of perception. The general environment of Britain poses a real challenge to its inhabitants. The darkness and fog envelope a material object, say, a tomato, in such a fashion that it appears as a patch, a coloured patch, bulging out towards your eyes. It is only when one comes closer to a tomato, touches it, and performs all those activities which the British philosophers describe as 'verification activities', that a tomato is ultimately perceived.

I.P.Q. .9

The anxiety about the perception of even such an insignificant item as a tomato has become so excessive in Britain that some British philosophers have come out with the declaration that there is no end to the process of verification, that whatever we do, our eyes and hands can never catch the *real* tomato. Thus in their project to catch a tomato, the tomato has slipped out of their hands, in a slightly different fashion than that in which their empire has slipped out of their hands. What remains in the hands of a British philosopher is just the bulging shape of a tomato, nothing but a patch of colour, without any juice or pulp in it. There is no surprise that these bulging patches of colour become independent sorts of things and obtain a technical name 'sense-data'. Once sense-data become a part of *reality*—whatever sort of reality it is—all kinds of philosophical problems find their way. The loss of empire has already introduced sufficient worries for the British, and now they have added worries—philosophical worries arising out of the loss of material objects.

How can one understand, relish or be stimulated by the problems of British philosophy without living (at least for sometime in one's life) in the dark-foggy atmosphere of Britain? How can these problems be exported to those countries where there is light and sunshine, where the environment of darkness and fog is missing? Even the philosophically developed neighbours of Britain, Germany and France, failed to be impressed by the British philosophical systems. Britain can smuggle its philosophical literature into another country but not its environmental setting. The British are quite aware of this fact, and therefore they try to get people acquainted with the environmental setting of Britain.

The British fog and cold is responsible not only for the philosophical problems of Britain but also for the growth of her imperial power—the search for territories having sunshine and heat. The recent introduction of the central heating system in Britain is not a bad compensation for the loss of British empire. But the fog in Britain continues to persist, therefore, the philosophical problem of perception also continues to persist. Of course, recently some other philosophical problems have also attracted the attention of British philosophers. The conditions of illumination and visibility of things in Britain have made considerable advancement over the past.

Why were Pyramids constructed in the deserts of Egypt ? Why were they not constructed in India, when a civilization of the same sort prospered in these countries ? Would a piece of forest attract your attention if it is planted in a piece of land adjoining a never-ending forest ? Could a Pyramid become an item of wonder if it is planted in the land of Himalayas ? Could a foothill catch your attention if your eyes are busy with the never-ending Himalayas ? Further, where, in what sort of lands, would a person like to hoard treasures ? Certainly not in a treasure-land. What reason is there that the Indians did not preserve the bodies of their dead in the fashion in which they were preserved in the Ancient Egypt ? Why have the archaeologists failed in unearthing a mummy from the soil of India ? Perhaps it is an ancient Indian belief that what is immortal is not the body but the soul, the destruction of the body does not necessarily lead to the destruction of one's inner self. On the other hand it seems that the bodily concept of immortality is an ancient Egyptian concept. An Egyptian mummy exhibits not only the artistic achievement of a people but also a highly developed technique for preserving the body of a person for the Day of Judgement.

What has led Indian philosophers to their other-worldly metaphysics ? Why have they lost love for the physical body or the worldly treasures ? In India there is no problem about the visibility of material objects. Rather the bright sunshine along with the excessively hot climate makes an Indian disinterested in the problems of 'external perception', the problem of perceiving tables, chairs, coins and tomatoes. The environmental conditions force an Indian to withdraw himself from the existence of the outside world. He closes his eyes to what is going on around his body, and as a result becomes interested in getting a glimpse of his 'inner self'. The construction of an 'invisible self', the invention of the problem of 'internal perception' and 'yoga' etc., are the outcome of the excessive heat and sunshine. The uneasy, restless, physical bodies are rejected as parts of the *real self*. Hot winds, storms, floods and the outbreak of tropical diseases can torture only one's physical body, but not the real self. The real self is pure happiness and bliss, and therefore, one should not grumble about the suffering of his physical body. Even those who reject the existence of an inner self—the real self—as Buddha

did, have not denied the fact of bodily suffereing. The liberation from bodily suffering is the major concern of Indian philosophy. The bodily suffering caused by the environemtal conditions of India have not escaped the notice of philosophers.

The fog of Britain does not allow one person to see another person (the genesis of the problem of 'other minds'), and each person lives his independent solipsistic life. But for an Indian there is no such thing as the problem of other minds, for all minds are in reality one and the same mind. Social discordance created by caste-hierarchy etc., has been resolved in a simple fashion. Though one person remains beyond the touch of another person in this world, these persons become one and the same person as soon as they give up their physical bodies. It is only the physical body that suffers or makes a person un-touchable or touchable. What an Indian fails to achieve at the physical level, he succeeds in achieving at the higher level. Social unity,like happiness and well-being of a person, cannot be achieved in this world, therefore, it is an item to be taken care of in the other world.

An Indian philosopher clearly gives vent to his colour-consciousness when he provides a *sāttvika* body to his inner self. *Sāttvika* is associated with white colour and *tāmas* with black colour. So it does not matter that an Indian is a coloured person *physically*, for he happens to be a white person in *reality*. An Indian succeeds in discarding the natural colour of his skin and succeeds in obtaining the colour of his own choice in a slightly different fashion than that in which he obtains a social unity with his fellow beings. It is not the chemical but the metaphysical recipe that has been utilised for the purpose of changing one's colour or one's caste.

Though Pragmatism had a chance birth in Britain, it failed to survive in the cold climate of that country. It is only when Pragmatism was transplanted in the business community of America that it survived. And it is only the superior Aryan race of Germany and the tall bony structures of its people that can give birth to an abstract structural philosophy. One may feel dizzy in climbing the height of a German philosophical system. When one refers to German philosophical systems one is reminded of

Gothic structures. And neither the British philosophies of perception nor the German Gothic structures could influence the sublime, sensuous people of France. In spite of the racial minglings, the philosophical achievement of a region remains independent of the other region. For, though there is mingling of races but not the mingling of environmental settings.

How different, how much regionalised, are the pictures of philosophers and their philosophies ? Even the recent adventure of the British philosophers into the ordinary language analysis, besides their concern with perception, has a local base. The ordinary language for British philosophers is identical with English language. In analysing ordinary language he is analysing a language for which one requires Oxford and Cambridge dictionaries. It is no surprise that Austin used to carry English dictionaries in his discussion classes. Though they have lost the empire, the British have to remind the English speaking people of the world that they have not yet lost their control over English language.

Is Barlingay, or any philosopher who shares his views, right in wishing to have scientific respectability for philosophical pursuits ? Science is science and philosophy is philosophy, the twins shall never meet, for the simple reason that they are not twins. The aim of philosophical pursuit is not scientific but philosophical perfection, a perfection which has all sorts of regional and local imperfections. And could one say without any hesitation that sciences are free from regional and local imperfections ? According to professor K. J. Shah even sciences have failed to remove their regional and local colours, and it makes quite good sense to talk about 'German physics' and to distinguish it from 'British physics' or 'Russian physics'. But Shah has yet to formulate his position in clear and precise terms. If Shah is right then the whole issue of the relation between philosophy and science would have to be considered in a different fashion. I wish Shah is wrong and the popular notion about science is right.

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## MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN MODERN SCIENCE

“The mind is perhaps the deepest mystery, the most profound paradox of all existence. It may truly be that ‘Darker than any Mystery’, to use the words of Lao-Tzu”,<sup>1</sup> observes Keith Floyd. The main difficulty in the study of mind lies in the fact that we have no direct access to the mind of our own or even to those of others. We infer facts about mind on the basis of behaviour of the animal. Reflexes, instincts etc. are accounted for by the explanation of ‘random variables’ which cause the differences of behaviour. Generally the nature of behaviour is associated with the nature of the nervous system but there is no linear relation between them. The capacity to modify behaviour in the face of new situations is known as ‘intelligence’.

The capacity to learn by experience varies considerably among animals. No animal is, however, altogether incapable of learning. The theory that mind has steadily evolved is not confirmed by observed facts. Sudden jumps have occurred and new elements appeared.

A planarian worm can learn to find its way through a simple maze. It appears to show anxiety, conflict, protest etc. during the training. There is evidence that even the amoeba shows symptoms of rudimentary mind, as it pursues animals of its own size and avoids dangers by moving away. Single-celled animals too, have been conditioned after hundreds of trials and it has been concluded that neither a brain nor a nervous system is necessary for such learning. Perhaps life and mind are associated in all forms of life, even in the simplest protozoa. The possibility is supported by the evidence in embryology because long before a brain develops, the development of the embryo follows an intelligent plan. F. L. Kunz says, “—— it is becoming clear that some form of consciousness accompanies all organic life, even the most primitive slime, and there is an accumulating body of evidence which points to its presence even below the threshold of life.”<sup>2</sup>

The materialist philosophy explained man’s thoughts as consisting of motions of little billiard balls in his head. But the transition from balls to thoughts is too abrupt. The theory of Emergent Evolution states that at various stages of material complexity radically new properties emerge. Accordingly both life

and mind are emergent properties of material aggregates but both have different properties from those of their constituents. This theory even though not illogical suffers from the defect that it cannot be proved. Thus it cannot be a working hypothesis; at best it may be regarded as a mere possibility.

There are insurmountable difficulties in passing from the physical to the chemical, from the chemical to the living and from the living to the mental phenomena. A completely unified science to cover all varieties of phenomena is on the basis of Goedel's incompleteness theorem impossible. "We shall never reach a set of concepts in terms of which all phenomena can be described,"<sup>3</sup> observes Sullivan. If the molecule or atom which constitutes the life cell be endowed with additional properties to explain 'life' or 'mind', it will undergo a real change. Perhaps it may be necessary to include among the additional properties something like free-will or a rudimentary form of consciousness. This method maintains the principle of continuity which finds strong favour with scientists and yet introduces dualism in the properties of matter since consciousness is entirely different from the other fundamental properties.

Thus it is seen that there is no clear demarcation between the conscious and the non-conscious. Further, the connection between physical structure and mental characteristics is still hypothetical. The theory of biological evolution gives no clue to the development of the mind. Psychology also offers little help in the matter. Behaviourism gets rid of mind or consciousness by stressing that what we call mental processes are in fact bodily movements. We do not perceive nor we think, instead we just adjust our eyeballs or make incipient speech movements.

Yet one is directly aware of sensations, images, reasoning etc. within oneself and there is no reason to doubt that they happen in other people as well. According to behaviourism these sensations etc. are identical with bodily movements. Many authorities, including Dr. C. D. Broad, view this as impossible on the ground that if both were identical then it were reasonable to say that a molecular movement is also an awareness.

Skinner transformed behaviourism into a system of concepts and explanations which has become virtually the null-hypothesis

of modern psychology. A lot of laboratory work has been done under the Skinnerian Paradigm which tends to validate its assumptions. This is a proper paradigm in the sense originally stated by Thomas Kuhn, "for not only does it pretend to have the ability to generate explanations for all instances of human behaviour, but it also explicitly establishes the legitimate targets for scientific inquiry and sets the preferred methodological scheme for research."<sup>4</sup> (J. W. Sutherland). The presumptions of the paradigm accord substantially with those of Darwinian biology and the positivist—empiricist preferences of modern science in general. Yet the system as a whole is largely hypothetical rather than axiomatic.

Modern science concerns itself almost exclusively with such phenomena as are empirical, reducible through surrogation to quantitative or precise qualitative terms and which can be handled within controlled laboratory environment. Under behaviourism humans must behave deterministically, a condition which quantum mechanics has already removed from its inanimate subjects. According to Sutherland, "the Central (and limiting) assumption of behaviourist psychology is this : given a sufficient knowledge of the genetic and environmental predicates associated with a particular individual, that individual's reactions to given stimuli may be predicted with essential accuracy."<sup>5</sup> However, since the behaviourist theory is not able to deliver the deterministic models of behaviour despite its operant conditioning, the operational limits are reached long before the logical conclusion.

The study of human behaviour can best be made by considering it under three categories : the deductive, inductive and sense-driven modalities. The sense-driven behaviours give us the Freudian reflexive man (*homo sentient*). The inductive-driven give the Skinner's deterministic man, and the deductive-driven give the potentially autonomous man. Philosophers of science have found evidence to show that many of the greatest scientific "discoveries owe their origin not to the Baconist dictate that we let observed facts speak for themselves or the inductive engine which translates specifics into generalisations, but to largely deductive data and experience independent engines such as metaphysics, theosophism or neo-platonic devices."<sup>6</sup>

Like a computer system the brain functions towards the storage, transfer and operation of data and performs those tasks which can be reduced to the point where successive addition and subtraction or Boolean logic exhaust the process requirements. However, the human mind also tends to emphasize the manipulation of gestalten where as the computer must reduce each problem to the lowest order units like bit-strings and 'ands', 'ors' etc. The basic building blocks of the memory in the brain tend to be complex gestalten, scene-like patterns. The nature of the gestalten, however, as also the nature of the process in which we manipulate them remains vague as yet.

Behaviourism has been able to draw attention to mechanical aspects of 'mental' activities. It reduced mental processes to conditioned reflexes. Pavlov's experiments about conditioned reflexes though conducted on dogs throw light on fundamental processes in other animals also, including human beings. He tried a variety of stimuli, noises, colours, touches, electric shocks etc. The results obtained by Pavlov were of particular interest since they were based on a sound scientific method. Later on experiments were carried out by others to show that conditioned reflexes can be established in children as in the case of Pavlov's dogs. According to Sullivan, "—it seems very rash to describe the mind as wholly built up of conditioned reflexes. Yet this is what some Behaviourists do. They regard the human mind as almost infinitely plastic, so that, by proper conditioning and environment, a baby can be turned into any kind of man."

Psycho-analysis assumes the existence of the 'unconscious' where mental processes actively go on of which we are quite unaware though they can be brought into consciousness by a voluntary effort or by special techniques of psychoanalysis etc.. Mental effects may leave traces in the brain which may give rise to memories. This sort of hypnotism was used by Freud in the investigation of the unconscious which is populated largely by painful memories and repressed wishes. They struggle to emerge into consciousness. Symptoms like dreams appear due to struggle of the memories or wishes against the repressing force. Freud laid great stress on repressed sexual desires and gave dreams a sexual significance. However, in view of the fact that there are too many variables in the interpretation of a dream, it is difficult to give or accept any

precise or convincing interpretation. Jung denied that the unconscious is a region populated by desires which have been repressed after conflict; it is according to him, a consequence of the individual's one-sided mental growth. Adler ignored the unconscious and the notion of repression. Likewise there were many breakaways from Freud, each giving a different form to psychoanalysis. As a science therefore psychoanalysis failed to take a satisfactory stand. So is the case with the Gestalt theory. "These concepts are too vague and indefinite to be called scientific,"<sup>8</sup> says Sullivan, No theory or paradigm of itself can cover the range of phenomena properly falling under the purview of psychology. In fact there is as such, no generally acceptable system of psychological doctrines.

Mind and matter together are being studied at present employing the technique of biofeed-back using electronic gadgets to measure and amplify the minutest physiological changes. The study confirms that the mind with training, is capable of controlling the body. This fact was already known to Indian Yogis and meditators for thousands of years. It shows that in the 'alpha' state of consciousness or in the state of deep meditation the mind can 'will' changes in blood pressure, heartbeat, brainrythms or even stop the activity of a single cell in the spinal cord. To study this phenomenon one needs precise information on what goes on in one's brain at the time it occurs. Biofeedback simply extends the normal ways of learning by measuring the minute changes in physical functions which remain hidden from consciousness, by displaying and evaluating the same to tell the learner or self-experimenter whether he is improving or not. Rewards are used, in the form of rapid signals such as a flash of light or beep, to shape behaviour as in B. F. Skinner's operant conditioning. According to the traditional view, the automatic nervous system is rather too stupid to learn by such a method.

Brain waves in the alpha range—eight to thirteen Hertz per second—represent the idling between the states of high mental activity and sleep—calm, alert, serene, relaxed, open to pleasant experiences. It is receptive and occurs spontaneously without violence. Those people who are introspective and intuitive produce a large quantity of alpha. It may be a language problem to give a satisfactory verbal description of the variety of experiences in the alpha state since there are only a few words in English for the varying states of mind whereas in Sanskrit there are perhaps twenty.

The field-of-mind theory views the body, mind and spirit as structural expressions of one basic energy. This theory is quite similar to Sri Aurobindo's concept which suggests that physical matter is the densest form of spirit, or spirit is the most rarefied form of matter. The idea of self regulation or voluntary control of involuntary physiological processes was developed in recent times by a German physician Johanness Schultz in 1910 and by biofeedback techniques in the 1960's. The yogis explain this by saying, "all of the body is in the mind, but not all of the mind is in the body". Accordingly the mind is a field—a real energy structure—of which the body, including the brain, is merely the densest segment. This is a concept similar to the field theory of science. "All physiological and parapsychological data are subsumed under one field-of-mind idea (name proposed by R. Alexander in Creative Relation). It encompasses the 'normal' physical, biological, and psychological facts of science, and also provides a matter-and-consciousness substrate for mystical, spiritual, and altered states of consciousness phenomena,"<sup>9</sup> observe Greens.

The basic idea is that like a gravitational or electro-magnetic field, a field of mind surrounds a body. All such fields are in fact said to exist as subsidiary part of a general planetary field of mind, an energy domain having a multidimensional continuum of physical, mental and spiritual substance, as in Sri Aurobindo's matter-spirit concept. Each subsidiary field associates specific existential states, states of consciousness. Perception of these states comprises the basic data of all knowledge.

The human being is represented as a composite of many kinds of force, mostly at a level of unconsciousness. Man lives mostly unaware of his unconscious but his awareness can be extended into it by the methods of 'self-realisation', yogic practices etc. It is possible to conceptualise volition as the extension of energy from a higher existential level consciously into activities of a lower level i.e. from superconscious to conscious, to conscious/subconscious, or from transpersonal (which has four levels including intuition) to personal (which is mental, emotional, etheric physical and dense physical in the descending order.) Each level serves as a metaforce source for the level immediately below and the sequence of volitional metaforces can coordinate the entire life pattern

viz. physical, emotional, mental, and transpersonal (moral) and can express 'purpose'. "Mind and matter require an energy link, and common substrate, if the Stanford demonstrations with Uri Geller and similar phenomenon observed in our laboratory with Swami Rama, are to 'fit' into a theory,"<sup>10</sup> indicate Greens.

Parapsychology does not fit into an ordinary space-time theory; psychokinesis implies the existence of a many dimensional universe where volition directly handles energies. Biofeedback and parapsychological data together are stimulating the study of the mindbody problem and hopefully,<sup>11</sup> 'humans are close to a breakthrough in consciousness'. The ESP is not limited by the speed of light (hence beyond space-time), for consciousness has nowhere to go as it is everywhere. Precognition would seem natural once one recognises the absence of the concept of time in the unconscious since distance/duration are exclusive properties of the space-time frame. It is now being realised that it is not the brain which produces consciousness but on the contrary, consciousness creates the appearance of the brain and of the physical universe.

The Buddhists have been all along trying to tell us that the infinite unconscious, named Nirvāna, and the activity of the conscious mind, named Samsāra, are one and the same. When brainwaves slow down to perceptible flicker, one perceives clearly the off phase and the on phase—Nirvāna and Samsāra; each creates the other and is the same. In the ordinary consciousness or beta stage one fails to see that the environment is everything that is including oneself. Only in the 'high' moments different states of consciousness, from alpha to theta to delta, one sees through the screen of darkness, undergoes the successive experiences of slowness of time and motion to stillness; the conscious mind plunges into the infinite unconscious, out of time and beyond the relative world altogether (if time does not exist, space and matter become tenous or imaginary concepts indeed), catches a glimpse into his self-Nature, erases his mistaken identity and feels one with the all-pervading (Tat Twam Asi = you are that, as the Vedas indicate).

Keith Floyd remarks, "It is encouraging to note that the idea of the Oneness and Allness of one and all, once thought the drink

of wild-eyed mystics, is fast becoming the meat of clear-eyed modern physicists."<sup>12</sup> Schroedinger, for instance, apart from pleading for new organising principles for biology which should go beyond the laws of physics and chemistry, discussed the following three questions regarding life and mind : (1) Where or how does mind act on matter ? (2) What determines the qualities of our sensations ? and (3) What events in space and time correspond to consciousness ?

Regarding the first question, Schroedinger says that there is no place in the nervous system or elsewhere in the body where mind acts on the matter. His assertion that 'mind per se cannot move a finger of a hand '<sup>13</sup> does not agree with the findings of the recent biofeedback theory. He concludes that either mind is matter or by its very meaning it cannot act on matter. As regards the second question he said that no matter how far we go in scientific investigation, we see no way in which the stimuli of perception can have special action on the mind apart from the biological action. In view of the foregoing, the third question becomes acute. Schroedinger observed that consciousness is not associated with a kind of matter but with a kind of occurrence—specifically the occurrence of 'novelty' in a biological system. He said, "consciousness is associated with the *learning* of the living substance; its *knowing how* (Koennen) is unconscious ".<sup>14</sup> Consciousness began to appear in the course of evolution when the process of biological adaptation began. Greater the complexity of the novel situation to which an animal can adapt, the greater consciousness is ascribed to it. Consciousness is thinking new thoughts, the completely habitual has no correlation with consciousness at all.

William T. Scott feels that "The motive underlying all the diversity of Schroedinger's work is the search for an answer to the question of Plotinus : 'And we, who are we, anyway?'"<sup>15</sup> This question has direct bearing on life, mind and consciousness. The theory of relativity had established that time is relative to the frame of reference. According to Boltzmann and Gibbs the direction of time might be derived from the behaviour of aggregates of particles following laws of chance. The arrow of time has no fixed, absolute direction. Schroedinger attributed greater absoluteness to mind as he said, "—physical theory in its present stage strongly suggests the indestructibility of Mind by Time."<sup>16</sup>

The world is held in common, is a common constituent (not object) of perception; it is located *in* the mind, on which the action of the world is carried out. The world and the mind 'consist of the same blocks, as it were, only arranged in a different order—sense perceptions, memory, imagination, thought.'<sup>17</sup> But focussing attention on both simultaneously is really difficult. If consciousness is the most fundamental entity, then one can say that all life, mind matter are made up of overlapping parts of consciousness.

New Delhi.

S. P. Gupta

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## WITTGENSTEIN, MEANING-MODEL AND BUDDHISM

Wittgenstein in his 'Philosophical Investigations' speaks thus : "And the best I can propose is I suppose that we yield to the temptation to use this picture; but now investigate how the application of this picture goes."<sup>1</sup> In this way Wittgenstein talks of 'models' to take the 'ontological sting' out of many concepts which might otherwise be dismissed for absence of correspondence with facts, consistency, etc. The notion 'model', if taken in this sense, I believe, will do good to the concepts of 'causality' in Buddhism. In this paper I shall re-examine the contemporary empirico-buddhistic interpretation of the concept of 'causality' in Buddhism in the light of Wittgenstein's above passage.

### 1. The concept of 'causality' :

1.1. The concept of 'causality' is not an easy one to understand as it takes different meanings in different contexts. Wittgenstein once remarked that a word can take very-different uses<sup>2</sup> and, hence one has to be careful in one's uses of words in one's argumentations. The concept of 'causality' in Buddhism does not pose a philosophical problem; but if it be isolated from the context to which it naturally belongs, in which it should be used, in which alone it has meaning, will give rise to puzzlement and confusion which in turn gives rise to a pseudo-problem. The attempt of some contemporary buddhist thinkers towards understanding the concept of 'causality' outside its natural context leads us to a confusion which results in simply uttering words without meaning. This trend can be avoided if the notion of 'model' as envisaged by Wittgenstein be incorporated as it successfully prevents a pseudo-problem on the one hand and any sort of ontological commitment from slipping into the argumentation, on the other. My attempt in this paper is to elicit this point.

1.2. In the philosophical tradition of Graeco-Roman classical thinking, orientation and emphasis were knowledge and wisdom. The latter concept had something to do with a sort of ethical virtue; yet after David Hume, it took a new turn. Needless to say that the stress is simply philosophical analysis. Alternatively, ethics, morality and religion were either discouraged or

avoided. The seeds of this trend came to its fruition in Early-Wittgensteinian philosophy. The method envisaged here is as follows : to say nothing except what can be said. All meaningful statements must conform to a model. Ironically, though, the model is but the scientific one. To put the point yet more explicitly, the philosophers who conform to this model, namely, Logical positivists, aimed to vindicate science and mathematics on the one hand and to discredit metaphysics on the other. The scientific model embedded in "factual content" is accepted as the only criterion of meaning. This is a very narrow conception of meaning, needless to add. However, it occupied a significant place in the recent philosophy in the English speaking world.

## 2. Positivism and the meaning-model :

2.1. Two buddhist thinkers, K. N. Jayatilleke and D. J. Kalupahana have tried to interpret Early Buddhism, taking refuge in the above conception of meaning. This contention is amply justified if one cares to go through Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,<sup>3</sup> and Kalupahana's "Causality : The Central Philosophy of Bhuddhism".<sup>4</sup> The thought process in both these books develops in and through the most significant concept in Logical positivism, namely, "The meaning of a factual statement is the method of its verification."<sup>5</sup> This standpoint is amply substantiated by the following. For instance, Jayatilleke contends, "For the Positivist, a statement to have meaning must be in principle verifiable but verification for him is solely in respect of sense-experience, whereas the Pali Nikāyas would admit extra-sensory experience as well."<sup>6</sup> D. J. Kalupahana expresses, "Following a method comparable to that adopted by the modern Logical Positivists, he sometimes resorted to linguistic analysis and appeal to experience to demonstrate the futility of metaphysics."<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the oft-quoted empiricism in the theses of these said thinkers too substantiates their indebtedness to the positivistic meaning-model, in general. Indeed, it is difficult to present Logical positivism as a tidy philosophical position as the positivists themselves modified their ideas to meet criticism. The basic aim of the mathematico-philosophers of the Vienna Circle (subsequently known as Logical positivists) was to vindicate science and mathematics on the one hand and to demolish metaphysics on the other. It was, hence, necessary to devise a means

or introduce a method of doing this. They found it in Humean atomic empiricism which Early-Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus. Humean atomic empiricism can be expressed thus : " Meaningful statements are of two kinds. Those of logic and mathematics which are analytic and certain, and statements of fact based on empirical investigation which are synthetic and probable; statements of any other kind are literally meaningless." The above ideas were developed into a broader theory in which scientific probability was heavily involved. But Jayatilleke and Kalupahana seemed to have taken asylum in this science-oriented model to give a modern interpretation to Buddhism. Do they give a convincing one ?

### 3. Causality and its nature :

3.1 The central concept that any buddhist thinker would quote in this connection is that of ' causality '. But what is the nature of the concept of ' causality ' in Buddhism ? Samyutta Nikāya notes the concept of ' causality ' in the following way : " Imasmim sati idam hoti, immassa uppādā idam uppajati; Imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati."<sup>8</sup> (The meaning of this passage is as follows : " When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises : When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases too." ) The Pali term *paticcasamuppāda* denotes the causality expressed above. ' *Paticca*' means " having come on account of," and ' *samuppāda*' means " arising. "

3.2 However, the above expressions do not reveal the logical nature of the concept. The most noteworthy expression which helps to detect the logical nature of the buddhist concept of causality can be found in the Samyutta Nikāya. It says, " causation is said to have the characteristics of objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality."<sup>9</sup> This statement expresses a kind of universal truth which is valid ethicalwise, independently of the advent of the Buddhas. However, there is a point of interest here which perhaps gives a clue to understanding the very logical nature of the concept of ' causality ' which is basically neglected by the contemporary interpreters of Early Buddhism; and that is that the concept is expressed in the wider context of an atheistic ethics rather than in a kind of empiricism which has considered Physics as a model

for philosophical inquiry. The strict causal basis emphasized in the doctrine testifies to it. But the basis is embedded in ethical determinism. This conclusion is resented by empirico-buddhistic thinkers. They argue against any ethical determinism being implied here. Yet I believe that this is a crucial point which shall help to grasp the nature of Buddhism.

#### 4. The nature of Buddhism :

4.1 Often we find arguments developed on the wider basis that Buddhism is a philosophy rather than a doctrine/religion. Needless to say that this contention is not borne out by scriptural passages in the Pali canon or any other source like Chinese Āgamas. The Buddha clearly testifies to the effect that “.... I am one of those who profess the basis of a religion....”<sup>10</sup> Now it is obvious that the Buddha claims himself as a religious teacher one amongst many. It is tempting at this point to raise the following question, namely, “Is Buddhism a religion ?” Indeed, just like most words, the word ‘religion’ is not that clear-cut. Alternatively, it stands defined in many ways depending on the contexts, tastes, etc. It is generally held that Buddhism, often a “view” of life (*darśana*) and a “way” of life (*patipadā*). Therefore, the Buddha’s doctrine is held to be a *philosophy of life* which leads to liberation or moksha. Yet this is not the only interpretation possible. For instance, the word “doctrine” in the English version of the Nikāyas is derived from the Latin “docere” meaning “to teach.” But what does the Buddha teach ? He teaches a doctrine developed on a value system which prescribes a procedural guide on an ethical code.<sup>11</sup>

4.2 Very broadly speaking, though we may use the word “true” when dealing with an ethical system, ethical statements are neither true nor false. What I mean here is that the very logical nature of ethical statements is but value-orientation; hence criteria of truth or falsity and tools of validity measurements as accepted in the broad spectrum of physical sciences are inappropriate.<sup>12</sup> We need not borrow a model from Physics for philosophical inquiry. Alternatively, we need not borrow a model from contemporary Logical positivism to suggest significant (meaningful) statements in Buddhism. The point I labour to make, I hope, is clear now. That is : The word “true” in certain

ethical statements does not emphasize a literal meaning but only a figurative one. This tendency is amply evident in the buddhistic ethical system. If one cares to examine the concept of "Āriya Sacca" ("Noble Truths"), the above tendency is revealed. For instance, can one entertain the idea to the effect of a possible falsity of the Āriya Sacca (Noble Truths)? In the buddhistic context, a possible falsity of Noble Truths cannot be entertained, logically, as empirical falsity is inappropriate. It is noteworthy that Buddhism, by nature, is an ethico-religious system in which falsity of its statements is not entertained. Such questions make no sense in the system.

### 5. Science and causality :

5.1 Since the nature of Buddhism is clear, now, we shall attempt to analyse one of the major concepts—that of 'causality'. Ironically, though, the concept of 'causality' has become, nowadays, the battle-ground of the so-called empirico-buddhistic academics; for it is a fashion to interpret Buddhism on a scientific line incorporating scientific methodologies. In this connection, a statement by Ninian Smart seems very well appropose. He says, "... the power of the Canon (meaning : Pali canon) is that it can still be modern"<sup>13</sup>. It's a weakness on the part of Ninian Smart to allow a word to remain unanalysed, as if it is context-free. To put the point in other words, the word 'modern' in the statement can mean anything or nothing at all. Buddhism, essentially, is the doctrine established, preached and taught by the Buddha. It has its own natural context; and any attempt to use words in this religious system out of the natural context that is their natural home, can lead to emptiness alone.

5.2 Suppose we accept Ninian Smart's assertion to the effect that Buddhism can be given a 'modern' ('mod'?) interpretation. And in this connection, the concept of 'causality' is, certainly, unavoidable. A 'modern' interpretation, I believe, cannot escape, a scientific colouring. K. N. Jayatilleke and D. J. Kalupahana are noteworthy academics who have tried to interpret Buddhism on this line. Referring to the concept of 'causality' as depicted in the Samyutta Nikāya,<sup>14</sup> K. N. Jayatilleke says, "That a causal sequence or concomitance occurs independently of us and that all we do is to discover this, is implied in the follow-

ng description of causation....”<sup>15</sup> In this connection Jayatilleke quotes the following scriptural passage found in the Samyutta Nikāya. “ What is causation ? On account of birth arises decay and death. Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this order exists namely the fixed nature of phenomena, the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality. This is the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it out, teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it and says ‘ look ! ’ ”<sup>16</sup> Commenting upon this description, D. J. Kalupahana says “ ....according to the Buddha’s philosophy, there are no accidental occurrences; everything in the world is causally conditioned or produced. The realization that every occurrence is a causal occurrence is said to clear the mind of all doubts, a characteristic of the state of perfect knowledge and enlightenment. This truth the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends....”<sup>17</sup> Paradoxically, though, the above exposition does not help to unearth the nature of the concept of ‘ causality ’ in Buddhism, both narrations depict the following words such as “ comprehension”, “ truth”, “ discovery”, “ teaching”, etc., but fail to explicit the logical nature of them and their natural context.

5.3 Now one cannot agree fairly readily with the contemporary buddhist thinkers who satisfy themselves with :

- ( i ) quotations from the Pali Nikāyas or the Chinese Āgamas or both,
- ( ii ) historical analysis,
- ( iii ) sweeping statements incorporating modern science, and,
- ( iv ) borrowing models in Physics for philosophical inquiry.

5.4 The above are, certainly, methodologies, but they do not help to clarify concepts in buddhistic religion. It’s only a conceptual analysis that would help us to understand, very clearly, the nature of the major concept in the argument, its natural context and the major conceptual family which makes the body of the argument. We do not aim to fulfill all what is expressed and hinted above. Yet, hope to analyse, briefly, the concept of ‘ causality ’ in Buddhism to note its logical nature.

5.5 The significant words in the above quotations such as “ comprehension”, “ discovery”, “ truth ” and “ teaching ” remain as borrowed ones from different contexts, but ironically depicted as if they are context-free. This has led to confusion of contexts.

An implication follows, namely, that the concept of 'causality' stands riddled. These buddhist thinkers err, philosophically, as they often tend to isolate the context whenever the need arises to clarify concepts. As a matter of logic, the context of the buddhistic concepts is ethico-religious; and that is their natural home.

5.6 Often, Jayatilleke<sup>18</sup> and Kalupahana<sup>19</sup> argue as if the concept of 'causality' in Buddhism is not *that* different from that in the sciences. Both the thinkers quote a one-one correlation in this connection. What is a "one-one correlation?" The aim of the scientific investigator is to find a relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, a one-one relation: "Whenever X occurs, E occurs, and E does not occur unless X has occurred."<sup>20</sup> Commenting on this, Kalupahana adds: "The general statement of causation, 'whenever this exists, that exists or comes to be' when coupled with the negative aspect, 'whenever this does not exist, that does not exist or come to be,' seems to establish a one-one relation which, according to Stebbing, is a scientific theory of causation."<sup>21</sup> But Kalupahana's sweeping generalization is a significant philosophical error for he misconceives the nature of this relation. As he himself notes, "The change in things is not haphazard or accidental. It takes place according to a certain pattern and this pattern of things, this orderliness in things, is said to be constant. It is a cosmic truth eternally valid and independent of the advent of the Tathāgatas."<sup>22</sup> The expression suggests as if the buddhistic causality expresses a universal truth which is valid, independently of the advent of Buddhas. If so what is the logical nature of the one-one correlation? A probable one or a necessary one? Neither Kalupahana nor Jayatilleke nor Ninian Smart seems clear as to the very nature of the relation being expressed in buddhistic causality. If it is being absorbed in a scientific theory of causation, then the relation is probable. But "*a probable relation*" and "*a cosmic truth eternally valid*" are not one and the same thing. The former is a logical ingredient in a scientific theory of causation while the latter falls outside the boundary of science. What I mean there is not any kind of inaccessibility but simply an emphasize of a different subject, say, Logic and Mathematics where necessary truths (which are eternally valid) or necessary implications are worked out or dealt with. The conceptual structure in these

sciences basically differs from that in the descriptive sciences such as Physics or Astronomy. "*A probable relation*" is an ingredient in the latter sciences and not in the former ones. Now, Buddhism, the religion of the Buddha, does not fall into either category of sciences. Its conceptual structure is normative in nature. To put the point yet more explicitly, its nature is ethical in character with a set procedural guide which commands the adherents to do certain deeds. The procedural guide is expressed in the ethical mean or the Middle Path or Majjhima Patipadā. This path or patipadā is neither true nor false. Furthermore, a statement dealing with the patipadā too is neither true nor false.

5.7 How, then, this causation or paṭiccasamuppāda be referred to as the truth? In most religions inclusive of Buddhism, the word "truth" ("true") is used in a figurative sense which is basically different from the usages of the word in our everyday and scientific parlances. As Wittgenstein remarks, a word can take many different uses. He expressed this idea by employing the concept "countless different kinds of use."<sup>23</sup> It is revealed, therefore, that the use of the word "truth" in the sciences is different from the use of the same word in Buddhism or any other religion or ideology, etc. The emphasis is the avoidance of confusion of contexts, say, scientific, religious, political, poetic, managerial, etc. It seems as if the quest for truth is replaced by the clarification of concepts with a view to avoid confusion of contexts.

5.8 Same is the case concerning the word 'causality.' It is not probable causality in Science which is noted in Buddhism. What is noted in the latter is moral causality which is neither true nor false empirically. It is tempting to say that it cannot be established or substantiated scientifically. 'Causality' or 'paṭiccasamuppāda' is a belief entertained by the buddhist adherent who accepts the "middle path" or the "majjhima patipadā." Conceptually speaking, according to Buddhism, a logical relation exists between "majjhima patipadā" and "nirvāna." The following question shall clarify the point. That is: Does "majjhima patipadā" pave way to realize nirvāna? The answer to it within the buddhist model is a categorical affirmation. Another way of making this point would be to say that the future position, namely, nirvāna, is strictly determined in a sort of

Newtonian sense. This is *the essence of Buddhism*. What is emphasized is *moral causality*, a strict logical relation between *the path* (*majjhima patipadā*) and its *certain effect* (*nirvāna*). In this sense, the ontology of causality stands inappropriate simply because, all analysis of causality, by necessity, may not end in noting what actually exists and in what way. Our attempt is to analyse the notion of 'causality' on the basis of limiting it to a context, say, religious one, only. It is, in other words, an investigation of the application which it finds in a particular context. It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of experimentation and substantiation is simply irrelevant as it is not what is needed.

5.9 The logical nature of the concept of 'causality' in Buddhism is further made explicit, once its conceptual family is noted. Needless to add that the effort is a very difficult one indeed. The religious argument in the buddhist doctrine runs incorporating certain significant concepts such as "*impermanence*", "*nonsubstantiality*," "*moral causality*", "*middle path*", "*nirvāna*", "*samsāra*", etc. Major excursions into Science and Western philosophy is thus, stands, logically inappropriate. The buddhistic argument develops within an atheistic religious context where significant statements must be formulated in the language of religion and *not* in that of physics or aerodynamics.

### 6. Conclusion :

6.1 The upshot of our brief argument must be very clear indeed. The buddhistic concept of 'causality,' if needs clarification, in fact it does, it is *pointless* to do the following :

- (i) quoting statements from the Pali Nikāyas or Chinese Āgamas or both,
- (ii) attempting a historical analysis,
- (iii) reading Empiricism,<sup>24</sup> Positivism and Science into Buddhism,
- (iv) borrowing meaning-models from science and Western philosophy, and,
- (v) formulating statements in the language of physics.

6.2 Evading the above mentioned methods, one can get buddhistic concepts analysed, slowly but gradually, firstly, by noting the context of the argument. And secondly, by detecting and eliciting *the conceptual family*. If an analysis of this sort can

be called a method, it suggests the following : It prevents any sort of "ontological commitment" from slipping too easily into the argument. With this triumph, empiricism of the kind being read into Buddhist religion by empirico-buddhistic thinkers, stands, doomed, indeed. But as we clearly pointed out, if we can draw the "ontological sting" from the key concept—causality—in Buddhism, and satisfy with noting its language-game only, then, we can avoid many meaningless philosophical problems.

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## DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

Metaphysics has been generally described by the modern philosophers as that which, by the help of a set of basic presuppositions, seeks to interpret the universe of experience as a whole. We have not taken here the other concepts in which philosophers describe metaphysics as dealing with transcendent entities beyond experience. The set of basic presuppositions or categories in the former sense form a sort of conceptual framework for various branches of studies including sciences. In the field of sciences, these basic presuppositions are most important, as the scientists work within the frame-work prescribed by the presuppositions. This has been pointed out to be the cause of immense progress in the field of sciences. In case of metaphysics, however, there is no such presupposition to start with. It is actually concerned with framing them appropriately, so that the system consisting these presuppositions would explain the world of experience adequately.

This way of characterisation of metaphysics is related with the question of language. Accordingly, different conceptual schemes would give rise to different types of language systems in various branches of studies. In the case of natural sciences, while explaining the world of experience, the conceptual scheme and the language system related to it play most important role. In the words of A. J. Ayer<sup>1</sup>, "...to ask what the world is like is to ask of any given empirical proposition whether it is true or false, and this means that what counts for us as the world depends upon our conceptual system. It is, however, at least conceivable that our conceivable system should be radically different and in that case the facts would be different too." He goes further in the same work and says .... "Thus there is above all a sense in which philosophy can change the world, not indeed materially, for that must be left to science, but formally, by refashioning the structure of language. In this way it may help to determine what fact there can be."<sup>2</sup>

Following this line of thought we may say language with different conceptual schemes would give different accounts of the facts

of experience. Accordingly, different conceptual schemes would give rise to different observational languages also. Again, from this it may follow that any language in use should have a conceptual scheme lying at the core of it and explaining the universe of experience in some particular way.

Ordinary language of every day use, therefore, has some particular conceptual scheme embodied in it. It gives some sort of account of the particular facts of experience. It may therefore, be said that the observational language of every day use has its own 'metaphysical theory' behind it though commonly, they are taken as 'observational' or 'factual'. Some philosophers hold that the metaphysics or the conceptual scheme consisting of categories and concepts lying hidden in the ordinary language is more serviceable rather than any other brought from out side. The metaphysics of ordinary language would be more adequate to explain the universe of experience according to the ordinary language philosophers. Hence, the metaphysicians should only 'describe' the categorical concepts of ordinary language—in order to have a proper conceptual frame-work. This trend has been called as 'descriptive' in comparison to the other trend of metaphysics which aim to 'revise' the old categorical concepts and devise new ones in order to have a better conceptual scheme. The former seems to give a 'descriptive metaphysics' in contrast to the other which has been called as 'revisionary' metaphysics (We follow here P. F. Strawson's classification).

The ordinary language philosophers hold that a metaphysician should try to build up a metaphysics only by 'unearthing' and 'revealing' the categories lying hidden in the ordinary usage and describing them without any bias or 'pre-conceived ideas'. Sometimes it is also held that a metaphysician's study should consist of studying the traditional metaphysical categories in their ordinary uses and try to find out how the uses of these words are learnt and taught etc. The same sort of enquiry may be undertaken about the other words also. These ideas may be found to criss cross each other as Wittgenstein says, [and none of them may be found basic or essential. Some ideas of the traditional metaphysics may thus be found senseless or meaningful in the linguistic structure unearthed and validated. Again different

categorial concepts may also be related to each other and organised into a definite metaphysical system. In this attempt to build up a metaphysical system, the philosophers would be guided by the grammar of the functioning language and the need of communicating experience among the fellow-beings.

There has been some attempts to build up metaphysics by inventing the presuppositions and categories lying in our ordinary language and relating them in order to make a systematic 'whole'. We may take Fred Sommer's article 'The ordinary language tree'<sup>3</sup> as an attempt of this sort. Fred Sommers holds that some ontology is necessarily implied in our ordinary language. Thus we always see that there were some expressions which are used as both subject and predicate forms of an intelligible statement and there are some other expressions which are not so. In this pattern of meaning relation a sort of hierarchy culminating in an apex is revealed when one passes from the lower level of this hierarchy to the higher, one passes from expressions that are not used together as subject and predicate to more general expressions that are used with each of these at the lower level. The expression 'shape' is used with both physical body and circle, though it cannot be said that physical body is a circle or a circle is a physical body. Now 'shape', 'physical body' and 'circle' are all related and 'shape' stands on a higher level than the other two. According to the structural requirement of such a hierarchy, the expression at the apex level can be predicated of all the other words in the language. This expression can be used as a predicate of all the other words and so it is a universal category. It can never be misused. The expressions like 'exists', 'can be talked about' are the examples of such universal category. By studying these categories an ordinary language ontology may be devised.

The strong faith in the ordinary language philosophy has been asserted on various grounds. E. Hall claims "Philosophy can discover and express the fundamental dimensions of reality, the categories only through or by means of the terms of sentences we use to talk about the world."<sup>4</sup> He goes further and says.... "that predication in every day language functions in several radically different ways, that these different ways are easily distinguishable by any one who has a sense for common usage, and that,

when differentiated clearly by setting up a normal form of sentence for each, they reveal basic dimensions of reality.”<sup>5</sup>

Without going into detail, we may mention that E. Hall has distinguished among four types of predication (by constructing four normal forms of basic sentences) which he holds differ fundamentally in the ways the predicates are ascribed and claims that it can be shown how each of the reveal some sort of dimension of reality. The four sorts of basic sentences are (a) descriptive declarative, saying the ‘individual’, ‘a’ has the property ‘f’ (example, table is blue), (b) revelatory declarative sentences inwhich ‘a’ is a property and the property is predicated of it, (example, green is between yellow and blue), (c) valuative sentences include imperative, hortative, optative and the value statements ‘a ought to be f’. (example— it were good that the table has the property of blueness) and (d) Semitic declarative sentence speaking about language, for example, a sentence characterising the event which is an occurrence of some linguistic expression. He has tried to show that each of them have some metaphysical implication as they reveal some dimension of reality. We shall not, however, discuss whether this sort of system is adequate or these predication are the only sort of predication which may be contained in the language.

The faith in ordinary language philosophy has been demonstrated by many other philosophical works though the mode prescribed for building up a metaphysical system on the basis of ordinary language may vary. Stuart Hampshire holds, on the line of the philosophers we have discussed, that for defining some one’s philosophy it is enough to discover what existential statements he takes to be unproblematical and in need of no further explanation. And in order to discover what existential statements he takes as unproblematical, it must be enough to discover what kind of discourse provides him with this absolute certainty in the use of language—‘This as certain as anything can be’ (e.g., ‘as that  $2 + 2 = 4$ ’ or ‘as that I am sitting in this room’). “There has always been this connection between the so-called theory of knowledge i.e. the critical comparison of the conditions of certainty in application attached to expressions of different types and metaphysics; in fact the two cannot be separated or even in the end distinguished. Some one who in exaggerated

respect for the common sense at the moment, refuses to make such weighted and critical comparisons, refuses to enter the domain of Philosophy<sup>6</sup>. ”

Such a view that the study of ordinary language is sufficient for obtaining a proper metaphysical system, naturally goes against the view that the ordinary language may be reformed in the light of the categories which are not derived from ordinary language. Ordinary language has rich resources, they say, and is more well grounded than the categories which are devised and brought from outside the ordinary language. J. L. Austin argues, “ Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the life time of many generations<sup>7</sup>. ”

He goes further and adds that these words “ are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since have stood upto the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle....than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs on an afternoon<sup>8</sup>. ”

It has been claimed also that the conceptual frame-work revealed by the language cannot be revised in the light of some other devised conceptual frame-work. Since that would mean stepping out of the ordinary language which is impossible for any one. Stuart Hampshire holds in conformity to such a view,— “ We cannot step outside the language which we use, and judge it from some ulterior and superior vantage point<sup>9</sup>. ” Language, he seems to think, is something which is determined by the ‘ form of life ’ which every body must share with other members of his society. Language evolves in this ‘ form of life ’ so that it would be understood by people having that ‘ form of life ’.

Stephen Toulmin and Stuart Hampshire have tried to analyse the whole structure of ordinary language and in doing so, they try to discover the rules which must be obeyed in any use of any linguistic expression under any circumstances so that the expression would be communicable intelligibly.

J. L. Austin, however, seems to be the pioneer working in this direction. He seeks to find out the nuances in the ordinary uses of significant words and then to organise in a new and instructive fashion, the limits provided by them.

However, it has been noted in the history of Philosophy that the conceptual frame-work in terms of the categories taken from the ordinary language, may not be satisfactory to all thinkers. Sometimes the established uses may be held as such that they ignore some important aspects of our experience whereas a conceptual frame-work in terms of the categories that are not actually derived from ordinary language but devised by some metaphysicians may be preferred for such purposes. In such case one may change the uses in ordinary language in the light of these categories or in other words may revise the ordinary language taking these new categories as nothing but proposals of possible uses. Thus the terms like 'gravitational potential', 'absolute temperature', 'electric field', 'Psi function' etc. are not derived from our ordinary language but were devised for explaining some aspects of experience. Development in the field of scientific researches made it necessary and at the same time possible to devise such terms for explaining certain aspects of experience which previously were not explained or were explained but only unsatisfactorily. The renowned Scientists like Einstein, Plank, Heisenberg and Schrodinger are responsible for such revision of language, yet so far as they are building up some systems of sciences they are also fulfilled metaphysicians.

A metaphysician thus, has to elucidate the rules of the category words either in ordinary use or in proposed use. In both the cases metaphysical activities are interpreted in terms of language system. Aristotle and Descartes among others may be mentioned as those who proposed for important uses of some new keywords for the subsequent scientists and philosophers. Wittgenstein among others in recent days has changed the uses of some old terms and also introduced some of the extra-ordinary uses. Many others again prefer to stick to the categories of ordinary language only. We may take P. F. Strawson,<sup>10</sup> a celebrated ordinary language philosopher, for a short review as he tried to build up a 'descriptive metaphysics' on the basis of ordinary language in the book "Individuals". He, like the other ordinary philosophers we have already discussed, declares that metaphysics should only describe the 'actual structure of our thought about the world'. It is not 'revisionary' since it would not propose

for a revision of the conceptual frame-work "which is revealed in the study of ordinary language". He admits, however, that strong demarcation between the 'descriptive' and 'revisionary' metaphysics is not possible. He also holds that only a close examination and analysis of the ordinary language would not be sufficient to reveal the hidden structure of thought lying submerged in ordinary language.

The particular theory that Strawson has built upon the language of ordinary use has been and may be criticised on various points. His endeavour to build up a descriptive metaphysics on the basis of ordinary language has drawn attention of the recent thinkers. It has been a detail work to establish the claim of the ordinary language philosophers. Hence, we shall take up the basic presuppositions prescribed by him and examine the possibility of an acceptable descriptive metaphysics.

The most important presupposition seems to be that the proper conceptual system constitutes the essential structure of ordinary language by which people talk to each other about the publicly identifiable and re-identifiable objects. So the descriptive metaphysics exposing and explaining the conceptual system has to be built upon the basis of ordinary language. We can see that the conceptual system would provide the essential structure for any medium of ordinary communication. Again as the history is full of records of changes in concepts, it may be said that the conceptual scheme of understanding and explaining the universe is in a process. So it does not seem reasonable to hold one particular conceptual scheme at one point of time as the 'actual'.

To these doubts, however, Strawson would reply that the human thought in its massive central core does not change at all. Hence the categories and concepts in their most fundamental character would remain unchanged always. Consequently new truth is unlikely in descriptive metaphysics. This, however, does not mean that the metaphysical activities would come to an end when the right conceptual scheme is reached. Strawson has accommodated the historical fact of endless metaphysical activity. He holds that though the Central subject matter of descriptive metaphysics does not change, the critical and analytical idiom of philosophy changes constantly. The permanent relationships are described in an important idiom and it reflects both

climate of thought of the age and the individual philosopher's personal style of thinking. So all philosophers must re-think other's thought in their contemporary terms.

The question, however, remains : how to known that one has discovered truly the actual conceptual scheme lying hidden in one's contemporary language. Only when one is convinced about a particular conceptual scheme, its rethinking may be taken up.

When talking about the 'actual' conceptual scheme, Strawson seems to be thinking of the 'right' conceptual scheme. But then, he also uses the word 'actual' in the sense of 'adequate' or 'suitable'. Since the purpose of the conceptual scheme is obviously to enable us to interpret and understand the world around us, the revisionary metaphysicians always claim that they are concerned with discovering a better or more adequate conceptual scheme than the existing one for a better interpretation of the world. Strawson also recognises the claim and the merit but he maintains that the revisionary metaphysics may be ascribed this merit only because there is descriptive metaphysics.

This confidence of the descriptive metaphysicians in the unchangeable 'actual' or the 'right' conceptual scheme seems to be based on a changeless categorial core of human thinking. This faith has been shared by many celebrated thinkers. Yet, we cannot ignore the historical fact that the most important concepts of one time have been changed or are discarded, and new concepts are devised for the sake of science and philosophy from time to time.

The contention of the descriptive metaphysicians along with the emphasis on the serviceability of the ordinary language has been supported by the view that the concepts of classical physics are refined concepts of ordinary language and they are fundamental for scientific discourse and investigation since they serve for unambiguous communication about events, about setting up of experiments and the results. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, though admits the importance and necessity of the concept of classical physics, it also shows that the application of these concepts would be limited by the relations of uncertainty. Thus Heisenberg holds that in quantum theory, the initial position and velocity of the electron could be determined by some sort of experiment but then there would be an inaccuracy

following at least from the uncertainty relations. It may, however, contain more errors because of the difficulty of the experiments. So what is obtained is a probability function representing the experimental situation at the time of the measurement which include the possible errors of the measurements also. This probability function would allow us to calculate the probable result of the measurement of experiment.

The Copenhagen interpretation of classical physics has been criticised by many philosophers like Bohm, Janosy, Einstein and Vonlake etc. They have tried in their different counter-proposals to show that concepts of classical physics are more serviceable for the purpose of sciences. Accordingly, the categories derived from ordinary language and the ontology involved in it would be more preferable for the scientific discourse—as the ordinary language philosophers claim.

Following W. Heisenberg in his book "Physics and Philosophy"<sup>11</sup> we may observe that these critics of the Copenhagen interpretation of classifical physics try to cling to classical physics without reservation—in contrast to the Copenhagen interpretation. They however, admit the experimental results of the Copenhagen interpretation as adequate. Again, in this criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation the essential symmetry properties of the quantum theory have been sacrificed. If this feature is taken as a genuine feature of nature, these counterproposals cannot be supported.

In view of this discussion, it seems that the categories derived from the ordinary language and the materialistic ontology in it, though necessary, is not sufficient for the formation of a frame-work of scientific investigations. The scientific investigation based upon the frame-work would only yield a probable result. Hence; a mere description of the categories of ordinary language would not be sufficient for a metaphysical theory.

Strawson assumes in building his 'Descriptive metaphysics' that one conceptual scheme pervades all ordinary language of current use. But with due respect for the recent philosophical researches trying to establish a similar point of view, we may point out that the modern linguists have reached the conclusion that the categorical schemes of different languages are different from each other, cutting the universe of human experience supposedly

at the joints—in quite different way. It has also been found that many of these schemes are fairly successful and one of them cannot be preferred with sufficient reasons rather than others.

Again, ordinary language has vast dimension, many purpose to serve and accordingly many characteristics. One word may be used in various ways under different circumstances. It does not seem possible that one person would be able to detect all the possibilities some of which are very often vague. In such case a philosopher with particular bent of mind, like a positivist, or an idealist would come to note some features of the language—while overlooking the others which may seem important to another philosopher. Hence different categorical schemes would be built up on the basis of ordinary language. Again, new usages of the old words etc. may be introduced along with some new-ones while emphasising some vague ‘categories’ lying hidden in the language. This may lead to a change in the structure of ordinary language. Hence, we cannot say following Strawson that the structure of ordinary language is logically necessary.

No doubt there are many reasons to take up ordinary language as the starting point in building up metaphysics. It is more appropriate and reasonable than other starting points. Since it has evolved from the ‘form of life’ of our society which we share with each other. Again, this language is the fund of varied lessons of innumerable experiences gained from our life. But for the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be the end. Since the language would have a new look as soon as the new categories are revealed. The philosophers may try to reform the language so that these categories would be made more clear and prominent. From the other point of view, the new interpretations of the world would bring new categories and concepts to language in use. So the change of ordinary language becomes obvious. In view of these possibilities, a descriptive metaphysics should describe the categories and changes and indicate their future states of progress.

It may be argued that if men were capable of inventing theories lying hidden in ordinary language, they can also invent new theories and new languages. When a new theory seems to be more serviceable, it would be better to abandon the theory along with the old language.

The point seems to be that a metaphysical theory or conceptual frame-work contained in the ordinary language of every day use has to change when better theories come to be conceived due to progress of knowledge or the new theories have to be reduced into the old theory embodied in the ordinary language. If change in the categorial concept and conceptual frame-work is accepted, a revisionary metaphysics cannot be denied. But the reduction of one theory into another has been found inadequate in most of the cases. A detailed discussion has been taken up by P. K. Feyerabend amongst some other philosophers about the inadequacy of reduction. Some philosophers have suggested the possibility of reduction of the dispositional concepts of sciences like 'temperature', 'gravitation' etc. which seem to be beyond the level of ordinary language, into the empirical concepts of ordinary language. Similarly, the theoretical concepts of sciences like 'absolute temperature', 'electric field' etc. obviously do not belong to the ordinary language. Philosophers have tried to interpret them in terms of empirical concepts or ordinary language by the help of what they call as 'correspondence rules' or 'bridge rules' etc. This could bring the dispositional terms and the theoretical terms of sciences into the level of ordinary language. However, a complete interpretation of the theoretical concepts by the 'correspondence rules', in terms of empirical concepts of ordinary language has been found inadequate and even unprofitable for the sake of sciences. Similarly, the Scientists would prefer to use the dispositional terms as they are, even if it would be possible to reduce these terms completely into the observational vocabulary of ordinary language. We do not intend to enter into the detailed discussion of this problem which has been taken up exhaustively by R. Carnap, C. Hempel and others.

It has been pointed out by many philosophers that 'reductionism' sometimes, is a sort of perversion of the principle that one should seek unity in diversity and that one should try to render the complex into simple. We may also note that a close study of ordinary language itself warns against forceful denial of significant differences which may result from 'reductionism'. In fact, it has been suggested that the irreducibility of the new concepts into the older ones suggests the revolutionary progress in the field of sciences and forceful preservation of the older con-

cepts would be undesirable. P.K. Feyerabend writes that "wherever such preservation is observed, we shall feel inclined to think that the suggested new theories are not as revolutionary as they perhaps ought to be and we shall have the suspicion that some ad-hoc procedures have perhaps been adopted. Violation of ordinary usage and/or other 'established' usages, on the other hand, is a sign that real progress has been made and it is welcomed by any body interested in such progress provided of course that this violation is connected with the suggestion of a new point of view or new theory and is not just the result of linguistic arbitrariness" <sup>12</sup>.\*

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## RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM OF RUDOLF OTTO : A CRITICAL EVALUATION

### I

Both the terms of the compound phrase, ' Religious Mysticism ' are rather vague and liable to different interpretations. Definitions of religion differ from the traditional definition as 'the recognition on the part of man of some unseen higher power etc.', to the psycho-analyst's view of religion as man's projection of his own consciousness into objectivity. The meaning of mysticism is still vaguer. Rudolf Otto himself wavers between two different interpretations of mysticism. At one place he admits that the characteristic common to all types of mysticisms is 'the identification in different degrees of completeness of the personal self with the universal self'<sup>1</sup>. But usually he seems to mean by religious mysticism 'an approach which emphasises the non-rational element not only in man's religious experience, but also in man's conception of the objective reality of that experience.'<sup>2</sup>

According to Rudolf Otto the Divine or the 'Numinous' is above all an object of great fear, terror or awe (tremor). He goes on to explain the developed 'numinous awe' on the analogy of more primitive types of feeling, such as terror or dread of ghosts, the feeling of something 'uncanny' or 'weird'.<sup>3</sup>

The corresponding quality to the 'numinous awe' in the subject is the 'wrath of God', which expresses for Otto the absolute unapproachability, the supreme majesty and the absolute over-poweringness of the Numen.<sup>4</sup>

The Numen is further experienced as a great mystery. But again in order to explain the mysteriousness of the 'Numen', Rudolf Otto takes recourse to seemingly baser and more primitive forms of emotion, such as stupor, blank wonder or dumb astonishment, which are experienced whenever we are in the presence of 'wholly other'.<sup>5</sup> The numinous object is experienced in contrast to the whole world order, as super-natural and supra-mundane.<sup>6</sup>

The absolute otherness of the Numen is expressed both in its awefulness (Tremendum) and mysteriousness (Mysterium). In higher religions the numinous or the non-rational element is

synthesised with the rational concepts and the category of the Holy emerges as category of absolute objective value.<sup>7</sup> But even this Holy is experienced as 'Wholly Other'. There is a corresponding self depreciation on the part of the subject. He calls the religious emotion the 'creature feeling', which he explains as the emotion of a creature submerged and over-whelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme and above all creatures.<sup>8</sup>

### Critical Evaluation :

1. Almost every religion represents a synthesis of two opposing trends which emphasise the transcendent and awe inspiring and the immanent and fascinating aspects of the Divine. Though Otto admits both elements in the Numen, he emphasises the first almost exclusively.

Rudolf Otto's conception of the object of religious emotion as 'Wholly other' explains well the first trend in Judaic religions. In Judaism and Islam, God's transcendence and omnipotence and in contrast man's insignificance are generally emphasised. In so far as the spirit and attitude of Old Testament have survived in Christianity, it also conceives God as the 'Father in Heaven' and man as completely sinful and depraved. Man can be saved not through his efforts, but only through God's grace, which seems to be quite arbitrary and unquestionable in its favour.<sup>9</sup> The need of atonement of man's sins by Christ and of the mediation of Christ for the winning of God's grace,<sup>10</sup> similarly suggest a vast gulf between man and God.

When we come to Hinduism we find that Otto's concept of the Numinous explains very well certain trends within it. The image of Kali and the description of the Virāt-rūpa of Krishna in Gita bring forth the terror and awe inspiring character of the Deity.<sup>11</sup>

Otto claims that the numinous element is equally predominant in mysticism, including Advaita Vedānta. And to a certain extent he is right. Advaita Vedānta boldly opposes the Self from the not-Self and the not-Self includes not only the outer world, but also what one would normally call one's own self, as ego, mind and intellect.<sup>12</sup>

Eckhart similarly contrasts the Godhead from the world, which he calls 'creature'. God or 'Esse' is not only above the world, but even above being.

Granting that there is a core of truth in Otto's affirmation about the numinous element in religious experience we would still say that it leaves a major part of religious experience unexplained. To that we shall return lateron.

Otto's conception of the Holy as a category of value is essentially correct. God would not be God unless He were realised as supreme value, the end of man's religious endeavours. In Vedānta Mokṣa is recognised as the supreme value and Mokṣa is the same as Brahman.<sup>14</sup>

Similarly, his emphasis on the non-rational elements in the idea of the Holy is also correct, in as much as he means by the non-rational as that which cannot be exhaustively described by purely rational concepts. But here-with end all our agreements.

It is our contention that Rudolf Otto's concept of the highest Reality as the 'Numen' or the 'Wholly other' does not explain the higher religious phenomena, including mysticism. First of all it cannot explain the central or the more fundamental beliefs of the Christianity itself, i.e. the Fatherhood of God, man's being created in the image of God and the Kingdom of God being within ourselves. The modern Christian thinkers disown the semi-Deistic middle age conception of a super-natural God, revealed through miracles. Instead they uphold the concept of an immanent God who is revealed in the laws of nature.<sup>15</sup> They reaffirm Christ's vision of God who loves man as a father loves his children, and who cares and even sacrifices himself in Christ's body for the sake of mankind.<sup>16</sup>

Otto's conception of the numinous emotion as consisting of awe and fear cannot explain man's love for God. He himself affirms that the 'Numen' is an object of fascination also, this fact being revealed in the joy and peace felt in the mystic's experience of union with God.<sup>17</sup> But an object of terror cannot be at the same time an object of love. On the other hand, the loving Father of Christ can hardly be conceived as an object of awe and terror.

There have been saints in every religion whose passionate and exalted love of God can hardly be explained by the theory of God as 'Mysterium Tremendum'. In Muslim religion we have Abu Yazid, Al Hallaj and other Sufi saints; in Christianity we have not only the mystics like Dionysius and Eckhart, but also saints like St. Paul and St. Teresa, recognised even by Christian orthodoxy; in India, the Bhakta saints of middle ages such as Mira, Chaitanya, Tukaram, Namadeva, Eknath etc. All these loved God with an intense passionate longing, suffered when they felt themselves separated from their Beloved, because of their earthly existence and rejoiced when they felt themselves united with their Love in the mystical vision. We cannot love a God who is an 'Wholly Other' to ourselves.

Rudolf Otto's contentions that, 'Mysticism is not first of all an act of union, but predominantly the knowledge of the wholly other God and 'that mysticism implies a mystical God,<sup>18</sup> cannot be agreed to by many.

His insistence that for Śaṅkara Brahman is essentially a mystery, though suggestive, can hardly sum up the essential spirit of Śaṅkara's philosophy. In order to support his thesis Rudolf Otto has quoted those passages from Śaṅkara where the latter has contrasted the Self to the world.

But, for one thing, Ātman is not a mystery for Śaṅkara in Otto's sense. It is self-evident, being the pre-supposition of all experience, our very Self.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, for Śaṅkara as for Eckhart and all the other mystics of the world the vision of unity is the most fundamental of all experiences. Otto arbitrarily distinguishes several stages of mystical vision, regarding the negation of the reality of the creature as the highest.<sup>20</sup> In Indian Mysticism the denial of the mundane world, instead of being the culmination of mystical experience, is a mere stepping stone to the realization of ultimate Unity.<sup>21</sup>

It is true that the highest vision is often described in the Upaniṣads as an experience in which all diversity is annihilated. But it only suggests the complete merger of the subject's individual consciousness into the Object, and not the perception of the Object as the 'Wholly Other'.

Otto himself quotes passages from Eckhart suggesting the primacy of the vision of Unity.

"All creatures are one being."

"All this then is to see the essence in the one and in Unity, it is to see in God and to see God."

"In this embrace all is dissolved in all, for all embraces all."<sup>22</sup>  
Examples from Upanisads can be multiplied. "Sarvam Khal-  
vidam Brahman".<sup>23</sup>

"Idam sarvam yadayamātmā "<sup>24</sup>

When the Upaniṣadic ṛsi declares 'Ayamātmā Brahama,'<sup>25</sup> or 'Aham Brahmasmi'<sup>25</sup> he is negating this very otherness of Brahman by declaring an absolute identity of the two—Brahman and Ātman. Even though all the mystics may not be non-dualists of the above type, it cannot be denied that, "Mystical experience basically involves a powerful urge towards the reconciliation, unification and harmony of all with all"<sup>27</sup>. Therefore, the declaration of the Divine or the Absolute as 'Wholly Other' goes directly against the spirit of mysticism. Not only the Non-dualistic, which is often mistakenly called the Pantheistic mysticism, but even the Theistic mysticism of St. Teresa, Mira or Chaitanya cannot be explained by the theory of the Divine as the 'Numinous'. God even for these latter type of mystics is nearer to the heart than one's own self, and no external deity.

Lastly, the Mysticism of the type of Mahāyāna Buddhism is left completely unexplained by the theory of Numinous. Though having no specific reference to the Divine, Mahāyāna Mysticism, because of its essential vision of unity, is akin to all other types of mysticism described above and a theory which completely fails to explain it, shows its inherent weakness only.

Rudolf Otto's description of the 'Holy' or the 'Numen' as the 'Mysterium Tremendum', is also one sided. He explains the 'mysteriousness' 'awfulness' of the Numen on the analogy of primitive types of feeling, such as awe, terror and a sense of 'uncanny' or 'earie'. He regards, fear as the most elemental or fundamental religious emotion. The terror or the sense of 'creeping flesh' one feels when faced with some unfamiliar experience, as that of ghosts, seems to be the paradigm of

the highest religious emotion to him.<sup>28</sup> It is so because all these experiences suggest the super-naturalness of their object, and God or Numen is essentially super-natural for him. That is why he even seeks justification of his theory in the old dogma of miracles.

But terror or the sense of uncanny are primitive types of emotions. They describe the feelings of the primitive man whose lack of knowledge of the laws of nature makes him afraid of natural forces. But if there is a God for the modern man, he must be revealed in the order of nature and not in the experience of 'uncanny' etc.

Comparing the primitive religions with the higher religions, John Caird rightly observes, "Far removed is this reverence from the mere dumb wonder of ignorance, or the gruesome awe of the super-natural.... Instead of ignorant wonder we have here intelligent admiration, instead of blind submission, trust and sympathy and love, instead of the paralysis of thought before a pretentious insoluble enigma, the ennobling and ever renewed impulse to thought which arises from the assurance that God is light and in Him there is no darkness at all."<sup>29</sup>

Without intending, Principal Caird's description of primitive religion fits Otto's conception of the numinous experience, and this speaks for itself.

All the modern thinkers insist that if religion has to have a meaningful place in modern man's life, it must be a positive, ennobling experience. Had William James read Rudolf Otto, he would surely have labelled his 'Numinous Experience' as the religion of the sick soul. For him religion of healthy mindedness necessarily has positive practical consequences in the form of purity of heart, strength of the soul, charity and love towards all, a new zest for life, an assurance of safety and a temper of peace and love.<sup>30</sup> We can recall here the description of a seer of Brahman in the Upaniṣads. Supreme Joy (ānanda) and complete fearlessness (abhyā), are the chief characteristics of a man who has realized Brahman as his own Self.<sup>31</sup> That the mystical vision is an experience of joy, peace and self-expansion and not of fear and self depreciation would be agreed to by all the modern thinkers.

In contrast, Rudolf Otto, describes the religious experience as 'creature feeling', which is a feeling of complete depreciation, a sense of utter nothingness of the self. It is to be compared with the sense of sin and guilt so much emphasized in early Christian theology. Nietzsche was shocked at the 'unparalleled madness of human will' which feels satisfied in declaring its own sinfulness and which conceives the holy God before which man can feel himself totally unworthy and sinful.<sup>32</sup>

Most philosophers of religion agree in declaring that 'not fear and submission, but love and assertion of one's own powers are the basis of mystical experience'.<sup>33</sup>

The total depreciation of man, the almost morbid emphasis on man's sinfulness, the categorical denial of man's capacity to emancipate himself and the emphasis on the vast gulf between man and God must of necessity have harmful consequences for man's social and moral life. Though we may not agree with the Pragmatist in regarding practical consequences as the test of the validity of a belief, they cannot be totally neglected either. The faith in man's total depravity and utter dependence on God can hardly be an inspiration for any efforts for self emancipation of which man is declared to be utterly incapable.

Secondly, the conception of God as "Wholly Other" deprives the creature or the created world of any positive value or meaning. If God is completely transcendent to the world, you cannot realize him through a life in the world. The world and the life-negation, of which Indian Philosophy has been often accused, stares us here direct in the face.

It is strange that the so-called Pantheism of Advaita Vedānta and the super-naturalism of the Otto's theory of the Numinous, both seem to result in world and life-negation. Whether it is Śāṅkarā's Brahman, or it is Otto's Numen, whenever the Divine is conceived in opposition to the world order, such a conception would result in the depreciation or even negation of the world order.

In the end we may recall Otto's own view about the essential differences in the nature of mysticism or religion as such. Rudolf Otto's conception explains well certain numinous trends in popular religions. But it leaves so much that is basic and of supreme

worth in all religious experience, mystical or otherwise, that is the love for God, or the desire to rise above one's limited ego into communion with the source of one's existence etc. unexplained.

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#### NOTES

1. The Idea of the Holy ( Penguin Books, 1959 ), p. 36.
2. Mysticism East and West ( Macmillan, New York, 1972 ), pp. 158-9.
3. The Idea, pp. 31, 71-80.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-35.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-44.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 66-7.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 34, 66.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-72.
10. See—John Caird. The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, ( 1904 ), Vol. II, pp. 1960.
11. Mysticism, p. 77.
12. Adhyāsa bhaṣya, Upadeśa Sahaśri, II.1.17; II.11.7; II.12.11, etc.
13. See Mysticism, pp. 42, 110.
14. S. B. on Brahma Sūtras, I.1.4.
15. John Caird, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 6-7.
16. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 79ff.
17. The Idea, pp. 45ff.
18. Mysticism, p. 159.
19. S. B. on Brahma Sūtras, I.1.4 etc.
20. Mysticism, pp. 73ff.
21. S. B. on Brahma Sūtras, II.1.20.
22. S. B. on Brahdāraṇyaka, Up. II.4.6.
23. Mysticism, pp. 80, 88.
24. Chāndogya Up. III.14.1.
25. Brahdāraṇyaka Up., II.4.6.
26. *Ibid.*, II.4.19.
27. *Ibid.*, I.4.10.
28. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. V, p. 432.
29. The Idea, pp. 29-31, 39-43.
30. John Caird, Philosophy of Religion, p. 28.
31. Varieties of Religious Experiences, pp. 268-9, 476.
32. Īśa Up., 6, 7, Mūndaka Up., II.ii.8.
33. The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 712.
34. Eric Fromm, Psycho-analysis in Religion, pp. 52-53.

## THE REDISCOVERY OF THE PERSON

Philosophers may appear to deal in abstractions and to live in ivory towers but their ideas seldom remain uninfluential on the course of human history. In the event of the French Revolution we see in an exemplary way the mutation of intellectual views into principles of social transformation and directives for revolutionary action. Other factors contributed to its explosion but what gave them structure and thrust is the conjunction of ideas regarding man and society disseminated by the unorthodox thinkers of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries.

### 1. From the Hierarchical to the Equalitarian Society :

What the French Revolution meant to accomplish was not a mere political change but a radical transmutation of the social system. Ancient society was hierarchical and aristocratic; the new society would be equalitarian and democratic; it would be a triumph of the atomic Individual, of the particular citizen, in the liberty, equality and fraternity of a self-ruling People.

In order to bring into focus the difference between the hierarchical and the equalitarian society, I shall summarize two paragraphs of Alexis de Tocqueville in Chapter II of his *Democracy in America*. He speaks there of the social system of the aristocratic nations of old Europe but we may listen to his description with the model of the Hindu society of castes in our mind.

"Among aristocratic nations, as families remain for centuries in the same condition, often on the same spot, all generations become as it were contemporaneous. A man almost always knows his forefathers, and respects them; he thinks he already sees his remote descendants, and he loves them. He willingly imposes duties on himself towards the former and the latter ( . . . ) Aristocratic institutions have moreover, the effect of closely binding every man to several of his fellow-citizens ( . . . . ) As all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above the other, the result is that each of them always sees a man above himself, whose patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man,

whose co-operation he may claim. Men ( . . . . ) are, therefore, ( . . . . ) closely attached to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves. It is true that ( . . . . ) the notion of human fellowship is faint, and that men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice themselves for other men. In democratic ages, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed.

" Amongst democratic nations new families are constantly springing up, others are constantly falling away, and all that remain change their condition; the woof of time is every instant broken, and the track of generations effaced ( . . . . ) The interest of man is confined to those in close propinquity to himself ( . . . . ) Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks that chain, and severs every link of it. As social conditions become more equal, ( . . . . ) men owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands. Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back for ever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart."

Tocqueville's description thus shows the profound gap that separates the ancient societies from the societies of the modern Western type. The first were based on the natural order of things and had evolved their structures after the manifested data of life. In them the persons were, as soon as born, caught in a network of relations which immediately gave substance and reality to their natural sociality. They were distinct, singular, as Aquinas emphasised, but as essentially related. They pertained to the group before discovering their autonomy and through the group this very autonomy was shaped and their personality moulded on a pattern of participation and co-adjuvancy. The groups themselves were hierarchised into an overall structure of mutual

dependence and collaboration sanctioned more or less strictly by religion. The social held primacy over the political. The state was an important but secondary formation which found its rationality in its conformity with the exigencies of the naturally hierarchical society. Through this society it was connected with something universal and religious, the conception of a cosmic order antecedent to any ordering of man's fabrication. In short, hierarchy integrated the ancient societies of men by reference to their universal values. Such societies could, of course, become rigid and their organisations oppressive but at their best they offered individuals the proper scope for exchange, co-operation and mutuality which are demands of the essential relatedness of human persons.

As against those societies which based themselves on the given sociality of human nature, the equalitarian societies were born from a desire to be "rational" by breaking away from nature in order to set up an autonomous human order. Drawing their inspiration from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and other philosophers of the so-called Enlightenment, their creators started with the postulate that men are by nature isolated individuals and that the problem of making them live together lies exclusively within the competence of reason. Nature provides only the basic equality of those individuals and its absolute demand is the equalitarian principle which directly negates the old hierarchies.

This equalitarian principle is not simply equivalent to the moral principle of equality so strongly inculcated by Christianity. The latter affirms that all men, even the least, are equal in nature, dignity, inviolability and natural rights; it does not deny their concrete inequalities, their complex relatedness, their mutual complementarity; it does not affirm their basic identity. The equalitarian principle, on the contrary, posits this basic identity of all men whom it conceives as pre-social atoms to be socialised by the Social Contract which is the work not of nature but of reason.

The chief consequence of the equalitarian principle is to deny the legitimacy of the intermediary group-structures which ramified society and to set up the democratic state directly over against the multitude of individuals. The state is supposed to result from the compact of their many wills. It can begin a new by

means of a constitution approved by a popular referendum or by elected representatives of the people. Once set up, it organises society through structures which too are, ideally at least, determined and controlled by the will of individuals manifested by devotee. The power of such a state tends to become ubiquitous since it is no longer mediated and possibly counterchecked by hierarchical intermediaries independent of itself. The political threatens to devour the social.

The creation of democratic societies secured many positive results. It did away with the worst excesses of inequality. It proclaimed solemnly the Fundamental Rights of Man which became the norm of the codes of law elaborated for their furtherance. And its offspring, the modern state, has been an apt instrument of modernisation made possible by the progress of industry and technology.

However, the unmediated polarity of the isolated individuals and the Leviathan state has remained to a large extent unreconciled. Hegel's attempt in his *Philosophy of Right* to reconcile freedom and authority ended in his glorification of the Prussian state. He conceived that law is rational as the deepest expression of man's freedom but also that it is prescribed in opposition to the individual's freedom. He belonged to the voluntaristic tradition begun from Duns Scotus and Ockham and his paradox is that law is "Liberty" because it is "Will", command, but it is only the positive will of the state. In line with the philosophers of the Enlightenment, he persisted at looking at society in exclusively political terms. He disregarded with contempt the unwritten customs and mores of peoples. For him as for Hobbes or Rousseau the conscious individual is abruptly called to recognize in the State his higher self, and in the State's command the expression of his own will and freedom.

Hegel's posterity branched off into a "right" and a "left", which respectively accepted only either the positivistic or the rationalistic ("critical") aspect of his doctrine. Marx believed in the natural perfection of the individual so much that he dreamed of ultimately abolishing all class-distinctions and even the state. But his economic interpretation of history persuaded him that his dream could only be realised by violent revolution, abolition of private property, economic collectivisation and political dicta-

torship of the proletariat. The rightist current produced another kind of dictatorship, that of the fascist totalitarian state.

Against this background of the modern age in the West, we may consider briefly the parallel evolution in India. We shall have to distinguish here the speculations of the philosophers and the concrete reality of man and society. The ideal man of the philosophers is not the empirical member of society but the renouncer (*sannyāsin*) who prepares for liberation (*mokṣa*) and has already isolated himself from the secular bonds and concerns of society. In this renouncer they value essentially the radically free spirit (*puruṣa* or *ātman*) or even, if they are Buddhists, the pure freedom which substitutes for *ātman*. The empirical man is only a name-form (*nāma-rūpa*), fictitious and evanescent, and for most of them society deserves no abiding interest.

This society, however, continues its course and bears within itself a certain conception of man. It is a hierarchical society, a society of castes and sub-castes. Castes are permanent groups which are at once specialized, hierarchised and separated (in matters of marriage, food and physical contact) in relation to each other. The common basis of these three features is the opposition of pure and impure which is part of the religious outlook. This opposition is of its nature hierarchical and implies separation in customs and life and specialisation in occupations. Thus the foundation of the caste system is not power, economic or political, which may be important in practice but is distinct from, and subordinate to, the hierarchy. According to L. Dumont, the relation between hierarchy and power is as follows. Hierarchy culminates in the Brahman; it is the Brahman who consecrates the power of the Kṣatriya, which otherwise depends entirely on force. While the Brahman is spiritually supreme, he is materially dependent; the gifts made to Brahmins transform material goods into spiritual values. Whilst the Kṣatriya is materially the master, he is spiritually subordinate. A similar relation distinguishes the two superior ends of man in society, *dharma* (action conforming to) universal order, and *artha* (action conforming to) utilitarian interest. These two are hierarchised in such a way that *artha* is legitimate only within the limits set by *dharma*. Thus hierarchy is the integrating concept of the whole society. It never attaches itself to power as such, but always to religious functions and

dignities from which power may then derive or by which it may be sanctioned. Hierarchy integrates the Hindu society to its universal values which are religious because religion is the form that the universally true assumes in this society.

Within this caste society, persons are being focussed on the three values or constellations of values, *artha*, *kāma* (bonds of sexual and family affection) and *dharma*. These form the realm of activity (*pravṛtti*), of actions and results (*karman* and *phala*), which is governed by the law of *karman*. The maintenance of *dharma* tends to make this society extremely conservative, the ideal being to preserve the hierarchy of the castes and the distinction of each caste and sub-caste duties. The unity of this complex society arises from the fixed complementarity of its constituent groups which is expressed in the *jajmāni* system of dominant and dominated castes. The caste system is essentially social, not political, so that the Hindu society has been able to preserve itself almost untouched by political upheavals till recent times.

Such a society does not itself favour the singularity and the autonomy of human persons but rather their relatedness and their religious rootedness in universal values. The call of freedom comes from outside the society, from the renouncers who propose spiritual emancipation (*mokṣa*) through *nivṛtti* (abstention from activity) but it reaches all the groups and polarises them on an end which is beyond and apparently opposed to the aims of society. It is the great merit of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to have discovered a reconciliation of the demands of the hierarchical society with the call of the renouncers. Its rule of *niṣkāma karma* (disinterested action) introduces renunciation within activity itself and thus redeems activity dedicated to the welfare and maintenance of the caste society.

Traditional India encounters the modern ideas almost as soon as they become active in the West but its confrontation with them is much less immediately radical and metamorphosing. For almost the whole of the XIXth century the changes advocated are mainly partial reforms, corrections of excesses, whereas the structure itself of the society of castes is seldom if ever put into question. Liberal individualism, democratic nationalism, positivism, socialism are catching the minds of intellectuals but they hardly become

aims of systematic pursuit and points of political programs before the turn of the century. And when they begin to dominate and finally triumph they do so only on the political level, and this level has not succeeded in swallowing the social level. The Constitution of Independent India may abolish the legality of the caste system but the latter remains the organisation of society as such; the Constitution may be secular but religion continues to permeate the lives of families and most individuals. The way that has been found to take in the new while retaining the old passes through the federalism of the state, a secularism not opposed to but benevolent towards religions, the recognition of linguistic boundaries, a communalism and a casteism officially denied but often upheld in practice, a planned and partly socialized economy respectful of petty mercantilism and private capitalism, and in general a healthy sense of pluralism. More than compromise or synthesis, there is duplication and conjunction and the overall change is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Without denying the validity of many possible complaints, I venture to say that contemporary India accepts a conception of man which is congenial to the development of persons. This conception is made of various elements : the old hierarchical casteic conception of society, which provides the roots and ligaments that prevent Indian citizens from ever being isolated individuals; the modern conception, which sanctions the basic rights and freedoms of each man and abolishes excessive privileges or disabilities; the philosophy of Neo-Hinduism, which mingles the lofty transcendentalism of the Upanisads with the humanism of the Sermon on the Mount and the self-sufficiency of Hinduism with the universal openness of religious and cultural pluralism. The conjunction of these three has opened India to all the chief dimensions of the human person.

On the contrary, with regard to divine personality we suffer in India at least from a linguistic embarrassment. We here speak of 'personal' and 'impersonal' as if they were synonyms with '*saguna*' and '*nirguna*'. Thus we fail to recognize the personality of the *nirguna Brahman* and the parallel *nirgunatva* (simplicity befitting the Absolute) of the personal God of Christianity and of most Western conceptions. In this we follow the guidance offered by the great translators of Sanskrit works during the late XIXth

century. But we can trace their understanding of the term 'person' to the trend of rationalistic individualism studied earlier and, more precisely, to F. H. Jacobi, the philosopher of faith as the sense of reality. Jacobi appears to be the first in the whole Western tradition to have considered that 'person' necessarily implied limitation and relational dependance so that it could not be applied to God except anthropomorphically. A small number of Protestant thinkers, chiefly Germans, accepted his ruling and we have inherited their usage. But we must be aware at least that it is contrary to the larger tradition of European and Christian thought and idiom within which the term 'person' received its original denotation.

## 2. The Redintegration of the Person :

Passing now to our own century, we may on a broad estimation say that it is marked with a renovated sense of the person and a will to promote its welfare.

This redintegration of the person is, first of all, observable in the sciences of life or of man. In biology, for instance, J. S. Haldane holds that physiological events should no longer be interpreted in terms of lower levels of physico-chemical laws but from higher standpoint of consciousness. At the same time, we should cease to consider consciousness or personality as a mere parallel of the organism and to suppose that man as a person is anything different from his organism perceived and understood more fully. The advance in the social sciences has revealed anew the social dimension of human personality. It has shown it as a datum both of nature and of nurture or culture. The new-born infant is received and cradled by a network of social relationships, thanks to which he can emerge as a self and unfold his particular potentialities into realisations which in turn affect society. In psychology, we have attained to the notion of personality as a dynamic unity of traits or as a body-mind complex of dispositions. Even extreme behaviourists would not deny this position taken by James, Dewey, Haldane, Mead, etc. Psychology further acknowledges the inequalities between persons and, in view of measuring them, resorts to various types of data obtainable from life-situations (L), objective tests (T), questionnaires (Q), population sampling (P-technique), etc. The structure which is thus being measured is

a complex typical pattern of traits, dispositions, needs, interests and values which are in dynamic relationship to each other and to the environment in a given situation. The psycho-analytical approach has destroyed the Cartesian domination of consciousness and mapped out the various levels, conscious and subconscious, of the mind. The perceptual-motivational research has demonstrated that the configuration of personality does not result from mere conditioning by stimuli but from the need-system which motivates the organism. As to the origin of the religious sentiment, it is less and less attributed to sex instinct or to the so-called religious instinct but it is found, by Selbie for instance, in the fact that many primitive motives work in such a way that they attract a person closer to the religious interpretation of the Universe. Thus religion is seen as a product of persons' rational reflection as much as the sciences. Psychology, in order to isolate and measure the various traits and factors of personality, had initially to take man to pieces but, beyond that analytic procedure, there has now emerged a dynamic concept of the self, a new holistic picture of personality.

In philosophy, there is a similar convergence towards a holistic, anti-Cartesian understanding of personality. Husserl opens up the *Cogito* by placing intentionality at the centre of his doctrine. Bergson dynamises completely the conception of man and relates him more satisfactorily both to matter and to the living and personal God of open religion and mysticism. Blondel centres on the question of man's destiny his great book on *Action* and his later trilogy on *Thought*, *Being and Beings*, and *Action*, which together form the most comprehensive and, perhaps, most impressive system of this century. Lavelle develops his dialectics of participation by which man discovers himself as sustained by the personal Absolute and constantly dependent on this Source but as a free being entrusted with the choice of his own destiny. The Neo-Thomists restore the personalism of St. Thomas and find in it valuable directions to guide them in their encounter with science and technology, social development, international relations, violence, dictatorship, etc. Existentialists, without denying the experience of the *Cogito*, explore, often with rewarding results, the complementary experiences either of anxiety (Heidegger) or of hope and commitment (Marcel) or of pure (contingency and absurdity (Sartre). More recently, the structuralists have drawn

our attention to the *a priori* but external systems of relations which pertain to language, symbols and culture, thus anteceding each man and conditioning his social personalization.

In order to illustrate more vividly the trend which I have just outlined, I shall now report briefly on three thinkers, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Mounier, and P. F. Strawson.

Scheler, the most illustrious of Husserl's disciples, is the phenomenologist of sympathy and of the polar sentiments of love and hatred. His central view may be expressed as follows : Love can explain all things (i.e., God and the universe) because it is directed to the person which is the supreme and synthetic value. Love is manifested as the aspiration towards values. But values are realised by the person, which synthesises them and transcends each of them as well as their sum. We love a person not simply as a totality of values but as something more and unique, an "unaccountable Plus" (*unbegründliche Plus*), says Scheler. He calls it "the concrete (or vital) unity of our being in all its activities" (*die konkrete Seinseinheit von Acten*). The whole person is committed in each act and varies in each act without exhausting its being in any one of them. The person is necessarily individual and thus unique in the sense of unrepeatable. To talk of a general person or, in Kant's way, of "consciousness in general" is nonsense. The person is doubly autonomous, firstly, through personal insight into good and evil and, secondly, through personal volition concerning the good or the evil as concretely given. Due to this autonomy and transcendence, the person is never part of a world but always its correlate. However, the essence of the human person is found in the fact that his whole spiritual being and activity is rooted both in individual reality and in membership in a community. Man enjoys an elemental and irreducible religious experience : the divine element belongs to the primitive givenness of his consciousness. God is subsistent Being, Consciousness, Power, Holiness, Infinity. Thus He is personal, the person of persons. The reproach of anthropomorphism against attribution of personality to the Absolute is misdirected because it is not true that God is conceived according to man's image but rather that the only notion of man which makes sense is "theomorphic."

Mounier (1905–1950) was not only a professor of philosophy but the founder of the Paris review *Esprit*, a leading periodical which has remained in the van of progressive thought as the organ of a movement also called *Esprit*. This movement tries to achieve a peaceful revolution which will be personalistic and communitarian. Mounier's *A Personalist Manifesto* delineates the features of such a revolution in the various spheres of private life and education, economy and politics, international and intercultural relationships. These features are commanded by his conception of the human person which he sets forth in contrast with the Cartesian and Sub-Cartesian conceptions.

Against dualism, he proclaims that “*I exist subjectively, I exist bodily* are one and the same experience.” “Man is a body in the same degree that he is a spirit, wholly body and wholly spirit.” But against materialism, he asserts that although man is a natural being, he transcends nature. “The singularity of man is his dual capacity for breaking with nature. He alone knows the universe that enfolds him, and he alone transforms it.” Against liberal individualism, he upholds communication as a primordial requirement of personality. “Individualism is a system of morals, feelings, ideas and institutions in which individuals are organized by their mutual isolation and defence.” “Man in the abstract, unattached to any natural community, the sovereign lord of a liberty unlimited, and undirected; turning towards others with a primary mistrust, calculation and self-vindication; institutions restricted to the assurance that these egoisms should not encroach upon one another, or to their betterment as a purely profitmaking association—such is the rule of civilization now breaking up before our eyes. It is the very antithesis of personalism.” . . . “In its inner experience the person is a presence directed towards the world and other persons. It is thus communicable by its nature.” “One might almost say that I have no existence, save in so far as I exist for others, and that to be is in the final analysis to love.” Self-recollection is the complementary opposite of communication. Persons must be assured privacy for self-withdrawal and concentration. “Discretion and reserve are the homage that the person renders to the sense of an infinite life within.” And this leads to a “surpassing of the self”, a self surrenders to the transcendent

divine. "Personalists, however, cannot willingly surrender the person to anything impersonal. (On the contrary they finally deduce all values from the unique appeal of the one supreme Person.)"<sup>1</sup>

P. F. Strawson published in 1959 *Individuals, An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. "Descriptive metaphysics," he explained, "is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure. Boardly (speaking), Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and Kant descriptive." The first part of this *Essay* aims at establishing the central position which material bodies and persons occupy in our conceptual scheme as it is. At the outset, he puts two questions : (1) why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all ? and (2) why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc. ? His answer, on p. 98, is that states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to the same things as certain corporeal characteristics, etc. And what he means by the concept of a person is precisely the concept of a type of entity such that *both* of those distinct predicates are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. He maintains that the concept of a person is primitive, i.e., it is the ultimate subject of this twofold attribution and is not analyzable into more ultimate subjects, such as body and soul, or reducible to the Humean fiction. Thus Strawson restores in his own way the holistic character of 'person' and bars the way to any dualism or scepticism in this matter. This vindication of the primitiveness of the concept of person permits me to speak of a rediscovery of the person even in the uncongenial atmosphere of contemporary British philosophy.

### Conclusion :

Our survey of the troubled history of the notion of person may have revealed several things : the centrality and the primitiveness of this notion; the difficulty of defining it correctly, i.e., of providing for it a well-conducted piece of descriptive rather than revisionary metaphysics; the need for considering not only the pronouncements

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1. All Mounier quotations are taken from his *Personalism* transl. by P. Mairet, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.

of philosophers in this matter but also the views implicit in the ways of life and the institutions of the different peoples and cultural areas; the active role played by the several competing conceptions of the person in the transformation and revolutions of mankind, including India, especially during the last two hundred years; the difference between individualism and personalism and the lag between many of our conceptions, institutions and ways of behaviour and what appears to be the richest and most adequate conception of person and personalism.

Surely in this matter more than in any other one the wish is true that we should not only *explain* but *transform* and that theory should usher in *praxis*.

Jnana Deepa,  
Poona-14.

R. V. De Smet

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EDITORS

## REVIEWS

*Saṅkara e la Rinascita del Brāhmaṇesimo*, : Mario Piantelli, Editrice Esperienze (Maestri di Spiritualità, sezione : Mondo orientale), Fossane, VIII+319 pp., Lire 3.500, 1974.

To the growing but uneven shelf of books on Śaṅkara, the author adds a valuable contribution. It is unusual insofar as it provides much information difficult to come by elsewhere. Its three chapters deal respectively with the life of Śaṅkara, his doctrine, and the sources concerning them. Scholars know the difficulty of ascertaining the age and the dates of Saṅkara, the circumstances of his life, and the number of his authentic writings, not to speak of the exact content of his original teaching. To the study of these topics, the author brings forth the resources of his remarkably complete erudition and sums up the results of recent critical research without venturing into presumptuous hypotheses or too controversial assertions. Thus adopting a soundly critical attitude, he yet tempers it with an openness to examine with sympathy even very doubtful sources and to expose leisurely their alleged data, especially regarding the life-events of the great Ācārya. He is led to this by a laudable but typically Western desire to discover the man beyond the writings. But apart from these writings there are only legendary biographies, later than Śaṅkara by at least five centuries, unsupported by any discernible dependence on an authentic tradition that would link them with the early disciples, and clearly fabricated for the threefold purpose of pious edification, providing a mnemonic framework for enshrining a host of pieces of pseudo-Śaṅkarian literature, and often striving to uphold the claims of one or the other *matha* (monastic centre) over its rivals and to link Śaṅkara with a sect like Shaivism or even Tantrism.

In the beginning of his first chapter, the author sets forth in 17 lines the only data that can be considered as certain regarding the life of Śaṅkara : he lived between the end of the 7th century and the first half of the 8th; he was a Brahmin of the Atri clan; he became an itinerant saṇṇyāsin who won many disciples to his teaching and form of renunciation; the India of his time was no longer a unitary monarchy and society was in a state of confusion

regarding the duties of the different *varṇas* and *āśramas*; the places he refers to belong all to North India; none of the five *rājas* he mentions has been identified with certainty; in the course of his career, he disputed with a certain *Vināyaka*, probably a Buddhist scholar, and defeated him; among his disciples, two are most certain, *Sureśvara* and *Padmapāda*. That is all. In the following 100 pages, the author in a very attaching narration harmonizes the "data" of the legendary Lives, exposing fairly their mutual conflicts and sifting out manifest historical impossibilities. For this work of comparative hagiography scholars will be grateful but the question remains, will they be richer in reliable information? Piantelli himself is not inclined to dismiss these "biographies" *in toto*. "Śaṅkara's image, as alive today in the hearts of millions of Indians, cannot prescind from them, and single episodes reveal so much a character both coherent and most plausible that they cannot be discarded rashly. Śaṅkara, who in his works disappears willingly behind his arguments, appears in them with the sweetness, the strength and also the imperfections of one among us and we feel that we can understand and love him as a man and not merely as a thinker" (p. 217). While respecting and even sympathizing with this attitude we would still question character coherence and plausibility as sufficient criteria of acceptability in such matters (are they not the marks of fiction more than of real life?). Besides, there is a real danger that such an openness towards legendary materials will, in the eyes of Indian readers, appear to justify the present uncritical bias of even scholarly advaitins towards a ready acceptance not only of the Śaṅkara legends but, less harmlessly, of doctrinal works ascribed to Śaṅkara with little chance of genuineness.

Chapter III which treats of the sources deals first of all with the writings of Śaṅkara. A useful appendix lists 433 titles, 107 of which merely duplicate for another 69. 219 do not enjoy unanimous recognition by the tradition while 214 titles do. Scholars, however, reject most of them. The list of genuine and doubtful works established by S. K. Belvalkar remains a solid basis which Piantelli accepts for discussion. Regarding the *bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*, he remains unconvinced by the arguments of the critics of its authenticity; in my opinion he is right. As to the *vivarana* on the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*, he takes good note of its

rejection by Jacobi, Belvalkar and V. Bhattacharya but finds their arguments undecisive and counterbalanced by Ānandagiri's reference to glosses on that work earlier than his own (13th cent.). Given the doctrinal importance of this *vivarana* I wish he could have devoted a critical disquisition to the genuineness of this—to my mind, extremely doubtful—work. He refers to the traditional thesis that these two *bhāsyas* (on *Gītā* and *Māndūkya*) would be the earliest products of Śaṅkara's exegetical activity; for textual reasons I would accept it for the *Gītābhāṣya* but find no compelling reasons to agree with it even as a compromise solution in the case of the *Māndūkyabhbāṣya*. Among the minor works, the *bhāṣya* on the *Viśṇusahasranāmastotra* has in his opinion some probability of being authentic. The *Dakṣināmūrtistotra* which is one of the 8 hymns retained as more probably genuine by Belvalkar is singled out for translation in the closing appendix on account of its doctrinal weight. As to the *Saundaryalahari* and the *Shivabhujaṅga* which Belvalkar had rejected, the acceptance of the first by Radha-krishnan and Mahadevan, and of the second by Mahadevan, should have called for a serious discussion rising above the level of mere feeling on which these authors seem to have remained. There is no serious ground to doubt the authenticity of the verse part of *Upadeśasāhasrī* but the prose part continues to appear apocryphal. As to the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, Piantelli remains rightly unconvinced by Ingalls's arguments for his rejection and calls for a new investigation which might result in saving its main core of 265 stotras in *anuṣṭubh* (apart from a few like 144, 343, 353) out of its total number of 580 stotras as already suggested by Belvalkar. He further suggests reasons for reconsidering the case of *Ātmabodha*, *Pāñcikaranapratyayā* and *Ātmānātma viveka*.

The rest of ch. III deals quite informatively with the works of Śaṅkara's immediate disciples, the documents relating to the succession lines of the heads of the five chief Śaṅkara *mathas* (without discussing the legitimacy of their claims to have originated from the Master,) the traces of Śaṅkara's influence on the rival schools and references to him in other literary works. At this point, he usefully recalls that the dating of Śaṅkara which the majority of modern writers have unquestioningly accepted, namely 788–820, was determined on a very weak basis by the Dutch scholar

C. P. Tiele in his *Outlines of the History of Ancient Religions* (1877). Piantelli exposes the spuriousness of the sources used by Tiele and other attendant documents on pp. 213–214 after presenting, on pp. 209–210, some at least of the solid reasons for bringing back Śaṅkara to about one century earlier. A more precise dating has not yet been attained. In the same chapter, Piantelli examines also the rather scanty archaeological data and the 14 so-called biographies of the ācārya. In the closing appendix, he offers a careful translation of ch. 28 of the verse part of *Upadeśasāhasrī* which is Śaṅkara's best exposition of the *mahāvākyā* "Tattvamasi".

The author's outline of Śaṅkara's doctrine (ch. II, pp. 107–187) is solid, personal and uncompromising. He takes his distance from many a modern interpreter : Otto, Zaehner, Radhakrishnan, Lacombe, Hacker, Panikkar, Hoang-Sy-Quy. He studies successively (1) the human condition, (2) Reality, (3) unreality, (4) liberation and the way which leads to it. This is preceded by a brief setting forth of Śaṅkara's intention and method. What Śaṅkara intends is exclusively liberation (*mokṣa*) through recognition of the nature of Reality as revealed by the *Upaniṣads* or *Śruti*. Hence, he only claims to be an *Aupaniṣada* or *Śrutiyādin*, i.e., an exegete of the *Upaniṣads* according to the tradition of *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*. Their testimony which is eternal and, hence, infallible is received as sovereign and independent, not as complementary to any other source of truth within its domain, *mokṣa*. Reliance on it gives Śaṅkara an assurance which underlies his intellectual fervour and courage, his serene objectivity in meeting opponents, and the organic unity of his thought.

The misery of man's condition in the passing world of *Samsāra* ruled by the law of *karman* and rebirth which makes man the binder of his own shackles is a *locus communis* of Indian culture in Śaṅkara's time. Instead of simply showing that the latter endorses it, the author might profitably have introduced the reader to Śaṅkara's criticism of Jaimini's conception of *karman* in *Vedāntasūtra Bhāṣya*, 3,2,38–41 + 2,1,34–35 and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, 3,8,9–12. He, however, does not fail to point out Śaṅkara's high estimation of human birth : man alone is capable of intellectual knowledge and infinite desire; this capacity gives every man access to the saving knowledge even though the study of *Śruti* requires

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qualifications which are the privilege of only few; but man is also free and can refuse to "cut off the tree of *samsāra*" and thus miss salvation.

The opposite of *samsāra* is Reality, i.e., the unchanging Absolute, the *Brahman-Ātman*. Its mark, indeed, is unchangeableness. Speech, being *samsāra*-bound, is radically unable to express it. Hence, Śaṅkara's apophatism is inflexible. It is rooted in the Upaniṣadic *neti-neti* which prescribes that the *Brahman* can only be attained "through elimination of all differences due to *upādhīs*." *Upādhi* means finite and diversifying adjuncts or attributes or relations wrongly superimposed upon the infiniteness and simplicity of the Absolute. The author refers to this notion but without working it out. Śaṅkara's apophatism, however, is not Buddhistic. Though silence—of speech but with a mind entirely focused on the absolute Fulness—would be the most adequate attitude, the Upaniṣads themselves make use, without betraying apophatism, of positive appellations. And one of the most original and helpful contributions of Śaṅkara is his justification of this practice through recourse to the theory of *lakṣṇā*. This theory takes into account the secondary meanings which accrue to words (and concepts) from their function in contexted sentences. Through such a *lakṣyārtha*, a word may "indicate" (*laks-*) a reality beyond the area (*gocara*) of "expressive" power of its primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*). In particular, some words whose primary meaning abstract from both finiteness and infinity can contextually infinitized so that their "supreme meaning" (*paramārtha*) becomes "indicative" of the Absolute. Such, for instance, are the words *satya* (reality) and *jñāna* (knowledge) used with *ananta* (infinite), which infinitizes them, in the definition of *Brahman* provided by *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2,1. The author is quite aware of this feature of Śaṅkara's exegesis but does not expose its full scope. Further, in denying its affinity with the Thomistic theory of analogy, he is only half-right. This theory, indeed, is primarily a theory of the secondary meanings of terms which differs little from the theory of *lakṣṇā* especially in its Śaṅkarian application; but it is prolonged by a theory of ontological participation which is foreign to Śaṅkara.

To the positive capacity of words thus to serve as pointers to the Absolute, Piantelli rightly adds the capacity of human consciousness to discover it at the very heart of its experience : in its experience of the universe (as the internal and transcendent Cause of all,) in its awareness of 'I am' (as the innermost Self or Ātman of everyone,) in its *cogito* (as the absolute and *per se* Light, *svayamjyoti*, Witness, *sākṣin*, Seer, *drastṛ*, and Consciousness itself, *cit*, of every thinking.). Our transitory vision would be impossible without that eternal Vision or Seer. Thus, in the most elevated sense (*paramārthataḥ*) of the term *ātman*, there is but the unique Ātman. In *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 2,18 translated by the author, Śaṅkara explains that our finite 'I' or *ātman* is but a mere reflection of that unique Ātman but Piantelli does not take up this important theory in his exposition.

This presence of Reality at the very root of consciousness relativises all the rest into unreality (or un-Reality, as I would prefer). Śaṅkara's loaded definition of these two terms, *sat* and *asat* (loaded inasmuch as it focuses only on the "supreme sense" of *sat*) in his *Gitābhāṣya* is unfortunately neglected by Piantelli who simply writes, "impermanente—e dunque irreale." (p. 135) Unreality comprises the whole realm of multiplicity, nothing of which—neither knowers nor objects—can ever be indentified with the Real. The latter, therefore, is not a distinct object and in that sense is unknowable. It is often said that for Śaṅkara "all this is *māyā*" but Piantelli is careful to recall that Śaṅkara himself (as distinct from later disciples) speaks very little in terms of *māyā* and rather in the sense of marvellous, divine power than of illusion. The term he affects is *avidyā*, nescience. All that it really implies for him would have been more relevant than the diverse theories of his followers rapidly mentioned by Piantelli. The latter, however, does not fail to quote the masterful text of *Bṛhadāraṇī*, Up., 4,4,7 which shows that *avidyā* is eternally surmounted by the Ātman which sees it as *avidyā* and is thus unaffected by it. Ordinary knowledge is imbued with *avidyā* but this does not mean that its objects have no reality at all. Rather they are undefinable (*anirvacanīya*) in terms of 'being' or 'non-being' taken in their supreme sense (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*). The independent reality we spontaneously attribute to them vanishes as such at the moment of our awakening to *Vidyā*. Does this mean that ultimate truth negatives all reality

apart from the Atman ? To this question Piantelli gives, and seems to adhere simply to, the facile answer that acosmism is not justified before awakening but is imposed by it. However, the rather intricate explanations he gives ( pp. 140-152 ) are more refined than that. They should be read carefully. What they amount to is a defence of non-dualism against any confusion with monism and any compromise with dualism. The latter would admit that cosmic reality is in some regard or at some time *per se*; the first would uphold that the aseity of the Absolute renders it incapable of any true creativity. Of these two misconceptions the first is very ably refuted by the author but the second receives no proper treatment. Whereas Saṅkara devotes numerous stretches of his writings to the topic of creative causality, it is nowhere considered seriously in this book.

If non-dualism is true, liberation is not really an aim to be attained but an eternal fact to which man awakens. Only so long as we are under the sway of *avidyā* can we conceive of it as an end to be reached by some way or means. This way is the teaching of the Upanisads duly inculcated by a guide who has himself overcome *avidyā*. It proceeds along the classical three steps of audition, reflection and intense meditation. It cannot be entered without proper qualifications, especially total renunciation and desisting from secular and even sacral activity. Saṅkara's hard polemics against all *karmavādins* is here recalled. The author is aware that it nullifies the very presuppositions of the whole theory of *karman*. Liberation can take place in the very course of one's life (*jivanmukti*) since it consists in a total awakening to absolute Consciousness which is ever present. It is infinite Joy and Freedom.

Through Piantelli's book, Saṅkara becomes alive and we are richly introduced to the profundity of his doctrine. For this and the many helps it provides including an excellent bibliography, the author deserves all our gratitude.

Jnana Deepa, Poona.

R. V. De Smet

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## ANNOUNCEMENTS

Subscribers of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly are hereby very earnestly requested to agree to give us the Back Numbers of I.P.Q. (Volume II Nos. 1 and 2 only). The office of the I.P.Q. dose not unfortunately have these numbers. We would be prepared to buy them at an appropriate price.

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Due to a very heavy load of articles to consider, the Editors regietfully announce that there may be some unavoidable delay in publishing the selected articals. Pre-publication letters of acceptance would, of course, be sent in advance. It is also to be noted that it will not be possible to consider more than one contribution from the same author for at least three successive numbers of the journal.

EDITORS

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

Concepts of Indian Philosophy	Saraswati Channakesavan, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1976; pp. xv + 258
Hegel : A Re-Examination	J.N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976; pp. 372.
The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays	W. V. Quine, Harvard University Press, 1976; pp. x + 355.
Bhartṛhari	Harold G. Coward, Twayne Publishers, A Division of G. K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1976; pp. 150.

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## THE CONCEPT OF UNANSWERABLE QUESTION

In this paper an attempt has been made by us to find out a suitable account of the meaning of *unanswerable question*.

1. Unanswerable questions bear intimately on the problem of the extent of knowledge. And that, also, is how, usually, their significance in philosophy would perhaps be summed up. However, they seem to assume significance in certain more ways too.

For men of religion, unanswerable questions tend to provide a ground for upholding the greatness of God.<sup>1</sup> If there really are some questions which are unanswerable, then one can, on the basis of that, well proclaim that God and the world, which God has created, are more than a man is able to know.

What, however, might appear considerably more interesting about the concept of unanswerable question is a particular historical fact about it. I mean its paradoxical use by Kant and the logical positivists. Both disbanded metaphysics as impossible, but the former on the ground that there are some questions, *e.g.* those in metaphysics, which are unanswerable, and the latter on the ground of the exact opposite of it, namely that there are no questions which are unanswerable.

Anyway, in deciding to occupy ourselves with the concept of unanswerable question here, we do not have in mind any predilection for God or any prejudice against metaphysics. As regards both of them, we are non-committal. What we have in mind as a motive is something different. It is, if we may say so, the idea of a possibility which tends to suggest itself quite strongly to us. To be a bit more explicit, we have a definite feeling that unanswerable questions, if they exist, would make for a significant addition in our list of categories, and, that way, would call for a revision of it. In a sense, this may appear in the eyes of

some to be subservient to metaphysics. But all that is purely accidental.

But on what, one may ask, is this feeling of ours logically grounded? Lest we might appear too dogmatic, we would answer: two things together which are as follows.

*First:* the position, worked out elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> that unanswerable questions form a basic class of questions.

*Second:* a principle to the effect that the basic classes of questions and the ontological categories are isomorphic with each other, so that, given one or all of the former, you can, correspondingly, model one or all of the latter.

This principle, of course, is not something which we have discovered ourselves. It may be said to underlie Aristotle's<sup>3</sup> doctrine of categories. True, not all of Aristotle's commentators<sup>4</sup> will agree on this point. But that is theoretically immaterial. For, obviously, pedigree and, for that matter, difference of opinion as regards it, can make no difference whatever to the logical value of a principle. So, the principle is true, if it is true. And, separately, elsewhere, we shall try to show that it is so. Pending that, we may just assume its truth.

2. Our search for what, really, is to be meant by 'unanswerable question' must begin on an elimination of certain senses of the locution which are palpably irrelevant. These senses include especially those which happen to derive from certain norms which we generally adhere to in certain appropriate contexts; they have no logical bearing on the nature of unanswerable questions *qua* questions. Take, for example, the following three questions which will illustrate the point.

- (1) Why do you doze during committee meetings?
- (2) How old are you?
- (3) When are the troops going to move?

The three questions are all answerable, in the obvious sense that each has an answer which it is possible for one to know. Yet you may call them unanswerable also in cer-

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tain senses depending on their contexts. (1) will be unanswerable, *e.g.* for a person in authoritative position, if it is addressed to him by one who is subordinate to him, (2), *e.g.* for a sophisticated young lady, when it comes from, say, her curious neighbour, and (3), *e.g.* for the officer in command of the troops, if it is asked by, say, a layman or an enemy agent.

3. Whatever sense of 'unanswerable question' is to come up for our consideration here must have to derive from its logical character *qua* question. That, indeed, is the primary requirement. Now, a description which would appear to conform to this stipulation is readily available to us. It is as follows :

An unanswerable question is a question which *has no answer*.

The formula looks quite simple. But that, in our opinion, is thoroughly deceptive. What is it, let us enquire, that is to be meant by saying that a question *has no answer*? This is far from obvious. As a matter of fact, the notion of *having no answer* happens to cover a range of employment which is fairly varied; and, that way, naturally, it assumes a number of senses which also are likewise varied. Therefore, left as it is, it can say very little about itself or about the notion of *being unanswerable* which is sought to be defined by it. On the other hand, when the different senses of *having no answer* are sorted out explicitly, one begins to be aware of certain hazards that will result from the attempt to define the notion of *being unanswerable* in terms of it.

- (i) In certain instances, the attempt would make non-sense of the notion of unanswerable questions.
- (ii) In certain other instances, it would totally fail, because there happens to exist in our discourse certain examples of questions about which it would be pretty meaningful to talk of *having no answer* but not of *being unanswerable*.

(iii) Finally, there are instances where the attempt would make it necessary that we should impose an arbitrary restriction on the scope of being answerable or having an answer.

Let us elaborate these three propositions *ad seriatim*.

3.1. Take the question 'What colour are apples?', and fancy that your respondents say:

- (i) Apples are the inertia of a greenish symphony.
- (ii) Apples are blue.
- (iii) One apple a day keeps the doctor away.

All alike would be readily dismissed by you as *no answer* to your question, though for very different reasons of course. (a) In saying (i) is no answer to your question, you will mean that it is a piece of nonsense, neither true nor false, and so the question whether it stands in the QA-relation<sup>5</sup> to your question does not arise at all in its case. (b) In saying (ii) is no answer, you just say that it is not true, not that it is nonsense or that it does not stand in the QA-relation to your question. (c) As regards (iii), all that you intend to say is that it does not stand in the QA-relation to your question, remaining non-committal about its truth and falsity. In short, as regards (i), you say that *it is not a statement at all*, as regards (ii), just that the *statement is not true*, and as regards (iii), just that the *statement is irrelevant*.

Considered in the light of this three-fold ambiguity of the locution 'non answer', the description that an unanswerable question is a question which has *no answer* would, naturally, admit of reformulation in the following three ways :

- (1) A question such that whatever sentence is furnished in response to it is a piece of nonsense and, for that reason, does not stand in any QA-relation to it.
- (2) A question such that whatever sentence stands in QA-relation to it is a false sentence.

(3) A question such that no sentence, true or false, can ever stand in QA-relation to it.

To examine the three formulations:

(2) contradicts itself, which is quite obvious. For, what, on earth, might be said to make for any sense in our saying that all sentences in QA-relation to a question would express false statements, unless it is presupposed that there is at least one sentence in that relation which would express a true statement?

(1) and (3), on the other hand, contradict the notion of question itself. That is, it makes of an unanswerable question what is not a question at all.

A question must always have something, a statement, or an order, or something else of its kind, which is to stand in QA-relation to it. That is a necessary requirement. And what fails to answer it is not a question, its question form notwithstanding. Therefore, to say that an unanswerable question is that to which nothing can stand in QA-relation is truly equivalent to denying that it is a question. From which it would follow further that to ask for what is to count as the right sense of unanswerable question in this sense would really amount to asking for the right sense of a kind of question which, in fact, is not a question at all.

3.2. The *unanswerability* of a question is not, in any way, the same thing as its *having no answer*. The latter connotes less and denotes more. Accordingly, in actuality, one will come across instances of questions in our discourse about which it would make good sense to say that they *have no answers*, though not, for that reason, to say further that they are *unanswerable*. Consider, for example, 'What shape is your love, round or rectangular?', or any other like question. What, possibly, can one say in reply to it? One may dismiss it summarily saying that it is a sheer nonsense. Or one may say, "Well, love, like a snuff-box, isn't the sort of thing that has a shape, round or rectangular".

However, in neither case, would it be proper to say that we have got an answer to the question. The first is only a

comment on the question, and second only the denial of the presupposition of it, namely, that love has a shape, round or rectangular.

So, we get a sample of a question which, we can say, has no answer. But can we, on that ground, call it an unanswerable question also? No. For, the question is meaningless; and, like a meaningless statement which cannot be said to be true or false, a question, which is meaningless, cannot be called either answerable or unanswerable.

Like 'true' and 'false' which stand for the basic predicates of statements and can be predicated, in their primary sense, of meaningful statements only, the words 'answerable' and 'unanswerable', we maintain, constitute the basic predicates of meaningful questions and can be ascribed, in their primary sense, only to them. This, with us, we should point out, is a fundamental logical point about questions.

But the matter, we are afraid, may be called in question particularly in the face of such specimens of meaningless questions as, for instance, 'Is love rectangular', 'Can this hillock run a race?', and so on. Can't we say they are answerable, since to each of them we do seem to give an answer by saying 'no', 'never', etc. One may ask.

Well, speaking truly, these are not questions at all; their sentential form is totally misleading. They call for no answers, and as such there can be no point in calling them answerable. 'No', 'never', or such other verbal responses to them are all logically superfluous. These so-called questions are really statements themselves posed as questions simply for emphasis or to subserve some rhetorical objectives. Thus 'Is love rectangular?' is just a figurative way of pointing to the obvious fact that love can never be rectangular, and 'Can this hillock run a race?' that of pointing to the equally obvious fact that this hillock can never run a race. The grammatical form of these so-called questions communicates nothing about their logical character to us.

3.3. We shall consider questions of a third variety now, which, also, are sometimes supposed to have no answer and

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are called *unanswerable* in that sense. Following Renford Bambrough,<sup>6</sup> one may take them to include:

(i) questions which have no *objectively right* answers, and (ii) questions which, contrary to what would appear from their forms, do not yield any clear-cut 'yes' or any clear-cut 'no' as their answers.

(1) (i) may be exemplified best by those questions which happen to involve some choice, moral, aesthetic, and so on. The question 'What should I do?', which puzzled Sartre's pupil,<sup>7</sup> is a typical specimen of such questions. They are said to *have no answers* and, in that sense, to be unanswerable because, unlike questions of the kind, e.g. 'What colour is the cloud?', 'Is saccharine sweet or sour?', 'What is one third of 99?', etc. etc., they do not admit of answers which can be objectively confirmed, i.e. on the ground of experience, by the rules of mathematics, etc.

(2) (ii) may be instantiated, among other things, by those questions which are named 'borderline questions' by Bambrough.<sup>8</sup> These questions are those "to which it seems clear that the answer 'definitely yes' and the answer 'definitely no' are equally inappropriate."<sup>9</sup> Bambrough's example of borderline question: 'Is this man a bald?', where the man in question "has too much hair to justify us in calling him definitely bald, and too little hair to justify us in calling him definitely not-bald..."<sup>10</sup> Such questions, it is often said, *have no answers* and, that way, they are *unanswerable*.

(1) and (2), we think, suffer from a common defect. The defect is that in both of them the notion of 'being answerable' or that of 'having an answer' has been taken in a restricted sense which is arbitrary. And this mistake, again, as far as we can see, could arise entirely because of a set of mistaken assumptions about what is to count as an answer or a right answer to a question.

(a) Let us elaborate this objection as regards (2) first. Unlike 'What is laterite?', 'When did you see him last?', and so on and so on, there indeed are a species of

questions which would seem to indicate by their form that they are in a position to collect definite 'yes' or definite 'no' as their possible answers. Form is undeniably a significant thing with these questions. It does play a role, a role which is important. Yet, merely by itself, the form, we think, is far from enough; so that one who chooses to judge the questions entirely by their form is very likely to misjudge them. One must take into account certain more elements, e.g. their contexts, their contents, etc., which must have to match their form in an appropriate way. The question, which conforms to this requirement, can, by that, make a claim to definite yes-answer or no-answer. But the one which fails will have to go without it. However, that alone, in no case, can be said to imply that the latter will *have no answer* or that it will have to be called *unanswerable*. For, it is perfectly possible that it will admit of something other than 'yes' or 'no' as its answer.

And Bambrough's borderline questions, with 'Is this man a bald?' for an example, we may say, are, precisely, questions of this kind. Their form does not blend properly with their other relevant ingredients; so that they are answerable only by something besides 'yes' and 'no', no matter that their form suggests otherwise.

Hence, to say that these questions *have no answers*, or that they are, for that matter, *unanswerable*, merely on the ground that they cannot be answered by 'yes' or 'no', would be a sheer mistake; and the mistake, as we understand, arises from their form being taken too seriously and relied upon too blindly. Bambrough also concludes substantially to the same effect. He says:

A question to which "Yes" is a wrong answer, and to which "No" is also a wrong answer, is not a question to which there is *no* answer, but one to which some answer other than "Yes" or "No" is the *right* answer.<sup>11</sup>

(b) Now about (1), which, as is not difficult to notice, involves two assumptions.

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- (i) That what is to count as an *answer* or *right answer* to a question will have to be *objectively right*, i.e. provable by experience or by some other relevant method.
- (ii) That a question can have *only one* answer which is objectively right in this sense.

But the assumptions are both of them purely arbitrary.

(i) Taken for valid, the *first* would impose an unwarranted limit on the range of what can justifiably make a claim to count as answers or right answers. That is, it would restrict them strictly to statements and their cousins (e.g. propositions, beliefs, descriptions, etc.). For, truth being a semantic value of statements only, it is statements, and statements only, which can be called true, in other words, *objectively right*. But this would be most unfair. Must all questions be answered by statements? What, for instance, is to be said about those which collect imperatives as their answers? For example, 'What am I to do now?', to which you can answer, say, 'Draft that petition to the Mayor', 'Get ready for dinner', 'Come, let us have a walk', and so on. None of these can be *proved* true, as none of these can be *called* true.

Besides, why is it that answer, which is to be called right, will also have to be objectively so? We don't really know. This appears in our eyes, if we may say so, taking objectivity just a bit too far, making a fettish of it. Suppose that in reply to your question whether I would like to drink tea or coffee, I say, "Tea". This, undoubtedly, would be the right answer, if it expresses my sincere preference for tea; though there is no point in saying that it is objectively right, insofar as there is no point in saying either that it can be proved true.

(ii) The *second* assumption also is likewise wrong and arbitrary. There is no ground whatever for one to suppose that a question can admit of *only one* such answer as can be considered right. Numerous examples would point to the contrary of it. Take, for example, 'What are the fac-

tors of 16?', to which one can answer by saying '2 x 8', '4 x 4', or '2 x 2 x 4' or '2 x 2 x 2 x 2'. Not just one but each of these answers has an equal right to being objectively right. Just another example, someone asks, 'How can one kill a bird?' You may answer: 'by a gun', or 'by a bow and an arrow', or 'by a stone', and so on. Each of these, not merely one, would be an objectively right answer to the question, since each of them can be proved by experience.

On this point, one, however, we fancy, may have recourse to the following line of argument. Well, singly, none of the alternatives in either of the two examples, it may be said, is the complete answer and, that way, the right answer. In either case, what is truly to be reckoned as the complete and, therefore, the right answer, is one and only one: it is, so to say, the whole of the disjunction of the alternatives, the so-called right answers. From which it would follow that the answer to 'What are the factors of 16?' which is to be called its right answer should be formulated as '(4 x 4) -or-(8 x 2)-or-(2 x 2 x 4)-or-(2 x 2 x 2 x 2); while the answer to 'How can one kill a bird?' which is to be called its right answer should be formulated as '(by a gun)-or-(by a bow and an arrow)-or-(by a stone).'

The argument is a bit too artificial. But this artificiality apart, it is also logically unsound, for the simple reason that whatever logical value is to belong to the two disjunctions of alternatives above must in each case be the function of the alternatives themselves; so that to say that the former is right, while denying that the latter are so would be palpably self-contradictory.

#### 4. To summarize the results of our analysis so far.

An unanswerable question, we have seen, is not to be construed merely as a question which *has no answer*. For, the notion of *having no answer* is prone to assume a number of senses some of which are incompatible with the notion of question itself, while the rest with the permissible uses of the expression 'unanswerable question'.

What, then, to constitute an unanswerable question? Is there any alternative account which might be expected to prove adequate? We would venture to suggest the following:

A question is to be called unanswerable, if what is to count as its right answer is *unknowable*.

What is distinctive of this formulation is plainly its epistemological orientation, that is to say, the idea of the *answer being unknowable* which it is made to incorporate. This, however, goes to introduce a significant ambiguity which we must make explicit.

It is common to distinguish three senses in which a thing may be called *unknowable*. *First*, a thing is called *logically unknowable*, if its knowledge is found to be incompatible with the laws of logic. *Secondly*, even though logically knowable, it will be called *empirically unknowable*, if its knowledge is found incompatible with the laws of nature, e.g. those about the nature or the working of the mind that is to know, those about the nature of the object that is to be known, etc. *Thirdly*, a thing, even though it may be otherwise knowable, may yet be called *technically unknowable*, if its knowledge becomes unattainable because of any technical reason, e.g. want of necessary equipments, etc.

This three-fold distinction of the senses in which a thing is to be called *unknowable* will, naturally, proceed to introduce a corresponding distinction of three senses in which an answer to a question is to be called *unknowable*, and, that way, further, it will give rise to the following three types of unanswerable questions as conceived by us:

- (1) *Logically unanswerable questions* (LUQ), where the right answer is logically unknowable.
- (2) *Empirically unanswerable questions* (EUQ), where the right answer is empirically unknowable.
- (3) *Technically unanswerable questions* (TUQ), where the right answer is technically unknowable.

(2) and (3), i.e. EUQ and TUQ, which have countless instances in our discourse, can neither of them become

much of a problem in philosophy. Nobody denies their existence. As a matter of fact, those, e.g. the logical positivists, who are anxious to deny that there are unanswerable questions, do not have either EUQ or TUQ in mind. And the same is to be said also of those, e.g. Kant, who admit them. The philosophical interest over unanswerable questions is confined entirely to (1), i.e. LUQ, and this, therefore, for us is to become the sole important sense of the concept of unanswerable question.

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Mihirvikash Chakravarti

#### NOTES

1. Cf. Moritz Schlick, "Unanswerable Questions", reprinted in the *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. W. Barret and H. D. Aiken, Random House, New York, pp. 23-24.
2. Vide my "Theory" Towards a Theory for the Classification of Questions", *Indian Review of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1973.
3. Vide, for example, *Analytica Posteriora*, Book II, *The Works of Aristotle*, translated under the editorship of Sir David Doss, vol. I, The Clarendon Press, Oxford. Also, see Ryle's "Categories", *Logic and Language*, ed. A. G. N. Flew, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 65-75.
4. E.g. J. M. E. Moravosik. See his "Aristotle's Theory of Categories", *Aristotle*, ed. J. M. E. Moravesik, Macmillan, London, 1969, pp. 125-145.
5. I mean the characteristic logical relation which holds between a question and its answer.
6. "Unanswerable Questions", *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume XI, 1966, pp. 151-172.
7. Quoted by Bambrough from Sartre's *Existentialism and Humanism*. See *ibid* pp. 153-154.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*

## A NOTE ON THE INDISCERNIBILITY OF FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

From morning to the next morning we incessantly spew sentences like,

1. that book is red,
- and
2. this book is brown.

Early in life we get to know that these, and all those that are similar to these, are declarative sentences; and soon after our initiation to philosophy we are instructed that declarative sentences *express* propositions, and are *hooked* to facts. Further, those of us who are blessed to be better instructed are even indoctrinated that they express *propositions*, and are hooked to *facts*. These better instructed being modern Schoolmen deriving their inspiration from that anti-Semitic semanticist Frege and his ilk, their pupils being bewitched by their professional priggishness, started believing that the conjunction here could not possibly be idempotent. This belief, conjoined to their conviction that the Schoolmen clearly aim at semantic rigour, and cautiously refrain from sneaky rhetoric, sharpened their cognitive faculties to the extent of their being able to tell the tweedledom of facts from the tweedledee of propositions. The less literate Wittgenstein, of course, invariably took one for the other. My reading of the *Tractatus* to mean this — or, to make him mean this — may be due to my illiteracy, but it shows how for the not so well-tutored the indiscernible and the identical are indiscernible and identical. That apart, as *doing* philosophy — as distinct from *living* a philosophy — is to attempt at a conversion of others to one's point, what I am at here amounts to deschooling the Schoolmen and their students so that they may see things the way I see. The foregoing is my first point in that direction.

In order to talk about any entity we need to have an expression referring to that entity; this constitutes the

*conditio sine qua non* of minimum strength, for isolating that entity from other entities. Naming, thus, is as much a prologue to discourse as it is to hanging. Now, how do we refer to a fact or a proposition? The answer, obviously, is: by nominalising the sentence which is supposed to express that proposition, or hooked to that fact. Thus

3. *that this table is brown.*

is supposed to name the entity which (2) above is hooked to, and also the entity which it is supposed to express. Further, it is *not* the *token* in (3), but the (3)-*type* that is assumed to be discharging these *twin* functions. This is fair, for otherwise we will end up in a muddle; the reasons for such a prospect are obvious. At least this much is obvious that but for that assumption, we will be left with nothing to determine the role which a given inscription of (3) is supposed to perform. Anyhow, a muddle is evaded, all right — but only to end up with a dilemma. As there is just *one name type* and *two nominata*, all our talk about facts and propositions is multivocal, *or else* facts and propositions is multivocal, *or else* facts and propositions are one and the same. This however, is *not* a dilemma for me, (nor was it to Wittgenstein), as I (we) cheerfully accept the latter alternant; but it is one to all those to whose hearts the dual-role semantics is dear, and also to all those who want to run facts (things) parallel to propositions (concepts). *They* will have to find a way out; if not, they will have to *reconcile* themselves to ambiguous discourse. The latter, for them, is a foreclosed option — for, if they go for it, they will be indulging in a teleological contradiction. After all, their aim is to bring precision into discourse about language. Hence, they will have to opt for the former.

As a way out one might reconstrue the notion of naming so as to make it comprehend what are called *definite descriptions*. It is possible to spin expressions like

4. *the fact to which the sentence 'this table is brown'*  
*is hooked,*

and

5. the proposition which the sentence 'this table is brown' expresses.

The expressions (4) and (5) are different. True; they are not tokens of the same type, nor are they of the same type. And we may be able to spell-out their difference with the required accuracy. But the propositions characterising their difference do not neither individually or in conjunction — guarantee that they are *not* referring to the same entity, nor do they "entail" that they *do* refer to two distinct entities. Whence, reconstruing the notion of naming to hit at a solution to the problem at hand is no more than a futile exercise. Further, (4) and (5) have an unpleasant feature; they are *abstract descriptive phrases*. To clarify what these creatures are I offer a couple of definitions (which, I hope, need not be — in the present context — more rigorously formulated).

6. An expression is *normal* if, and only if, (a) it is a referring expression, and (b) each member of the set of the sub-expressions of that expression are *used*.

6.1 An expression is a *sub-expression* of another if, and only if, the former is a meaningful unit of speech, and both the expressions are meaningful units of speech in the same language.

7. A descriptive phrase is *concrete* if, and only if, there exists a *true identity sentence* in which the other half is composed of a normal expression, such that both the expressions, as well as the identity sentence, are expressions of the same language.

From this it should be evident that in order to defend our ability to do things satisfactorily with (4) and (5), we are required to have expressions the paucity of which led us to spin (4) and (5). If we can fill-in the schemata

8. (4) is ...  
9. (5) is ...

by two distinct normal expressions with different referents, those expressions themselves would have been sufficient for the purpose to meet which (4) and (5) are construed. In addition to all this, (4) and (5) are question-begging, because to assign a truth-value to

### 10. (4) = (5)

we need to know *whether* facts and propositions are the same or different. Their difference is *not established* from the falsity of (10); on the contrary their difference is *assumed* to guarantee the falsity of (10).

An alternative way out might be based on *causal* explanations. It might be argued that the fact

that this table is brown

is caused — in a suitably specified sense of the term — by the carpenter who made it, whereas the proposition

that this table is brown

could not possibly be thought of being causally so conditioned by carpenters.<sup>1</sup> But — I fail to comprehend — why carpenters should not be causally efficacious on propositions too! Why should propositions, like the Platonic furniture, be beyond the reach of the mortal carpenter's adze, brush, and taste? True, the carpenter did choose to paint this table brown, and thereby caused the fact that this table is brown. But, then, he also chose to make the proposition that this table is brown true. This is to say that his choice is the cause of this true proposition, or — variantly — the truth of this proposition. It is not denied that he could have gone for green (or some other colour so that our friend Shah may not mistake it for black), whence it would not have been a fact that this table is brown; then he could have caused the fact that this table is green. Now, can it be denied that had he done so, the proposition that this table is brown would not have been true, or that the proposition that this table is green would have been true? Moreover, his causing the fact in question, and his causing the true proposition in question, are *not* two distinct acts; they are one and the

same. Which carpenter does double the work for the same wages!

At this stage my original position, I am afraid, stands in need of a revision. Earlier I maintained that facts and propositions are indiscernible; and what emerged from the scrutiny above is that true propositions are indiscernible from facts. Thus the need for a modification of my earlier position — but not to weaken it, only make it more precise. And in this attempt Wittgenstein's distinction between *facts* and *cases* comes handy.<sup>2</sup> The set of cases is a proper subset of the set of facts; and members of the former set, and the members of the latter set have actuality and possibility as their respective differentia. Isomorphically, the set of true propositions is a proper subset of the set of propositions. Here the parity is perfect. So my revised position can be formulated as: propositions are indiscernible from facts, and true propositions from cases.

Nobody should try to see my Achilles' ankle here (at least). I am explicitly cautioning, for it is tempting to rush to the conclusion that the preceding paragraph goes against the thesis which it is intended to extend. It might be argued that we speak of propositions being true (false), and we speak of facts being actual (possible); so here we have a pair of properties using which we can discern facts from propositions. I suggest that those who would rush with that — or a similar — argument may pause a while, and consider whether to say that a proposition is true is *different* from saying that the fact which is supposed to be the binary of that proposition is indeed actual. These could as well be alternative ways of doing the same, namely to make intelligible our linguistic behaviour of assenting and dissenting. Being equipowered, one of them ought to be sufficient for whatever purpose the other is wanted. If you owe me ten bucks, you can pay me in two fivers or in one tenor; not that I would decline your offer to pay in both — yet, I would suggest that you need not pay more than you need to pay. The minimum requirements of semantics need not be determined by the way in which semantic terms have been

used conventionally. Conventionally we have been using the binaries *true* (*false*), and *actual* (*possible*). But the nature of the issue at hand is such that only one of them is needed to handle it; the other is redundant. I am suggesting that we better go digital.

Even if all this convinces one, another may point out that though facts and propositions are indiscernible in the sense that their difference cannot be characterised, collapsing the distinction between them — as I did attempt to collapse — is a little unwarranted, and that it is unwarranted at least on two grounds. If my ability to anticipate is not poor, these would be: first, the sense in which I am taking discernibility — either in my sense of the term, or in a more inclusive sense — is not precisely characterisable, it is all the same *conceivable*. Contra these, I would like to point out that characterisability is not a strong requirement at all; indeed, it is the minimum that is required in order to be able to rationally believe that two entities are different. Thus, I am not taking discernibility in any exclusive sense. In fact, I have *not even* given a criterion by stipulating which we can tell whether they are discernible or indiscernible. All that I have been labouring at here is to point out that some such criterion is in order, and that whatever might be the criterion that one intends to tender, it certainly requires two distinct normal concrete expressions — one having its referent in the realm of facts, and the other in the abode of propositions. My point is that there is no way of having such expressions.

Characterisability is not one thing, and conceivability another. Non-characterisable conceivability is a trick — a trick with which too many philosophers for far too long have been cheating. While relaxing in my deck-chair I can conceive myself to be squaring circles; but what does that amount to! — not even that I too am capable of daydreaming, I suppose. The conceivable-but-not-characterisable is illusory, say like the skills of the unproductive.

The impasse involved in a characterisation of the (hypostatised) discernibility of facts and propositions induces

## THE INDISCERNIBILITY OF FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

me to believe in their indiscernibility. And as the indiscernibles are identical (there are innumerable arguments convincing us of this, so I need not add another), I am tempted to take

facts are propositions

as a tautology. If this is true, then it has far reaching consequences, two of which I shall try to mention. First, we need to rethink about a whole range of topics in semantics; and in our rethinking we need to drop, once for all, the dual-role semantics (or semantic dualism). This may not appeal to many. For instance, the versatile Kelkar<sup>3</sup> thinks that any single role semantics (or semantic monism) is bound to be a "hand-to-mouth" affair. Admitted, but *that* is all that we need; and wanting more than that, semantic dualists are — like capitalists — attempting to thrive on a continuous conversion of wants into needs.

I have barely stated my first argument towards fusing facts and propositions and thereby simplifying semantics. In *doing* philosophy to give all the arguments at a stretch is as undesirable as it is to field in a battle all the divisions at a time. If my first argument is destroyed, I will deploy the next two. Meanwhile I will be content with pointing out the second of the consequences that I said the fusion of facts and propositions has. And it is: a totality of facts is supposed to uniquely determine an ontology, and a totality of propositions an ideology. Now, two totalities are discernible if, and only if, their constituents are discernible. Then, it follows that ontology and ideology are indiscernible; thus, ontology is ideology. The credibility of this becomes obvious if those happen to be propositions of what are called social sciences. Otherwise it may remain there as a nebulous truism until its inherent dynamics turn into a dangerous cloud threatening our own being.

Jaipur

A. P. Rao

## NOTES

1. In fact that was the point of Strawson — that Guru and Govind of several neophytes in the Indo-Gangetic plain. He made it in a conversation, and I do not know whether he would stick to it in the light of my objections here (and then), for the conversazione shifted to a different and totally un-connected topic.
2. See my: *A Survey of Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning*, Calcutta, 1965.
3. He made that remark in the conversazione referred to in fn. 1.

## LEIBNIZ' PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

I propose to consider in this paper one of Leibniz' principles which according to him is "basic to his entire system",<sup>1</sup> namely, the principle of sufficient reason. Unfortunately it is not easy to say what precisely the principle is, for, it seems to have been given different formulations at different stages in Leibniz' thoughts. In some places he speaks of it as if he regarded it as coordinate with the principle of contradiction, governing the truth of necessary propositions. But in some other places he appears to suggest that the principle of sufficient reason is nothing else than his definition of truth, (viz. that in all true propositions the predicate is contained in the subject); and seems to treat it as the governing principle of all propositions, necessary as well as contingent. And there are passages in which there is a suggestion that the principle of sufficient reason is the same as the principle of perfection or of the best. The result of these bewildering variety of statements is that there is a lot of dispute among the scholars of Leibniz as to what this principle is. We shall begin by stating different views, citing passages in support of each, and try to see if we can arrive at some satisfactory conclusion.

The first impression which one naturally has of the principle is that it is the principle governing contingent propositions, just as the principle of contradiction is the governing principle of all necessary propositions. The following are some of the statements which support this impression. In *The Principles of Nature and of Grace* he says, "Up till now we have spoken as physicists merely; now we must rise to metaphysics making use of the great principle, commonly but little employed, which holds that *nothing takes place without sufficient reason*, that is to say, that nothing happens without its being possible for one who has enough knowledge of things to a reason sufficient to determine why it is thus and not otherwise. The principle having

been laid down, the first question we are entitled to ask will be: *Why is there something rather than nothing?* For, 'nothing' is simpler and easier than 'something'. Further, supposing that things must exist, it must be possible to give a reason why they must exist just as they do and not otherwise." (Sec. 7). In the *Correspondence with Clarke*, he says, "The great foundation of mathematics is *the principle of contradiction or of identity* . . . And this single principle is enough to prove the whole of arithmetic and the whole of geometry, that is to say, all mathematical principles. But in order to proceed from mathematics to physics another principle is necessary, . . . that is, *the principle of sufficient reason*, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus and not otherwise". (*Second Letter to Clarke*, sec. 9, G.<sup>2</sup> VII, P. 355) The paras 31, 32, and 36 from his *Monadology* express the same view.

But a different view is suggested by the following passages quoted by Couturat. "The fundamental principle of reasoning is that *nothing of devoid of reason*, or, to be more explicit, that there is no truth unsupported by *reason*. And this *reason* of truth consists in the connection of the predicate with the subject either manifestly, as in the identical propositions, or, in a hidden way, such however that this containing may be revealed by the analysis of their notions". (*Opuscules*, p. 11). A similar statement appears in one of his letters to Arnauld in which he says, "There must always be, for the connection of the terms of a proposition, a foundation which must be found in their notions. This is my great principle . . . the corollary of which is the commonplace axiom that nothing happens without a reason" (G II, p. 56), and again in another letter in regard to the connection between the subject and the predicate he says, ". . . I do not mean any other connection between subject and predicate than that which is to be found in most contingent truths, that is to say, there is always something to be conceived in the subject which provides the explanation why this predicate or this event belongs to it, or why a particular event happened rather than not". (*Letter to*

Arnaul, May, 1686). The following passage suggests the same view. Leibniz says, "In demonstration I use two principles, of which one that what implies a contradiction is false; the other is that a reason can be given for every truth' (which is not identical or immediate), i.e. that the notion of the predicate is always expressly or implicitly contained in the subject, and *this holds good no less in extrinsic than in intrinsic denominations, no less in contingent than in necessary truths*". (G. VII, p. 199, — italics mine). To be sure, the principle of sufficient reason is not expressly mentioned in these passages. But the expression 'a reason can be given for every truth' which is the formula that invariably occurs in the enunciation of the principle of sufficient reason in most of Leibniz' passages, leaves little doubt that it is the principle of sufficient reason that is being spoken of here. If this is correct, then the principle of sufficient reason simply states the nature of truth in general (viz. the view that in all true propositions the predicate is contained in the subject). Russell, while commenting on Couturat's view, remarks that "The principle of sufficient reason . . . asserts simply that every true proposition is analytic, and is the exact converse of the law of contradiction which asserts that every analytic proposition is true" (*A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Preface to the Second Edition*, p. iii). This would make the principle of sufficient reason the principle of *all* propositions — necessary as well as contingent. But if the principle of sufficient reason were the principle of all the propositions, there would be need of two more principles one for necessary propositions, and the other for the contingent ones. And in fact there *are* two such principles: the principle of contradiction for the necessary, and the principle of the best for the contingent propositions. The principle of the best is spoken of as the principle of contingency in several passages. Consider, for example, the following passages: "There are two first principles of all reasonings, the principle of contradiction . . . and the principle that a reason must be given to every proposition, which is not known *per se*, has an *a priori* proof or that a reason can be

given for every truth, or, as is commonly said, that nothing happens without a cause. In the marginal note Leibniz remarks: The true cause why certain things exist rather than others, is to be derived from the free decree of divine will, the first of which is, to will to do all things in the best possible way" (G. VII, p. 309). Consider again the following passage: "... All contingent propositions have reasons for being as they are rather than otherwise... which render them certain and show that the connection of the subject and predicate in these propositions has its foundation in the nature of one and the other, but they do not have the demonstrations of necessity, since these reasons are only founded on the principle of contingency, or of the existence of things, i.e. what is or appears the best among several equally possible things, whereas the necessary truths are founded on the principle of contradiction and on the possibility and impossibility, of essences themselves without regard in this to the free will of God or of creatures". (G. IV, p. 438, *Discourse*, Sec. 13). These passages suggest that the reason for the truth of contingent propositions is the principle of the best which is described by Leibniz himself as the principle of contingency.

From the various kinds of statements each professing to be the principle of sufficient reason, it becomes clear that it cannot be decided clearly which of these is the Leibnizian doctrine. Let us call the principle that in all true propositions the predicate is included in the subject, the principle of truth. Then the question is: Is the principle of sufficient reason the same as the principle of truth? If not, then what is it?

Of the commentators, Russell's view is different from all the rest. He thinks that the principle of sufficient reason is the principle that every contingent proposition has its ground in the final cause. Then there can be no doubt that this is the principle which Leibniz regards as self-evident, and also that his metaphysics requires it. Russell is of the opinion that the principle of sufficient reason as understood by Leibniz is really two principles: a wider one which ap-

## LEIBNIZ' PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

plies to all contingents, possible and actual; and the narrower one which applies to actual contingents alone. The wider principle states that every existent has a sufficient reason in the sense of a final cause, whereas the narrower principle states *what* this final cause is. This latter principle, according to Russell, is the same as what Leibniz calls the principle of the best. The rationale of the wider principle seems to be as follows: What actually exists is contingent, i.e. it is possible that it might not have existed. Now the reason which can account for the existence of contingent must be one which in Leibniz' famous phrase, "inclines but does not necessitate". The reasons which have this character are the free decrees of the free beings. So we can account for the existence of contingent things by regarding them as the results of purpose or design. The principle of sufficient reason in its wider application simply states that all contingents have reasons in the sense of designs. But this principle thus understood applies actually to possible as well as to the actual contingents. For a contingent, whether actual or possible, must be looked upon as grounded in some design. Thus we require something more to account for the contingents which actually exist. This principle, Russell says, is that God always acts for the best, which is called by Leibniz the principle of the best. It is because the actual world is the best possible that God created it in preference to other infinite number of possible worlds.

Let us enumerate here all the principles which have been used by Leibniz in his system. Though he says that in demonstration he uses two principles, he actually uses four principles at least, and these are (1) The Principle of Contradiction; (2) the Principle that in all true propositions the predicate is included in the subject, (3) the principles that the contingent truths are grounded in final causes, and (4) the actual contingents are determined by the principle of the best. Now which of these is the Principle of Sufficient Reason? It is certain that it is not (1). But it is not at all certain that it is not (2) or (3) or (4). As we have seen,

the scholars have identified this principle with (2) (Eg. Couturat), with (3) and (4) (Russell), and with (4) only (Erdmann). It is impossible to state which of these is right, and futile in the face of conflicting statements of Leibniz. It is best to leave the matter in this undecided state.

Vidarbha Mahavidyalaya —  
Amravati.

B. Y. Deshpande

#### NOTES

1. *The Philosophy of Leibniz*: By Nicholas Rescher, Prentice-Hall, (1967), p. 25.
2. G. is the short form for *Die Philosophen Schriften Von Leibniz*, Ed. by C. I. Gerhardt.

## INDIVIDUAL VERSUS SOCIAL ASSENT\*

While presenting his own theory of knowledge in terms of social assent Walsh has launched a massive attack against Descartes. Though I do not accept the Cartesian view, I find some difficulties with the arguments of Walsh. My aim in this discussion is limited. I have restricted myself to the reaction of Walsh against the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness. In the context of Descartes' thought, the issue of *criterion* is of supreme importance, therefore, it requires an independent treatment.

Describing the Cartesian pursuit of Knowledge, Walsh says that it is a "pursuit carried on by a lonely thinker who has, at bottom, to satisfy no one but himself."<sup>1</sup> This remark requires clarification. Walsh makes two points, and not one as one may be misled to think. To make these points explicit, Walsh is pointing out that the Cartesian pursuit (a) is carried on by oneself without taking help from others, and (b) is meant for one's own satisfaction by excluding the satisfaction of others. But to say that one may pursue a course of inquiry without taking help from others is one thing, and to say that this inquiry is meant for one's own satisfaction by excluding the satisfaction of others is another. The truth of (a) does not entail the truth of (b).

Following the Cartesian line of inquiry one can easily distinguish between the structural and the material features of science. In so far as the material features are concerned science is a corporate activity. But if I am interested in discovering the structural features of science, I can do so in a single-handed fashion, for I am not required to perform any laboratory work or to go for any field-investigation. My mind is the only sort of laboratory I require. But the fact that I have discovered the structural features of science in a single-handed fashion does not mean that this discovery is restricted to me, that it cannot be transferred to others, that none else except me is capable of knowing it. Descartes was surely not a solipsist, he

allowed others to have mental abilities. If any of my discoveries (be it about structural or non-structural feature) is restricted to me, and could not be transferred to others, then no progress in science is possible.

Walsh is right in thinking that scientists "stand on the shoulders of predecessors."<sup>2</sup> Though he does not say, he also means that they 'impart their learning to their successors'. It is impossible to have progress in science if a scientist has nothing to take from his predecessors and nothing to give to his successors. The only question worth consideration in this context is whether Descartes was interested in the progress of science. If he had any such interest, then he would have never liked that the results of this inquiry should be kept restricted only to himself. Commenting on the views expressed in *Discourse* Walsh himself accepted that according to Descartes, "The only proper course for one who hoped to make progress in the sciences was accordingly for him to go through the whole corpus of his existing beliefs, to ask himself of each individual item whether he could either see it to be clearly and distinctly true or deduce it from another proposition which satisfied this requirement, and thereafter to make the sharpest of distinctions between what he really knew and what he merely believed or took for granted."<sup>3</sup> These remarks of Walsh clearly imply that it is for the sake of having progress in science, for having a clear distinction between what he really knew and what he merely believed, that Descartes proposed his criterion of 'clarity and distinctness'.

Walsh gives the impression in his paper as if Descartes proposed that one should start from scratch. Not only that one had nothing to hand over to one's successors, if one follows Descartes, but also that nothing could be obtained from one's predecessors. But could one start from scratch? Even a genius cannot start from scratch, he too in a sense stands on the shoulders of his predecessors. (For example, Einstein on Newton, and Newton on Galileo). And would the genius appreciate that the results of his inquiry should be kept restricted to himself, that none else but he himself

should be satisfied about these results? The most effective way of killing a genius — not unknown to those who shoulder the responsibility of academic establishments — is simply to neglect him.

Does Descartes give any impression at all that one who is in search for knowledge and truth has to start from scratch? Descartes refers to the 'corpus of one's existing beliefs'. From where has this *corpus* sprung? Has one's own mind manufactured the items of this corpus, or has it obtained these items from one's predecessors and fellow-travellers? If one has obtained the corpus of one's existing beliefs from others (one's predecessors and colleagues), then surely one is not starting his inquiry from scratch.

Further, does Descartes give any impression at all that one has to reject totally the corpus of his existing beliefs, that his criterion of clarity and distinctness is an instrument of destruction? There is no such implication. The function of the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness is certainly not to manufacture a new corpus of beliefs, its function is simply to reorganise the same beliefs which are found in the existing corpus of beliefs. The assumption behind the Cartesian move is simply that some of the items in the corpus of one's existing beliefs could function as axiomatic truths, whereas others could be deduced from these axiomatic truths. Those truths which are clearly and distinctly perceived by one's mind are axiomatic. Any belief which fails to appear either as an axiomatic truth or one deducible from an axiomatic truth, fails to express knowledge. The truth of such a belief has to be taken for granted. Not all one's beliefs (whatever be the source of these beliefs) express knowledge.

The issues with which Walsh is directly concerned in his paper are connected with the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness. However, Walsh refrains himself from providing a detailed analysis of this criterion. As he says, "What Descartes meant by speaking of a proposition (or an idea) as 'clear and distinct' is a difficult problem in

Cartesian scholarship which I shall pass over in silence."<sup>5</sup> Though he does not give any account of this criterion, he does not mind in lashing out two objections against this criterion; one referring to its psychological character and the other to the extent of its application. I would like to consider the second objection of Walsh before taking up his first objection. The second objection requires less careful analysis than the first.

Walsh objects that "clarity and distinctness as tests of truth" make the "sphere of knowledge extremely narrow."<sup>6</sup> He goes on saying — "Many propositions which are commonly thought to be matters of knowledge, including many commonly accepted 'truths' of everyday life, turn out to be dubious if nothing can be known unless seen to be clear and distinct."<sup>6</sup> There is no doubt that the Cartesian test of truth implies the restriction of 'knowledge' to axiomatic systems, that Descartes failed to consider the fact that the distinction between knowledge and belief is also applicable to our judgments of every day life, the judgements which are parts neither of science nor of philosophy nor of any other academic discipline. But Descartes is not alone in restricting the use of 'knowledge' in such a fashion. Plato did the same, and Hume and his followers in our own time are doing the same. It is quite an old story to tell that philosophers have somehow felt that 'knowledge' should be restricted to the realm of the *a priori*, logic and mathematics being the most favoured subjects of this realm. All our empirical knowledge, whether concerning science or everyday life, is nothing but a variety of belief. The objection of Walsh against Descartes on this issue is quite general in nature, and can be levelled against *any* test of truth. In providing a test of truth or a criterion of knowledge one is putting an end to the unrestricted use of the words 'knowledge' and 'truth'. In our everyday life these words are used in an unrestricted way. So when one provides a criterion of knowledge, the unrestricted use of 'knowledge' is stopped, and as a consequence many cases arise which fail to have the title of 'knowledge'.

I would like to press my point by considering the criterion of knowledge formulated by Walsh himself. Walsh, as is obvious from the title of his paper, formulates his criterion of knowledge in terms of 'social assent'. We are deprived of knowing a judgement if it fails to have any social approval. But so far as our everyday life is concerned we make knowledge-claims for which we do not require, and do not wait for, any social assent. Rather sometimes we would positively like to hide ourselves from society, for we do not want to create public scandals. We know quite well that instead of getting a social assent we will get a social dissent for our knowledge. How is Walsh going to introduce 'social assent' where 'social dissent' seems to be the only course for our knowledge? Walsh must accept that 'social assent' is a term of contrast for 'social dissent'. In giving a note of assent you are certainly not giving a note of dissent, or vice versa.

Suppose one defends Walsh on the ground that one could use the term 'social assent' in a technical sense. Logicians use the term 'truth value' in a technical sense, it includes both the values, 'true' and 'false'. Similarly, 'social assent' could be given a technical sense, a sense which would include both 'assent' and 'dissent'. In giving a note of dissent against my judgement you are, in a sense, giving a note of assent in my favour. Your disapproval is also a case of approval of my knowledge. But Walsh would not like to take this technical step. With this step the social reaction would loose its grip over personal judgements. In introducing 'social assent' as a necessary condition of knowledge Walsh is interested in introducing some sort of check on one's personal claims to knowledge. But if 'social assent' includes both 'assent' and 'dissent' then there remains no social check on my personal claims to knowledge. They get through in both the conditions, the condition of assent and the condition of dissent. So Walsh cannot use 'social assent' in a technical sense. But then the difficulty concerning one's knowledge of socially disapproved judgements remains to be solved.

Further, there are judgements which are not put forward for social approval or disapproval; they are not meant for social reaction. Walsh is aware of the existence of these judgements, and struggles hard to provide some sort of their analysis. Even such an ordinary judgement as 'I feel nervous' has led Walsh to make an appeal to the Kantian distinction between "judgement of perception and judgement of experience".<sup>7</sup> He describes 'I feel nervous' as a judgement of perception which, in Kant's terminology, does not require a social assent and remains at the level of personal validity. But what is the epistemological status of a judgement of perception? Concerning such a judgement Walsh says that its "title to the name 'judgement' is of course doubtful."<sup>8</sup> So a judgement of perception is a judgement by courtesy. It would become a full-fledged judgement, a "judgement proper"<sup>9</sup>, as Walsh puts it, when its status is raised to the social level. Descartes would not take away the title of 'judgement' simply because a judgement failed to satisfy his criterion of clarity and distinctness. He would simply say that the judgement in question does not express knowledge, it simply expresses a variety of belief. Walsh has certainly gone ahead of Descartes. Has not Walsh converted a good number of socially accepted truths of everyday life into just gibberish talks?

Consider now his first objection, the objection that the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness is subjective and psychological in nature. Walsh remarks that the Cartesian "Method was in fact to provide something like a new logic, a logic whose principles could be worked out and validated by the individual for himself and commitment to which was accordingly a personal rather than a corporate act."<sup>10</sup> This remark requires elucidation. What Walsh means to say is that it is one thing to say about a given proposition that it is entertained by my mind with clarity and distinctness and quite another that I deduce a given proposition from another which is clear and distinct to my mind. The former does whereas the latter does not refer to a psychological fact about me.

In talking of deducing one proposition from another I cannot avoid reference to the rules of deduction. Could there be a subjective rule of deduction? A rule of deduction which is meant for my subjective personal use. But a subjective rule, to argue in the fashion of Wittgenstein, is no rule. If I am the only judge to decide whether I have applied a rule correctly, then there is no check on my stupid applications. As Walsh points out rightly, "If logic is in no sense a shared possession, it will be impossible to make a case intelligible, let alone to confute an opponent. The very notion of an argument — of premises, conclusions and orderly steps from the first to the second — would be without application in these conditions."<sup>11</sup> The subjectivity of the Cartesian criterion, according to Walsh, is inconsistent with the objectivity of logic.

In support of his view that logic has an objective social character Walsh refers to the argument of Waismann from *How I See Philosophy*, "that a proposition is analytic if, after the acceptance of certain definitions and the carrying out of certain linguistic and logical operations, it can be shown to correspond to a formula recognised as tautological in the *Principia Mathematica*".<sup>12</sup> Commenting further on Waismann's argument Walsh points out that "it is not essential to his argument that reference be made to a particular logical text, however eminent its authors". . . "But it is essential to the argument that there should be a publicly accepted body of logical knowledge, a set of doctrines and procedures which anyone who knew his way around the subject would take to be in order."<sup>13</sup> There is no doubt that for carrying out a logical operation what is required is simply a reference to certain axioms and rules etc. Reference to any person or book is not a part of the logical operation. The analyticity of the proposition 'either it will rain tomorrow or it will not' does not depend on any person or book; it depends on the formula ' $p \vee \neg p$ '. But can Walsh deny that a person has as a matter of fact brought the logical rules and axioms etc., to the notice of the public,

that what has become now a publicly accepted body of logical truths is nothing but an individual's unique effort?

The fact that the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness is subjective does not mean that it would fail to provide an objective set of axioms and rules required for logical operation. Would it be right to say that Descartes was attempting to discover something like a 'new logic', an individualistic logic, a logic whose axioms and rules are to be restricted to the individual himself and commitment to which is an individual rather than a corporate act? It is one thing to argue that the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness fails to provide *any* axioms and *any* rules for performing logical operations. And a quite another thing to argue that the criterion in question succeeds in providing only those axioms and rules commitment to which is an individual rather than a corporate act. The former argument refers to the failure of the Cartesian criterion in providing any sort of axioms and rules. The latter argument does not refer to any such failure. Walsh does not use the former argument, he uses the latter argument.

What Walsh denies is that the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness succeeds in providing any objective set of axioms and rules. And the ground on which his denial is based is simply that he thinks that this criterion is subjective. Cartesian axioms and rules could not be objective, for they have been discovered with the help of a subjective instrument. Walsh has surely not made an independent logical operation with the Cartesian axioms and rules to see whether he would fail in his operation. He has made an *a priori* decision that neither he nor anyone else would succeed in performing any logical operation with the Cartesian axioms and rules. Is it legitimate to declare that an axiom or rule is subjective without making any object test with it, without seeing how it operates? Walsh would have stood on stronger footing if he had just denied that the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness succeeds in discovering any sort of axioms and rules. Unfortunately he does not follow this course of reasoning.

The Cartesian Method is, however, open to serious difficulties. Walsh somehow does not feel these difficulties, perhaps because he has himself been duped by this method. A single-handed inquiry concerning scientific thought, as has been pointed out earlier, presupposes a distinction between structure and matter of sciences. Different scientific disciplines could have the same structural features without having the same material features. But to accept the existence of identical structural features presupposes that the progress of scientific thought is unidimensional, for if it is multidimensional then it is impossible to have even structural identity. Suppose one considers the progress of mathematics. One points out that the Riemannian system is a leap over the Euclidean system. However, the structural features of these systems remain the same, for both of them are axiomatic systems. Similarly one can consider the advancement of a many-valued logical system over two-valued logical system. However, the mode of logical operation, truth-table method etc., are the same in these systems, hence the structural identity is not lacking in them. Though there are leaps and jumps in the progress of logic and mathematics, they are not wholly unconnected leaps and jumps.<sup>14</sup>

The question arises whether the distinction between structure and matter which holds good in the field of *a priori* studies, i.e., logic and mathematics, would also hold good in the field of empirical studies. Different scientific disciplines or systems within the jurisdiction of empirical science could be considered to have the same structural features. But could empirical sciences share the structural features of logic and mathematics? Could empirical sciences be treated as axiomatic systems? To consider empirical sciences as axiomatic systems is to dissolve the distinction between logical and non-logical truths. The Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness deals with all sorts of truths in the same fashion. But an empirical science is not an axiomatic system, therefore, it cannot share the structural features of logic and mathematics.

The usual argument to bring empirical sciences closer to *a priori* sciences, to bridge the gulf between these two diverse disciplines, is to refer to the use of logico-mathematical tools in scientific investigations. But this move would make the concept of 'structure' extremely loose. It would appear as if the identity of structure has been imposed on different scientific disciplines (in spite of the fact that one of them differs wholly from the other) simply because all of them carry the same name 'science'. We consider these diverse disciplines as scientific, therefore, we must also accept that they have something in common, if not the content then the structure.

The difficulties increase if we consider the fact that Descartes asks us to scrutinize the whole corpus of our existing beliefs. But the corpus contains a number of different varieties of beliefs. Though scientific beliefs may be important, extremely important for one's very existence on this planet, they are not the only sorts of beliefs found in the corpus of one's existing beliefs. Beliefs concerning philosophical, religious or aesthetical matters are not scientific beliefs. But the Cartesian method treats all sorts of beliefs in the same fashion, as if these beliefs are not of different kind. The same criterion of clarity and distinctness is to be applied on philosophical and religious truths which has to be applied on non-philosophical and non-religious truths. All one's existing beliefs, of whatever kind, in Descartes' eyes must obtain scientific respectability. And scientific respectability for Descartes meant the same thing as logico-mathematical respectability, the respectability of an axiomatic system.

Walsh does not disagree with Descartes on the question of scientific respectability to our beliefs. He clearly gives vent to his Cartesian prejudice when he suggests that even philosophy should have scientific respectability.<sup>15</sup> However, this is a different issue which I do not wish to discuss in this context.

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## NOTES

\* This discussion is based on the first part of my paper "Quest For Knowledge and Academic Establishment", read in a seminar organised by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, in the month of September, 1976.

1. "Knowledge In Its Social Setting", *Mind.*, July 1971, p. 321.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 321-322.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 322-323.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 322. This remark of Walsh is crucial. For Walsh is not denying the possibility of a logical system based on the principle of clarity and distinctness. What he denies is simply the social use of such logic.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

14. I owe these observations to Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 330. Walsh describes scientific respectability in terms of corporate activity, therefore, his concept of scientific respectability is slightly different from that of Descartes.

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## SOME PROBLEMS IN IDENTITY MYSTICISM\*

Professor Zaehner's *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*<sup>1</sup> is one of the valuable and scholarly works in the area of comparative study of mysticism, Eastern and Western. Zaehner is undoubtedly one of the authorities on Christian mysticism; and his interpretation of Christian mysticism must, therefore, be given due consideration by any one who is interested in it. Three chapters in *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* entitled "Some Hindu Approaches", "Monism versus Theism", and "Theism versus Monism" are extremely relevant to a consideration of some problems in identity mysticism. The title of the chapter "Monism versus Theism" or "Theism versus Monism" is significant as it clearly indicates Zaehner's standpoint on this problem. To Zaehner, monism and theism cannot go together. Zaehner's sympathetic interpretation of Christian mysticism is understandable. But his interpretation of Indian mysticism in general and Hindu Theistic mysticism in particular is not satisfactory; and his presentation of Advaita and identity mysticism is unfair. Professor Stace in his important book *Mysticism and Philosophy*<sup>2</sup> examines the nature and characteristics of the two types of mysticism, the extrovert and the introvert, and discusses some of the issues connected with identity mysticism with sympathy and understanding, though he holds the view that the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara leads to absurdities in the same way as a dualistic position lands its supporter in difficulties.<sup>3</sup> The issues raised by Stace are so important that Professor H. D. Lewis finds it necessary to devote a full chapter called "Mysticism and Monism" in his book *The Elusive Mind*.<sup>4</sup> Lewis pays special attention to the problem of the dissolution of individuality in mystical experience which Stace discusses in the context of introvertive mysticism. I shall discuss in this paper some general issues connected with Indian mysticism and certain specific problems bearing on identity mysticism raised by Zaehner, Stace, and Lewis.

## II

When we say that some one is a mystic, we mean that he is one who has mystical *experience*. A mystic, whether Eastern or Western, Christian or Hindu, extrovertive or introvertive, is one who has *direct apprehension* of the transcendent reality resulting in *unitive experience*, in whatever way the expression "unitive experience" is interpreted. Zaehner admits that mysticism implies, among other things, these two essential features, *viz* direct apprehension and unitive experience.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, he holds the view that Indian mysticism is not the record of actual experience. He says: "When we come to discuss Indian mysticism, we will no longer be speaking entirely in terms of recorded experience. The Hindu mystical classics are not autobiographical and are not the record of actual experiences undergone by given individuals."<sup>6</sup> A statement of this kind, if it comes from any other person, may safely be ignored. But coming as it does from no less an authority than Zaehner, it merits consideration.

There are mystics in Hinduism who speak of God-experience attained by them all on a sudden or as a result of the pursuit of a rigorous discipline. Ramkrishna Paramahansa and Ramana Maharshi, to mention only two, are outstanding examples of mystics in modern times who speak of their God-experience. There are also cases of mystics who speak of their God-experience even in the prenatal condition when they were lying in the womb. Poygai Ālvār is one such gifted soul to have not only the experience of God while lying in the womb, but also the extraordinary power to recollect that experience. This is how Poygai Ālār speaks of his experience of God: "Even then (before birth) when I was lying in the womb did I worship with the hands united in the direction of the Lord who has taken his abode at Śrīraṅgam, and saw Him. Even for a moment I have not forgotten the Lord whose colour is like that of the ocean full of waves. O ye poor! How can I forget Him now?"<sup>7</sup>

It is necessary to note first of all the tone of certainty with which the Ālvār speaks of his experience of God. He says that he worshipped the Lord, and as a result of worship *saw* Him even while he was lying in the womb. There is no reason to think that the Ālvār mis-reports his experience. Another feature to be stressed here is that the Ālvār did not attain the direct knowledge of God through any process of reasoning. His condition when he was in the womb was such that he had neither a developed mind nor the instruments of knowledge fit enough for action at that time. Nevertheless, he recollects the God-experience he had at that time, and claims that he was in touch with a reality outside and beyond himself. Though his experience is subjective, the object of his experience is trans-subjective. It is, therefore, wrong to treat the mystical experience of God which PoyagiĀlvār, and also other mystics, had as an emotional state and nothing else than that. The experience he speaks of is the direct experience of God. He is more certain about the *presence* of God which he has experienced than we are of the things of the external world in our normal waking consciousness. It is just like Wordsworth's claim, "I have felt a presence ..... a spirit that impels all thinking things, all objects of all thought, and rolls through all things."

Peyālvār goes into raptures in his description of the divine form of Viṣṇu, which he experienced. Instead of just declaring "I saw God", he gives details of what he witnessed in his mystic experience. In a hymn of matchless beauty, unsurpassed vividness, and inspiring declaration, he says: "Today, in the Lord who is of the colour of the sea, I saw Śrī; I saw the body shining like gold; I saw the luminous light like that of the sun; I saw the lustrous disc which displays its supremacy in the battlefield; I saw the conch."<sup>8</sup>

Like the Ālvārs, Saint Māṇikkavācakar too speaks of his God-experience. He says: "Behold Him who is manifested in the forms of the male, the female, and the neuter. Note that I too saw Him with my eyes. Behold God-Ambro-

sia yielding grace in abundance. Note that I saw the greatness of His grace.”<sup>9</sup>

It is necessary to invite attention to three important features in this declaration of Māṇikkavācakar’s. First, it expresses the view that the transcendental reality appears in different forms such as male, female, etc., echoing what has been stated in a text of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, IV, 3: “You are woman. You are man. You are the youth and the maiden too...” Second, it emphasizes that God is the embodiment of grace. Third, it is a record in no uncertain terms of the authentic God-experience which Saint Māṇikkavācakar had.

It should not be thought that Poygai Ālvār, Peyālvār, and Māṇikkavācakar are just isolated cases. There are quite a few mystics in Hinduism. Every mystic in the Hindu tradition, as in the case of other traditions, has his or her authentic God-experience. There is a long, continuous succession of mystics in the Hindu tradition right from the time of the Vedic seer who declared, “I know this great *Puruṣa* shining like the sun beyond the darkness. He who knows Him thus becomes immortal in this life. There is no other way to immortality.”<sup>10</sup> So there is no justification for Zaehner’s view that Indian mysticism is not the record of actual experience undergone by the concerned individuals.

### III

I shall now consider another problem raised by Zaehner. According to Zaehner, monism and theism are opposed to each other. With reference to Ramkrishna Paramahamsa, Zaehner writes: “(Ramkrishna) was torn between two doctrines, between the Vedānta which he officially professed in its extreme non-dual variety on the one hand, and an intense devotion to a personal God, usually conceived of as Kālī (the Mother) on the other.”<sup>11</sup> In another place he says that for a monist “any theistic experience would have to be written off by him as ultimately illusory, since personal gods are little more than convenient fictions.”<sup>12</sup> Lewis refers to the same problem in another

way by joining issue with Stace. Though Stace does not accept the monistic position, he nevertheless holds the view that God is both personal and impersonal. Lewis thinks that it is a contradiction to think of God as both personal and impersonal, and that only if the contradiction could be allowed Stace could hold the view that God who is personal as an object of worship is also impersonal as an undifferentiated unity. But the contradiction, according to Lewis, cannot be admitted as true.<sup>13</sup> It will be of interest to refer to Zaehner's observation in this context. Zaehner says: "On the question whether God is personal or impersonal, it seems to me that a great deal of nonsense has been talked."<sup>14</sup> What emerges clearly from the views of Zaehner and Lewis is that according to both of them monism and theistic mysticism cannot go together. Let us consider this issue.

According to Śaṅkara, one and the same reality, Brahman which is the Absolute, is viewed in two ways — as what is associated with the distinctions of name and form arising because of the adjunct and as that which is free from every adjunct.<sup>15</sup> It may be stated here that according to Śaṅkara there are not, numerically speaking, two Brahmans — Brahman as *nirguna* and Brahman as *saguna*. From the relative standpoint conditioned by *avidyā*, we view the undifferentiated, non-dual, non-relational reality as differentiated, dual, and relational, and bring in distinctions such as the worshipper and the worshipped. It may also be noted that the numerous gods and goddesses of the pantheon, according to Advaita, are the manifestations of one and the same reality, and that the question of hierarchy among these gods and goddesses is, therefore, meaningless, though it is legitimate and significant to accept the concept of personal God (*iṣṭa-devatā*) which is a remarkable feature of Hinduism. Advaita admits the need for the worship of God and provides an important place for it in the scheme of discipline leading to the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*). Theism which involves the concept of personal God and the worshipper — worshipped relation is

an important stage in the life of a spiritual aspirant. According to Advaita, the goal to be attained is Brahman, the non-dual, non-relational reality. It is a state of unity devoid of distinctions and relations which constitute empirical existence. It can be attained by means of right knowledge alone. It is spoken of as the state of enlightenment (*vidyā*) with a view to contrast it with the state of empirical existence which is referred to as the state of ignorance (*avidyā*). So the real position is that Advaita is not anti-theistic, but trans-theistic. It means that the alleged conflict between monism and theistic mysticism can be reconciled, according to Śaṅkara, in terms of the difference between absolute and relative standpoints, the former being the standpoint of *vidyā* and the latter that of *avidyā*.

It must be borne in mind that Śaṅkara is not the only person to make such a distinction between the state of enlightenment and that of ignorance to solve the problem of the one and the many. The distinction which Meister Eckhart introduces between the level of understanding and the level above understanding corresponds to the distinction between the relative and absolute standpoints (i.e. states of ignorance and enlightenment) spoken of by Śaṅkara. according to Eckhart, when a person sees one thing as different from another, he is at the level of understanding; but when he intuits the oneness of all things, he is at the level above understanding.

Let us consider the testimony of Saint Kumaraguruparar who, though born dumb, got the power of speech when he was five through the grace of God at Tiruchendur, one of the six *padai-vīḍus*. Kumaraguruparar's *Kandarkali-venbā* which is full of philosophical and mystical significance is a devotional hymn of great importance. It explains the nature of the transcendent reality both in its essential nature (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) and accidental attributes (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*). It speaks of the goal and the way thereto. Kumaraguruparar says: "The Absolute is eternal bliss and knowledge without beginning, middle, and end; it is of the nature of supreme knowledge without any limita-

tion. Being free from name, attribute, and form which are associated with it by the *jīva*, it is the all-pervasive Śiva. It is beyond comprehension by the intellect. It transcends the fivefold function. It is beyond the reach of mind...”<sup>17</sup> Kumaraguruparar who gives the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of the Absolute in the above passage describes it in the sequel most vividly in its manifestation as *Subrahmanyā* from head to foot. He also describes the spiritual rule of the Lord giving an account of His “ten limbs”. The standpoint of Kumaraguruparar is relevant to the problem of the relation between monism and theism which we are considering here. It testifies to the fact that there is no conflict between monism and theism, between the conception of the Absolute as one and non-dual, as undifferentiated, as devoid of name, form, and distinctions on the one hand, and its conception in a differentiated form with name and qualities on the other.

Since every form of God is a manifestation of the One, it is wrong to think of one form of God as superior and another as inferior. Śiva and Viṣṇu which are manifestations of the Absolute are one, though it is open to a devotee to worship any one of these two forms, or both, or any other, according to his inclination and training. Poygai Ālvār testifies to the oneness of the Absolute, the supreme Being, manifested as Śiva and Viṣṇu. He says: “Hara is the name of the one, Nārāyaṇa that of the other. Bull is the vehicle for the one, and the white-headed kite for the other. (*Śaiva*) Āgama is the source of our knowledge of the one, and the *Veda* that of the other. The (*Kailāsa*) mountain is the abode of the one, and the milky ocean that of the other. While the one performs the function of destruction, the other that of protection. The one is armed with the trident, and the other with the disc. The form of the one is like the glowing fire, while that of the other is like the dark cloud. The body of both is one.”<sup>18</sup> In this passage there is an implicit reference to the concept of Śāṅkara-Nārāyaṇa, i.e. to the idea that Śiva and Viṣṇu are one, because they are manifestations of one and the same

reality. Peyālvār explicitly refers to this concept in one of his hymns. It is a great wonder, declares Peyālvār, that the Lord of Tirumalai appears uniting the two forms Śiva and Viṣṇu.<sup>19</sup>

Gifted as they are with mystical intuition, Poygai Ālvār and Peyālvār are able to realize the oneness of Śiva and Viṣṇu. Though Śiva and Viṣṇu are distinct at the level of understanding, they become one at the intuitive level of mysticism which is above the level of understanding. Blades of grass, wood, and stone are no doubt different when we view them through reason. But they become one to a mystic like Eckhart at the level of mystical intuition. Distinctions cease to exist, and opposites coincide in mystical experience. This may appear to be absurd and untenable to us at the level of understanding; and so we fail to see the truth realized by Eckhart and the Ālvārs. We will see only distinctions, when we look through the many coloured glass of reason which is stained by *avidyā*. To realize oneness which Ālvārs and other mystics experienced, one must rise to the level of mystical intuition which is a medium altogether different from reason. One, therefore, fails to see how there can be any conflict at all between monism and theism, or between oneness and difference, which are assigned to different levels.

#### IV

I shall now consider the problem of the dissolution of individuality in mystical experience. Every mystic speaks of union with God. What does this expression "union with God" mean? Theistic mysticism and identity mysticism answer this question differently. According to theistic mysticism, union with God does not mean identity of the released soul with God. For example, Viśiṣṭādvaita, which is a theistic system, explains *sāyujya* or oneness with God, which the soul attains at the time of release, in terms of experiential unity between the released soul and God; union with God does not annul their entitative difference. The liberated soul is only united with God, and there is insepar-

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able union between them (*viśiṣṭa-aikya*). The soul does not become God; and so there is no absolute identity (*svarūpa-aikya*) between them. Since there is existential difference between the liberated soul and God, there is no loss of the individuality of the soul even in the state of release.

According to Stace, the nucleus common to all kinds of mystical experience is the experience of unity or oneness. He maintains that, though the mystic experience does not point to duality of soul and God, it is nevertheless interpreted dualistically by philosophers who belong to theistic tradition. He is of the view that the mistake lies in the interpretation. It may be stated here that Stace does not support the standpoint of Advaita, and that he is interested only in defending the position that there is the dissolution of individuality in mystic experience.

Lewis joins issue with Stace on the question of the dissolution of individuality in mystic experience. Committed as he is to the theistic position, Lewis considers that the individuality or the separate identity of the mystic is not dissolved in the so-called union with God, though there is the appearance of its elimination at that time. The mistake, according to him, lies in the interpretation of the experience. He says that the mystic, in the rapture and intensity of his consciousness of God to the exclusion of all other things from his consciousness, "could genuinely feel, as no doubt many of them did, that their own being, at the very core of it, had been wholly taken up into the being of God. In this they (the mystics) would be quite mistaken, there could hardly be a greater mistake. But it is a mistake which we can easily understand."<sup>20</sup> In another place he says that "there seems to be a case for maintaining that oriental mystics are misrepresenting their case"<sup>21</sup> when they talk of their oneness with God.

Lewis gives the following arguments in support of his position. First, a sound view of the transcendent as well as finite beings seems to preclude from the start any possibility of our being strictly identical with God. The claim that we are so is bound to be mistaken whatever the mystic may

feel or experience. Second, it is hard to describe mystical experience; and the peculiarly distinctive character of the mystical experience will make a mystic reluctant to modify the terms in which he describes his experience. But a careful examination of the mystic experience, Lewis argues, will convince us that the mystic is wrong in his interpretation of the experience of oneness with God. But this is not to question, he says, the "merits and importance of mystical experience." Third, the Western mystics have a sounder view of what the experience in all its forms is bound to be in essentials."<sup>22</sup>

None of the arguments given by Lewis are convincing. The first argument proceeds on a presupposition which is questionable. On the assumption that his view of the transcendent and finite beings is sound, Lewis denies the identity of the soul with God in mystic experience. One may, however, hold the opposite view that the individual soul in its essential nature is identical with God, and claim that this view which is sound is corroborated by the experience of the mystics. Mystic experience is not irrelevant to the consideration of the issue whether the individual soul is identical with God or not. So the first argument given by Lewis will not avail him. Nor does his third argument hold good. In fact it is no argument at all, but only an assertion, for without any supporting arguments Lewis holds the view that the Western mystics have a sounder view of the essentials of the mystical experience. Lewis does not give us any criterion for deciding the soundness of the essentials of the mystical experience, Eastern or Western.

We are now left with only the second argument. Lewis admits the validity and importance of mystical experience. It is true, as he himself states it, that it is hard to describe mystical experience. Though he does not question the authenticity of the mystic's experience, he questions the mystic's interpretation of his experience. The mystic, according to Lewis, is wrong in his interpretation of the experience of his oneness with God.

Though it is hard to describe mystical experience, it does not follow that it cannot be or has not been described, however inadequate the description may be. If mystical experience is important, one has to accept the mystic's account of his experience as given by him without questioning his account and interpretation of it. Since we cannot have access to the experience of a mystic, which we consider to be important and authentic, we have to accept the account which a mystic gives of his experience.

We may refer to the description of mystical experience drawn from two different sources. The *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* (VII) gives the following account of the mystical experience of the transcendent reality: "The wise say that the Fourth is unseen, beyond empirical dealings; beyond the grasp of the organs of action, uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable. It is pure, unitary consciousness. It is free from the phenomenal world. It is ineffable peace. It is the supreme good. It is non-dual. It is the self." According to this description, mystical experience is the experience of oneness without distinctions and plurality. It is free from subject-object relation, I-thou relation, and so on.

Let us now consider how Saint Māṇikkavācakar describes the nature of God-experience in his *Tiruppādaiatci*. In the state of union with God, the divine Fisherman, there is no longer delight in the vision of His anklet-girt feet, no association with the life of the jīvas, no worship of the Lord's feet, no scope for dance and song, no room for grace, no fear in respect of merit and demerit, no association with the good, no distinctions of caste, no notions such as good caused by *māyā*, no thought that we are slaves of His slaves, and so on. Only some of the things which Māṇikkavācakar speaks of as absent in mystical experience are stated above. The list which the Saint himself gives is only illustrative, not exhaustive. In fact, it cannot be exhaustive at all. The point which Māṇikkavācakar wants to drive home is that in the mystical experience of union with God, there is no scope for subject-object relation, I-thou relation, worshipper-worshipped relation, servant-master relation, and so on.

In that state, there is the absence of the mind; consequently the sense of individuality, the notion of 'I', what Rāmānuja would call *ahamartha*, cannot persist at that time.

Either one accepts the authentic character of mystical experience or rejects it as spurious. It makes no sense to say that the interpretation of one's own experience given by the mystic is wrong and cannot be accepted while at the same time admitting the authenticity of mystical experience. It is not for others to say that the mystic is wrong in the interpretation of his experience of oneness or union with God. No one who does not have the mystic's experience is competent to sit in judgement on what the mystic says about his experience.

Does the loss of individuality or personal existence in the state of release mean the annihilation of the Self? Rāmānuja, for instance, argues that it does, in the course of his objection against the standpoint of Advaita.<sup>23</sup> Advaita holds the view that the loss of individuality or the sense of "I" when the individual soul (*jīva*) attains liberation does not lead to the annihilation of the self. According to Advaita, the individual soul in its essential nature is no other than Brahman, the ultimate reality. But on account of ignorance (*avidyā*) it thinks that it is different from Brahman, and is involved in the empirical existence. For realizing its identity with Brahman all that is required is the removal of *avidyā* which has caused the status of individuality (*jīvabhāva*). When *avidyā* is destroyed by the right knowledge, the individual soul realizes its essential nature as Brahman, i.e. it remains as Brahman. In this explanation there is scope for both endeavour and attainment. There is the endeavour to remove the *jīvabhāva*, the false role which the Self plays due to ignorance; and consequent on the removal of the *jīvabhāva* there is the attainment of the original status from which there has been a lapse. It means that identity mysticism can account for both destruction (*fanā*) and survival (*baqā*) which are considered to be important features in God-realization according to theistic mysticism.<sup>24</sup> What is annihilated is

avidyā and the false status of individuality (*jīvabhāva*) caused by it. What abides is the ever-existent Brahman-Ātman in its true form. It may be stated here that Advaita does not explain the attainment of oneness with Brahman by the *jīva* in terms of the "merging" of the *jīva* in Brahman as Zaehner seems to think.<sup>25</sup>

## ~ V

One more issue to be considered relates to the role of the mystic in society. C.E.M. Joad is of the view that a mystic, though a precocious child, is an "unprofitable servant"<sup>26</sup> as he withdraws himself from society. He has a specific charge against the Eastern mystics. While the Western mystics realized the importance of the world of affairs "looking upon mysticism not as a permanent vocation but as the joy and refreshment of a life of effort and endeavour", the Eastern mystics, according to him, have either missed or deliberately ignored it.<sup>27</sup>

Zaehner has objections specifically against the identity mysticism of Advaita. He remarks that, while there is place for love in theistic mysticism, in the identity mysticism of Advaita there is absolutely no place for love. His point is that identity mystics to whom non-dualism is the ultimate truth do not care for the welfare of the world and that they do not endeavour to remove the misery of the people through social reform. Further, there is, according to Zaehner, a theoretical difficulty in the position of Advaita so far as a mystic helping others in society. He says: "It does much credit to the heart of the ultramonist Vedāntins that they have always been ready to help others towards liberation; it does very little credit to their head, for what logic can there possibly be in seeking to free from illusion a person who, from the point of the would-be liberator is by definition illusory? Moreover, it is contrary to the quite logical advice of Gaudapāda that one 'should behave in the world like an insentient object'."<sup>28</sup>

What Joad says about mystics in general and Eastern mystics in particular is untenable. It is not true to say that

mystics in India have been, and are, indifferent to the problems of others in society. Consider the case of Ramana Maharshi, one of the mystics of our own time. The gracious look of the Maharshi has been a solace to those who have met him. What is true of Ramana Maharshi is equally true of other mystics. The greatness of a mystic is not to be judged exclusively in terms of moral and social activities. Moral and social activities are not the only ways through which a mystic has to outwardly show his concern for others. By his thought and word, by his benign look and gentle touch, and also by his "eloquent silence" a mystic comforts the agonized mind and soothes the aching body of those who seek his guidance. Ramana Maharshi used to say that only those who have realized the Self can serve others. Moral activity, social reform, and community service undertaken by the rest are more often than not much propaganda and little service.

While Zaehner's bias for theism is understandable, his criticism of identity mysticism is unfounded. It is anything but truth to say that great mystics like Śaṅkara, Ramana Maharshi, and others withdraw from society with a view to enjoy the emotional ecstasy of bliss all by themselves. What a mystic speaks and does is at once an example and an inspiration to others. In his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, III, 25, Śaṅkara observes that a person who has realized the Self should work for the welfare of others, though for himself he may have nothing to do.

"Who can rescue whom?" is the most important question to be considered in order to answer the logical difficulty raised by Zaehner. The wise man alone who has realized Brahman-Ātman, who is liberated-in-life (*jīvanmukta*), can rescue one who, because of ignorance, is in bondage. Gauḍapāda whom Zaehner has quoted refers first of all to the qualifications of the person who realizes the non-dual reality. He says: "This Self, which is trans-phenomenal and non-dual, which is free from all imagination, is realized by the wise, who are free from attachment, fear, and anger, and who are well-versed in the meaning of the Vedas."<sup>29</sup> How would the man of wisdom, i.e. the God-

## SOME PROBLEMS IN IDENTITY MYSTICISM

realized person, behave in the world? Gauḍapāda himself answers this question in the next verse from which Zaehner has quoted. He says: "Therefore, after knowing it thus, one should fix one's attention on non-duality. Having realized the non-dual reality, one should behave in the world like an insentient object."<sup>30</sup> What does Gauḍapāda mean when he compares the behaviour of the liberated-in-life (*jivanmukta*) to that of an insentient object? In his commentary on this verse, Śaṅkara says that a *jivanmukta* will not broadcast his realization to the world; he will behave as though he has not known the truth; he will not tomtom to others what he is and what he has attained. Zaehner seems to think that a *jivanmukta* will remain inert like a stone, and that he cannot, therefore, go to the help of others in bondage. It is obvious that Zaehner has misunderstood the point of Gauḍapāda.

The individual (*jīva*) who is to be rescued is one who, without knowing his real nature, is subject to illusion, and suffers from various wrong notions about himself. Advaita does not say that the *jīva* is illusory. On the contrary, it says that what the *jīva* thinks of himself is illusory; i.e. his status as a finite individual (*jīva-bhāva*) is illusory. A prince, not knowing his real status, thinks of himself from his childhood as a hunter and behaves accordingly. While his status as a prince is real, his role as a hunter is illusory. One who knows the truth cures him of the illusion he suffers from by telling him the truth that he is not a hunter, but only a prince and thereby rescues him. Likewise, a God-realized person, i.e. a *jivanmukta*, out of compassion for one who suffers from wrong notions due to *avidyā*, tells him in the same way as Uddālaka instructed Śvetaketu that he is not a *jīva*, a limited and finite being, but only Brahman which is "real, knowledge, and infinite."<sup>31</sup> So Zaehner's question, "what logic can there possibly be in seeking to free from illusion a person who, from the point of view of the would-be liberator, is by definition, illusory?" betrays lack of understanding of the standpoint of Advaita.

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## NOTES

- \* This paper was presented in the Seventeenth All-India Seminar organized by the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras.
- 1. R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1957).
- 2. W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1961).
- 3. *Ibid.*, pp. 237 and 240.
- 4. H. D. Lewis, *The Elusive Mind* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969).
- 5. *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.
- 6. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
- 7. *First Tiruvantādi*, verse 6.
- 8. *Third Tiruvantādi*, verse 1.
- 9. *Tiruvandappakuti*, 57-60.
- 10. *Puruṣasūktam*.
- 11. *Op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.
- 12. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
- 13. *Op. cit.*, p. 318.
- 14. *Op. cit.*, p. 140.
- 15. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I, i, 12, at the beginning of the *ānandamayādhikarana*.
- 16. Stace, *Op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 16. Stace, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 17. Kumaraguruparar, *Kandar-kaliveñbā*, lines 4-10.
- 18. Poygai Ālvār, *First Tiruvantādi*, verse 5.
- 19. Peyālvār, *Third Tiruvantādi*, verse 63.
- 20. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
- 21. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
- 22. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
- 23. See Rāmānuja's *Śrī-bhāṣya*, I, i, 1.
- 24. See Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
- 25. Zaehner, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140. The examples of the juices constituting honey and the rivers merging in the ocean given in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, ix-x, in the context of *sat-sampatti* are mentioned by Zaehner in support of his view. He says that this portion

of the *Chāndogya* is the *locus classicus* of the non-dualist Vedānta. The passages mentioned by him in this connection do not lend support to his conception of "merging" of the *jīva* in Brahman. Had he taken into consideration the issues that are raised in the context and the answers to them contained in these illustrations, his conclusion would have been quite different.

26. C. E. M. Joad, *Matter, Life and Value* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 409.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 410.
28. Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
29. Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍukya-kārikā*, II, 35.
30. *Ibid.*, II, 36.
31. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II, i, 1.

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## THE CONTINUITY OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION :

1. The logical structure of pre-1500 scientific theories was only conceptual and therefore these are contiguous with those of today only conceptually. Contrarily, the post-1500 theories are contiguous with those of today both conceptually as well as experimentally, for the subsequent evolution of scientific knowledge up to 1900 A.D. was nothing but a chain of experimental discoveries all explainable within a single axiomatic framework.

The heliocentric theory of solar system first proposed by Aristarchus of Samos in defiance of the geocentric theory of Aristotle was revived by Copernicus (1473-1543) on the grounds of its simplicity and mathematical beauty.<sup>1</sup> Copernicus, however, did not support his theory by observations. Thus, it was only a conceptual extension within the earlier framework. A true revolution was affected only by Galileo (1564-1642) whose vigorous criticism of Aristotelian dogmas, not only in the field of astronomy but also in that of dynamics, ultimately succeeded in liberating science from the shackles of argumentation devoid of experimentation.<sup>2</sup> This revolution was brilliantly consolidated by Newton (1642-1727), an English genius. Whereas Aristotelian framework dominated the scene of scientific knowledge for nearly 1800 years, Newtonian framework could do so only for 300 years or so. But the Newtonian framework owes a great deal to two other thinkers: Descartes (1596-1650), a brilliant Frenchman contemporaneous with Galileo and Leibnitz (1646-1716), a German philosopher and mathematician contemporaneous with Newton. Another revolution occurred in 1900 A.D. which brought down Galileo-Descartes-Leibnitz-Newton model. The primary exponents of this revolution were Planck and Einstein. The new framework was articulated and cultivated by a host of thinkers such as DeBroglie, Bohr, Born, Schrodinger, Heisenberg and Dirac etc. However, this Planck-Einstein model has also started to give way within such a short period of 50 or so years. It can, thus be safely guessed

that another revolution in natural philosophy is round the corner. The important question, therefore, is how these thinkers contributed to the continuity of the revolutionary process in scientific thought?

2. Galilean revolution derives its importance not only from the fact that it challenged Aristotle's dogma and thus arrived at a new scientific method, but also from the fact that it revolted against the then authority of the church. In his new logic of science, Galileo demanded the supremacy of experimental method over pure speculation; he demanded the method of 'observation of a section of reality'. "At first it will be expedient to find out and explain a definition best agreeing with that Nature makes use of. For though it be not inconvenient to feign a motion at pleasure and then to consider its properties, . . . yet because Nature makes use of a certain kind of acceleration in the descent of heavy bodies, we are resolved to search out and contemplate the passions thereof, and see whether the definition that we are about to produce of this our accelerate motion does apply and congruously agree with the essence of motion naturally accelerate."<sup>3</sup> Thus, the method demanded not pure speculation and logical explanation but a continuous striving for an explanation that aptly agrees with the natural occurrences. The essence of revolution, therefore, consisted in this discovery of a new method: by experiments on falling bodies and pendulum, Galileo opened the way to a new science of dynamics; and with the discovery of telescope he established the correctness of the heliocentric theory in astronomy.

As compared to the sincerity and the aggressiveness of Galileo, to his courage in defying the authority of the church, to his untiring efforts for fearless expression and defence of that which is congruous with the ways of nature, the contributions of Copernicus are meagre. Contrary to popular belief, Copernicus was not at all a revolutionary for he restrained himself from expressing what he thought was correct and true. Neither did he make any fundamental contribution to astronomy, for whatever he said had already been proposed. It seems, therefore, that

the phrase 'Copernican Revolution' is a misnomer since the personality that emerges as of a true fighter who ignored the miseries to which he was subjected in contrast with the importance of what he was saying, was the personality of Galileo. "I will open the way to a most extensive and excellent science, of which these our labours shall be the elements into which more subtle and piercing wits than mine will be better able to dive."<sup>4</sup> Further, he said, "If someone had held it to be heresy to say that the Earth moves, and if later verification and experiment were to show us that it does indeed do so, what difficulties would the church not encounter. If, on the contrary, whenever the works and the World cannot be made to agree, we consider Holy Scripture as secondary, no harm will befall it, for it has often been modified to suit the masses and has frequently attributed false qualities to God. Therefore I must ask why it is that we insist that whenever it speaks of the Sun or of the Earth, Holy Scripture be considered quite unfallible?"<sup>5</sup> It is owing to this insistence of Galileo to ascribe supremacy to experimental method in science that nowhere do we find him making ambiguous metaphysical utterances. He, thus, gave science the jolt it most needed, namely by separating the wheat from the chaff: Galileo insisted that physics be separated from metaphysics. He, therefore, instead of employing his reason in the metaphysics of matter, motion and the cosmos, thought it best to employ it in laying solid foundations for the experimental sciences of dynamics and astronomy. His vigorous criticism of Aristotle's laws of motion, of falling bodies, and of the theory of the stable earth as the centre of the universe is well known by now. We, therefore, proceed to examine the contributions of Descartes, Newton and Leibnitz to the furtherance of scientific revolution.

3. Descartes' name is usually associated with a revolution in philosophy, but equally great are his works in geometry and astronomy. It can be said that he was primarily a scientist and metaphysics attracted him 'in so far as it provided a framework for his physics.' Physics, he thought, was nothing more than geometry. But Descartes rejected

the ‘slow-going methods’ of Galileo, perhaps primarily because of his metaphysical leanings: Descartes remarked, “Without considering the first causes, he (Galileo) sought only for the causes of a few particular effects and thus built without a foundation”, and “I see nothing in his books which I envy and almost nothing which I would acknowledge as my own.”<sup>6</sup> Descartes insisted on the incorporation of mathematical methods in physics: “That I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstration can be given of them.”<sup>7</sup> In his voluminous *Principles of Philosophy* he begins with the problem of acquirement of knowledge, discusses the principles and nature of material things, the problem of vacuum, space, time and motion, and finally deals with astronomy in which he propounds the famous vortex theory of the heavens — here he discusses for the first time in the history of natural philosophy, the concepts of gravity, light, heat etc. The *Principles of Philosophy* is so exhaustive that rarely can a treatise be found with such scope and breadth. Here Descartes discusses the concepts of infinite/indefinite, substance, mind/body, rarity/condensation, internal place/external place, space/extension, vacuum, motion etc. and thus lays the foundations of theoretical physics. We can now discuss some of these concepts.

“Substance”, says Descartes, “is infinite.” “By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concourse of God.”<sup>8</sup> In this sense, God alone can be said to be infinite substance since it cannot have any limits, it being perfect and existing independently. This substance can itself *create* substance and created substances are of two kinds: thinking substance and corporeal substance. But how do we know about these created substances? This is possible by our perceiving their attributes and since nothing is possessed

of no attributes we conclude that the perceived attributes are necessarily of the substances. These attributes are the principal properties of their respective substances in that these constitute their nature and essence and all the other properties depend on these. The principal property of thinking substance, which he calls mind, is thought and that of corporeal substance, which he names body, is extension in length, breadth and depth. Thus, thought constitutes the nature and essence of mind and extension constitutes the nature and essence of body. All other properties, of thinking or of corporeality, are the modes of these principal properties.

Extension is synonymous with space in that the corporeal substance or body or matter is everywhere. "Space or internal place and the corporeal substance which is contained in it, are not different otherwise than in the mode in which they are conceived of by us.... The difference between them consists only in the fact that in body we consider it as particular and conceive it to change as body changes; in space, on the contrary, we attribute to extension a generic unity, so that after having removed from a certain space the body which occupied it, we do not suppose that we have also removed the extension of that space, because it appears to us that the same extension remains so long as it is of the same magnitude and figure, and preserves the same position in relation to certain other bodies, whereby we determine this space."<sup>9</sup> Also, the notion of vacuum becomes absurd now, for, space and vacuum are the same since if vacuum is a space in which there is no substance, then obviously vacuum will be extended and it is inconceivable that nothing should possess extension. Vacuum, in the Cartesian sense, is that 'place in which there are none of those things which we expected to find there': vacuum contains nothing perceivable. For the same reason → of extension — it is impossible to have atoms, "for however small the parts are supposed to be, yet because they are necessarily extended we are always able in thought to divide any one of them into two or more parts; and thus we know that they are divisible. For there is no-

thing which we can divide in thought, which we do not thereby recognise to be divisible; and therefore if we judged it to be indivisible our judgement would be contrary to the knowledge we have of matter.”<sup>10</sup>

Now, matter is found to have variety of forms and figures and magnitudes. Is this diversity intrinsic to matter? What is the cause of this diversity? Descartes answers that there is but one matter in the whole universe because it is extended. This extended matter can be divided into parts and these parts acquire motions—motions caused by God. The diversity therefore, is due to different motions possessed by different parts. The parts will be hard or fluid depending on the kinds of motions they had—circular or vortex or rectilinear motions. The world is the totality of corporeal substance and is extended indefinitely. Because of the uniformity of matter everywhere, the plurality of worlds is inconceivable. “Thus the matter of the heavens and of the earth is one and the same, and there cannot be a plurality of worlds.”<sup>11</sup> Further, “All the properties which we clearly perceive in it may be reduced to the one, viz., that it can be divided, or moved according to its parts, and consequently is capable of all these affections which we perceive can arise from the motion of its parts. For, its partition by thought alone makes no difference to it; but all the variations in matter, or diversity in its forms, depends on motion”.<sup>12</sup> And motion is nothing but transportation, it is always in the mobile thing not in that which moves it. Motion is not a substance but a mode of the mobile thing. Movement and rest are nothing but two modes of a body in motion. No greater action is required for movement than for rest. “Motion is the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others”.<sup>13</sup>

With such understanding of matter as fluid as well as hard, depending on the motion that it has, Descartes built his mechanical model of the universe. In the beginning was created the fluid matter which was endowed with motion by God. The whole universe is nothing but an interplay of

different parts in vortex motion. Our own solar system is a huge vortex in the centre of which is the sun. The planets in it are not mobile by themselves but are carried by the vortices of the fluid. This mechanical theory, though inadequate in many respects and contrary to the mathematical spirit of Cartesian method, was indeed an ingeneous astronomical theory.

Also, Descartes' contribution to dynamics consisted in formulating his laws of motion when, for the first time, he vaguely discussed the now well known third law of motion. Here he also delved upon the question of impact of two bodies and the nature of dynamics thereupon. His theories of magnetism and light built upon the vortex theory of the fluid matter were again ingeneous: the former he explained as resulting from directionality of vortex motion and the later as resulting from the pressure transmitted through space from the luminous body.<sup>14</sup>

We know today that the theories of matter as developed by Descartes, though were by no means lacking ingenuity, were singularly lacking rationality. "To invoke divine immutability as the guarantee of the soundness of his 'rules' was unworthy of one whose aim was to explain the workings of the cosmic machine mathematically. Had he been content to learn from Galileo instead of being at such pains to disparage his works, it is impossible to imagine what heights he would have scaled".<sup>15</sup> And therefore, at least in this sense, Descartes made a reaction, but he unwittingly furthered the Galilean Revolution by emphasising with equal vehemance — as that of Galileo for the experimental method — the importance of mathematical method not only in physics and astronomy but also in disciplines such as philosophy.

4. As a successor of Galileo and Descartes, Newton was the inheritor of a physics that had, in the course of its advancement, acquired two very powerful working tools: Galileo had given it the experimental method and Descartes had given it the mathematical method. Thus, with these two powerful methods at hand, Newton embarked on build-

ing up a systematic mechanical model of the universe which was to guide physicists and philosophers alike for nearly 300 years — and here Newton has been second only to Aristotle. This new synthesis of Newton was given the name of ‘experimental philosophy’ and its importance was clearly recognized by the learned men of those days.. “They proceed therefore in a twofold method, synthetical and analytical. From some select phenomena, they deduce by analysis the forces of nature and the more simple laws of forces; and from thence, by synthesis, show the constitution of the rest. This is that incomparably best way of philosophising....”<sup>16</sup> Newton’s “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy” was undoubtedly a landmark in the history of philosophy — it laid down in clear terms the acceptable rules of reasoning and method of experimental philosophy. The four basic rules of reasoning that were to be followed strictly were: “to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearance; to the same natural effects, we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes; the qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever; in experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exception”.<sup>17</sup> As should be clear, the impact of the first rule was to eliminate all metaphysical speculation from physics; the second and third rules ascribed to physics a universal nature; and the fourth rule guaranteed the supremacy of the experiment realising that no logical hypothesis could be absolutely true once and for all. The impact of this Newtonian spirit in method was universal and everlasting. The emphasis on mathematical and experimental methods naturally gave rise to a tendency for quantification, for it is inevitable whenever measurements

are made. Newton, therefore, talked of quantity of matter and quantity of motion which concepts he used to great advantage in his three laws of motion. Another concept, perhaps central to Newton's mechanical theory of experimental philosophy, was the concept of 'force' with its variations inertia, mass, and gravitation. Apart from these, Newton sharpened the concepts of 'place', 'space' (in the spirit of Euclidean and Cartesian geometries), 'time', and 'velocity'. With all these concepts thus sharpened, Newton developed a very powerful synthetic system of dynamics — celestial as well as earthly.

Newtonian space and time are immovable, immutable, unchangeable. Parts of space are ordered, one after the other, so are the parts of time, i.e., they have their *places*: To move a part out of its place — whether in space or in time — is to move them 'out of themselves'. "For times and spaces are, as it were, the places as well of themselves as of all other things. All other things are placed in time as to order of succession and in space as to order of situation. It is from their own nature that they are places; and that the primary places of things should be moveable is absurd".<sup>18</sup> An immovable space is required for explaining motion. Thus, "... all motions, from places in motion, are no other than parts of entire and absolute motions; and every entire motion is composed of the motion of the body out of its first place, and the motion of this place out of its place, and so on until we come to some immovable place ....".<sup>19</sup>

How, then, to measure absolute space, time, and motion? And, how, for instance, to distinguish true from relative motion for a body can be in relative motion without actually moving with respect to the absolute space? The answer to the latter question is that the true motions can be measured by measuring their causes, i.e., forces; and that the apparent motions are in fact nothing but differences of true motions. Regarding the first question: so far as the use of space, time, and motion is concerned, only the relative ones are to be preferred, 'but in philosophical disquisition we ought to abstract from our senses, and

consider things themselves distinct from what are only sensible measures of them, for it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which the places and motions of others may be referred".<sup>20</sup>

5. If we compare him with Descartes, Leibnitz seems to possess greater metaphysical tendency, nevertheless he reached much closer to present day physics than perhaps any of his predecessors or contemporaries. Leibnitz, in his philosophy, sought to explain both the bodies endowed with consciousness and without consciousness. His whole philosophy seems to be permeated with four fundamental and what he likes to call, 'great' principles: (i) Principle of the perfection of God,—that God, a perfect Being, created things that always approximate its perfection; (ii) Principle of the identity of indiscernibles,—that no two things in Nature can be identical, internally or externally; (iii) Principle of contradiction,—that what implies a contradiction cannot be true and therefore is false; (iv) Principle of sufficient reason,—that 'nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it is thus rather than otherwise'. Leibnitz used these principles with great ingenuity while taking issue with Cartesians on the question of extension being the essence of matter; and with Newtonians on the question of the absoluteness of space and time; and in general in his *Monadology* and *Specimen Dynamicum*.

According to Leibnitz, real entities are those that are simple and imperishable—those that cannot be changed by any external influence. These atomic entities can either be conscious in which case they be called souls; or without consciousness, in which case they are souls-without-consciousness:—for both of them a common name is *monad*. According to the Principle of identity of indiscernibles, since no two things that exist are indiscernible, each monad differs from another. But these must possess some quality, otherwise they will be unknowable. Thus, God has endowed them with force by virtue of which they are always active. But how these monads *interact* with each other since they are simple? "A substance", says Leibnitz, "which is of

infinite extent inasmuch as it expresses everything, becomes limited by the mere perfect or less perfect manner of its expression. It is thus that one can conceive that substances hinder or limit one another and are compelled, so to speak, to accommodate themselves to one another. For it can happen that a change which augments the expression of the one diminishes that of the other".<sup>21</sup> These monads, being nothing but simple substance, are without parts. They can only begin and end all at once, that is to say, 'they can only begin by creation and end by annihilation, whereas what is compound begins or ends by parts'. Obviously the simple substance of Leibnitz is atomic. But he actually refutes the possibility of atoms as well as of the void. Matter, says Leibnitz, is a plenum. "All bodies form a coherent whole. All are separable by force from the others, but not without resistance. There are no atoms or bodies whose parts are never separable by force".<sup>22</sup> For his argument against void and atoms we must reproduce here a lengthy excerpt as it will also show with what ingenuity he used his principles: "Actually the least corpuscle is subdivided *ad infinitum* and contains a world of new created things, which the universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom, that is, body all of a piece and not subdivided. All the same, to want to put a void in nature is to attribute to God a very imperfect producion, it is to violate the great principle of the necessity of a *sufficient reason*.... I assume that any perfection which God could put in things without derogating from the other perfections in them, has been put there. Now, let us imagine a space entirely empty; God could put in it some matter without in any way derogating from anything else whatever; therefore, he did put some matter therein; therefore there is no space entirely empty; therefore everything is full. The same argument proves that there is no corpuscle which is not subdivided".<sup>23</sup>

Leibnitz discusses at great length the concepts of force, space, time, and motion in his 'Specimen Dynamicum'. Force is the effort in the body which, 'were it not limited by a contrary effort, would come to realisation'. Force is not mere "potentiality", it is either *active* or *passive*. Each of

them exists in two forms: *primitive* and *derivative*. Derivative force is only a limitation of primitive forces, 'arising from a multiplicity of conflicting interactions of bodies. This primitive active force is what is *substantial form* or *soul* and 'pertains only to general causes which do not suffice for explanation of phenomena'. Primitive passive force, on the other hand, is the persistent force of resistance in the bodies and constitutes the "primary matter" of scholastic philosophy. It is by virtue of this force that one body cannot be penetrated by another. The derivative passive force is the force of persistence (or inertia) which reveals itself in many ways in secondary matter."... having once established that every body *acts* by virtue of its *form*, and is persistent or offers resistance by virtue of its matter, we wish to proceed to the further problem and to deal with the theory of derivative forces and resistances".<sup>24</sup> Thus, force must always be conserved. "A body which pushes another along must therefore always suffer a retardation such that neither more nor less force is contained in the effect than in the cause. Since this law cannot be derived from the merely geometrical concept of mass, there must be another basic principle immanent in bodies, viz., the force itself which is always preserved in the same quantity, although it is divided among different bodies".<sup>25</sup>

Space and time, says Leibnitz, are purely relative. Space is an order of coexistence and time an order of successions. Space is neither a substance nor an absolute being, nor an organ of God. Space is absolutely uniform and 'without the things situated in it, one point of space absolutely does not differ in any respect from another point of space'. "Now, from this it follows that if we suppose that space is something-in-itself, other than the order of bodies among themselves, it is impossible that there should be a reason why God, preserving the same positions of bodies among themselves, should have arranged bodies in space thus and not otherwise. But if space is nothing other than this order or relation, and is nothing whatever without bodies but the possibility of placing them in, these two conditions, the one as things are, the other supposed the other

way round, would not differ from one another, their difference exists only in our chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in truth the one would be just the same as the other, as they are absolutely indiscernible and consequently there is no occasion to search after a reason for the preference of the one to the other. The same is true for time".<sup>26</sup> It immediately follows that, since space and time are not real, motion is also not real. Since it does not possess any coexisting parts just like time, it has no existence as a whole. "And thus there is nothing real in motion itself, apart from the reality of the momentary transition which is determined by means of force and an effort for change".<sup>27</sup>

Since the Newtonian model prevailed in spite of Leibnitz, who sounds extraordinarily modern so far as the recent developments in physics are concerned, it seems he could not fight single handedly the well established experimental philosophy of Newton. Today we know that the notions of space, time, and motion, of the Newtonian scheme had to be abandoned altogether. Today, we are asking anew: are, in fact, space and time mere notions?

6. The history of the success of Newtonian-Leibnitzian model is well known. Newtonian mechanics was widely applied to various phenomena and it proved amazingly successful in most of them. But it failed completely in explaining the phenomenon of light; and the phenomenon of heat too could not be fully understood.<sup>28</sup> It was, however, continuously developed in the form of mechanics of rigid bodies where the forces, masses, and motions of tiny particles constituting the rigid body were simply summed so as to find the mechanics of the whole body. This corpuscular-kinetic view was a natural consequence of the Newtonian framework and it in no wise challenged any of its fundamental axioms.

In a sense, Newtonian mechanics was a systematic embodiment of the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. And the concepts that were adopted had to face the only two criteria: of logical conformity with the existing theory, and

of measurement. But the logic of the theories was also to be confirmed by measurement albeit the objects of measurement were not these subtle atoms which had definitely found their place in the mathematical framework. It was never the aim of Newtonian framework to measure the motions and masses of those very particles which appeared in the corpuscular-kinetic theories: their aggregates alone were the object of measurement. And this was precisely the limitation of Newtonian framework.

When Newtonian mechanics did not succeed in explaining some of the phenomena of light and heat, these were excluded from the category of matter. Light was considered a manifestation of wave-motion in an elastic medium and heat (caloric) was thought to be 'some kind of imponderable fluid which was strictly conserved'. And the amazing thing of all was that the physicists of that period did not expect much from these phenomena and they thought that all that was to be known had been known and what was further needed was to achieve an accuracy to a greater number of decimal places in the results already obtained!

As these problems matured, efforts were made to measure the velocity of light, and a new phenomenon known as 'heat radiation' came to the notice of some German physicists. So far as light phenomenon was concerned, Newtonian mechanics demanded that although its true motion would be that which is relative to absolute space, in different frames it should have different relative motions. But experiments by Michelson and Morley revealed that the velocity of light remained constant in every frame and every direction. This was in obvious contradiction with the Newtonian model and eminent physicists of those days, like Lorentz, tried to explain the experimental evidence so as to reconcile it with the Newtonian model. Einstein, however, accepted the truth of this fact, namely, that the velocity of light remains constant in any frame and in any direction. With the additional assumption that no material body could transcend this limiting velocity, he developed his theory of relativity<sup>29</sup> which forced a fundamental revision of all the

basic concepts in the Newtonian model. These concerned motion, mass, space and time. With the new concepts as foundation, Einstein further developed his theory so as to make it 'general'. Newtonian model could not be saved. And undeniably, Einstein had effected a revolution in scientific thought.<sup>30</sup> In the direction of the phenomena of heat radiation, it was becoming increasingly difficult to develop a theory that would precisely explain the proportionality relation between the intensity of radiation as against its frequency and temperature,—as discovered in the experiments on 'black body'. Planck<sup>31</sup> finally succeeded in giving a mathematically derived expression which excellently tallied with the experimental data. He, however, had to make certain assumptions which were also contray to Newtonian spirit. However, it was also found to give correct results when applied to other phenomena such as photoelectric effect and gas ionisation. This showed that Planck's idea was not only correct but a revolutionary one too. To this turbulence in physics which occurred in the first decade of the 20th century, we give the name Einstein-Planckian Revolution: it was indeed as significant, as was to be proved later, as that made by Descartes and Galileo in respect of both experimental and logical methods.

7. The story after this is well known. Realising the importance of Planck's discovery, physicists sought to explain every micro-phenomenon on these lines. Thus, the phenomena of heat ionization, electricity, magnetism were successfully explained. Bohr<sup>32</sup> sought to explain the observed spectra of gases by presenting a model of the atom, i.e., of the particle which in Newtonian physics was rigid and compact and structureless. He had worked out on Planckian line and his theory was fairly successful but not entirely so even for the simplest hydrogen atom. DeBroglie<sup>33</sup> independently sought to take the duality of waves as particles to its natural conclusion, i.e., he asked: if light can behave as a quantum oscillator, i.e., as a particle, then why particles should not behave as waves? He, thus, advanced a wave theory of atom in which he accounted for the relativistic velocity of the electron in an orbit. This theory stood to

experimental confirmation. Subsequently, Heisenberg<sup>34</sup> and Schrodinger<sup>35</sup> advanced their Quantum Theories: the former arguing that the concept of *velocity* of electron in the orbit must be abandoned since it cannot be measured by any experiment whatsoever, and instead of that the concept of *frequency* should be adopted; the latter again giving a model of atom as a 'particle', i.e., nucleus diffracting in a cloud of electron waves. With these theories as the base, it became possible to develop more refined theories which made a penetration of atom a reality. Thus, it has gradually become possible to develop a spectrum of what are called 'elementary particles' in about the same manner in which Daltonian chemistry developed a periodic table of the elements and Maxwell's equations developed a spectrum of visible light. Highly refined techniques have made even the penetration of these elementary particles possible. But we are lacking a comprehensive theory of these particles which would explain why their number is as much as it is, how they are formed, and so on? It is hoped that some crazy idea, such as Planck, will make such a theory possible!\*

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#### NOTES

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## MĀYĀ: A NOTE

Śaṅkara speaks of Māyā as the power of the Lord, and beginningless. Sadānanda says that Māyā is something positive though intangible which cannot be described as either being or non-being. (It is very doubtful whether it can be described as cosmic illusion). Māyā cannot be described as being or as non-being that is why Māyā is said to be indefinable. If it were being, in the true sense, then its effect, the tangible universe would be perceived at all times. For being can never become unreal. On the other hand, if Māyā were non-being a non-existent unreality, like the son of a barren woman, the manifold universe could not be seen. One could not see the world of names and form as real. Therefore Māyā is said to be 'something positive'. If it is regarded as something positive then Monism cannot be established because then there would be two principles not one, Brahman and Māyā. (Orthodox thinkers would consider this a 'type fallacy' for the two cannot be equated). Yet the word 'positive' suggests that 'Māyā' cannot be explained away as 'airy nothing'.

This dilemma can only be solved by changing the form of the question. Instead of asking the question 'What is Māyā' we should ask the question, 'What are those features of the world that make us regard the world as 'Māyā'?' We know that there are certain features of the world which refuse to add up. Then at once the problem becomes verifiable, checkable. 'Māyā' is not a genuine name. It cannot function as name.

I would like other philosophers to comment upon this original suggestion of mine.

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## NORMAN MALCOLM'S ANALYSIS OF DREAMING

The Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind is mainly concerned with (1) determining the criteria of application of the psychological terms (2) the first-person third-person asymmetry in their application (3) learning the use of expressions which have psychological terms and (4) analysing how the psychological concepts are framed in the context of the impossibility of private language. Malcom's analysis of dreaming is Wittgensteinian in all these aspects.

I have here referred to Malcolm's analysis of dreaming (Part I). Some recent objections by D. M. Armstrong and H. D. Lewis are then briefly stated (Part II).

In evaluating the objections (Part III) I have argued that (1) Armstrong's objections do not undermine Malcolm's analysis because Malcolm is not a philosophical behaviourist. (2) Armstrong's own account of dreaming is incompatible with his contingent-identity theory. (3) The objections raised by H. D. Lewis have considerably weakened Malcolm's position.

In the concluding section (Part IV) Malcolm's Criterion of dreaming has been discussed. I have pointed out some genuine difficulties in extending Wittgensteinian concept of Criterion to dreaming, in view of the Malcolm's argument that remembering a dream is a non-standard use of remembering and telling a dream is talking about something subsequently discovered as a non-event.

Malcolm's argument that physiological criterion changes basically the concept of dream is inadequate because I believe that unless one is a physiologist who subscribes to Identity Theory, this conclusion does not follow.

Malcolm denies that the sentence "I am asleep" is a meaningful claim about anything. It does not have a use that is homogeneous with the normal use of the sentence "He is asleep". The sentences "I am asleep", "I am unconscious" and "I am dead" cannot assert anything.<sup>1</sup>

No one can make assertions during sleep. Having argued for this, Malcolm further argues that the sentence "I am asleep" cannot be used to make a judgement. Nothing would count as its verification here and no correct use is available for such a sentence. Arguing in the style of Wittgenstein, Malcolm makes out a case against private ostensive definition of dreaming or being asleep. Sleeping man cannot judge that he is asleep and it makes no sense to say that his judgement is true or false.

Of course, Malcolm admits that the first-person present tense indicative use of "I am in pain" is meaningful because there is a Criterion for determining whether someone uses the sentence "I am in pain" correctly. For the correct use of "I am asleep" there is no such criterion.

Malcolm observes,

"A connection in sense between "I am asleep" and "He is asleep" is exactly what cannot be established, since the fulfilment of the criterion of truth, relative to the third person sentence can play no part in the fulfilment of the criterion of understanding relative to the first-person sentence" (p. 17).

Malcolm agrees that even though "I am asleep" has no sense, its negation "I am not asleep" has a sense. Again, "Are you asleep"? has the grammatical form of a question, but it is not actually used as a question.

For the sentence "He is asleep", we have two criteria and hence it has a correct use. We have, (1) Criterion of behaviour and (2) Criterion of testimony. Malcolm points out that "Criterion of testimony is merely supplementary to the criterion of behaviour" (p. 25).

Malcolm, having fully analysed "I am asleep" as a claim of assertion and judgement, extends his analysis and applies the same logic in coming to the conclusion that thinking in sleep, reasoning in sleep, imagining in sleep and so on are all unintelligible notions. But what about dreams? Malcolm states that "dreaming while asleep" is a

meaningful notion as contrasted with 'judging while asleep' which has no sense.

It is clear that if Malcolm denies that we can judge, assert, reason, think and argue during sleep and if he also accepts that we dream while asleep, then the strange conclusion irresistibly follows that dreams are not experiences, images or hallucinations or any other type of mental acts at all. Malcolm boldly accepts the conclusion "Indeed I am not trying to say what dreaming is. I do not understand what it would mean to do that" (p. 59). Malcolm, on the one hand, clearly distinguishes between 'dreaming' and 'telling a dream'. He also rejects the suggestion that "dream is the waking impression that one dreamt". On the other hand, Malcolm refuses to tell us what dreaming is. Dreams and waking impressions are two different things but they are not logically independent. Telling of a dream is the criterion of the occurrence of a dream. This criterion is applied to the third-person statements like "He had a dream". "I had a dream" — this sentence does not require such a criterion. Malcolm emphasises the point that if a man wakes up with the impression of having seen and done various things and if it is known that he did not see and do those things, then it is known that he dreamt them. I dreamt that 'p' implies 'not-p'. "Telling a dream is telling a kind of story". Malcolm is very cautious in drawing many-types of distinctions among various types of discourses. He closely follows Wittgenstein here and he is explicit about it in his discussion of the criterion of dreaming.

Malcolm, for example, distinguishes between historical use of the first-person psychological sentences and their corresponding dream-telling use. Suppose someone says "Last night I was very angry with my brother"; this statement as a historical statement would be open to correction, verification or revision, but the same statement in dream-telling context would not be open to correction. Discrepant appearances would require explanation in the context of historical statements; on the contrary, discrepant appearances would be required for dream-telling context. The

consequences of the same statement in the different contexts are also different.

Malcolm concludes, "First person past tense psychological sentences have sharply different grammars in these two modes of discourse" (p. 98). Malcolm firmly believes that waking testimony is the sole criterion of dreaming and physiological criterion employed by contemporary research on dreams would alter the normal concept of dreaming beyond recognition.

## II

I now consider two of the recent criticisms of Malcolm's analysis of dreaming. It would be interesting to note that a recent supporter of Materialist theory of Mind, D. M. Armstrong (1968), discusses Malcolm's thesis under the section "behaviourism" and argues that as dreams are events that occur in the minds during sleep, the existence of dreams falsifies behaviourism.<sup>2</sup> Professor H. D. Lewis (1968), a recent defender of dualism, has also subjected Malcolm's analysis of dreaming to an exceptionally close and critical study.<sup>3</sup> Malcolm thus faces objections from both materialists and dualists. Let us review the objections in order.

### (a) *Armstrong's Objections :*

Armstrong argues in support of psychophysical identity theory by claiming that the concept of mental state is the concept of inner cause of outward behaviour. These inner causes are in fact brain states and this means that mental states are brain-states. Armstrong tries to explain dreams in the context of such a theory.

"The core of dreaming is a perceptual experience involving belief. Dreaming is simply the total hallucination occurring during sleep" (p. 304).

Armstrong agrees with Malcolm in granting the possibility that the linguistic institution of telling one's dream may be a part of our ordinary concept of dreaming, but his main argument against Malcolm is that dreams are inner

events and Malcolm has only concentrated on outward criteria without proper analysis of dreaming as a mental event. Armstrong claims that dreams are perceptual experience during sleep. As Armstrong advocates reductive analysis of perception, he further argues that as illusory perception, "dreams are acquiring of false beliefs about the nature of current situation and environment". Carrying the reductive analysis further, he concludes that acquiring of such false beliefs are events within us which would give us the capacity to discriminate the various features of environment. The main thrust of Armstrong's argument is that images and dreams can be analysed in terms of central-state materialism without undermining their unique differences from perception.

(b) *Objections by H. D. Lewis :*

The objections raised by Lewis (1968) can be summarized as under :

- (1) It is not necessary for a dreamer to be aware that he is asleep, in order to give an account of dreams on awaking.
- (2) Malcolm's position requires us to draw a very sharp distinction between waking and dreaming. Lewis wonders whether we can make such a distinction in absolute terms without disregarding the processes of gradually falling asleep and of slowly pulling ourselves awake again.
- (3) Lewis fully agrees with Malcolm that if a waking person makes the judgement "I am asleep" it would be odd to the point of self-contradiction, but Lewis denies that on the basis of detecting such an absurdity in a particular claim, Malcolm can support the general conclusion that there can be no process or experience of dreaming.
- (4) Lewis is not impressed by Malcolm's argument from memory and verification because Lewis is of the opinion that it is not a "misuse of Language" to talk about 'remembering dreams' and complete verification of a dream-report is not even expected.
- (5) Malcolm's acceptance of Wittgenstein's advice to philosophers to know when to stop does not convince Lewis.

On the contrary, Lewis argues that Malcolm stops exactly where his position is unsupportable. For example, Malcolm maintains that dreams and walking impressions are not identical. This is a perfectly sound observation. On the other hand, Malcolm refuses to answer the question "what is a dream?" by declaring "I do not understand what it would mean to do that" (p. 59).

Commenting on this strange position, Lewis concludes, "Malcolm has decided to stop not where the logic of the situation requires him but where it best suits his argument".

### III

It would be interesting to evaluate the arguments of Armstrong and Lewis.

(a) Armstrong's claim that existence of dreams would falsify behaviourism does not damage Malcolm's analysis of dreaming for the simple reason that Malcolm is neither an ontological behaviourist who would deny the existence of mental processes nor a linguistic behaviourist who would reduce all psychological statements to behavioural statements. On the contrary, Malcolm has strongly insisted on the first-person third-person asymmetry regarding psychological statements. In fact, in his recent book "*Problems of Mind — Descartes to Wittgenstein*" (1972), Malcolm quotes from Wittenstein in emphasising such asymmetry as constituting a valid objection to behaviourism. In the preface to his above-referred book, Malcolm just refers to Armstrong's Identity-Theory but does not develop any detailed objections specific to Armstrong's version of Identity-Theory for lack of space, but the conclusion of the book is unmistakably clear. Malcolm rejects mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism and behaviourism. He admits that the outcome is too negative but this can not be helped.

I believe that Armstrong has missed some points of Malcolm's analysis of dreaming because Armstrong seems to think that Malcolm is a reductive behaviourist, "who makes a gallant attempt to argue that going to sleep and

dreaming is simply being disposed after waking to tell certain stories of how things seemed to be". This would amount to a dispositional analysis of dreaming. Malcolm does not subscribe to such analysis because he does not reduce dreaming "to a disposition of telling a dream".

I further believe that Armstrong own version is not free from difficulties. Armstrong appears to be accepting the inner mental states in his arguments against Wittgenstein, Malcolm, Ryle and Skinner, but when Armstrong carefully distinguishes between Central-state materialism and behaviourism, he observes as follows:

"Unlike behaviourism, the Central-State theory does not deny the existence of inner mental states. On the contrary it asserts their existence; they are physical states of the brain" (p. 75).

Our question would be, "What does this assertion mean?" It would definitely mean the denial of mental states because to say that they are only physical states is exactly to deny that they are mental states. Armstrong's brilliant analysis of images, dreams, perceptions etc. is vitiated by his epistemological ambivalence regarding the mental and the physical.

Armstrong refers to physiological research on dreaming (p. 340) and the possibility of finding out that a man is dreaming while he is still asleep. But if the mental state is nothing but physical state then the E.E.G. records definitely indicate the pattern of brain events and the question of further finding out whether a person is dreaming would make no sense, because there is nothing else to find out.

Armstrong begins by stating that there are inner mental events and ends by saying that these are inner physical events. If anyone submits that dreaming is an inner physical event and nothing else then he is open to all the attacks against behaviourism. Malcolm's earlier objection<sup>4</sup> that brain-processes can be located but we have no independent test for locating mental events, applies to Armstrong's version too.

(b) The objections raised by Lewis against Malcolm's analysis of dreaming help us in evaluating Malcolm's view from the standpoint of a dualist ontology.

I believe that Malcolm's bold declaration to the effect that he does not understand what dreaming is, is not very illuminating. The comments of Lewis on Malcolm's Wittgensteinian silence on the issue are entirely justified. The same can be said of the comments of Lewis regarding the verification of dreams and remembering. A person reading a book on 'Dreaming' (1959-Malcolm) expects to be told what dreaming is and Lewis admirably criticises Malcolm for not having completely enlightened the reader on this crucial point. Lewis has been successful in surveying at length some of the strained arguments of contemporary philosophers of mind in explaining the inner experience. But in order to be clear about the basic issues and to be fair to Malcolm, it must be emphasised again that neither Malcolm nor Wittgenstein is a behaviourist.

#### IV

Since Wittgenstein, the concept of criterion has provoked a new controversy in Philosophy. Criterial relation is different from correlation. It is also distinguished from statements describing symptoms. Criterion is to be treated as a decisive piece of evidence. In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein stressed the need for outward Criteria of inner experiences but in the discussion of pain, images, memories, etc. it was found that (1) As lying is possible, behavioural criterion is not absolutely decisive in spite of it being absolutely essential to the understanding and employment of sensation-language and (2) First-person statements are not Criterion-governed. One does not establish that one is in pain by employing the Criterion of pain.

Malcolm explicitly employs Wittgensteinian concept of Criterion to dreaming. Malcolm makes the following observations.

- (1) The concept of dreaming is derived not from dreaming but from the descriptions of dreams (p. 55).

(2) Our concept of dreaming has for its Criterion not the behaviour of sleeping person, but his subsequent testimony (p. 63).

(3) "If a man wakes up with the impression of having seen and done various things and if it is known that he did not see and do those things: that it is known that he dreamt them. No problem remains whether a dream really existed or whether anything corresponds to his memory of dreams" (p. 66).

Now there are several difficulties here :

- (1) If dreams are non-events or if dreams are not any kind of experiences, what does the criterion establish? What do we describe when we describe dreams? What would count as framing a concept of a dream from the description of dreams?
- (2) As lying is possible, Malcolm believes, following Wittgenstein, that truthful account of dream would be the Criterion. But if, as Malcolm himself admits, nothing would count as verifying anyone's dream-report how can one ever be sure about the truthfulness of anybody's report? If report of dream qua report is the sole criterion and if there is no sense in talking about the report agreeing with dreams, how can one still talk of sincerity of any report?
- (3) Malcolm agrees that the first-person dream-report is not Criterion-governed and still he makes a distinction between 'knowing that one dreamt' in the sense of 'concluding that one dreamt', and 'knowing that one dreamt' in the sense of 'having applied the Criterion to oneself'. For the statement regarding having of an impression that certain events occurred, one does not require a criterion; concluding that one had a dream would only mean that events did not occur. When one says "It occurred in a dream" one means to say "it did not occur".

Now this is not what we mean by talking about dreaming. Of course, dream-events do not occur in the real world.

This is obvious. But there is something else. When I say I had a dream, I do not merely want to say that events mentioned did not occur. I also want to say that they did occur in my dream. For "X did not occur" you cannot always substitute "one dreamt it". They are non-synonymous expressions and not contingently identical either.

The following example by C. S. Chihara and J. A. Fodor is an adequate counter-instance to Malcolm's criterion.

"A person, from time to time, gets the strange feeling that shortly before he had seen and heard his father commanding him to come home. One morning he wakes with this feeling knowing full well that his father is dead. Now we are asked by Malcolm to believe that the person must have dreamt that he saw and heard his father; supposedly, it would be logically absurd for the person to claim to have this feeling and deny that he had dreamt it!"<sup>5</sup>

- (4) Story-telling, talking about our fantasies, talking about our past, talking while awake that one was mistaken in having thought that something happened when it did not happen;— all these differ from talking about one's own dreams. Malcolm's account of learning to talk about dreams does not adequately differentiate among our modes of talking about the non-event in many ways. Discovering that certain event did not occur can well take place in our waking life. An investigator may discover that a Crime did not take place by coming to know that he was misinformed. Discovery of a non-event is not a differentia of dreaming.
- (5) Malcolm believes that physiological criterion, if adopted universally, would basically alter the concept of dreaming. Nothing like this would ever happen, unless the physiologists have accepted the mind-body identity theory. If identity-theory is accepted "having a dream" and "being in a brain state" would be contingently theory. If identity-theory is accepted, "having a dream" event during sleep, I do not think that physiological criterion would alter the concept of dreaming.

It appears that Malcolm has unnecessarily restricted criterion of dreaming. Of course, I do not know how one would meet Malcolm's objection regarding the determination of dream-duration through physiological methods. I am not sure as to what would count as duration of dreams and Malcolm has definitely raised an interesting problem here. Still however, in so far as one can establish the duration of sleep and admit that dream is a mental event occurring during sleep, the concept of dreaming is protected from behaviourism and identity theory.

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#### NOTES

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2. ARMSTRONG, D. M., *A Materialist Theory of Mind* (Routledge 1968).
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## DIALOGUE

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## V. S. SOLOVYOV'S PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRAL KNOWLEDGE<sup>1</sup>

Solovyov's interest in epistemological problems dates back to his first major work, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (1874). Solovyov's philosophical system is a synthesis of ideas drawn from Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza and the German idealists. In his early work Solovyov accepts Spinoza's types of knowledge, i.e., sense data, intellectual knowledge and reason. He also accepts Schopenhauer's view that the world is "idea" (*Vorstellung*) as well as his "ideas of ideas" (*Vorstellungen von Vorstellungen*). These "ideas" are the general concepts whereby we can classify phenomena according to the common features that are of interest to us and which give us a conceptual structure of the phenomenal world.

Solovyov is also indebted to Schelling's *System des tranzendentlen Idealismus* in which a theory of knowledge is constructed consisting of three stages which progress from sensation to perception, from perception to reflection and from reflection to will. According to this theory, the separation of knowledge from its object occurs only in abstraction. In actuality concepts have no existence apart from their object, since knowledge implies the meeting of object, and the Self. The Self is not merely one of the objects of knowledge but is the *condition* of all knowledge.

Solovyov's mysticism which is central to his epistemology is rooted in the doctrine of Total-Unity — a doctrine whose antecedents are the Stoics, Plotinus, Proclus, Nicholas of Cusa, Philo and the German mystics Franz Baader and Jacob Boehme, all of whom sought to construct a metaphysics of Total-Unity. Solovyov "resurrected" this doctrine. The central idea underlying this doctrine is that the phenomenal world is absolute being in the process of becoming. Let us note two points regarding Solovyov's mysticism. (a) He firmly believed in the existence of mystical perception, and (b) that at the basis of his *Weltanschauung*

there is the object of mystical perception, which he terms God, Deity, Absolute spiritual Principle, Truth-bearer, Truth, but the most important term is the Totally-one Subsistence. According to Solovyov, God contains within himself all things, including man. God is not merely the sum of its parts but differs at the same time from each of the parts. Solovyov terms this *Total-Unity* rather than *Unity*. The Absolute and the Cosmos are for Solovyov *con-substantial*.

Solovyov was fully aware of the radical dualism inherent in the doctrine of Total-Unity. He also realized that it would be difficult to prove the existence of mystical perception without offering some proof for its existence. The first proof for the existence of mystical perception, according to Solovyov, is to be found in the doctrine of the Totally-One Being which contains within itself everything including man. From this he concludes that it is possible to know God within one's own spirit without having to resort to sense data or concepts. Mystical perception, says Solovyov, can only be explained when we admit that in perceiving ourselves in God we at the same time perceive all other objects or beings. He calls this apprehension "faith," which is one of the elements of mystical perception, which gives us the certainty of the existence of objects outside ourselves.

The second proof for the existence of mystical perception is based on our belief in the empirical world by means of the senses, which entails our admission that these qualities belong to the external objects themselves. But, says Solovyov, we also know that these senses are subjective states of consciousness. Hence, we cannot prove the existence of the empirical world by means of sense data alone. Solovyov realized that these 'proofs' cannot be 'demonstrated' without mystical perception since we would have two series of subjective states of consciousness. He therefore insists that we cannot have an objectified image of the empirical world without mystical perception, for knowledge requires a synthesis of the senses with *a priori* ideas; mystical knowledge alone makes such synthesis possible. This is obviously a *petitio principii* argument. What Solovyov was trying to

do is to relate the empirical world to the Absolute. In other words, he was faced with the problem of having to deduce the conditional from the unconditional.

It should be stated here that Solovyov's metaphysics contains two Absolutes. The first Absolute is the super-Subsistence given to us directly by means of mystical perception. The second Absolute, or the "other," is mediated through reason. Zenkovsky points out that the second Absolute is basically Plato's "intelligible world (*kosmos noetos*), the principle or the productive force of being, i.e., the plurality of forms of the idea."<sup>2</sup>

Solovyov was painfully aware of the fact that the idea of two Absolutes was incompatible with the Christian religion which he was eager to defend. He therefore tried to circumvent the problem by relating the second Absolute to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. This idea is developed in his *Lectures on Godmanhood* where he tries to provide a philosophical explanation for man's religious development which he regards as a divine-human process. Solovyov identified God with the Absolute First Principle which, in his view, reveals itself in Triunity. Since Triunity precludes a pure monism, Solovyov is forced to resort to the "other" in which the Absolute must manifest itself, thus making it possible for the Absolute to emerge from Unity into Total-Unity.

There are three fundamental principles in Solovyov's philosophical system which provide the clue to his theory of knowledge and the nature of his mysticism. These principles are: (a) the inner spirituality of all being; (b) the doctrine of Total-Unity, and (c) the concept of Godmanhood. Solovyov maintains that at the root of all spiritual activity there is an intuition of a religious nature. Religious intuition manifests itself in the unity of consciousness in which all symbols are related, and in the consciousness of the unity of all being in the Absolute.

Solovyov discusses the general characteristics of mystical knowledge in his three works.<sup>3</sup> He distinguishes between "mistika" (the mystical) and "mistitsizm" (mysticism).

The "mystical" is "the direct, and immediate relation of our spirit to the transcendental world."<sup>4</sup> "Mysticism" is "the reflection of our intellect on this relation, constituting a particular direction in philosophy."<sup>5</sup> The mystical corresponds epistemologically to art, while "mysticism" has to do with "the intuitions which recognize a supra-cosmic and supra-human principle as the true being, not only in the form of an abstract principle, but also with the entire richness of the being's actual life, such intuitions transcend the limits of institutional philosophy with its two types by adding a special third type of intellectual intuition, usually called 'mysticism.'"<sup>6</sup> Solovyov maintains that mystical knowledge is the foundation of true philosophy, just as sense experience is the foundation of empirical philosophy and logical thought of rationalistic philosophy. Solovyov cautions us that mystical knowledge *per se* does not however give us integral knowledge, which is a synthesis of philosophy, science and religion. According to Solovyov, integral knowledge alone, which he terms "free scientific theosophy," is capable of apprehending reality both in the ideas of reason and in the ideas of nature. "Free theosophy or integral knowledge... must represent the highest condition of the whole of philosophy... Knowledge in its unity is theosophy."<sup>7</sup> The material of philosophy as integral knowledge consists of psychic, mystical and physical phenomena. Theosophy as defined above is at the very heart of his epistemology.

The phenomenal world for Solovyov is a continuous process — it is *my* idea, but at the basis of this empirical world there is *real* being which manifests itself as the totality of elemental substances endowed with desire and ideas. Solovyov calls these substances monads which represent an organized unity or cosmos at whose centre is the idea of love. "Absolute love is precisely that ideal *all*, that fulness... which constitutes the actual content of the divine principle."<sup>8</sup> Solovyov's epistemological and metaphysical conception presupposes the world both as *will* and *idea* as the object of the philosophy of integral knowledge, which is central to his theory of knowledge.

Solovyov differentiates between absolute knowledge and knowledge of the Absolute. The former is inaccessible to man and the latter is man's chief task. Intellectual intuition or mysticism is the basis of both types of knowledge. Mystical perception requires special subjective grounds which are peculiar for the most part to prophets and mystics, while apprehension of an object is not peculiar to the human species alone but includes animals as well.

The cognitive process involves mystical perception, imagination, and creativity. Solovyov speaks of intellectual contemplation in a dual sense. Intellectual contemplation in the first sense is a necessary element in the composition of perception and is unconscious and common to everybody. Intellectual contemplation in the second sense is a conscious state of inspiration and ecstasy influenced by the transcendent world. Solovyov always regarded the mystical element as caused by the transcendent influence on man, hence man is able to cognize the transcendent world by means of mystical perception which plays a dual role, first in perception and second in philosophical construction.

Solovyov's epistemology is primarily concerned with integral knowledge which differs from abstract knowledge in that it regards reason and logic as means of verifying intuitive knowledge. We cognize an object sensually, intellectually and absolutely. Sensual and intellectual cognition of an object is based on the certainty of its independent existence which presupposes an internal relation between subject and object, vital to a true knowledge of reality. Since the prime purpose of such knowledge is the absolute essence of the object, it necessarily presupposes an interrelation between object and subject where the subject apprehends the true essence of the object. The interrelation between substances is defined by Solovyov as 'imagination.'

Solovyov differentiates between objective and rational knowledge. Objective knowledge contains only the basis for cognizing the truth.

By truth we generally mean that which is, hence, we call true knowledge that which is... if by the word

'is' is meant being in general... But since we differentiate between true knowledge and imaginary knowledge, and truth from falsehood, then the very question of truth and true knowledge depends on such a distinction between truth and falsehood. Hence, it is not sufficient for an object to exist in general. It must exist in some other quality which we call truth... The difference between the true and the false is to be seen in the difference between subjective consciousness and that which exists outside the subject, which we call the *real* object or thing. True knowledge must be an experience not merely an idea.<sup>9</sup>

The three elements in the cognitive process, namely, intuition, imagination and creativity, correspond to the three definitions of the object itself, its absolute being and its appearance. In examining the various alternatives to a theory of knowledge Solovyov came to the conclusion that real metaphysical truth cannot be found in either abstract rationalism or in abstract realism. Solovyov maintains that any real knowledge of an object has something more than is given by our sensations and concepts concerning that object. What is this 'more'? Solovyov states that there are three aspects to be considered in every object: first, the inner reality of its essence; second, its common essence, and third, its visible reality. He insists that neither realism nor rationalism is genuinely concerned with these aspects of an object. He maintains that true objective knowledge presupposes such a relationship between subject and object which unites them internally by what is absolute to both of them. This 'absolute' element is not reducible to either sensations or concepts, but necessarily exists in both the object of knowledge and the knowing subject.

Every object of knowledge, according to Solovyov, is in itself an 'invisible object'<sup>10</sup> What we 'see' in an object is our sensations and their logical relations, but an object in its absolute existence is just as 'invisible' to our reason as it is to our physical sight. Knowledge of an object is possible because subject and object are rooted in the same absolute being. Hence an object is known from two aspects:

externally from the point of view of our separateness, which is relative knowledge and internally from the point of view of absolute being, which is mystical knowledge. Mystical knowledge reveals to us the absolute essence of an object.

The chief goal of knowledge is to bring man to an inner union with reality. Solovyov develops this idea in his *Critique of Abstract Principles* where he tries to show that mystical intuition is very important in the cognitive process. For at the basis of true knowledge there is mystical perception. His earlier ideas are elaborated in *Foundations of Theoretical Philosophy*. The following is a brief summary of the salient points of *Foundations*.

There is a threefold certainty for the principle of philosophy. First, the subjective states of consciousness as such, i.e., the psychic material of every philosophy. Second, the certainty of the general logical form of thought as such (independent of content). Third, the certainty of the philosophical activity, as a definite form which contains the embryo or seed of its absolute content. The unity of this threefold certainty is to be found in the fact that its first form is inherent in the other two, since both thought in general and purpose of absolute thought are first of all facts of consciousness. But logical thought introduces into this subjective certainty a universal and objective significance for all its manifestations. The philosophical task is to unite that subjective certainty and logical significance with that determination which is the actual principle of movement and which converts thought into the reason for truth.<sup>11</sup>

The difference between his earlier views and those found in *Foundations* lies in his attempt to define the significance which must be attached to truth, but there is no essential difference between his earlier and later views on the nature of mysticism in his theory of knowledge. In his later works Solovyov rejects the Cartesian view that in subjective experience we have to do with reality and not with appearance. This change in no way alters his views

on mystical knowledge and its relation to sense experience and reason.

The mystical principle in the cognitive process, according to Solovyov, is a fact established by an analysis of perception, but this principle is not exhausted by perception. In perception this principle manifests itself in a more elemental form, unconscious and common to all living beings. But its highest manifestation is in the recognition of unity of the world of appearance with the absolute principle. This mystical principle which Solovyov calls faith, testifies to the connection of the part with the whole, of man with God, of heaven and earth. Faith gives us with full certainty what neither experience nor reason can give, namely, the transition from the subjective to the objective world in its unity. To demand logical proof for the existence of this principle, is in Solovyov's opinion a complete misunderstanding of the nature of logical proof. Solovyov accepts the existence of God as an axiom of faith (*axiome de la foi*), which may however be confirmed by philosophical arguments as well as by experience.

Some scholars contend (as for example A. I. Vvedensky does), that Solovyov's earlier views of the nature and function of mysticism in his epistemology have undergone a radical change in his later works. This is not however the case. For example, Solovyov's division of all phenomena into physical and mystical is also found in his *Justification of the Good* where he constructs the moral world on the three principles of shame, compassion and reverence, i.e., the three feelings which correspond to the physical, psychic and mystical phenomena. Solovyov insists that the mystical principle enables us to recognize ourselves to be different in essence from what we appear to be empirically; it enables us to transcend the empirical self, thereby realizing our inner freedom.<sup>12</sup>

We thus have three concepts: the mystical, as the particular sphere of man's creative relationship which transcends the realm of cognition, mysticism, as a one-sided philosophical position which assumes true meaning only in integral

knowledge, and mystical knowledge. As indicated earlier, Solovyov identifies mystical knowledge with faith which testifies to the inner freedom from everything and at the same time it testifies to the inner connection with everything. The object of mystical knowledge is neither a sensation nor a concept, but a testimony to the absolute existence of the unity of everything.

Solovyov cautions us that mystical knowledge does not yet tell us what the object of knowledge is and that the answer to this important question cannot be given by thought which attributes to the object only general categories characteristic of any other object, nor by sensations which apprehend only indefinite sensuous qualities. To find the answer to this question we must presuppose such an interrelation between object and subject which enables the subject to apprehend its essence or idea. This is possible because the subject itself is a certain idea and is therefore in a certain correlation with ideal substances.

It should be evident by now that Solovyov's theory of knowledge is fully rooted in the concept of Total-Unity. This means that everything that exists in the universe is interrelated and interconnected and that the living centre of this unity is manifested in *love*. Solovyov maintains that man does not know the truth because he does not live in the truth. The task of creative thought is the true organization of knowledge.<sup>13</sup> Love is the absolute principle in the world; it is that living force which enables man to transcend his false egoism. True love is based on faith which enables man to recognize that behind every being there is absolute being. Solovyov offers two meanings of "absolute being." "The first meaning defines the absolute itself in its being for itself... The second meaning defines the absolute *positively* in its relation to another being, as something that possesses everything, that can have nothing outside itself... Together the two meanings define the *absolute* as *hen kai pan*."<sup>14</sup> This conception of the "absolute being" is totally different from the "absolute" of rationalistic philosophy of the West, according to Solovyov, and is the underlying principle of his system of integral knowledge.

We can now sum up the salient features of Solovyov's theory of knowledge. The central idea in Solovyov's philosophical system in general and his theory of knowledge in particular is *mysticism* which is peculiar to both his early and later works. Solovyov distinguishes two elements in mysticism, the subjective and the objective. The subjective element is more akin to religious faith whereas the objective element is closer to philosophy. Solovyov regards union with God as the main task of mystical perception. He states that,

There is a connection and influence of the transcendent world on the empirical world. Man occupies a special place in the world of appearance; he was destined to unite the heavenly with the earthly. The possibility for this union is given in the natural affinity of man with the divine.<sup>15</sup>

To recognize God's influence in the empirical world is not some quality of mysticism, but the positive content of religion. When mysticism seeks to justify the content of its faith by reason without relying on personal experience, then it is more akin to philosophy than to religion. Religion is a synthesis of the natural with the mystical which Solovyov terms "free scientific theosophy."

Religion is reunion of man and of the world with the absolute and integral principle. This principle, as integral and all-inclusive does not exclude anything, and therefore the true union with it cannot exclude, suppress, or forcibly subdue to itself, any element whatever, any living power, either in man or in his universe. Reunion or religion, consists in bringing all elements of human existence, all particular principles and powers of humanity, into a rightful relationship with the absolute central principle, and through it, into right and harmonious relationship with each other...<sup>16</sup>

Solovyov was fully convinced that only such a synthesis can give us integral knowledge whose object is a world of living beings internally related. He states that,

Intellectual contemplation or immediate cognition of ideas is not man's ordinary state, and moreover, it does not depend on his will, since it is not given to everybody to experience divine food. It depends on the internal action on us by ideal transcendent beings. This action is called inspiration. It takes us out of our natural centre, raises us to a higher sphere, creating in us ecstasy.<sup>17</sup>

Again,

Intellectual contemplation is not a subjective process, but a real relation to the world of ideal beings... Consequently, the results of contemplation are not the work of a subjective, arbitrary creation. They are not inventions or fantasies, but are actual revelations of super-human activity, perceived by man in some form or another.<sup>18</sup>

Intellectual contemplation is for Solovyov a necessary element of perception, hence it is unconscious in nature and is common to everybody. In the more particular sense intellectual contemplation is a conscious state of inspiration and ecstasy evoked by the influence of the transcendent world upon man's consciousness. It should be pointed out that Solovyov was not primarily concerned with the mechanics or methods of cognition but with the nature of reality and the possibility of knowing reality. Solovyov maintains that the organization of reality is essential for the organization of knowledge. The task of universal creativity is the organization of reality, the object of great artistic realization by man of the divine principle in the real existence of nature which Solovyov terms 'free theurgy' which finds expression in the creative sphere, 'free theosophy' finds expression in the cognitive sphere and 'free theocracy' in the social sphere. The organic synthesis of these three spheres constitutes the idea of the 'integral life' in Solovyov's system. The mystical sphere however assumes priority over the other spheres, for it is the highest principle of the life of humanity as a whole. The task of philosophy, in Solovyov's view, is to establish in the universal as well as

in the particular an organic relationship between the divine, the human, and the natural elements. His theory of knowledge seeks to establish this threefold relationship by means of his threefold approach to the cognition of the Absolute.

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#### NOTES

1. Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov (1853-1900) was born in Moscow where his father was professor of history at the university of Moscow. Vladimir Solovyov is perhaps best known in the West for his *Godmanhood Lectures* and *Justification of the Good*. His principal philosophical works are: *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (1874); *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (1877); *The Critique of Abstract Principles* (1877-80); and *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897-99). His collected works consist of nine volumes and his *Letters* of four volumes. In his philosophical works, Solovyov deals primarily with epistemological problems and directs his criticism against empiricism, rationalism and German idealism.

2. Zenkovsky, V. V. *A History of Russian Philosophy*. Trans. by George L. Kline. Columbia University Press, New York, 1953, Vol. II. p. 496.

3. The following three works deal with the nature of mysticism: *Filosofskiya nachala tsel'nago znaniya* (Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge) Vol. I in *Collected Works*, St. Petersburg, 1877, pp. 290, 292, 293. This work will be referred henceforth as *Philosophical Principles*. *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal* (A Critique of Abstract Principles), Vol. II, *Collected Works*, pp. 307-308. Henceforth *Critique*. *Chteniya o bogochelovechestve* (Lectures on Godmanhood, Vol. III, *Collected Works*, pp. 60-61, 89-90. Henceforth *Lectures*. All quotations are from the Russian texts unless otherwise stated and the translations are mine.

4. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, p. 263, note 6.

5. Solovyov, *Ibid.*, p. 263.
6. Solovyov, *Ibid.*, p. 303, where he discusses the nature of mystical knowledge.
7. Solovyov, *Ibid.*, p. 306-356.
8. Solovyov, *Lectures*, pp. 45ff.
9. *Critique*, pp. 186-187.
10. Solovyov, *Ibid.*, p. 311.
11. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 219-220.
12. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, p. 261.
13. Solovyov, *Critique*, p. 333.
14. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, I, p. 346; III, p. 44.
15. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, I, p. 286.
16. Solovyov, *Lectures*, pp. 12-13.
17. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, I, p. 290.
18. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, I, p. 291.



## CAN MOTIVES BE CAUSES OF ACTIONS?

Recent writers on philosophical psychology do not look favourably on the thesis that motives are *causes* of human actions. This thesis is logically secondary to the contention that the concept of cause cannot intelligibly be applied to the explanation of human actions. Since Ryle's analysis of mental concepts, Austin, Peters, Urmson, Anscombe, Dray, and Melden have discovered new categorical boundaries separating psychological concepts from the language of natural events. A psychological explanation is not a causal explanation; the two, it is held, are logically incompatible. Though to cite the motive for an act or to cite the cause of an event, is to answer the question 'why', the meaning of the question is different in the two cases. It has been argued that to ask 'why' about a human action is to make the action rationally intelligible by filling out its purpose and context, not to mention the beliefs and attitudes of the agent who performs it. A motive explains an action by identifying the agent's reason for doing it. Reasons, like causes, are said to have explanatory power, but a reason is not a cause in the sense of an antecedent event. Or to put the matter in a more radical manner, the rational explanation of an action is so incompatible with any causal explanation that in the former case we should only have description of behaviour in purposive language, while in the latter it would be inappropriate, since causally explicable behaviour could only be involuntary.

My purpose, here, is not to attempt a critique of the views which insist on a radical distinction between reason and causes. Without any intention of minimising the value of the conceptual insights of such views, I shall content myself with indicating that Hume's thesis that human actions are caused by motives is not rendered a howler by the recent philosophical disfavour it has fallen into.

Some of the criticisms advanced against the view that human actions are causally explicable may be taken

as directed against Hume. I propose to offer the following considerations. Usually Hume's view that cause and effect are logically distinct or independent is appealed to show that the concept of cause cannot be applied to the explanation of human actions. It is argued that a cause must be logically distinct from the alleged effect; but a reason for an action is not logically distinct from the action; therefore, reasons (for that matter any motive) are not causes of action. In one or more versions this argument, inspired by Ryle's treatment of motives in *The Concept of Mind*, is fairly common and can be found in the writings of Kenny, Hampshire, Peters, Melden and Winch. The credibility of the argument depends on the contention that a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it in purposive language. We do not have two events, but only one under different descriptions. Causal relations, however, demand distinct events.

Let us consider Hume's logical independence thesis concerning the relationship between cause and effect. That the cause and the effect must be distinct existents is certainly what we have learnt from Hume. But is that the whole story of his views about the causal relation? In some of his moods he wants nothing more than to say that there is no "real intelligible connexion" between external objects. 'Intelligible' and 'real' are not synonymous; and Hume cannot be said to be committed to a denial of the possibility or actuality of real connexion. On page 29 of the *Treatise* he says something that might set the idea of causal necessity in another light: "Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects." If that be so, why not likewise in the case of cause and effect? Hume does not ever contend that the ideas between which the necessary connexion or the causal relation holds are not adequate representations of objects. What then shall we decide about the intelligibility and reality of the relation or idea of necessary connexion? I am aware that it might of course be objected that the relation of cause and effect does not hold between ideas *qua* ideas but only between

ideas *qua* existents. This point is in fact raised by Kemp Smith, and hence the relation is not discoverable by comparing independently given entities. Without contending the validity of the objection it may be submitted that there can be an interpretation on which the causal relation in some sense shares in the character of knowledge. If the proposed interpretation holds good, then the relation between cause and effect no longer remains open, at least to the extent of making them logically independent. Further, unless one should be inclined to discount a great deal of Hume's characterization of a relation as "that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination" (*ibid.*, p. 13), the proposed interpretation of the relation of cause and effect would not be without viability. If the necessary connexion between cause and effect is a relation (which Hume says it is) and the ideas it relates are in no way inadequate representations of objects (there is no reason why they should be so), then one can, by Hume's criterion of reference, apply the relation or idea of necessary connexion to objects.

Now then what is called "the determination of the mind" be accounted for? It is said that the determination is a specific mode of causation, in the imagination, when one adopts the attitude of the spectator in respect of objects in constant conjunction. A feeling of being necessitated is experienced, and hence a transition from a given object to its usual attendant becomes possible. The feeling and the transition need not be sharply distinguished, though a mental content and a mental activity are to be kept separate. We are in no way concerned with such nice questions. The value of this experience of necessity lies in that any assertion of causal connexion between objects is argued from it. In this sense, it would not be improper to say that the determination is a *universal condition*, for asserting causal relation being external objects. Hume says: "Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we could never draw any inference from causes to effects" (*ibid.*, p. 92). That the feeling of necessity is transferred to the external world

is what we find in the *Treatise*. But this should be taken as a metaphor, far less as a confession of animistic projection. Rather, the determination is significant as a "model" (*ibid.*, p. 165). If we take the model view of the determination of the mind seriously, certain important consequences follow. There has got to be some sort of structural similarity between the model and the phenomena in respect of which it is used. If determination of the mind is a specific mode of causation and forms thereby the basis of causal connexion, then as a model it is an analogue of causal phenomena. The structural similarity between the model and the phenomena helps us in understanding and explaining the phenomena by providing us with a technique for talking about it. As an analogue model of causation "the determination of the mind" is authenticated by our causal inferences. Their *natural* character does not mean that they have to be arbitrary. Hume points it out on page 484 of the *Treatise*. His reasons for the non-arbitrary character of our causal inferences is that they are based on such principles of the imagination that "are permanent, irresistible, and universal" (*ibid.*, p. 225).

Unless I have thoroughly misunderstood the nature of Hume's notion of determination, it has not been his intention to say that causation is nothing but constant conjunction, as the protagonists of the logical distinctness of cause and effect appear to imply. Rather, "necessity makes an essential part of causation" (*ibid.*, p. 407, italics not in the text) is what Hume says. If causal explanation of human actions is a methodological device for Hume, the practical utility of the model of the determination of the mind cannot be underplayed. The union of determinant factors with human actions is not enough, it has got to be "certain" or reliable if explanations of human actions are to be viable. If the union is *natural*, i.e., peculiar to human nature (at this point another model of Hume, e.g., the model of mirror: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another", is interesting to notice) then causal explanations of human actions become reliable and practically interesting. As for assurance, in the context of practical interest, causal explanations of

human actions it should be preferable on account of its non-empty character as opposed to the empty assurance of logical necessity.

Now about motives. Hume holds that human actions, when they are voluntary, are determined or have causes. He assimilates a variety of items with the class of causes, e.g. the agent's motives, temper, situation, character, and the indirect passions with "bent or tendency". Jointly or severally these can be the antecedent determinants of human actions. Whether they uniquely determine an action is another question. But it has been Hume's contention that antecedent determinants settle or select the range of possibilities that an agent can choose from. To be more exact, according to him, since actions have a constant union with motives, temper and circumstances, an inference from one to the other is possible. Hume sometimes uses 'motive' and 'character' in an interchangeable fashion, when, for example, he says that character is something durable and constant in man which gives his actions moral quality, or for that matter, "when we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them" (*ibid.*, p. 477). To this class of "durable principles of the mind" can be assimilated what he calls the calm passions which are "the settled principles of action". Motive then, for Hume is a name for whatever influences the will. The causal view concerning human actions is derived from the "uniformity of human actions" or from the fact that there is "a general course of nature in actions" (*ibid.*, pp. 402 and 403). This uniformity consists in the constant union and connexion between like human actions and like motives of agents. The constancy of "the *union* betwixt motives and actions" together with the "determination of the mind" make it possible to infer the existence of one from that of another.

The causal model invoked by Hume is an explanatory device, and if this assertion is philosophically unobjectionable his determinism can be said to be methodological. Various factors occur in explanation of human actions.

Some may be antecedent factors, others may be law-like factors. And Hume employs both, in addition to an including of teleological factors. It is not easy to say if he intends any of the factors alone to do the explanatory job. He mentions antecedent, law-like and teleological factors as those that might influence the will, besides good and evil. Sometimes 'motive' is a general term for all the factors determining the will. He takes the word 'motive' in the etymological sense meaning that which *moves* or induces a person to act in a certain way; and the candidates would be found in a mixed bag. He includes intention also as a factor in the causal explanation of actions. "By the intention we judge of the actions" (*ibid.*, p. 348), says Hume.

It might be objected that while it is right to say that singular causal statements imply generalizations, it is wrong to suppose that motives, desires, passions and intentions are causes of actions. It is said that Hume supposes that the statement that a person did something because, say, he was angry, carries the implication that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow. Such an argument is put forward by Hart and Honore. Further, it may be that we do have rough laws that can be improved. Whether such laws can be made the basis of reliable predictions is another issue. But it does not follow that Hume is essentially wrong in claiming that singular causal statements entail laws. If he is taken to mean that no particular law is entailed by a singular causal claim, then it can be defended without defending any law. In another way, we may, by way of settling the claim, look for some generalization of which an action in question may serve as an instance. If a causal claim assigns a motive, the success or failure of the assignment would depend on showing it to be an instance of a regularity. In this respect assignment of motive works in the same way as the attribution of causes. Generalizations about human behaviour need not be on the whole about behavioural regularities. That is why Hume includes interpretations of situations, temper of the agent, etc., in the set of attributive conditions. The uniformity of human actions presupposed in assignment of motives is

hardly mechanical, quantifiable uniformity. It is a matter of aim, purpose and value that involve both the agent and the spectator. Some prisoners, on discovering the impossibility of their escape, choose to work upon the nature of the gaoler, some upon the stone and iron. But none perhaps resist from attempts for their freedom. I think this use of Hume's own example would be permissible.

The inferences on which we base our beliefs about matters of fact are not formally valid. There should be no reason for appealing to this logical point, nor can it be decisive. The relation of cause and effect is a law-like one, and when we are to deal with human actions we are not really concerned with the formal validity of such relations. When we are to formulate our predictions in non-metrical terms, as we do for human actions, the sort of inference that leads to predictions will not have to specify a class of similar actions. We hardly ever demand any detailed and delicate description capable of identifying unambiguously one and only one action whose occurrence would satisfy the prediction. There is a limit to precision, and human actions are no exception to the fact that in nature no prediction can identify a determinate event without ambiguity. It is we, *qua* spectators, who set up conventions (this too is based on socio-cultural considerations and not an arbitrary, isolated affair) as regards what performance of an agent will be taken as satisfying our predictions about him. In the domain of human actions, *predictability* and *determinism* need not be equivalents in the strong logical sense of the terms. Predictability in practice is what Hume demands for this methodological determinism.

'Motive' is indeed a puzzling word and yet ascription of causal role to the determinants of human actions is a commonsense position. A complete abandonment of the position is urged by many recent writers. Hume has observed that a motive need not always be an antecedent occurring. On this issue Ryle thinks that a motive is a disposition to behave, while Anscombe and Melden hold that it is intention to do the deed. But despite their differences they

agree that explanations of human actions are possible in terms of motives. It may be asked: how are the explanations of human actions in terms of antecedent factors, dispositions and intentions related, and if they are compatible? Now Hume does not distinguish between the factors in terms of which explanations of actions are offered. His inventory of determinants of actions, we have noted above, includes dispositions as well as occurrences, and the fact that they are categorically separate appears to have been glossed over by him. He has been content with some sort of relation between them. As regards the question of compatibility, however, he was keenly aware. We find him carefully distinguishing actions done from motives from those that are done without design or by accident. Even actions that can be done without any other motive than their own sake (see *Treatise*, p. 479) has also been taken account of.

But Hume's general position remains such that he assimilates the explanatory factors of human actions, namely, the agent's desires, intentions, passions and motives — all that we nowadays call reasons — to causes. What does it mean to assimilate reasons for actions with causes? It is to give the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of actions to be explained. Generalizations link reasons for actions and actions, just as causes of occurrences and occurrences are linked. Both the cause-explanation and reason-explanation are signified by such words as 'because', 'cause', and even 'reason'. Again, motive or reason explanations could not be given if there were not regular causal sequences in the world. And since actions could not be directed to ends unless one action was more likely to be followed by a certain consequence than another. This matter is important equally for the agent as well as the spectator. In this respect it would be wrong to say, as Flew has suggested, that in the spectator's world "there seems to be no room for the interests of agents."

There are philosophers who would separate reasons and causes. They argue that psychological antecedents do not

explain actions. It has been observed that a cause must be describable without reference to its effect, while reasons for actions cannot be so described. Hence reasons for actions are not causes. The argument, if the assumption about the independent describability of causes from effects is not unsound, is valid, though it over-simplifies the case. Hume's candidates of 'motive' are not a homogeneous lot, they are as diverse as dispositions and psychological occurrences, antecedent factors as well as teleological ones. Some passions like pride (when it is not a character-trait) may qualify for such a notion of cause which can be described in isolation from its effect, though there are reasons to doubt whether pride can be so understood. When Anscombe says that motives can be "backward-looking", does not the class include feelings and emotions? And I suppose it would be pertinent to ask that. Again, what she calls "forward-looking" motives or intentions, does not an explanation in its term require mention of some of the agent's character-traits, emotions, beliefs and ends in order to be intelligible? Should it not be regarded a mistake to claim that it does, some causal factor will have been admitted in the explanation. That psychological antecedents of actions and the conative dispositions of the agent need then be taken into account in giving an explanation of human actions is a matter that merits admission. Hume's view that the psychological antecedents and dispositions are causally related to the agent's actions, or that they have a necessary place in causal explanation of human actions, has a methodological advantage, namely, this way of thinking renders human actions intelligible by relating them to the agent's experiences and beliefs which determine his behaviour. Attribution of causal efficacy to people's conative attitudes seems to be in order since conation is among the causes of behaviour.

Psychological concepts are explanatory, and a reason for an action, if our explanation has to be causal, may be a kind of cause. Motives are identified in terms of the actions they motivate. But can we, on that account, say that there can be a motive before an action has been performed?

Much would depend on what one means by 'motive'. Supposing that one means by 'motive', intention, does the claim that it makes no sense to speak of a motive before an action has been performed supplant the causal model of explanation of human actions? Melden has argued that the motive of an action is part of the way in which we identify the action (*Free Action*, Humanities Press, 1961, p. 77). It is specially interesting since Melden is one among others who would never ascribe causal status to a motive. Even Ryle, who had argued that motives were not causes, as Kenny noted, offered a theory which is no less causal. The irony, if it is one, is not plain, and not without deeper reasons. The causal model of explanation is good for two purposes as far as Hume is concerned. It is employed with a view to explaining human actions, identifying the agent's motives by what he does. On the other hand, we venture to tell how our agent would behave if his motives were such and such. In either case the attribution of a motive is the sort of assertion that can be justified by showing it to be an instance of a regularity. And in this respect the concept of motive works in the same way as the concept of cause.

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## JAMES ON SELF, ACTIVITY AND FREEDOM

During James' life-time his pragmatism attracted the greatest attention. It aroused a heated controversy in which both realists and idealists joined to attack his "cash-value" theory of truth. But in our own times James has been revived for his descriptive and phenomenological insights.<sup>1</sup> His *magnum opus*, *The Principles of Psychology* inspired and influenced both Wittgenstein<sup>2</sup> and Husserl.<sup>3</sup> Recent interest has therefore shifted from his pragmatism to "radical empiricism". James used his concept of British empiricism to distinguish it from traditional British empiricism which culminated in the Humean theory of experience. He certainly evinced a rare sensitivity and imaginative skill in giving a phenomenological description of the actual flux of "lived" experience both in *The Principles* and later in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. But James failed to perceive clearly the intimate relation between his "pragmatism" and "radical empiricism". He wrote: "... there is no logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism'. The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist".<sup>4</sup> However, a careful reading of James' works shows that there is a close link between his pragmatism and radical empiricism. Both these doctrines were conceived by him to be primarily methods for solving or "dissolving" conceptual philosophical problems. He conceived the notion of "pure experience" as a methodological principle which enunciates that "everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real."<sup>5</sup> This was basically a reaffirmation of his position in *The Principles* where he expressed his purpose as the "reinstatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life."<sup>6</sup> His pragmatic method sought to do the same thing — namely, to solve philosophical disputes and validate concepts by tracing them to the "realities of experience". This is what he meant by their

"pragmatic equivalence" or "cash-value". It is my intention in this paper, (i) to show that James' concept of activity is fundamental to his treatment of the problems of both self and freedom, (ii) to evaluate his attempt to solve the problem of self at various stages of his writings (in *The Principles*, 1890, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 1912, and in *A Pluralistic Universe*, 1909), and lastly (iii) to confront his treatment of freedom with the problems raised by Professor John Hospers in the light of the findings of psychoanalysis.<sup>7</sup>

The commonsense notion of self is meant to distinguish between experiences on the one hand, and *that* which *has* or *owns* these experiences, on the other. Self is supposed to be the *subject* of experiences. Secondly, self is taken to be a *continuant* as against the transient nature of experiences, and lastly personal identity forms an integral part of our notion of self. Let us see how James deals with the concept of self and the problems associated with it.

It will be fruitful to compare and contrast the attempts of Hume and James in dealing with the problem of the self. Both of them based their analysis on what they conceived to be empirical grounds. Hume's concept of experience was atomistic. Each perception was a distinct and disjointed particular. Hume, therefore, rejected the identification of the self with soul-substance for the reason that such a permanent entity was not encountered in the flux of impressions. To quote his famous passage:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or the other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perceptions".<sup>8</sup>

Hume was probably not aware of the paradoxical nature of the above statement since he was "presupposing" the "I" in the very effort to catch "myself." In other words, Hume accepted the ordinary concept of the self as a persisting entity and then failed to discover it in the flux of particular

perceptions. It did not occur to him that if the concept of self as an identical subject was accepted, then *ab initio* such a self could not become an object of my introspective glance and yet remain a subject of *that* very particular introspective perception. The self, as thinking subject, could not be its own object in one and the same act of thinking. This is not only a psychological but a logical impossibility. Now let us see whether James' treatment of the self is an improvement on Hume's. In *The Principles*, James devoted a lengthy chapter on "The Consciousness of Self," and because of his background in physiology, maintained a dualistic position with respect to the body-mind problem. He repudiated the soul-substance theory, the "bundle theory" of Hume and the transcendentalist theory of Kant on grounds of what he conceived to be "radical empiricism" as distinguished from Hume's atomistic empiricism. He said that the soul-substance theory, "explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it..."<sup>9</sup> He put forward, in *The Principles*, a new concept of experience as a "stream" of *continuous change* in place of Hume's concept that "all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences." He reaffirmed and elaborated this concept in his later essays, *Does Consciousness exist?* (1904), *A world of Pure experience* (1904) and *The Continuity of Experience* (1909). During this latter period he gave up the earlier dualism maintained in *The Principles*. In effect, he pointed out that Hume's "laws of association", introduced *ab extra* to account for the self's continuity, could be obviated if one rejected Hume's concept of experience as comprising distinct and disparate focal points of perception only and replaced it by his own brand of radical empiricism in which both the focal points (the "substantive" parts) and the vaguely felt relations (the "transitive" parts) were given in the continuous flux of immediate experience. He wrote,

"To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the

*relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relations experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system."*<sup>10</sup>

Before dealing with the question whether James improved upon Hume it may be worthwhile to note that he disagreed with those who thought that Kant had refuted Hume and given a satisfactory account of the self in his concept of the Ego as the "transcendental unity of apperception." No doubt, Kant emphasized the element of *activity* in our concept of the self — which was conspicuously absent from Hume's account of the self as a passive bundle of perceptions succeeding one another with great rapidity. We shall see below that James himself made a lot of this element of activity in accounting for our notion of the self. However, he repudiated the Kantian transcendental Ego on the ground that Kant, according to James' interpretation, accepted tacitly Hume's theory of experimental manifold as disparate and chaotic, and regarded the Ego as an outside Agent to perform the operations of unifying that manifold. If that is what Kant meant by the self, then James pointed out that,

"Transcendentalism is only substantialism grown shame-faced, and the ego, only a 'cheap and nasty' edition of the soul... The soul truly explains nothing; the 'syntheses', which she performed, were simply taken ready-made, and clapped on to her as expressions of her nature taken after the fact: but at least she had some semblance of nobility and outlook. The Ego is simply *nothing*: as ineffectual and windy an abortion as Philosophy can show."<sup>11</sup>

In other words, according to James, Kant himself accepted Hume's bundle theory of the self and invented the transcendental string to tie it up. James, therefore, rejected the Kantian Ego on the phenomenological ground that such an entity was not *presented* in the stream of experience. After distinguishing between the "Me" and the "I" he tried to describe the *feel* of the elusive innermost core of 'subjec-

tivity' for which all concrete psychical states were objects. He made use of the notion of *activity* to describe the central core of subjectivity to which all other parts of the stream seemed "transient external possessions." Kant, in contradistinction to Hume, recognized activity as an integral part of our concept of the self; yet, he limited it to the epistemological situation only. This is to say that according to Kant an active self was presupposed as an epistemological necessity; and without it the fact of organized human knowledge could not be explained. James generalized this notion of *activity* and, instead of introducing it *ab extra* (as he thought Kant had done), located it in the very heart of the stream of subjective life without limiting it to the epistemological situation only. He wrote "It is the source of *effort* and *attention*, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will."<sup>12</sup> In another graphic account he described this *central spontaneity* as follows:

".... I am aware of a constant play of furtherances and hindrances in my thinking, of checks and releases, tendencies which run with desire, and tendencies which run the other way .... The mutual inconsistencies and agreements, reinforcements and obstructions, which obtain among these objective matters reverberate backwards and produce what seem to be incessant reactions of my spontaneity upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or against, saying yes or no. This palpitating inward life is, in me, that central nucleus which I just tried to describe in terms that all men might use."<sup>13</sup>

However, James floundered when it came to a proper interpretation of this central *spontaneity*. In *The Principles* his account on this point was ambiguous. He could not decide whether this subjectivity was the *feel* of "a collection of *cephalic movements of adjustments*" only or it was the very core of spirituality. He was right in emphasizing that the "warm" and "intimate" feeling of our bodily existence was an integral part of our self. But was *this* the only part? Explaining "personal identity" in terms of "resem-

blance among the parts of a continuum of feelings" he assigned "ownership" to the real passing thought, and said, "each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever is realized as its Self to its own later proprietor."<sup>14</sup> But if the self (or subjectivity) is identical with the passing perishing thought how is it different from Hume's account of the self as a series of perishing particular perceptions? The only difference seems to be that whereas Hume made use of the "laws of association" to account for the continuity between distinct perceptions, James located that continuity *within* the stream of experience itself. And yet James committed the same error of searching for and identifying the self with the "passing Thought". The only real advance he made on Hume was in emphasizing the element of "activity" and "spontaneity" as the core of our notion of the self. James confirmed such a view of the self in some of his later works. In his essay *Does Consciousness Exist?* he dispensed with the transcendental Ego altogether when he wrote, "The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them."<sup>15</sup> But here again he comes perilously near identifying the innermost self with *mere* physiological breathing. His concept of "pure experience" in which relations were an integral part was meant to obviate the need for such "metaphysical fictions" and "trans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual categories and powers, or Selves."<sup>16</sup>

Before commenting upon the question whether James changed his position on the self in later works especially *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909) it will be appropriate to deal with his treatment of the problem of freedom. It is well known that during 1869-70 when James was 27 years old he suffered and later recovered from an attack of severe personal depression. This crisis was precipitated by the problem of freedom versus determinism. Responding to the seemingly powerful arguments against personal freedom he wrote in his *Diary* entry of April 30, 1870.

"My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will... Not in maxims, not in *Anschauungen* but in accumulated *acts* of thought lies salvation. Passer *outre*.... Life shall [be built in] doing and suffering and creating."<sup>17</sup>

Both James (in his essay *The Dilemma of Determinism*, 1884) and Peirce (in the essay *The Doctrine of Necessity Examined* 1892) rested their case for freedom, against the weight of arguments drawn from physical science, biology, psychology and psychoanalysis, on their notion of possibility, chance or tychism. James agreed with Peirce in asserting that novelty, variety and diversity are *genuine* features of our universe. The concept of chance or possibility does *not* contradict the fact of uniformity of habit-formation in our universe. It merely avers that the emergence of life, mind and consciousness are *real* additions to the evolutionary history of the universe, and no amount of knowledge, on the part of anybody, about the alleged original cloud-nebula, could predict the detailed diversification and specification manifested in the facts of life and consciousness. James wrote, "... actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of which they are chosen; and *somewhere*, indeterminism says, such possibilities exist, and form a part of truth."<sup>18</sup> However, from this generalized defense of novelty and possibility in the universe James passed on to the treatment of the specific problem of the human free-will. The problem of man's freedom should be stated clearly in order to see how James dealt with it. James saw the problem in the moral perspective. If determinism is true, so thought James, then the whole business of moral *effort* is an illusion. The problem of moral effort could not be solved by making the linguistic distinction between what is called "soft determinism" and "hard determinism." It is true that in our socio-legal context we can make a legitimate distinction between what we *choose* to do according to our desire and what we are *compelled* to do under external overpowering circumstance. It is perfectly intelligible to designate the former as a free act and the latter as a coerced one. That is, the distinction between what

we do and what *happens* to us is a genuine one. But, as James saw the problem, this valid distinction did not touch the core of the moral issue involved here. The central question, as James saw it, is: Is it *possible* for a person to *energise*, make an effort and act against his own desire in a moral situation? Can he act against his past character? Is this a *real* possibility? It is true that such a situation applies only to those persons who are *consciously* deliberating about the alternatives. That means that a majority of men may not face such a situation if they do *not* see that there is a moral choice involved here. Awareness or consciousness of the problem is a prerequisite for such a moral dilemma. James presented his view of the problem in the chapter on *Will* both in *The Principles* and in *Psychology: Briefer Course* (1892). He dramatized the issue by depicting the conflict between a propensity and an ideal motive (sense of duty) as one between a powerful sensual factor pitted against a weak ideal force. The ideal motive *per se* had no chance of overcoming the sensual antagonist unless it was buttressed by personal *effort* which was an *independent* factor derived from conscious energizing. He wrote, "But the E(*effort*) does not seem to form an integral part of the I (*ideal motive*). It appears adventitious and *indeterminate in advance*"<sup>19</sup> (italics added).

In other words James thought of freedom as not merely freedom from external compulsion but also from internal compulsion. To be free meant, for James, to have the potentiality of becoming aware of our past character, present desires and motives, etc., and then overcoming the entire past by making a *spontaneous* effort of free-will. Such an effort of free choice was regarded by James as an *unpredictable* "independent" variable brought to bear upon the given situation. This was, for him, the quintessence of personal freedom. He wrote:

"... the effort seems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we *are*, and those were but externals which we carry."<sup>20</sup> (italics in the original).

However, James recognized that such a spontaneous effort

characterized the *heroic* mind. But still he thought that every person, through conscious awareness, was capable of such a "strenuous" mood. There was a real possibility of summoning inner resourcefulness to overcome the entire past and begin afresh, and introduce a genuinely novel factor in the universe. He concluded, "what wonder if the amount which we accord of it (effort) were the one strictly *underived* and *original* contribution which we make to the world."<sup>21</sup> (italics added). James reiterated his position later in his essay *The Experience of Activity* (1904) when he said,

"As a matter of plain history the only "free will" I have ever thought of defending is the character of novelty in fresh activity situations."<sup>22</sup>

It is important to note that in this essay James was putting forward the thesis that the self as subject or the "I", and its freedom were both given originally in the felt experience of *activity*. The concept of activity was therefore basic to James' analysis of the self and freedom. He also emphasized at this stage of his writings that he was giving a phenomenological description of this *felt* experience of activity without assuming an *entity* of any kind. He was reiterating what he had said about the "I" in *The Principles* with the difference that now he explicitly repudiated the *dualism* maintained earlier. He wrote, "The *percipi* in these originals of experience is the *esse*; the curtain is the picture." And yet James said that he saw no contradiction between maintaining that the individualized self or the "I" was uniquely given in the *experience* of activity on the one hand, and, "on the other hand, in affirming, after introspection, that they consist in movements in the head."<sup>24</sup> Therefore, as late as 1904 James' analysis of the self or the "I" and its freedom was based on the felt experience of activity, and spontaneous effort of the moment. As he said, "sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention — this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts of its anywhere can be

discussed. Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.”<sup>25</sup> (italics in the original).

The most serious drawback in identifying the self or the “I” with the *present* experience of effort, striving spontaneity and free creative activity was that it could not give a satisfactory account of the element of continuity in our commonsense concept of the self. Certainly, the self could not be identified with the passing perishing thought or with the momentary free creative activity. Nor could it be identified with the *series* of such momentary acts of creativity. I have pointed out above that such an analysis would resemble Hume’s, except for the difference (however important that may be) that for James the self was given in *acts* of free and spontaneous effort, whereas Hume’s account was in terms of passive perceptions only. However, without realizing this serious lacuna in his analysis, and without any conscious attempt to reconcile both the *continuity* and the *present* experience of activity, James changed his position in the last years of his life. As a corrective he introduced the element of continuity in terms of the concept of *potency* as integrally related to that of the present on-going actualities. He shied away from the earlier reductionistic analysis of the self in terms of present actualities and wrote,

“The passing moment is... the minimal fact, with the ‘appartition of difference’ inside of it as well as outside. If we do not feel both past and present in one field of feeling, we feel them not at all. The rush of our thought through its fringes is the everlasting peculiarity of its life.”<sup>26</sup>

“The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional connection with the body’s imminent or present acts. It is the present acting self. Though the more that surrounds it may be ‘subconscious’ to us, yet if in its “collective capacity” it also exerts an active function, it may be conscious in a wider way, conscious, as it were, over our heads.”<sup>27</sup>

He expressed similar views in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and in his essay *What Psychical Research Has Accomplished*. He wrote:

"The result is to make me feel that we all have potentially a 'subliminal' self, which may make at any time irruption into our ordinary lives. At its lowest, it is only the depository of our forgotten memories; at its highest, we do not know what it is at all."<sup>28</sup>

It is, therefore, safe to say that James equivocated between two discrepant approaches to the self. On the one hand, he located it in the *experience* of creative activity, but on the other hand, he identified this creative activity with 'movements in the head.' This was because he mistakenly assumed, like Hume, that the self could be given or revealed as an *object* of an introspective glance. And James found to his surprise that all that he could discover through introspective glance was "I breathe" instead of "I think". He did not clearly grasp that the self was not completely given in any *one* of its momentary acts, and that the concept of self was unintelligible without introducing the notions of *possibility* and *potentially*. The self, truly speaking, is to be understood as the potentiality of free creative acts, rather than being identical with any *one* of such acts. As such it (the self) could be "given" only as the possibility of creative action unfolding itself in the ongoing continuum of the actualities of *experienced* acts. James wavered on the verge of recognizing this truth during the last years of his life.

One last point is worth discussing. How does James' account of free creative activity stand against a possible objection raised by Professor Hospers derived from researches in psychoanalysis? After dramatizing through various illustrations how *unconscious motivation*, as revealed by researches in psychoanalysis, plays an ubiquitous role in determining the actions of both the so-called normal and abnormal persons, Professor Hospers clinches the issue thus,

"The position, then is this: if we can overcome the effects of early environment, the ability to do so is itself a product of early environment. We did not give

ourselves this ability; and if we lack it we cannot be blamed for not having it.”<sup>29</sup> (italics given in the original).

What Professor Hosper is saying here is in headlong collision with what James maintained on this issue. For James, this capacity to try, this exertion of effort, this heroic striving to overcome the entire past is an “underived” and “original” contribution which we make to the idea at the moment of decision and action. Each such act is a *creative* one and is “indeterminate” and “adventitious” in advance. According to Professor Hespers those of us who have the ability to overcome are just plain lucky and this fact should prevent us “from indulging in righteous indignation and committing the sin of spiritual pride.”<sup>30</sup> Could we resolve this dispute with the help of the contemporary technique of explaining away the problem by saying that words when pushed outside their context make no sense. As a matter of fact Hespers came very near utilizing this strategy in his book *Human Conduct* (p. 516). But I would like to quote Hespers against himself:

“In every case, of course, it remains trivially true that ‘it all depends on how we choose to use the word’. The facts are what they are, regardless of what words we choose for labelling them.”<sup>31</sup>

The question then is: Are the *facts* on the side of James or Hespers? James appealed to the fact of our *immediate consciousness* of effort to overcome an impulse. Hespers appeals to the facts of scientific knowledge derived from psychoanalysis in pointing out that one “may even *think* he knows why he acted as he did, he may *think* he has conscious control over his actions, he may *think* he is fully responsible for them; but he is not.”<sup>32</sup> Suppose one becomes *aware*, either through psychiatric treatment or other means, of his early environmental conditioning, and (for the sake of the argument) also of the fact that this will to energise and make effort has been adversely affected, is it *still not possible* for him to overcome an impulse and act against his entire past? In other words, can *awareness* of the weak-

ened will arouse a person to make a heroic effort now? Is consciousness of any datum not an "original and indeterminate" factor which makes a difference to that datum? James would say: yes, it is. Such a "subjective" and "spiritual" possibility is always there as a genuine factor for turning one's back on one's past and making a new beginning. This is the creative edge of human possibility.

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#### NOTES

1. (a) Aron Gurwitsch, "Williams James' Theory of the 'Transitive Parts' of the Stream of Consciousness" in *Studies in Phenomenological Psychology*, Evanston, 1966.  
 (b) Alfred Schutz, "William James' concept of the Stream of Consciousness, Phenomenologically Interpreted," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, No. 4, Vol. 1, 1941.  
 (c) James M. Edie, "Notes on the Philosophical Anthropology of William James" in *An Invitation to Phenomenology*, edited by James M. Edie, Chicago, 1965.  
 (d) John Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James*, Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1969.  
 (e) Hans Linschoten, *On the Way Toward a Phenomenological Psychology*, edited by Amedeo Giorgi, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1968.  
 (f) Bruce Wilshire, *William James and Phenomenology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968.
2. John Passmore, *A Hundred years of philosophy*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1966, Note 4, p. 592.
3. Husserl is known to have read carefully the two volumes of *The Principles*, as well as the essay, "The Knowing of Things Together."
4. William James, *Pragmatism*, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, Ohio, 1955, p. 14.

5. "The Experience of Activity," *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1947, (1912), pp. 159-60.
6. *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 254.
7. I shall deal with the central issue raised by Hospers in his article "What Means This Freedom?" published in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook. Though Professor Hospers' views as expressed in Chapter 10 of *Human Conduct* through a dialogue show a slight change in as much as he emphasized the *context* within which the meanings of freedom, responsibility and deserts make sense, his position in the above mentioned article affords a better confrontation with James' treatment of freedom.
8. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, quoted in *The Philosophy of David Hume*, ed. by V. C. Chappell, The Modern Library, New York, 1963, p. 174.
9. *The Principles*, Vol. I, p. 350.
10. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943), p. 42.
12. Op. cit., pp. 297-8.
13. Op. cit., p. 298.
14. Op. cit., p. 339.
14. Op. cit., 339.
15. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 37.
16. Op. cit., p. 43.
17. From: "Diary", *Letters of William James*, ed. by Henry James, Jr., Vol. I, p. 147-148, (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920).
18. "The Dilemma of Determinism" quoted in *The Writings of William James*, ed. by John J. McDermott, The Modern Library, New York, 1968, p. 591.
19. *Psychology, Briefer Course* quoted in the Writings of William James, ed. by John J. McDermott, The Modern Library, New York, 1968, p. 705.
20. Op. cit., p. 715.
21. Op. cit., p. 716.

22. Quoted in *The Writings of William James*, ed. by John J. McDermott, p. 290, footnote 184.
23. Op. cit., p. 283.
24. Op. cit., p. 284, footnote.
25. Op. cit., p. 289.
26. *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 283.
27. Op. cit., p. 344, n 8.
28. "What Psychical Research Has Accomplished?", *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1897, p. 321.
29. "What Means This Freedom?" first published in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Science*, ed. Sidney Hook. Quoted in *The Problems of Philosophy*, ed. Alston and Brandt, Allyn and Bacon, Inc., Boston 1967, p. 366.
30. Op. cit., p. 366.
31. "Free Will and Psychoanalysis" first published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1950. Quoted in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Edwards and Pap, The Free Press, N.Y., 1967, p. 85.
32. "What Means this Freedom", Op. cit., p. 356.



## PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND AYER'S CRUSOE

### I

In his *Philosophical Investigations*,<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein characterises a private language as follows: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (243). In Malcolm's words, it is a language "that not merely is not but *cannot* be understood by anyone other than the speaker."<sup>2</sup> Malcolm further says that 'cannot' here is to be a logical 'cannot'; so a private language is one of which it is not merely the case that it is not understood by anyone other than the speaker, but more that it is logically impossible that it should be understood by anyone other than the speaker.

Having characterised a private language thus, Wittgenstein asks: In what sense are the sensations to which this language is supposed to refer 'private'? (PI, 246.). According to him, sensations are private in the sense that only the speaker of the language can know about them and that only the speaker can have them: "Only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it" (PI, 246); "Another person can't have my pains" (PI, 253). In other words, sensations are called 'private' if only the person who has the sensations can really know for certain that he has them, and what he has are unshareable and non-transferable. So the sensations to which a private language is supposed to refer must have no 'natural expressions', since if the words used are 'tied up' with such expressions, someone else might understand them, and in that case the language would not be called 'private' in the sense required.

Now, is it possible to have, or imagine the possibility of a language in which names of sensations, feelings etc. occur when these are supposed to be entirely 'private' in the sense just specified? "Let us", says Wittgenstein,

"imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. — How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. — But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. — Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. — But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection *right* in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: Whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about "right" (PI, 258).

This argument is followed by Wittgenstein's claim that the diarist here cannot even be permitted to associate his sensation with the sign 'S'. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a *sensation*? For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands" (PI, 261). Hence the diarist would have no reason for calling 'S' the 'sign for a sensation'. It would not also help to say that when he uses the sign 'S', he has something, since the words 'has' and 'something' also belong to our common language. Wittgenstein's point is that in calling 'S' the sign for a sensation we presuppose it to be intelligible in our common language, whereas 'S' is supposed to be intelligible only to the diarist, that is, to the speaker of a private language. The import of this argument is that no knowledge of the common language must be presupposed if one is to construct a private lan-

guage and Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that. That is, a private language must not be based in any way on the knowledge of a common language. So, in the end, the attempt to use a private language would mean that one would be reduced to uttering merely inarticulate sounds. This means that a private language is not a language at all.

## II

Since Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that a private language must not be based on any knowledge of a common language, the problem of private language is sometimes taken by philosophers as involving the question whether a person who had been completely isolated from other people since early infancy could invent a language of his own. So, in order to maintain the possibility of a private language Ayer is supposed to be on the right lines in considering the case of a Robinson Crusoe left alone on an island while still an infant unable to speak. We shall now see whether such an attempt as made by Ayer<sup>3</sup> can really solve the problem of a private language—a language which is absolutely 'private' in the required sense.

Ayer thinks that as Crusoe grows to manhood in his island, he would be able to recognise many things he sees around him, in the sense that he adapts his behaviour to them. It is then not self-contradictory to think that Crusoe might conceivably develop names for them. As Crusoe has only his memory to rely on whether he is trying to identify objective things or subjective sensations, his position is also not any worse when it comes to inventing certain signs or words as names of his sensations. On the whole, Ayer maintains that there is nothing wrong with the supposition that Crusoe might come to develop a private language of his own and that his language is as rule-governed as ours. Assuming that Crusoe can develop a language of his own, Ayer argues that on the arrival of Man Friday it achieves much significance. He considers the possibility that Man Friday might be so mentally and emotionally attuned to Crusoe that whenever one of them experienced a certain sensation, the other experienced it also—whenever one of

them described what he was feeling, the other might very well follow the description, even though he had no external evidence to guide him. Ayer even admits the extreme difficulty of mutual understanding of each other's private experiences by asserting that Man Friday might conceivably 'see into Crusoe's soul' and understand his language although his own experiences were unlike Crusoe's. Ayer appears to think that if Crusoe could use the names of his sensations consistently when Man Friday was present he could surely have done it when he was still alone.

But because of the very nature of our language it seems very doubtful whether an individual like Ayer's Crusoe who is isolated on an island from infancy could ever come to form a language of his own 'privately'. The characteristic of a language is that the meanings of words and the rules of their use are something which have to be learned; they are something which have to be kept. As because they are kept, we can call an object by a name and identify it to be the same. The naming and identifying of objects already presuppose a language; they are something which belong to the language we already know. We can invent names for our sensations because we speak language in which there are names of sensations. We can say that we are in pain again, because the word 'pain' has a regular use in our language, and because we know it, we know what pain is. Thus, as Wittgenstein says, we cannot talk about our sensations unless we already know a language. This means that our learning to talk about publicly observable objects is logically and temporarily prior to our learning to talk about our sensations. As Wittgenstein remarks, if human beings showed no outward signs of pain, it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache' (PI, 257). Hence, all the things done by Ayer's Crusoe — e.g., inventing names, calling things by a certain name, recognising a sensation etc. — already presuppose a language. In other words, all these cannot be done by Crusoe 'privately', i.e. independently of having learned a public language.

Again, even if Ayer's Crusoe might conceivably develop a language for his 'private use', yet his language, as Ayer tries to maintain it, cannot be called 'private' in the sense required. Although Crusoe is completely isolated from other people and his language is in fact unshared, yet it is sharable as Ayer conceives. Even if there may be no one to agree with Crusoe's judgments, but if there were some one (e.g., when Man Friday was present), the agreement might conceivably take place. In this respect Crusoe's language may be considered analogously with soliloquist's language. The soliloquist's language also is designed not for communication, but for 'private use'. His language also is rule-governed, like ours. But even if the soliloquist is quite solitary, his language too, though not shared, is sharable. There may be none to agree with what he says, but if somebody were there, he could agree. This point of the 'possibility of agreement', that is, the possibility of being understood by others is important here — because of this it makes sense to say that the soliloquist has a language. The necessity of agreement in language as emphasized by Wittgenstein<sup>5</sup> concerns only what must be possible, not what must be actual. Agreement determines the method of measurement, and a method of measurement is conceived of as a possible state of affairs which the world either satisfies or does not. So our agreement in 'methods of measurement' does not make our sentences determine the world, but only the possibilities which the world must satisfy. Similarly, the necessary conditions involved in the existence of language imply only 'possible sociality', only the 'possibility of inter-personal discourse', not its actuality.<sup>6</sup> The language of Ayer's Crusoe is grounded on such possible sociality or inter-personal discourse. Hence his language would not be called 'private' in the required sense, but it would be a public language in principle, in the sense that it could possibly be learned by others; only, it could not, in practice be understood by others unless its inventor were in a position to explain it or provide clues for understanding it. What is ruled out in Wittgenstein's attack on the possibility of a private langu-

age is not the imaginary soliloquist or Ayer's Crusoe, but one whose concepts, rules and opinions are essentially unsharable, rather than contingently unshared. What is difficult to understand is the private understanding of something, whose sense is given by private reference, and whose sense cannot be given in a language which anyone can understand.

Moreover, the very idea of one's inventing a language is absurd. "No one could invent just language. Language goes with a way of living. An invented language would be a wall-paper pattern; nothing more".<sup>7</sup> Language, as Wittgenstein suggests, should be thought of as something that is essentially a social institution, that it is a part of human behaviour. When we talk of something, our words do not refer to it unless there is a 'way' in which the language is spoken, or the expressions are used. This 'way' goes with the way people live, or with what Wittgenstein calls 'a form of life'—a common way of conceptualising experience together with the accompanying kinds of behaviour. Therefore, the meaning of words presupposes the idea of people meaning things; it consists in the function of human practices and human institutions.

But although it is true that language is first and foremost a social affair, which is developed as a means of communication between individuals and not as a means whereby a man communicates with himself, yet, it is interesting to note, as Ayer does,<sup>8</sup> that some particular human being must have been the first to use a symbol. The whole notion of a man completely isolated from early infancy, so as to develop a way of thinking and talking is, indeed, the one which needs a great deal of critical philosophical attention. But what should be noticed is that these are all beside the point of the problem of private language and must not be confused with it. Therefore, Ayer does not succeed in maintaining the possibility of a private language by bringing in the example of a Robinson Crusoe.

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## NOTES

1. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M., Third Edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968 (hereafter to be referred to as 'PI').
2. Malcolm, N., "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", reprinted in *Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. Pitcher, Macmillan, 1968, p. 66.
3. Ayer, A. J., "Can There be a Private Language?" reprinted in *Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. Pitcher, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 251-266.
4. cf. Rhees, R., "Can There be a Private Language?" reprinted in *Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. Pitcher, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 267-285.
5. 'If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.— It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement' (PI, 242).
6. cf. Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 222.
7. Rhees, R., op. cit., p. 278.
8. Ayer, A. J., op. cit., p. 259.



## ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA AND INSTITUTION OF RENUNCIATION IN VEDĀNTA

### *Introduction*

A long controversy, which still persists, concerns the origin and development of the idea and institution of Renunciation in India. The present paper is an attempt to the Understanding of Renunciation as a unique expression of the Indian spiritual consciousness. It is my contention here that *Samnyāsa*, which is linked with asceticism and monastic organization, is the most fundamental trait of the Indian religious spirit which Indian philosophy and religion as a whole developed and hence is part of the whole of Indian culture. Asceticism was largely concerned with the man who sought spiritual realization, the *Sādhaka* (also described as *muni* or *yati* in the *Rgveda*), as he is called in the later technical language, his undertaking being directed to the quest for a direct contact with Reality or *anubhava* (spiritual experience). Monastic organization, on the other hand, was an aspect of institutional life of society. Bearing this in mind, it can be asserted here that Renunciation belongs to the common spirit of all Indian religions, including Buddhism and Jainism. Sureśvara, the foremost disciple of Śamkara, remarks that, though systems of thought including Buddhism may differ in their metaphysical orientations, they are all unanimous on teaching Renunciation.<sup>1</sup>

The phenomenon of Renunciation in the whole of Indian tradition, is not based on the positivistic, anti-religious or anti-metaphysical outlook as might be the case with some of the ethical or humanistic traditions but it is an inseparable part of the *eschaton* of *Mokṣa* (Freedom) itself.<sup>2</sup> Since the Understanding of the Ultimate reality and Freedom differs from system to system, the rationale of Renunciation is bound to differ and it would be a grave injustice not to take into account the multi-dimensional nature of Renunciation. In fact, some scholars have interpreted this phenomenon without proper regard to this point. Indian

philosophy, therefore, has resulted in simplifications, which are, moreover, inferred from a limited body of data. Conclusions based on such study need further revision and construction. Eleanor Roosevelt's following impressions of India state a widespread view:

...Prime Minister Nehru is trying to develop a democracy that, though perhaps not exactly like ours, will ensure all the people personal freedom. But if an accompanying material prosperity is also to be achieved — and the government will not be successful unless it can demonstrate certain progress on the material side — considerable education and re-education of the people will be necessary. For a belief in the virtue of renunciation is not an incentive to hard work for material gain; but only hard work by all the people is going to bring any real betterment of their living conditions. Somehow a spiritual incentive, a substitute for renunciation, will have to be found... My own feeling is that with their religious and cultural background something different will be required to spark in them the conviction that the modern struggle of a highly technologically developed state is worthwhile.<sup>3</sup>

Leaving the details of this remark to be considered in the following pages we may add here that the present survey of the growth and development of Renunciation throughout the Indian tradition and its various motifs shows some of the peculiarities of the idea and the institution of Renunciation which refuse to be dogmatically classified into a rigid category of life-world negation.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Nature of Renunciation*

It should be pointed out that the term 'Renunciation' (*Samnyāsa*) has different shades of meaning emphasized by different writers. Most of them have understood the term to mean isolation from, and indifference to the world. Commenting on the genesis of the Roman Catholic asceticism, J. L. Mackenzie points out: "The flight from the world was religiously motivated; it was an effort to achieve a closer communion with God by abandoning human society and

human comforts.”<sup>5</sup> A. J. Toynbee’s observation on the Desert Hermits is as follows: “Turning their back on the wickedness of the world, they sought redemption by the infliction of suffering on themselves”.<sup>6</sup> Hence Renunciation has been taken to mean “the form of religious life led by those, who having separated themselves entirely from the world, live in solitude.”<sup>7</sup>

In the Indian (*Vedānta*) tradition Renunciation has also been similarly defined. Thus while explaining the meaning of *Samyāsa* according to Vidyāraṇya, the author of the great manual on Renunciation, the *Jīvan-Mukti-Viveka*, Pandit S. S. Śāstri observes as follows:

The path of liberation, according to Vidyāraṇya, is indicated in one word — Renunciation... Vidyāraṇya would not understand it in any but the formal orthodox sense in which he *Rsis* of yore (Hindu Seers) principally employed it. Have no concern bodily or mental, direct or indirect, with the world, live in entire isolation, so to speak, and wear the orthodox insignia of the order — this is *Samyāsa*, according to Vidyāraṇya.<sup>8</sup>

The question, however, remains, how a life of entire isolation and indifference can ever be the end of existence, not to talk of Freedom? How can such a long tradition of Renunciation gain as much ground as it did throughout the Indian religious tradition on the basis of isolation? How can a Vedic religion, which Śaṅkara re-established, be possible on the sheer principle of indifference? Professor J. G. Arapura anticipates these while making the following statement: “Actually, the real reason for Śaṅkara’s criticism of two systems, viz., the Sāṃkhya dualistic realism and Buddhistic subjective idealism (*Yogācāra*) is their inability to account for liberation. These may be singled out precisely because they are diametrically opposite and because their views, if adhered to, will destroy rational grounds of experience as well as the possibility of the world.”<sup>9</sup> B. G. Tilak also refutes this theory of isolation as the central theme of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara.<sup>10</sup>

In the light of the above observations, I am inclined to suggest that the pattern of Renunciation in the *Vedānta* has a different implication from what has been suggested by various scholars in terms of isolation or indifference.

Two quite different conceptions mingle in the history of asceticism. One of these preserves the original meaning of discipline of the body for some ultimate purpose, as when William James urges sacrifice to God and duty as the means of training the will. The other conception distrusts the body altogether. Asceticism has then as its function not the training but the destroying of the body or the negation of its importance.<sup>11</sup>

What is especially noteworthy here is that the *Vedānta*, while agreeing with other systems pertaining to the significance of Renunciation, assigns a different reason for it. Early Buddhism might have succumbed to the temptation of unconditional and absolute Renunciation because of its different metaphysical outlook but the *Vedānta* would go against its nature if it sets up a doctrine of Renunciation independently of the *Brāhmanical* society and ethos from which it evolved. The objective of Renunciation is to provide opportunity for the progressive development of the various aspects of human personality with reference to which alone the social ideal can be attained. As M. Winteritz remarks: "It is in their opinion to be approached only from the point of view of the *āśrama* theory, according to which the *Āryan* has first to pass the state of *brahmācārin*, the student of the *Veda*, and of the householder (*grhapatī*) who founds family, offers sacrifices and honours the *Brāhmaṇas*, before he is allowed to retire as a hermit or an ascetic".<sup>12</sup>

Here one might argue that the *āśrama* discipline was relaxed in later times as is the case with the Advaita *Vedānta* but it is to be remembered that even the *Vedānta* could not dispose of the importance of *brahmācarya* (student life) and perhaps the early Renunciation was a theoretical exception and not a general practice. A recent

article of E. Skorpen in the *Philosophy East and West* states:

But in Hinduism from greater antiquity another pattern of worldly withdrawal has also existed, quite different from the predominant Western or the Buddhist approach. This sprang from the Hindu conception of the four natural stages of life which after early childhood are those of student (*brahmacārin*), householder (*grīhastha*), forest hermit (*vānaprastha*) and homeless mendicant (*Samnyāsin*). On this pattern renunciation is the act not of people in religious communities who have not undergone secular experience and responsibility but of individuals who have—a difference of some note.<sup>13</sup>

Neither the West nor Buddhism offered the kind of scheme of life on the pattern of Hinduism as reflected in the *Brāhmaṇical āśramas* or in the *Padimās* of Jainism.

Taking into account the different emphasis we have laid on the nature of Renunciation, a working definition should be such that it includes the motifs of various traditions and yet be relevant to the Indian context in general. In its most characteristic sense, Renunciation would indicate a spiritual attitude having no superficial concern, direct or indirect, with the world as it forces itself mechanically and blindly upon us, for what characterizes the superficial structure of the world is its wrongness embodied in its relative and dependent status, too finite and too imperfect, to help achieve the tranquillity of mind, which once realized, transforms the nature of universe so radically (to the extent of its disappearance, as if) that the world becomes an arena for the discharge of motiveless activity at the religious plane, free from all anxieties born of egotism and self-aggrandizement. The present definition implies three elements: (a) Renunciation aims at the denial and transcendence of the universe and the obligations associated with it only when the latter is approached independently of any Reality behind it. This is the world at its surface and therefore it does not attract the Indian spiritual thought which

is based on reflection and self-culture. Hence the importance of *brahmacharya*. (b) The superficial structure of the universe is not denied dogmatically. Behind it is the strong support of *Śruti* (revelation), based on the understanding of each and every school which has its own cosmology, and (c) Renunciation unfolds the meaning of existence by eliminating egoism (*ahamkāra*) which constitutes human conditioning and keeps oneself divided from the rest of the universe. It aims at the complete eradication of all obstacles, stemming from the gulf between the object and subject as if they were independent and autonomous.

These characteristics differ slightly in various traditions but the underlying theme of Renunciation remains the same. It stands primarily for the self-culture which is essential for the social culture, finally culminating in the realization of the harmonious whole where all the conflicts completely disappear and the man becomes virtuous by nature.<sup>14</sup> But in order to justify the present standpoint with regard to the nature of Renunciation, let us turn to the Brāhmanical schools to ascertain as to what extent, this approach is plausible.

#### (a) *The Vedas*:

Without going into the controversy whether the Vedas represent a philosophy, system of philosophy, mythology or cosmogony, our aim is to see the elements of Renunciation which the Vedic thinkers supplied for subsequent thought so that Indian philosophy could never cut itself off from the general structure of Renunciation, tacitly implied or imperfectly conceived by the Vedas.

If the argument presented above is valid, it follows that in the Rgvedic times, the doctrine of renunciation was not unknown. There are also some evidences which prove that the Vedic thinkers also knew and promulgated the institutional aspect of Renunciation, refusing the claims of those scholars who think that Buddhism actually introduced Renunciation into Indian religions as it was absent in the Vedic thought.<sup>15</sup> It should be noted here that when the Buddha himself renounced the world, there are evidences to

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provide the existence of the renunciants as is seen in the "Legend of the Four Signs".<sup>16</sup> The legendary status of these signs might be disputed but the renunciation on the part of *Siddhārtha* cannot be regarded as original or without precedent.<sup>17</sup>

But the renunciation doctrine as we find in the *Rgveda* is markedly different from the one we find in the Buddhism in the sense that the former also incorporates such ideas as those of *brahmacārin*,<sup>18</sup> *grhaati*,<sup>19</sup> *muni* (ascetic)<sup>20</sup> and *Yati*<sup>21</sup> (*samnyāsin*).<sup>22</sup> The ascetics are called '*vātarasūnā*'<sup>23</sup> (it stands for nakedness, "one having only the wind of air for one's waist-girdle.) The word '*Śramaṇa*' which became very favourite with Buddhism has been used in the *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka*<sup>24</sup> which belongs to the *Yajurveda*. The following remark of Professor G. S. Ghurye is very significant:

The fact that in the *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka* (II, 7) *Rṣis* are said to have existed in former times, who were not described, as a little later they came to be, as either '*Samnyāsins*' or '*Parivrājakas*' but as '*śramaṇas*' that is those who were 'endeavouring', is significant. It should be noted that even in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, which cannot be much later than the *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka*, at one place (IV, 3,22), occur the terms '*Śramaṇa*' and '*Tāpasa*'. The passage in question describes the nature of the high stage of perfection... *Sāyanācārya* explains the word *Śramaṇa* in this passage to mean *Parivrājaka*, ascetic, that is one 'who has entered the fourth of the four regular '*āśramas*'. He takes the term '*tāpas*' to stand for '*vānaprastha*', the third of the four '*āśramas*'.<sup>25</sup>

In the light of the above observation, the *Śramaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* controversy which denotes the two different systems of Buddhism and Brāhmanism loses its significance. The remark of Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar that *Śramaṇas* are non-Brāhmanic or non-Vedic also falls to the ground.<sup>26</sup> In the *Pātika Sutta*, the Buddha himself has mentioned

*Śramaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas* belonging to the Brāhmanical period. If *Śramaṇas* belonged to the pre-Buddhistic period including the Vedic period, it cannot be said that the ascetic order was the creation of Buddhism and references to the effect can be found in Buddhism itself.<sup>27</sup> Apart from *Śramaṇas*, even the 'yatis' (meaning to control) constituted a separate class of ascetics who cherished independent views and did not believe in the Vedic ritualism. They belonged to the fourth āśrama of the *saṃnyāsa*.<sup>28</sup> Professor H. D. Sharma establishes the same fact:

The *vātaraśana* of the *Rgveda*, who by the time of *Āraṇyakas* took the title of *Śramaṇa* were the earliest dissenters from the orthodox Vedic religion. They are the same as the *yatis* . . . This *Śramaṇa* is the *atyāśramin* of the *Svetāśvataropaniṣad* (vi.21). Most probably it was before the rise of Buddhism that the old three āśramas were expanded into four...<sup>29</sup>

It is certainly true that a systematic exposition of either the theoretical structure of Renunciation or the practical aspect of it, viz., āśrama theory could not be legitimately expected in the Vedas, but in the background of the above discussion, it is clear that the Vedas themselves had some incipient ideas about the renunciation both in its individual setting as well as social or institutional.

Renunciation was introduced in the Vedas, unlike Buddhism, with reference to an āśrama theory. Besides these references, we have clear indication of religious mendicancy as an institution of the Brāhmanical society in the *Brahadāraṇyaka*.<sup>30</sup> The view of S. Dutt that the institution of religious mendicancy was quite foreign to the Vedic *Āryan* society, signifying that it came from outside, namely, Buddhism, does not seem to be tenable.<sup>31</sup> The chief reason assigned by Dutt is that the 'yatis' were not accepted as *āryans* after discarding the sacrifices and Vedic rituals. But in our opinion, the *saṃnyāsa* as reflected in the lives of *yatis* is beyond all these superficial considerations and represents the peak of the spiritual life. Paul Deussen's following remark is very helpful: "Henceforth meditation

alone is to serve as sacrificial cord and knowledge as the lock of hair, the timeless Ātman is to be both sacred thread and lock of hair for him who has renounced the world.”<sup>32</sup> On account of this it is difficult to agree with Dutt who thinks that: “the Vedas contemplate man’s life in one stage only, that of the pious and dutiful householder. The Vedas look to no beyond”.<sup>33</sup> Professor B. Barua agreeing with the view of Rhys Davids remarks that:

The Bhiksu order of homeless persons evolved originally from the *brahmācārins* (mentioned in the *Rgveda* once in x.109) who did not enter upon the stage of householders . . . the *śramaṇas* . . . broke away from past traditions, revolted against the older Vedic system of sacrifice and self-mortification or dissented from the later form of Brāhmaṇic religion . . . The revolt showed itself in every possible manner. For example, the *śramaṇas* . . . listened to nothing except their own conscience.<sup>34</sup>

The following conclusions may be arrived at regarding the position of Renunciation in the Vedas:

- (a) Contrary to the common belief that the Vedas do not entail the doctrine of Renunciation, we have found that the Vedas provided incentives to the later development of Indian thought pertaining to the phenomenon of Renunciation. In this sense the Vedas constitute the unbroken continuity of the tradition of Renunciation.
- (b) We also discovered that the renunciation as an institution is not the creation of Buddhism. It is an ideal which has a long history and can be discovered in the Vedas themselves.
- (c) We also noted that Renunciation does not take place in a socio-religious vacuum but it originates from life and centres around life. Only the perspective into which it views life is different from that of the common morality.
- (d) Another point which we indicated as a very important one was the prevalence of the four *āśramas* in the vedic times. It gave rise to the two streams of thought, one re-

presented by the *smṛtis* dealing with the gradual progression towards the *Samnyāsa* and the other represented by the Advaita Vedānta that one may proceed from the state of *brahmacārin* to that of the *Samnyāsin*, and finally,

(e) By introducing the concepts of renunciation and *Jñāna* without systematically unfolding them, the Vedas provided guidelines for the future development of thought about Reality and Renunciation for which alternative solutions were provided within and outside the tradition.

The evidences, however meagre, brought out so far from the Vedas show where the seeds of Renunciation lay which eventually blossomed out in the *Upaniṣads*.

Although the Vedas are more oriented to this worldliness than the *upaniṣads* and the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, it is a fact that the general outlook of the Veda was accommodated with the Vedāntic spirit on the basis of the positive ideal of the former in which the Indian philosophy and religion were predominantly rooted. In this sense only the Vedas can be regarded as the source of all later thinking.

### (b) *The Upaniṣads*<sup>35</sup>

In the previous section we noticed the implicit tendency of the Vedas towards linking Renunciation with *Jñāna* and providing an institutional basis to Renunciation. Because of a prominent place assigned to sacrifices and rituals in the Vedic scheme of life, the philosophy of Renunciation which appeared strongly in the tradition could not be carried further. Because of the denial of ritualism and the Vedic sacrifices by the *Yatis* who constituted a group of renunciants, it would be correct to hold that exclusive emphasis laid on ritualism caused some confusions between religious and ritualistic values, giving rise to a trend in philosophy which shifted from the external and formal characteristics of ritualism to the inwardness of religious experience.<sup>36</sup> In my judgment, this constitutes the real significance of the upaniṣadic thought on the subject. They assign a somewhat different status to Renunciation by

relating it more closely with *Jñāna*, i.e. *Brahma-Jñāna* and yet without divorcing themselves from the tradition.<sup>37</sup>

There is a view of Renunciation according to which it is a meditative act where contemplation plays a very vital role. Here the emphasis is purely inward rather than outward. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* gives a clear example of this. It attaches a different significance to the principle of the *Aśvamedhayajña* (the horse-sacrifice) and transforms it into a contemplative form of Renunciation, according to which everything is to be sacrificed for spiritual autonomy.<sup>38</sup> Here the universe takes the place of horse to be offered for spiritual progress and realization. The same *Upaniṣad* attaches a very positively interior orientation to what has been described as outward in the Veda: "Having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected, one should see the Self in Self".<sup>39</sup> Commenting on the above passage Paul Deussen remarks that the Vedic study, sacrifice, alms, penance, fasting are the more outward (*bāhya*) but tranquillity, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, concentration are the inward means to knowledge,<sup>40</sup> while emphasizing the role of renunciation as linked with *Jñāna*, the *Br. Up.* further asserts: "Men knowing Brahman, give up the desire for sons and wealth and prosperity and become almsmen".<sup>41</sup>

The above passages regard Renunciation as a consequence of the *Brahma-Jñāna* as also a means of attaining it. These two positions brought out together in the *Upaniṣads* show the continuity of the Vedic tradition. As we would see that Śaṅkara's theory of *Karma-Saṁnyāsa* (action-renunciation), brought into line with *Jñāna* for its culmination in Self-knowledge has its basis in the Vedas. Renunciation, therefore, is not a negative act but the real culmination of the spiritual progress. There is no sense, therefore, in interpreting Renunciation as something of a negative character.

It, therefore, becomes obviously an urgent matter to examine the question of Renunciation as a religious attitude towards *vyāvahārika satya* (empirical truth) where the

latter does not stand cancelled or negated but is transformed and transcended. This question can be examined theoretically from the standpoint of the Vedāntic analysis of Reality on the one hand, and by considering the role of the *āśramas* (stages of life) at the institutional level, on the other. I submit that these questions are predominantly rooted in the Vedic tradition itself.

The fundamental doctrine of all the principal *Upaniṣads* is hard to discuss and decide here, but in the light of Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, there seems to be ground for believing that a diversity of opinion on this subject could not possibly arise.<sup>42</sup> This becomes more so because of the revealed nature of the *Upaniṣads* as a part of the Vedas in a literal sense. "Verily, this whole world is *Brahman*" "... this my *Ātman* in my inmost heart is this *Brahman*".<sup>43</sup>

The understanding of this ultimate principle called *Brahman* and *Ātman* as the substratum or ground of Self and no-Self is based on the principle of Unity which Renunciation unveils in terms of *Jñāna*. The *Mahāvākyas* "I am *Brahman*", "That thou art" can only be understood in key of Renunciation which takes a very positive turn by isolating itself from everything other than the Ground which is *Brahman*. But the isolation from everything else should not be taken in a negative sense as everything is *Brahman*. Only in this context, *neti neti* (not this not this) which describes the nature of *Brahman* helps the *Sādhaka* to reach the realms of *Iśvara*, known as *Saprapancha Brahman* (Cosmic *Brahman*) by transcending the limitations of the diversity of the Universe. This we have called the Cosmic Renunciation. If it is the ideal of God that is the central point of attention, the world of varieties and limitations will be transcended as the existence of the world independently of God is inconceivable at the religious level of existence. The *Chāndogya* beautifully states: "Verily, this whole world is *Brahman*, from which he comes forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which he breathes. Tranquil one should meditate on it. Now verily,

a person consists of purpose. According to the purpose a person has in this world, so does he become on departing hence. So let him frame for himself a purpose".<sup>44</sup> That is precisely the acosmic Renunciation where God is replaced by the philosophic realization of God in terms of one's identity with the whole. The views as presented here are the same and if there is any difference, it is because of the differences in the standpoint from which the Absolute has been looked at. One of the *Upanisads* supports this contention: "To him he said: that which is the sound *Aum*, O *Satyakāma*, is verily the higher and the lower *Brahman*. Therefore, with this support alone does the wise man reach the one or the other."<sup>45</sup> Professor Haripad Chakraborti of Calcutta says:

Sāmkara draws our attention to the importance of *Samnyāsa* which may be said to be of two classes. One class is meant to be the means of true knowledge which every seeker aims at and the second class is resorted to by the man who has already had the vision of Truth and who desires to relish the blissful state of liberation even while living (*Jivan-Mukti*).<sup>46</sup>

These two types of Renunciation are nothing but the cosmic and acosmic along with the cosmic and acosmic nature of Reality. The *advaitin*'s insistence on Renunciation stems from his metaphysics but his efforts to accommodate Vedic philosophy of action in its cosmic form is certainly of no mean significance. The discipline of *Karma-yoga*<sup>47</sup> is a step towards the acosmic renunciation. J. C. Oman observes:

By the Hindu speculative theologians asceticism with a view to the repression of animal passions is regarded as means to the purification of mind, such purgation being an essential condition for the attainment of a complete knowledge of Brahman with its attendant freedom from *Samsāra*, i.e., embodied existence.<sup>48</sup>

The knowledge of the Supreme Reality, called *Brahman* and *Ātman* is conceived as the highest spiritual attainment and *Samnyāsa* is the key to unlock the door.<sup>49</sup> These *Samnyāsins* are known in the *Upanisads* as 'knowers of *Brahman*'.

### *Renunciation in its Institutional Setting*

Later *Upanisads*, referred to earlier, view the life of *Samnyāsa* as a kind of consummation to which man should progress. This position assigns a status to Renunciation in the scheme of life (called *āśramas*). It is a continuation of the implicitly conceived Vedic norm of life and therefore rooted in the Vedas. The *Chāndogya* mentions the first two stages, namely, the *brahmacārin* and *Gṛhastha* and also seaks of *tāpas* as the third branch of duty and contrasts these three branches with the position of man who stands established in *Brahman*.<sup>50</sup> ‘The passage names’, says Paul Deussen, ‘only three *āśramas*, recognizes their values, but contrasts with all three the “abiding steadfast in *Brahman*”; and this last is subsequently developed into the fourth *āśrama*.<sup>51</sup> The fourth stage was exalted above the three *āśramas*, *atyāśramīṇ*, as it is said in the *Śvetāśvatara*: “By the power of austerity and grace of God, the wise *Śvetāśvata* in proper manner spoke about *Brahman*, the Supreme, the pure, to the advanced ascetics what is pleasing to the company of seers”.<sup>52</sup> It is important to remember here that generally the stage of the *Paramahāṁsa* (the highest stage of the spiritual person, known as *Jīvan-mukta*) is not represented by men who may not have undergone the *Karma-yoga* and its duties and responsibilities imposed by the Vedic culture. The *Dharmaśāstras* to which we come later highlight this development to which even the *Vedānta* is not an exception. The *Vedānta* with *Jñāna* carried its own social implications. The *Samnyāsa* is not formal or an external mode of living but an enlightened outlook. In fact, the several passages of the *Upanisads* confirm this. We hear of king Bṛhadhratha who surrendered his kingdom, retires to the forest and gives himself up to the most painful mortification, gazing pointedly at the sun and standing with arms erect and yet he is obliged to confess — ‘I am not acquainted with the *Ātman*’.<sup>53</sup>

Considered accordingly, the *Vedāntic* renunciation does not demand what is impossible and therefore the ascetic life was made an essential part of the brāhmaṇical religious

system.<sup>54</sup> The dominant tendency of Indian religious thought still lies in the principle of *Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya* (Union of Knowledge-Action theory)<sup>55</sup> and in my judgment even the Advaita Vedānta and the *Upaniṣads* do not appear to take an extreme view of denying the *Sādhanā* as instrumental to not only the socio-religious life but also for self-realization. Swami Madhavananda remarks:

According to the *Vedānta*, there is no actual change in the Self, which is by nature pure and perfect. It is ignorance or *avidyā* that has covered its vision, so to say and it appears as limited and subject to change. Now this ignorance is embedded in the mind, and when the mind is thoroughly purified through *Sādhanā* or discipline the glory of the *Ātman* manifests itself.<sup>56</sup>

And here it must be noted the *āśrama* life embodies a system of vital social values, ethical principles, ends of life and ideals of conduct for structuring the life of society, founded on the *Āryan* tradition. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* asserts it: "On that path goes whoever knows *Brahman* and who has done holy works, as prescribed for the *āśramas* and obtained splendour."<sup>57</sup> While commenting on the *Śruti*, Śaṅkara makes it clear that the duties of *āśramas* are useful for the realization of Self.<sup>58</sup> The *Bhagavad-Gītā* characterizes the ideal of Renunciation by exhortation to inculcate:

humility, sincerity, non-violence, forbearance, simplicity, devotion to the teacher, cleanliness, perseverance, self-conquest, aversion to sense objects, freedom from egotism... equanimity in happiness and misery, devotion to God, love of solitude, pursuit of self-knowledge and the vigilant awareness of the final end.<sup>59</sup>

The *āśrama* like *dharma*, according to the *Vedānta* has a cosmic and a metacosmic aspect and these two aspects are closely interlinked as we shall see more fully later.<sup>60</sup> N. K. Brahma's following remark is very pertinent to this point:

Instead of denying that the *Vedānta* really describes a stage beyond the sphere of morality, we have to point out that as the Vedāntic experience, implying a transcendence of moral distinctions, comes after the severest

moral discipline, which can, in no case be excused, but is regarded as essential and compulsory, it cannot justly be charged with ignoring or neglecting the development of moral side of our nature. The *Vedānta* only points out that there is something to be achieved even beyond the highest moral progress and reveals to us the nature of transcendent spiritual experience.<sup>60</sup>

*Samnyāsa* culminates in the transcendent spiritual experience according to which the world becomes a sacred world and the ideal of righteousness to which the *Samnyāsin* willingly corresponds is the ideal of God-man. *Samnyāsa* therefore is a sanctifying principle at the cosmic level and a sanctified principle at the metacosmic.<sup>61</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. Sureśvara, *Vārtika on Śamkara's Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, ed., K. S. Agashe with Ānandagiri's *Śāstra-prakāśikā* (Poona: Ānāndāśrama Sanskrit Series, 16, 1892-94), pp. 513-15.
2. See, B. G. Tilak, *Gītā Rahasya*, trans. Bhalchandra Sitaram Sukthankar (2nd ed.; Poona: Lokmanya Tilak Mandir, 1965), pp. 665-714.
3. Eleanor Roosevelt, *India and the Awakening East* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 196-202.
4. The bulk of research done by Milton Singer happily supports some of my convictions. See "Cultural Values in India's Economic Development", — *The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 305, (Agrarian Societies in Transition, 1956), pp. 81-91; "Review of Max Weber's Religion of India", *American Anthropology*, LXIII, 1961 and "Religion and Social Change in India: The Max Weber's Thesis, Phase Three", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 14, 1965-66, pp. 497-505. Also see, Thomas R. Metcalf, *Modern India: An Inter-*

pretrative Anthology (London: The MacMillan Company, 1971), pp. 588-607.

5. J. L. Mackenzie, *The Roman Catholic Church* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 89.
6. Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Desert Hermits", *Horizon*, 12, 2 (Spring, 1970), p. 24.
7. F. Carnoy, "Monasticism", in James Hastings, ed. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), VIII, 781.
8. Sri Vidyāraṇya, *Jīvan-Mukti Viveka or The Path to Liberation-in-This-Life*, eds. and trans. Pandit S. Subrahmanyā Sastri and T. R. Srinivasa Ayyangar (Adyar, Madras: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1935), p. X.
9. J. G. Arapura, "Māyā and the Discourse About Brahman", in M. Sprung, ed., *Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta* (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973), p. 110.
10. "Buddhistic and Sāṃkhya asceticism is outside the purview of the Vedas and false; and as the path of Renunciation enunciated by me is consistent, with the Vedic religion it is true." (*Chān. Śām. Bhā.*, 2, 23, 1) Tilak *Gītā Rahasya*, p. 764.)
11. T. C. Hall, "Asceticism", in James Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1909), II, 63.
12. M. Winternitz, 'Ascetic Literature in Ancient India', *Calcutta University Review*, October (1923), p. 3.
13. Erling Skorpen, 'The Philosophy of Renunciation East and West', *Philosophy East and West*, July (1971), p. 284.
14. *Utpannātmaprabodhasya tvādveṣṭṭatvādyo Guṇah, a yatnato bhavatyasya na tu sādhanarūpiṇah, Naiśkarmyasiddhi*, IV.69.  
"In a person of Self-Knowledge virtues like non-hatred are established themselves without any effort on his part. They are not of the nature of means to him." See Sri Sureśvarācārya, *Naiśkarmyasiddhi*, Trans. S. S. Raghavachar, (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1965), p. 172.
15. E. J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History* (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1927), pp. 58-59.

16. The four signs (*Nimitte*) are conceived in the Buddhist legends as guiding signs for the Renunciation of the Buddha. These are the sight of an old man, a sick man, a dead man and a wandering monk (*Bhikkhu*). The fourth one is significant in this connection although its scientific status has been doubted. However, the legends clearly show the presence of monk even before Buddhism was originated. See S. Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries in India* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 36.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

18. *Rgveda*, X.109.5. The word 'brahmacārin' occurs only once in the *Rgveda*.

19. A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1970), pp. 358-63.

20. 'Muni' means one who meditates or reflects. In the *Rgveda* (X, 136, 2.) these 'munis' are described as *vātarasana keśin* (long haired, *Keśin*) and naked (*vātarasana*), a sign of total renunciation. Indra is said "to be the friend of munis" *Ibid.*, VIII.3.5.

*Munayo vātarasānāḥ bisangā vaste mala*

*Vatasyānudhrājim yanti yad devāso avikṣataḥ Ibid.*  
X.135.2.

21. *Ibid.*, VIII.3.9 and 6.18.

22. X.72.7 "Yad devā Yatayo yathā bhuvanānyabivavata" (when, O ye gods, like *yatis*, ye caused all existing things to grow.) *Yati* has been explained in terms of the *saṁnyāsin*.

23. *Ibid.*, X.136.2.

24. *Tai. Ara.*, 11.7.

25. G. S. Ghurye, *Indian Sādhus* (2nd ed.; Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964), p. 12.

26. D. R. Bhandarkar, *Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture* (Bombay, 1940), p. 53.

27. *Dīgha-nikāya*, III.23. "Santi Bhaggava ek Samana-Brāhmaṇa Issarakuttam Brahma-Kuttam ācariyakanāg-gannam pannapenti".

28. Ghurye, *Indian, Sādhus*, p. 17.

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29. H. D. Sharma, "History of Brahmanical Asceticism", *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. III, No. 4, (January, 1939), p. 43.

30. IV.3.22.

31. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 60-63.

32. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1966), p. 124 ff.

33. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 376-377.

34. B. M. Barua, *A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy* (1st ed.; Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1921), p. 242.

35. The word '*upaniṣad*' etymologically means 'sitting (Sad) near by (Upa) devotedly (ni)'. The teachings of the *upaniṣads* are regarded as a mystery (*rahasye*) for which only deserving candidates are qualified. The number of the *upaniṣads* are over two hundred. However, those texts on which Śaṅkara has commented are accepted generally as genuinely older ones and ascribed to the pre-Buddhistic period of 700-550 B.C. These *Upaniṣads* are also called *Śrutis*. See R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926), pp. 179-180. The thirteen principal ones of the *Muktikā* Cannon have been arranged in the following chronological order by the above author: *Bṛ. Up.*, *Chān. Up.*, *Īśa Up.*, *Kena Up.*, *Aita. Up.*, *Taitt. Up.*, *Kau. Up.*, *Katha Up.*; *Muṇ. Up.*, *Śvet. Up.*, *Pra. Up.*, *Mai. Up.*, *Māṇ. Up.* *Ibid.*, p. 13,

36. S. N. Dasgupta, *Hindu Mysticism* (New York: Federick Udgur Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 41-42.

37. George Thibaut, trans., *The Vedānta-Sūtras* (with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya) pt. I. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1968), p. CIV "... most probably they are to be viewed not as creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried by generations of Vedic theologians".

38. *Bṛ. Up.* 3,4,1.

39. *Ibid.*, IV.4.23. "Śānto dānta uparatas titikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvā ātmāny evātmānam paśyati". See S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London: George

Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York: Humanities Press Inc. 1969), p. 280.

40. Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 411.
41. Br. Up. III.5.1 "etam vai tam ātmānam viditvā, brāhmaṇah putraiṣanāyāś ca vittaiṣanāyāś ca lokaiṣanāyāś ca vyutthāya, atha bhikṣācāryam caranti."
42. Thibaut, *The Vedānta Sūtras*, 1.1.4, pp. 22-46. See Cha. Up. VI,2,1, Ait. Ara. II.4,1.1., Br. Up. II.5, 19 and Mun. Up., II.2,11.
43. Cha. Up. VIII.1.2. "atha yad idam asmin brahma pure daharam puṇḍarīkam veśma... tad vā va vijijuśitavayam". See Radhakrishnan's note, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 49.
44. Cha. Up., III.14.3. Mai. Up. IV.6: 'Sarvam Khalv idam brahma'. Maitri Up. IV.6. says 'brahma khalv idam vāva Sarvam': Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 391.
45. Pra. Up.. V.2: 'etad vai, satyakāma param cāparam ca brahma yad aumkārah tasmād vidvān etenāivāyatanaenaikartaram anveti'. See Mun. Up. I.1.6.
46. Haripada Chakraborti, *Asceticism in Ancient India* (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1973), p. 19.
47. Mun Up. 2.2.8., Br. Up. IV.4,5,
48. J. C. Oman, *The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India* (London: T. F. Unwin, 1905), p. 9.
49. *Kaivalyopanisad*, 2 — na karmanā na prajayā dhanena tyāgenaiken amṛtatvam anaśuh. (trans. — Not by work, not by offspring or wealth; only by Renunciation does one see the life eternal), Radhakrishnan, p. 927.
50. Cha. Up., II.23.1.
51. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, pp. 60-61.
52. Sve. Up. VI.21, Trans. — Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 749.
53. Mait. Up., I.2.
54. M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, trans. S. Ketkar (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927), I.233.
55. Tilak, *Gītā-Rahasya*, p. 500.

56. Swami Madhavananda, trans., *Vivekacūḍāmaṇī* of Śaṅkarācārya (Calcutta: Advaita Āshram, 1970), Śloka, 169, p. 65.

57. IV.4.9. *eṣa panthā brahmaṇā hānuvittah tenaiti brahmavit puṇyakṛt taijasaś ca.*

58. Thibaut, *The Vedānta Sūtras*, Pt. II, III.4.39, pp. 316-17. He quotes Smṛti 'Let a Brāhmaṇa stay not one day even outside the āśrama; having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin'.

59. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIII.7-11. Cf Swami Jagedananda, trans., *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Sri Śaṅkarācārya (Mylapore, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Matha, 1961), 1-5.

60. N. K. Brahma, *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1932), pp. 115-116.

61. Chā. Up. Śāṅkara bhāṣya. II.23.1. See G. N. Jha, trans., *The Chāndogya Upanisad: A Treatise on Vedānta Philosophy Translated into English with the commentary of Śāṅkara* (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1942), pp. 103-114.



## THE CONCEPT OF FUTURE IN BERGSON AND HEIDEGGER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

The concept of future is important in any philosophy of time. A study of this concept in the philosophies of Bergson and Heidegger throws light on several aspects not only of future but also of time. These two philosophers are studied in this paper as there is much in common in their views in spite of their holding two fundamentally different views of time. They have both something important to say on future.

### *Bergson's view of time:*

Bergson holds that there are two notions of time. (1) Pure time; and (2) alloyed time (time alloyed with space). He writes, "There are, indeed, two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all alloy, the other, surreptitiously bringing in the idea of space."<sup>1</sup>

Pure time is the time understood by itself. It is a product of mental synthesis. "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains separating its present state from its former states."<sup>2</sup> It is an indivisible, irreversible continuity. "The indivisible continuity of change is precisely what constitutes true duration."<sup>3</sup>

Alloyed time is the ordinary notion of time. This is what we mean by minutes, hours, years etc. It is a quantity and measurable. This is made possible by spatialising time and making it static. When "We project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity,"<sup>4</sup> and we get the spatialised or alloyed time. This is the time of the mathematician and the physicist. Bergson is of the view that alloyed time does not give us the real nature of time and characterises it as the 'ghost' of time.

Time is neither an abstract notion nor a disputable fact for Bergson. Time is concrete, real and effective.

### *Heidegger's view of time:*

According to Heidegger also there are two possible notions of time — (i) Authentic, and (ii) Inauthentic. Authentic time is Dasein's time and is also called as the primordial time. It is real. Like Bergson, Heidegger also is of the view that the real time cannot be quantified. He writes, "Half an hour is not thirty minutes but a duration (Dauer) which has no 'length' at all in the sense of a quantitative stretch."<sup>5</sup> Heidegger explains time as basic for Dasein and in so doing finds time to be finite, whole, and having a structure of its own. Past, present and future are the structural parts which together as a whole constitute time. They correspond to 'facticity', 'existence' and 'falling' of Dasein respectively.

Inauthentic time is the ordinary notion of time as a quantity of duration. It is understood in terms of the present or the now. It is infinite and is derived from the finite time of Dasein.

In order to understand the distinction between authentic and inauthentic times, we should know the distinction which Heidegger makes between authentic and inauthentic Dasein. Authentic life of a person is that which is based upon a correct understanding of human condition. In authentic existence the self is in search of its own most being. To be authentic is to be "something of its own".<sup>6</sup> Inauthentic life is that of an ordinary man who attends to his daily activities without any uniqueness about himself. Such a life is lost in the world and the individual becomes a 'nobody' by merging himself in the world. Dasein is inauthentic "when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment."<sup>7</sup>


Authentic time and inauthentic time are derived from authentic Dasein and inauthentic Dasein respectively. Dasein has a beginning (birth) and end (death) and thus is finite. The basic state of Dasein is care. Care is not anxiety but the desire for authentic living which constitutes the present. Authentic time which is finite is based on the authentic self.

Inauthentic Dasein lives in the 'present' or 'now' only without any care. Now, now and now go on infinitely. There is no concern for future which would consequently be indefinite leading to the notion of infinite time and that is the ordinary conception of time.

*The concept of Future in the philosophy of Bergson:*

Bergson recognises the distinction of past, present and future in the *Duree*. He writes, "the pure present" is "the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future".<sup>8</sup> There is a continuation of the past into the present and *Duree* is the fusion of the past with the present leading to the future. In his book 'Creative Evolution' Bergson says, "The evolution of the living being, like that of the embryo, implies a continual recording of duration, a persistence of the past in the present....."<sup>9</sup> While distinguishing between the past, present and future, Bergson expounds the view that future is something entirely new. Reality is a process and it is a process of creative evolution. Creation implies novelty and thus future is new, unpredictable and unknown. To quote Bergson, "The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new."

Bergson's notion of future may be represented by the following diagram.



The line AB represents the present; the dotted lines to the left of it indicate the past and the future is indicated by the question mark.


*The concept of future in the philosophy of Heidegger:*

Heidegger does not accept the ordinary notion of future as the not-yet. He writes, "By the term 'futural' we do not here have in view a 'now' which has not yet become 'actual' and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself."<sup>10</sup> In Heidegger's philosophy, as time has its origin and basis in Dasein, future also has to be understood with reference to Dasein. Dasein is a whole with birth, death and care in between. Dasein always looks 'ahead-of-itself' and such a 'looking-ahead-of-itself' is the primary item of care. Care is concern for the future. The individual is going towards future and is governed by the future. Thus future is very authentic for Heidegger. "Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself — that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general".<sup>11</sup>

Future determines the present. The individual acts and behaves in the present as required by the future. The present is dominated by the future and is to serve the purposes of future. "The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is in the process of having been') releases from itself the present".<sup>12</sup> Dasein is a being-towards future. Thus future is as real as the past and present. "The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been."<sup>13</sup> And in a sense future is more important than the past and present as future plays a more important role than the past and the present in the life of a person as the basic state of Dasein is mainly futural. Heidegger makes this point very clear when he says, "In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatalogical unity of primordial and authentic temporality."<sup>14</sup>

The concept of guilt also illustrates the importance of future. A sense of guilt arises from the fact that one could have been otherwise. It is a consequence of retrospective estimation of the past in the future. Dasein's feeling of a sense of guilt is a fact and as such a feeling arises only out of future, it is evident that future is very important in the philosophy of Heidegger.

Heidegger's notion of future may be diagrammatically represented as follows.



The line AB represents the present. Past and future are indicated by the dotted lines to the left and the right of the line AB respectively.

#### *Agreement between Bergson and Heidegger:*

For both Bergson and Heidegger time is self-generic. Bergson holds that "wherever there is any thing living there is inscribed somewhere a register where time is inscribed". Living organism is an individual self whose beginning and end are marked by birth and death. A living organism stands as a whole and may be characterised by the term 'self', though 'self' is ordinarily understood with reference to a human being. 'Dasein' of Heidegger corresponds to the self of Bergson. Though 'Dasein' also in general applies to anything which is 'being-there', Heidegger in particular applies that term to man. The authentic and inauthentic existence refer to the types of human living. The structural whole of authentic time is derived from Dasein whose essence is 'care' and "care is that which forms the totality of Dasein's structural whole". Thus for Bergson as well as for Heidegger self is the source for time.

The mortal blow which Einstein has given to the Newtonian theory of absolute time from the standpoint of physics is further hammered by Bergson and Heidegger from a metaphysical point of view by expounding a theory of time with reference to the self. Both Bergson and Heidegger do not accept the absolute notion of time.

Bergson as well as Heidegger hold that there can be two possible conceptions of time. Bergson distinguished between pure time and the alloyed time; and Heidegger's two views are authentic time and inauthentic time. However it should be noted that there is no corresponding relationship between the views of one and the other in this regard.

#### *Differences between Bergson and Heidegger:*

There are certain fundamental differences between Bergson and Heidegger in the detailed exposition of time and temporal concepts. Bergson's pure time is a mental synthesis of conscious states and alloyed time is an artificial solidification or quantification of pure time. There is nothing like such a conception of time in Heidegger's thought. Bergson's philosophy of time is far removed from the authentic and inauthentic notions of Heidegger.

Though time is self-generic in both the philosophies, the Duree of Bergson is a process of continuity which is never a completed whole, whereas the authentic time of Heidegger is finite corresponding to Dasein's life.

According to Bergson continuity of the living organism registers and reveals the *Duree*. Heidegger speaks specifically of Dasein (man) and not of any living organism; and time has to be understood as basic for Dasein. Bergson's view is that the very living of a living organism gives time, whereas Heidegger's view is that the (authentic) time is given by the way Dasein lives.

Bergson in his book 'Creative Evolution', goes to the extent of defying time and says that time is "a vehicle of creation".<sup>15</sup> Heidegger is not concerned with such view of time.

A very important point of difference between the two is with regard to the future. Future for Bergson is open, infinite and indefinite. According to Heidegger future is limited, finite and definite. This difference arises from the fact that Bergson thinks on the lines of creative evolution whereas Heidegger thinks on the basis of the life of authentic Dasein (an individual self).

#### Conclusion:

The above consideration of the views of Bergson and Heidegger shows that there can be more than one conception of time and of future. Nature of time and future depends upon the point of view which one takes. Bergson looks at time from the standpoint of creative evolution, whereas the standpoint of Heidegger is from that of the structure of *Dasein*. Bergson attempts to explain the nature of the ultimate reality and looks at time from a metaphysical point of view. Heidegger concerns himself with *Dasein* (the individual self) in his endeavour to know the Being and tries to understand time from an existential standpoint. Bergson's notion of time arises from his conception of Reality as a creative process. Heidegger's view of time arises from his distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence of man; and time is viewed as a possibility of understanding the Being in all its manifestations.

It is clear that there is a possibility of holding different views on time and future. If the theory of creative evolution is accepted, time is conceived as being creative and consequently future does not exist. Future will be the not-yet. On the other hand if the individual human self in authentic living is the basis for an understanding of time, the question of time as being creative does not arise at all. It follows from the authentic *Dasein* that time is finite as the individual self is finite and that future is not the not-yet but what is already existing along with past and the present.

Time is not an entity but is a notion which would depend upon the particular point of view which one takes. Consequently the problem of time which seems so puzzling and enigmatic disappears as there is nothing like time to be

puzzled about. 'Future' also depends upon the point of view which one adopts. The question which point of view is more reasonable and appropriate does not arise.

There are various theories of time and future, and two of the important views are studied in this paper. The most enigmatic part of time is future and this study has attempted to make it clear that there is an equipossibility of various views and that the question regarding the relative merits of different views is a *pseudo* question. In order to understand any particular view of future it is important to know the basic standpoint of the given author regarding time.

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#### NOTES

1. Bergson, Time and Freewill, Tr. F. L. Pegson, London, p. 100.
2. *Ibid.*
3. The Creative Mind, Tr. M. L. Andison, New York, p. 176.
4. Time and Free will *op. cit.*, p. 101.
5. Heidegger, Being and time, Tr. John Mecquarrie and Edward Robinson, London, p. 140.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
7. Heidegger, Being and Time, Tr. John Mecquarrie and Edward Robinson, London, p. 68.
8. Bergson, Matter and Memory, Tr. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, London, p. 194.
9. Creative Evolution, Tr. A. Mitchell, London, p. 20.
10. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.
11. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 401.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 378.
15. Bergson, The Creative Mind, Tr. Mabelle L. Andison, New York, p. 110.

## THE INTRINSIC GOOD AND THE UNCONDITIONAL GOOD

It is generally accepted that ethics is concerned with goodness of conduct. This has led people to suppose that one should first decide what goodness-in-itself is and then get a clearer notion regarding where exactly goodness in conduct lies. Thus, G. E. Moore in section 2 of his *Principia Ethica* writes "Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is..... 'good conduct' is a complex notion: all conduct is not good... And on the other hand, other things, besides conduct, may be good;..." This means that good conduct is a species of good in general. Therefore, Moore tells us that ethics cannot make a start at the beginning unless it tells us 'what is good as well as what is conduct'.

This approach to Ethics is not confined to ethical intuitionists like Moore. Even R. M. Hare, who belongs to the school of Linguistic Analysis, says in chapter 9 of his *The Language of Morals* that "'good' in the moral sense has the same logical behaviour" as it has in other departments of valuation.

I have my misgivings about this approach to ethics. 'Good conduct' is grammatically a complex expression. But goodness of conduct may conceivably be a logically simple notion. The way to know what is goodness of conduct may not be first to know what is good and then to know what is conduct. In other words, ethical goodness may not be a species of good in general or good simply. I think it is arguable that ethical good is a primary notion and that the goodness we become aware of, in other good things, for example, in the experience of listening to a musical melody is a pale reflection of the goodness we apprehend in the moral sphere.

The form of my argument will be: An X without qualification (or, an unconditional X) is logically prior to an X with qualifications (or, a conditional X) and the latter will derive its meaning from the former. The ethical good is good

without qualifications or conditions whereas every other thing that can be called good is good with qualifications or good under some conditions. Therefore, the ethical good is the primary notion of good and it cannot be a species, with other coordinate species like truth and beauty, under the genus 'good'. The ethical good (call it morality, moral good, virtue etc.) is not the highest good as is very often held, but 'the only good' in the primary sense of the term.

Consider the concept of a 'conditional apology'. This of course is a derivative concept. One cannot understand 'apology simply' or an 'unconditional apology'. An 'apology simply' is logically the basis of a conditional apology. Now, one can imagine conditions so quaint that a conditional apology ceases to be an apology. If I offer to tender my apology to somebody for hurting his self-respect on condition that he kneels before me and dusts my shoes, what I offer is no apology.

This has an analogical application to what Moore and others have called 'intrinsic good'. Enjoying a piece of music is intrinsically good. The reason given is "it will be good even if it existed quite alone without any accompaniment or effects whatsoever". But in such cases, one can imagine a context or conditions when the enjoyment of music ceases to be good. Nero fiddling while Rome was burning is a case in point.

It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish an unconditional good or a good without qualification from an intrinsic good. An unconditional good would be that which would be good under any circumstances whatsoever, that which would always be good and could never be bad. The intrinsic good, on the other hand, is that which is "good for its own sake and not for something else". It cannot, however, be said that an intrinsically good thing is good on all occasions and in any context. Even if pleasure is an intrinsic good, the pleasure in his own wickedness of a wicked man is not good. It all depends on circumstances. If pleasure is good, it is good with some qualifications, it is good under certain conditions. It is a conditional good. But, as said above, a con-

ditional X presupposes an unconditional X. So, if there is something which is a conditional good, there must also be an unconditional good which is presupposed by the former.

Where should we look for it?

Kant is very plausible when he asserts "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will". He compares 'good will' with Nature's gifts like various talents of the mind, or Fortune's gifts like power, riches, health and honour or even happiness and comes to the conclusion that only the good will is good without qualification. This comparison is carried by what, in Moore's tradition, would be called 'a kind of seeing' or 'inspection'. By 'inspecting' good will and the other things called good he concludes that the good will 'like a jewel, would shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value within itself'. If we agree with the results of Kant's inspection then there is a radical difference between the good will (which is good without qualification) and the intrinsic goods like talents and happiness.

The good will may well be regarded as an ethical or moral good. There are, at least, two characteristics which an ethical good has. (i) The production of it is within our power. We are free to bring it about. Nobody can command good looks. Therefore, goodness of looks is not a moral good. To set about doing something from a sense of duty is always within our means and since this is good it is a moral good. (ii) Secondly, 'good' in the peculiarly ethical sense gives rise to obligation. This does not happen in the case of a merely intrinsic good. Enjoying a piece of music, let us say, is an intrinsic good. But it is not obligatory on me to partake of that enjoyment. If Ravishankar is playing on his sitar in the adjacent hall where admission is free and I refuse to go there and listen, my action would be odd but not unethical or immoral. If, however, I refuse to fulfil a promise to gain some private ends, my refusal may not be odd but it would be immoral.

The 'good will' of Kant's conception has both these characteristics. It is always within our power to possess a good will and as rational beings it is obligatory on us to do what is required of us with a sense of duty. The good will, therefore, is a moral or ethical good and its goodness is unconditional.

The point of this discussion is that a distinction has to be made between what is intrinsically good and what is unconditionally good. The unconditional good is the moral good of which the most typical if not the unique instance is what Kant calls the good will. If the moral good has the status of being unconditionally good it will be logically prior to the intrinsic good and will not be a kind of intrinsic good like truth and beauty.

The reflected image of the moon in a mirror has also moonness in it. But that is a conditioned moon. The presence of a mirror is the condition of that moon. The lustrous round thing in the clear nocturnal sky, however, is the unconditioned moon. The relation between the two moons is not that of genus and species. The moon in the mirror is a reflection of the moon in the sky. In the same fashion an intrinsic good may be regarded as a reflection of the unconditional good.

In ethics our concern should be with the unconditional good and not with a shadowing abstraction good-in-itself. Kant's approach to ethics, therefore, is far more fundamental than that of Moore. Further it is a mistake to think that Kant's ethics is not an end-based ethics. The very first sentence of his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* recommends the end for human activity, namely, an unconditional good, which according to him is the possession of a good will.

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## SELF-INTEREST AND MORAL OBLIGATION

The question I propose to consider in this article is whether there is any rational justification of moral duty or moral obligation. When an individual is asked to do his duty even though it is against his enlightened self-interest, can he meaningfully ask, "why ought I to do my duty which requires me to sacrifice my own interest?" This, indeed, is an old question raised by many ancient Greek thinkers. It was, for instance, asked by Thrasymachus and was also put to Socrates by Adeimantus and Glaucon in the first two books of Plato's *Republic*. This question can be and is often put briefly in the following manner? "Why should I be moral?" or, "Why should I do my duty at the cost of my self-interest?" In fact, the question is as important today as it was in ancient time, and for this reason it has been widely discussed by many great thinkers including some contemporary moral philosophers. But before we endeavour to answer this question, it must be clearly distinguished from such factual questions as: "how does a man come to have the concept of duty?" and "why does he perform his moral obligations?" It is quite obvious that these factual questions require only explanatory answers in terms of causes or motives, while the question, "why should I be moral?", must be answered by adducing certain justificatory reasons in support of it. This article is an attempt to consider the nature and validity of such justificatory reasons for answering the above crucial question of moral philosophy.

Now, first of all, it is worth pointing out here that some philosophers have denied even the meaningfulness of this question, for, on their view, moral obligation being self-evident requires no further proof or justification. In his classic paper, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", (published in "Mind", 1912), H. A. Prichard has vehemently argued for this view. He contends that to give additional proof or justification for our moral obligation is neither possible nor necessary, because the apprehension

of what we morally ought to do is immediate, direct and self-evident; and in this respect the knowledge of moral obligation is similar to that of mathematical truths. Earlier, Kant also held that no justification could be given for moral obligation, since we ought to do our duty simply for the sake of duty and not for any other consideration whatsoever. So, for Kant, the question, "why ought I to do my duty?", is quite unnecessary and illegitimate. Similarly, in his "Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics", S. E. Toulmin also argues that the question, "why ought I to do my duty?", is logically meaningless and vacuous, because it turns out to be asking, "why ought I to do what I ought to do?". Thus, according to some philosophers, the necessity to perform one's duty is self-evident and therefore admits of no additional justification.

This view, however, is based on the assumption that morality is an end in itself, and for this reason moral obligation cannot be justified on any ground other than that of its self-evidence. Now, this deontological approach to morality is not acceptable to many philosophers who argue that moral rules or principles are meaningful and significant only in so far as they are conducive to the happiness or well-being of man. All moral philosophers, who advocate some or the other version of the teleological theory of morality, necessarily subscribe to this view. So, for these philosophers, the question regarding the justification of moral obligation is quite meaningful and legitimate. They, however, considerably disagree as to what ultimately justifies moral obligation. Those who advocate ethical egoism hold that the agent's enlightened self-interest alone ought to determine his course of action in all situations. This means that the individual ought to perform his duty when, and only when, doing so is in his long-term self-interest. Thus, on this view, no ground other than that of the agent's enlightened self-interest can be regarded as a valid justification for doing his duty. It is this egoistic point of view which Thomas Hobbes considered to be the only and ultimate justification for an individual's observing moral rules or principles. He points out that all of us want

to have peace, security and freedom from fear; and we also want to satisfy our desires to the maximum extent. Now, this is not possible in a community where each individual is totally indifferent to the welfare of other people and always endeavours to promote his own interest even at the cost of their interests. In such a community each individual would constantly struggle to gain the good things of life for himself and would even resort to violence in order to achieve his ends. This shows that the universal acceptance of the rule of self-interest would ultimately lead to an extremely harsh world which Hobbes calls "the state of nature" where everybody's life would be "nasty, brutish and short". If, on the other hand, each individual follows certain moral rules which override the dictates of self-interest, everyone's interest would be promoted in the long run. In other words, if everyone acts morally, all of us will be able to attain more of what we want; and so, on the whole, more good will be realized in a moral community than in a non-moral one where each person always seeks exclusively his own interest. Thus, according to Hobbes, it is each individual's enlightened self-interest which alone justifies ultimately his observing moral rules and discharging moral obligations. Similarly, in our own century, Moritz Schlick, in his "Problems of Ethics", also has advocated this egoistic standpoint as the sole justifying ground for an individual's acting on moral rules or principles. In short, according to enlightened egoists, an individual ought to discharge his moral duties or obligations because, and only because, doing this is in his ultimate and long-term self-interest.

The question now to be considered here is whether the above egoistic point of view can be regarded as a valid justification for moral obligation. Many philosophers have answered this question in the negative. In this connection the names of Kurt Baier and Kai Nielsen are specially worth mentioning. In his well-known book, '*The Moral Point of View: a Rational Basis of Ethics*', Baier has strongly argued against the contention that the egoistic point of view is identical with the point of view of morality.

He maintains that self-interest, whether short-term or enlightened, can never constitute the justifying ground of moral obligation which often requires us to do what self-interest forbids or refrain from doing what it recommends. He admits that the egoistic point of view can be universally adopted without self-contradiction, but, according to him, this point of view is not the point of view of morality. Explaining the reason for not regarding the egoistic standpoint as the moral point of view, he says that a consistent egoist always acts on the principle and can be justified only in the conditions of chaos when the moral order completely breaks down. If everyone accepts and acts on this principle of egoism, it will ultimately lead us to the law of jungle or to what Hobbes called "the state of nature". This is because each individual would then care only for his own interest and would do nothing for the interests of others unless acting in their interests is in the long run conducive to his self-interest. Thus, the standpoint of enlightened self-interest advocated by egoists is a purely prudential point of view, therefore, it completely rules out the possibility of a genuine self-sacrifice which is an essential condition for moral obligation. Baier is therefore right in holding that the point of view of self-interest is not the point of view of morality.

As a matter of fact, a consistent egoist cannot recognize any act to be his moral obligation unless it serves his own interest in the long run. This means that he cannot adopt a genuine moral point of view, since it requires each individual to act only on those principles which are for the good of everyone alike. The principles, which we generally recognize to be moral, fulfil this condition — that is, their adoption ultimately promotes the interests of everyone alike. "Thou shalt not kill", "thou shalt not lie", "thou shalt not be cruel", "thou shalt not steal", etc. are some of the examples of moral rules which ultimately aim at promoting the well-being of all and not of any particular individual or group alone. This is why all of us are required to accept and act on these moral rules or principles. But such principles cannot be adopted by a consistent egoist whose basic

tenet is only the promotion of an agent's self-interest. He can recognize the agent's duty to act on these principles only in so far as doing this in the long run promotes his self-interest. It is obvious that this purely prudential approach on the part of an egoist completely rules out the very possibility of an individual's acting on moral principles impartially and disinterestedly. He will not at all hesitate to transgress any moral principle if doing so ultimately promotes his self-interest. Thus, for an egoist, discharging duty or moral obligation is a mere means to the realization of an agent's own good in the long run, therefore his standpoint is only a prudential rather than a moral one. Now, it is not hard to understand that such a parochial point of view can never constitute a valid and justifying ground of moral obligation.

What, then, is the basis of moral obligation or duty? It would hardly be disputed that the demands of moral obligation, unlike those of self-interest, require each individual to be fair, just, and willing to make genuine sacrifices. When an individual is convinced that to follow a certain course of action is his duty or moral obligation, he would follow it without regard to his self-interest, provided he is not already committed to the prudential standpoint of egoism. In other words, such an individual is obligated to follow the dictates of duty even though doing so may be detrimental to his self-interest. It is, indeed, the essential demand of morality that, if the need arises, each individual ought to be willing to sacrifice his self-interest for the sake of his duty. This is why the rules of morality are designed to override the dictates of self-interest when following these dictates is detrimental to the interests of others. No one is entitled to violate these rules even though their violation is in one's self-interest. In fact, this alone can be regarded as a genuine moral point of view which is very different from the point of view of self-interest. It is clear that the point of view of morality, unlike the standpoint of self-interest, is essentially "other-regarding", and therefore this point of view alone can be said to constitute the basis of moral obligation.

Here it may be asked why, as a single individual, one should do one's duty instead of following one's long-term self-interest when there is a genuine conflict between them. One answer to this question, which we have so far considered, is that each individual's doing duty, rather than following his long-term self-interest, is ultimately in the interest of everyone alike. But to give this answer is to treat each individual's enlightened self-interest as the ultimate justifying reason for doing his duty. But this, as we have seen, is against the point of view of morality. To say that each individual should do his duty because this alone can ultimately promote everyone's interest including his own is to base moral obligation on the agent's enlightened self-interest; and this is tantamount to advocating the standpoint of rational egoism rather than the point of view of morality. So far as I can see, there seems to be no satisfactory solution to this serious difficulty. It is probably for this reason that some philosophers, like Kant and Prichard, have held that moral obligation is self justifying that is to say, no justification other than that some action is my duty can ever be given to convince me that I ought to do that action. In other words, my acceptance of the fact that a certain action is my duty necessarily obliges me to do that action without asking for further reason for doing it. This means that I ought to do my duty without regard to my own interest or, for the matter, the interest of anyone else.

Now, I think the most serious objection, which can be urged against this view, is that it fails to relate moral obligation with human happiness or well-being. It only shows that we should do our duty simply for the sake of duty and not for any other consideration whatsoever. But this tells us nothing as to how duty is related to human interest or well-being which alone can make it meaningful and significant for us. Whenever we say that to do a certain action is our duty, we mean that this action would ultimately contribute to the happiness or well-being of some individual or group of individuals. Any action, which is not at all conducive to the welfare of any human being or a sentient being, cannot be regarded as our duty or moral obligation. This

clearly shows that duty or moral obligation is necessarily and inextricably related to human happiness or well-being which alone can be said to constitute its ultimate justifying ground. If this account of the nature of moral obligation is correct, it can hardly be plausible to maintain that duty is an end in itself and that there is no further justification for doing our duty. Thus, the deontological view regarding the nature and justification of moral obligation does not appear to be wholly tenable and satisfactory.

I think that one of the most important distinguishing features of moral obligation is the fact that it obliges each individual to sacrifice even his long-term self-interest for the happiness or well-being of others. It is in this sense that duty is usually said to be "other-regarding". In ordinary circumstances every normal person seeks his own happiness by natural inclination; this is why the pursuit of one's own happiness is not generally considered to be one's moral obligation. This also accounts for the necessity of moral demand imposed on each individual to sacrifice his own happiness when its pursuit conflicts with his duty to promote the happiness or well-being of others. His reluctance to accept this demand of morality amounts to the total rejection of the moral point of view. But here it can still be asked why an individual should adopt the point of view of morality at the cost of his self-interest. Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the necessity of his being a member of human society to which he owes his very existence. It is simply in virtue of his being a member of society that each individual has a definite place or position in relation to others; and it is this social position which eventually gives rise to his various duties or moral obligations. So long as he is a member of society and holds certain positions in relation to other people, he cannot escape his duties or obligations which are unavoidable demands imposed by society upon him. Thus, to adopt the point of view of morality rather than that of self-interest is unavoidable for each individual simply because he is necessarily a "social being".

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Moreover, it is the moral point of view, and not the standpoint of rational egoism, which alone can provide us with an impartial and objective standard to adjudicate the conflicting interests of individuals and groups. If each individual's self-interest is regarded as the only justifying reason of his actions, we shall be left with no impersonal and objective standard to resolve the frequently occurring conflicts of interests among different persons or groups. In fact, the point of view of rational self-interest, if adopted universally, is likely to create and increase such conflicts in human society, since in that case none would act for the interests of others unless this ultimately promotes or is likely to promote his own interest. This is why the demand of moral obligation requires each individual to sacrifice his self-interest whenever it conflicts with his duty. The very word, "moral" entails the notion of sacrificing one's own interest. When we speak of a person as a "moral agent", we necessarily mean that he will endeavour to do his duty even at the cost of his own rational self-interest. Thus, we shall be misrepresenting the meaning of the word "moral" if we say that each individual ought to do his duty simply because it would eventually promote his own enlightened self-interest. It is not hard to see that such an individual would not be operating within the bounds of morality if he does his duty with a view to promoting ultimately his own interest. Thus, a consistent egoist cannot be said to function as a true "moral agent", because, as we have seen, to act "morally" presupposes that an individual would be willing to set aside even his long-term self-interest whenever his moral obligation requires him to do so. This willingness to sacrifice one's self-interest is, indeed, entailed by the very concept of "duty" on "moral obligation".

It is true that duty need not always conflict with an individual's self-interest, for on certain occasions he may do his duty and, by doing so, at the same time may promote his own interest. But when duty does conflict with a person's self-interest, it necessarily restricts his freedom to promote his own good or well-being. Then it obliges him to do what he does not want to do by natural inclination,

or compels him to refrain from doing what he likes or enjoys doing. Explaining this element of bindingness necessarily involved in the concept of "moral obligation" or "duty", Nowell-Smith rightly remarks: "Like other forms of obligation, moral obligation limits the range of free choice.... A moral obligation is... something which obliges me to act in a way that, but for the obligation, I would not have acted....! In fulfilling a moral obligation a man chooses to do what he does, but does not choose freely. The feature which distinguishes moral obligations from all others is that they are self-imposed."<sup>1</sup> This shows that the need of a moral obligation arises only because we are not always naturally inclined to care for the good of others, and on most occasions we invariably prefer our own good to theirs. In fact, if each individual always acted solely for the happiness or welfare of other persons, there would have been no such concept as "duty" or "moral obligation". This accounts for our great emphasis on the fact that duty or moral obligation is essentially "other-regarding". Although we sometimes do speak of duties towards ourselves, yet, from the moral point of view, these duties are not considered to be as important as our duties towards other people. Thus, the meaning of "duty" can be explained in terms of its other-regarding character and an individual's willingness to impose it upon himself. These two essential characteristics can be regarded as distinguishing marks of "duty" or "moral obligation".

In short, we can conclude that the ultimate justifying ground of moral obligation is the promotion of the happiness or welfare of others rather than the promotion of rational or enlightened self-interest of the agent.

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#### NOTE

1. P. H. Nowellsmith, "*Ethics*", p. 184.



## RELIGION AND ATHEISTIC EXISTENTIALISM •

The purpose of this paper is to make a critical study of the manner in which Atheistic Existentialism treats religion. Atheistic Existentialism occupies a peculiar position. It is atheistic and it is also against the excessive claims that religion usually makes. That is to say the type of philosophy that it comes to evolve places religion almost out of court. It feels that the philosophical doctrine of Theism and the usual deliberations of religion are both essentialistic. Therefore it apparently develops an attitude of indifference towards both 'God' and 'religion'. The purpose of this study is to analyse this attitude of indifference itself. Perhaps this analysis would yield a conclusion that will be comfortable both to religion and to Atheistic Existentialism.

But in order to derive certain useful conclusions with respect to the concept of religion from a study of Atheistic Existentialism, it would be essential to have a brief survey of some of the important views of some prominent Atheistic Existentialists.

Like every other Atheistic Existentialist Heidegger also makes man not only the starting point of his thought but also the central theme of his thinking. Dasein happens to be the centre of Heidegger's Ontology. If we analyse the nature of Dasein, we shall find that there is a basic difference between the being of man and the existence of things. This difference consists chiefly in the facts that things are simply present to a consciousness but man's nature can be grasped only by an individual subject through '*being in his own existence.*' Therefore, man, according to Heidegger, is not a thing in the world, but is a *being* in the world. And being in the world means that he is not anything to be taken for granted. He is not merely a man of reactions. He is a conscious existence living authentically and all the time trying to realise the possibilities lying within. Heidegger asserts that in authentic existence reduces man to the level

of things. But authentic existence necessarily is characterised by such existential characters as care, anxiety, attitude towards death and an indispensable awareness of nothingness. We are not concerned with a detailed study of Heidegger's Ontology of being but this simple statement of his basic standpoint clearly indicates that every problem has to be viewed from the point of view of Dasein. Any conception of the world does not give due regard to human existence and to man's concern will be a superficial account.

Even a description of God's nature by religion must describe the basic facts. If religion tends to place God at a high pedestal and makes man completely subordinate to it, such a God is of no consequence of Heidegger. He, almost like Nietzsche, feels that in a sense *man had created the concept of God*, therefore, he could any day kill God. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche's famous declaration about God's death is, in a way, a symbol for the destiny of the modern man. He feels that Nietzsche's nihilism, in a way, is an expression of man's existential awareness. As man becomes aware of his being and as he becomes conscious of the essential feeling of nothingness permeating the consciousness of man, he clearly becomes aware of the superficiality of the concept of God. The conception of belief in God, therefore, is, according to him, a consequence of the fundamental *evolution* which has been taking place. This evolution is nothing but an attempt to reassert the primacy of existence and the centrality of man.

He feels more or less like Nietzsche that if a man passes into higher dimensions and comes to realise that it is ultimately he who has to create new values, there is no other way for God but to die. Nietzsche expresses this idea by saying that the new race of supermen would take over the mastery of the world. He feels that man has come to realise that he is no longer dependent on and that he has to fix up future course himself.

Heidegger, even though accepting in principle the basic standpoint of Nietzsche, feels that Nietzsche in his prophetic zeal almost sidetracks and dodges a very important

and central issue that of the ontology of being. He never, tries to face the question as to how man, or for that matter superman, would replace God. Therefore, Heidegger says that the centre of man's vision must not be the superman as the new valuer of the world but being as such. If Nietzsche's solution is accepted, God will actually not be displaced. He will assume merely a new name and become the supreme custodian of new values. Therefore, Heidegger says that God must not be thought of as *being*. It is wrong to develop an ontology of God. Such a point of view will not be able to do justice to the perspectives and to the ontological status that man embodies. This kind of a mistake is one of the reasons why religion today seems to be out of place and not in tune with the existential conditions of man.

Heidegger asserts that our new search which is a search into the nature of being must begin with the awareness that all pre-determined security has now vanished. We must realise that we cannot get at the Dasein through the obedience to the traditional God. If at all the search is to be fruitful, it can be fruitful only when man stands free to face against nothingness. That is to say only when comes to realise the nothingness as an essential aspect of being. Heidegger, therefore, says that a traditional religion cannot help man in his ontological adventure. Thus, one feels that Heidegger is against the traditional reliance of religion.

Sartre is more emphatic and straightforward in asserting his atheistic conclusions. It would not be wrong to suggest that Sartre's reaction against the essentialistic ways of reason leads him to denounce not only the rational proofs for God's existence but also to realise *the redundancy and the superficiality of the concept of God itself*. It can be said that his opposition to the ways of reason almost coincides with his complete neglect of the concept of God.

Sartre does not make any persistent effort to develop his atheism. His atheism follows naturally from his existential convictions. There is no effort to try to uproot the concept of God, there is no attempt to demolish the proofs for God's existence, and *yet atheism is the inevitable con-*

clusion. In fact, for Sartre the question regarding the existence or the non-existence of God is not even relevant. He feels that intellect, by keeping man engaged in these unnecessary problems, leads him astray and makes him forget the real problem which ought to be the centre of his thought. Therefore an attempt to establish atheism or to reject the grounds for God's existence would, in Sartre's opinion, be a useless waste of time. Even so atheism naturally and necessarily creeps into his thought.

If we examine Sartre's position we would find that there are at least three basic ways in which the atheistic trends of thought becomes apparent. Firstly, it is apparent in the very enunciation of Sartre's basic principle of existentialism. That basic principle is that 'existence precedes essence.' "What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialists conceive him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be."<sup>1</sup> This means that man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. This again means that every kind of concept including the concept of God appears much later than man's existence. Now, if concept of God is a creation of man, that too after man becomes conscious of his existence, and if man is himself responsible for all his projects and ways of existence then obviously God is not needed.

Secondly, if we analyse the possible origin of the idea of God, we find that it invariably arises in awareness of despair and disappointment. It is only when man feels helpless and is in the dire need of some sort of a support he starts *leaning* on a God little realising that this concept is also a concept of his own creation. Now Sartre says that if we follow up the awareness of despair to its natural conclusion, we would find that this itself is an aspect of general feeling of what Sartre calls the feeling of *forlornness, anguish and abandonment*. These feelings are, at times, characterised as general feelings of *Nausea*. Now

Sartre says that an understanding of this feeling would clearly reveal that it is a result of an awareness of the superfluity and meaninglessness of life's ways. Now, if man's being is characterised by such a feeling of superfluity of everything then there is no sense in asserting that the idea of God can be accepted as a redeeming feature. This essential feeling of superfluity of everything pre-supposes that even the notion of God is superfluous. In fact, according to Sartre the starting point of existentialism is the awareness that there is no support for man to lean on and that, therefore, he has to take up the responsibility of everything on his own shoulders. It is on account of this that man is forlorn. Therefore the feelings of forlornness is not a reason for clinging to the idea of God but it is a result of the awareness that God is not.

Thirdly, it can be said that the chief ground of Sartre's atheism is his *belief* in human freedom. Sartre is not prepared to sacrifice the basic existential freedom of man at any cost. If God is conceived as the Ultimate Creator of the Universe then it means that man has been created in accordance with a pre-conceived form or idea in God's mind. But in that case man becomes fully determined. Sartre, on the other hand, is not prepared to accept that man is fully determined. Sartre says that man is *condemned to be free*, condemned because he has not created *himself*. But Sartre feels that it is *useless* to enter into the question regarding the creation of man. But once man is, he is definitely free. In fact, in a sense, man's freedom is basic and it permeates man's existence. Freedom, in Sartre's opinion, means freedom of choice, freedom to take decision in complete awareness of one's responsibilities. Sartre says that "if existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom."<sup>22</sup> That shows that in the face of this basic freedom of man atheism has to be accepted as a natural *corollary*.

In fact, at times, Sartre offers incidental arguments against the notion of God also. For example, in his '*Being*

*and Nothingness'* Sartre raises a question: what is the relation between the so-called notion of God and totality of the universe? Sartre says, "the question has no meaning. It is supposing that it is possible for us to take a point of view on the totality; that is, to consider it from outside. But this is impossible precisely because I exist as myself on the foundation of this totality and to the extent that I am engaged in it. No consciousness, not even God's, can "see the underside" — that is, apprehend the totality. And if by his nature, he is a being beyond consciousness (that is, an in-itself which would be its own foundation) still the totality can appear to him only as an object (in that case he lacks the totality's internal disintegration as the subjective effort to reapprehend the self) or as subject (then since God is not this subject, he can only experience it without knowing it). Thus, no point of view on the totality is conceivable; the totality has no "outside," and the very question of the meaning of the "underside" is stripped of meaning. We cannot go further.<sup>3</sup> It is apparent from this passage that it is not possible to maintain the *legitimacy* of the concept of God in any way. If we reflect on the possible relationship between God and totality we find that there is the possibility of two kinds of relation. God can view the totality either as an object or as the subject. If the first alternative is taken into account then the duality of God and totality has to be accepted. And if God views totality as a subject then it will have to be accepted that God can only be a witness of this totality because one subject can only be aware of the presence of the another subject. Thus in both cases God becomes limited and effected by the totality. As such in both cases God does not remain God.

There is yet another reference to, what might be considered, a possible argument against God. Sartre says that if God does not depend on any thing else for its existence then God cannot be said to be existent, because only such thing exists which for bare existence depends upon the conditions. Clarifying this argument Hazel E. Barnes says in the 'Introduction to Being and Nothingness'. "If God causes himself, then he must stand at a distance from himself. This makes

God's self into something contingent; i.e., dependent. But the contingent cannot be God. Therefore there is no God. Or starting from the other end, if God is not contingent, then he does not exist, because existent is contingent."<sup>4</sup>

Thus we find that Sartre's atheism is in a way a *rejection* of religion. It is a rejection of religion because it strikes in its own way at the very root of religion.

This brief survey of the atheistic thoughts of two of the prominent Atheistic Existentialists throws some light on the concept of religion. At the very outset it may be said that Atheistic Existentialism, by rejecting religion in one sweep, has *admitted religion in a mood of indifference*. Even though religion is religion only in *adversity* — only in being rejected, the fact remains that the grounds of rejection are more or less not so much convincing as they appear to be so. Religion is neglected because it creates falsehood. Religion is also sought to be superceded because religion keeps man confined to the world of essences and ideas and thereby prevents man from realising his *manness* or *uniqueness*. Thus religion by positing the notion of God creates a permanent excuse for every lapse on the part of man and thereby infringes on man's freedom. Again, it says that a true account of man must consider the actual involvement of man in life and existence. For example, if man's freedom is to be discussed, it should not be discussed in a purely essentialistic manner using the emotional tools of religion. An account of freedom must keep into consideration the actual fact of freedom, the actual conditions of obligations and free choice.

But Atheistic Existentialism does not realise that this is precisely the emphasis that the true religious spirit is to make. True religion speaks of involvements and commitments without which life's goal cannot be realised. It is true that many distortions of religion have completely neglected this fact and have taken to the purely rational ways for establishing their points. But the true religious spirit always emphasises the importance of *subjectivity* and *emotional commitments*. In this respect, then Atheistic Existentialism

will appear to be on the side of religion at least for all intents and purposes. Thus we come to an interesting conclusion that in Atheistic Existentialism there is a scope for a true religion.

This can be established by analysing the Existentialist's notion of freedom itself. Atheistic Existentialism asserts that man is basically free. By this is meant that the ultimate choice of every action or decision lies on man himself. Atheistic Existentialists have also emphasised the importance of man's subjectivity. It is said that man, in his subjectivity, weighs the alternatives and finally decides on his projects. If this is so, it means that there is no limitation set on the free choice of human subjectivity. It is quite possible, therefore, for a particular individual, to develop a religious sense and a faith in God. To begin with he may not have any awareness of God but it is a matter of his free choice to let his subjectivity grow in a manner which he wants it to grow. It is quite possible that a particular individual may come to develop a religion of his own. Atheistic Existentialism *cannot* deny this because such a denial would amount to an infringement on the freedom of an individual. Thus even in spite of the Atheism of Atheistic Existentialism religion somehow comes to stay.

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#### NOTES

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, trans. by Bernard Frechtman, p. 15.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 301-302.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Introduction, p. xxx.

ŚĀNKARA'S CONCEPTION OF ADHYĀSA :\*  
 HAS PROF. S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA REFUTED  
 PROF. G. MISRA ?

Prof. S. K. Chattopadhyaya's paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Concept of Adhyāsa: A Textual Interpretation' published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*<sup>1</sup> is a sequel to Prof. G. Misra's paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Adhyāsa: Difficulties of Propositional Symbolism' published in the same journal<sup>2</sup> carrying an impression that the former is a rejoinder to the latter. But a watchful reader must have found that Prof. Chattopadhyaya has once more expressed his difference and disapproval which he has been doing long since the publication of Prof. G. Misra's interpretation of Śaṅkara Vedānta.<sup>3</sup> Prof. Misra's interpretation is found in a number of papers and books, out of which Prof. Chattopadhyaya has referred to a select few. Prof. Chattopadhyaya perhaps thinks that Prof. Misra's account of Śaṅkara Vedānta in general and that of the concept of *adhyāsa* in particular are not based on a close study of texts and claims his own as a 'textual interpretation'.

We are, however, not given to understand what this 'textual interpretation' or what is later called as 'textual rendering of the words and sentences' is. We merely find Prof. Chattopadhyaya labouring hard to comment profusely on sentences and components thereof, i.e., words and punctuation marks *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Prof. Chattopadhyaya perhaps intends to expatiate on what Śaṅkara actually said or/and meant to say.

It must be unfortunate for us that Śaṅkara was not alive to Prof. P. A. Schilpp's day so that the latter could have edited a volume on Śaṅkara in *The Library of Living Philosophers* series with a view to freezing endless and fruitless speculation about what a philosopher must have meant. Even then the aims and achievements of Prof. Schilpp would have been much less than those claimed by Prof. Chattopadhyaya. It was never expected that *The*

*Library* would present the final word on the writing and thought of the philosopher concerned putting an end to all differences of interpretation and criticism. But Prof. Chattopadhyaya is very much ambitious to say the last word on Śaṅkara's views, which he could have hardly given even if he were Śaṅkara himself in one of his previous births.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya must not have been oblivious of the fact that there cannot be anything like the *interpretation* or 'indisputable interpretation' of the thought of a particular philosopher. Because, had there been such an one, he would not have wasted so much time and energy in scribbling not a cursory but, an elaborate and lengthy account of what Śaṅkara said; but, would have, instead, pointed to the work of any one of the galaxy of writers, traditional and modern (supposing they do not say different things). And why is there a galaxy of writers, glossers and reviewers? Why are there glosses after glosses and reviews after reviews? The simple reason is that they were called for. Is there any harm then to add another body to the galaxy if that body has something to offer? Would the galaxy then explode or what?

If Prof. Chattopadhyaya means by 'textual interpretation' going to the original texts of Śaṅkara, then so far so good. In the words of Prof. Schilpp, 'There is no substitute for first-hand contact with the original thought of the philosopher himself.'<sup>4</sup> If this is Prof. Chattopadhyaya's design, this is also prof. Misra's design.<sup>5</sup> They do not, therefore, differ as regards their referring to the relevant literature, but they differ in their rendering them. This is but inevitable, for the original thought of the philosopher has got to be rethought by the interpreter and rephrased in the diction of his own age, so that others may be able to understand and appreciate the thought of the philosopher. A pleonasm worth repeating is that interpretation is interpretation and not the work interpreted. If someone is puzzled over the conflicting interpretations and in a desperate state decides, as Prof. Chattopadhyaya, in effect, does, to go back to the original writing of the philosopher

himself and then make his own decision, the result is not that one has arrived at the original import of the philosopher, but rather that one has added one more body to the galaxy of interpretations which may differ to a greater or lesser degree from the existing interpretations. Prof. Chattopadhyaya seems to entertain the idea that there is something like original, objective, pure, pristine and philosopher's own view which can be bodily picked up — though not by anybody and everybody — and presented apart from the interpretation of that view. But that is the discredited dogma of the thing-in-itself. Prof. Radhakrishnan, whose authority Prof. Chattopadhyaya admits, writes in the preface to his *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I: 'My aim has been not so much to narrate Indian views as to explain them, so as to bring them within the focus of Western traditions of thought.' And commenting on the task of historians of philosophy he says, 'However much he may try to assume the attitude of a mere chronicler and let the history in some fashion unfold its own inner meaning and continuity..... still the judgments and sympathies of the writer cannot long be hidden.'

This judgment which Prof. Radhakrishnan talks about is given against the background of the climate of thought of the age and needs the acclimatisation of the commentator. Elsewhere he says, 'Our system of thought must act and react on the world progress..... There is nothing wrong in absorbing the culture of other peoples.'<sup>6</sup> If citation of Strawson's words, 'If there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscovered'<sup>7</sup> does not become agreeable to Prof. Chattopadhyaya as an alien trend of thought, then indigenous Jayanta may be cited to buttress the above stand:

*Kuto vā nūtanam vastu vayam utprekṣitum kṣamāḥ/⁸  
Vaco vinyāsavaicitrātāram atra vicāryatām / /*

[ (How can we discover a new fact (or truth in philosophy?) Hence (as far as this book is concerned) one should only consider our novelty in rephrasing (the older truths propounded by the ancients in modern terminology.) ]

If Prof. Chattopadhyaya insists to ignore all these, he is surely choosing to put the clock back with a doubtful deference to the tradition. Even if this deference is sincere and sympathetic, it is not worthwhile. In the words of Warnock, a contemporary writer, 'Excessive deference to the past, however sympathetic, may often be cramping and harmful; but an unapologetic deference to the future, however unhelpful it may be in the present, is certainly both prudent and becoming.'<sup>9</sup> Instead of sustaining or ruminating on dessicated fodder, to use Schiller's severe language, it is definitely worthwhile to change the food habits when there is plenty of green grass. If Prof. Chattopadhyaya is not able to find it and goes on complaining of hunger, then one would very much be inclined to liken him to Warnock's hungry animal who is looking in the wrong direction and does not realise that he himself is at fault.<sup>10</sup>

Anybody who is acquainted with the current philosophical literature would not fail to take note of the *zeitgeist*. Robert R. Ammerman writing in 1965 says, 'Around the turn of the century a revolution began in philosophy which is not yet over.'<sup>11</sup> This revolution is neither British, nor Polish, nor American, nor German, but it is human. It is a revolution in the history of human civilisation signalling progress and prosperity as was the industrial revolution at one time. Nobody today, queer characters excluding, objects to using a safety pin, or a razor blade, or a radio receiver because these are not indigenous but alien knowhows. This is the age of internationalism which aims at co-existence, co-operation and convergence of understanding. 'Races and nations which dwelt and flourished apart', Prof. D. M. Datta, whose authority also Prof. Chattopadhyaya admits, speaks seriously as back as 1930 in the preface to his *The Six Ways of Knowing*, 'are now coming into intimate contact and gradually tending to evolve a world of common ideas and beliefs.'<sup>12</sup> Philosophy cannot keep herself aloof from the mainstream of thought. Prof. Datta himself tried to give an exposition of the epistemology of Advaita Vedānta 'in the light of modern Western concepts.' His aim was 'to bring the problems, concepts and theories of the Vedāntins within

the focus of modern Western thought' and the method he adopted for the purpose was 'critical analysis, comparison and evaluation'.<sup>13</sup>

Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not appear to appreciate the true spirit of the thought and writings of these 'renowned scholars and great masters in the subject'; he only acclaims and approves their authority when he feels that he has found in them support for his angry railings.

Prof. Misra, in this sense, is very much on the right track, only that he replaces the worn out rails and tightens the loose bolts. If this be disclaimed as destroying the orthodoxy, then one is hardly sure of one's intentions. Prof. Misra's work is surely called for and not guided by some sort of personal or national pride to bring the Indian philosophic tradition *somewhat* on a par with the modern Western philosophic tradition.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya appears not so much ignorant of the change in the philosophic scene, but he cannot fully reconcile himself with that. For, even though he objects to Prof. Misra's use of certain terms as alien, he, himself, quite confidently appropriates them.<sup>14</sup> This leads one to think that Prof. Chattopadhyaya has fixations and motives. Frequently he argues to the person and talks slightly of Prof. Misra as a 'new theorist', 'innovator', 'ādhyāsika' and calls his view as 'noxious theory', 'nonsense'. He becomes unnecessarily garrulous in condemning Prof. Misra because he will milk the he-goat all the time and, on the contrary, in commending Prof. Datta because he can never make mistakes. So one would find it very hard indeed to consider this as a dispassionate and unbiased piece of writing as one expects from a senior academician like Prof. Chattopadhyaya.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not wish to come out of his shell for fear of destruction of his unflinching faith in the great spiritual climate of Indian peninsula perhaps, which is best brought out in Prof. T. M. P. Mahadevan's words, 'something in her very soil and air which makes a man at some stage or other in his life realise the futility of finite

ends and seek for righteousness (*dharma*) and there-through release (*mokṣa*) from finitude.<sup>15</sup> That is a question of faith and Prof. Misra would not question that. Prof. Misra wants to find out the key concepts and categories used in a particular system of thought or by a particular thinker and see whether those concepts and categories can admit appropriately and thoroughly an alternative interpretation in terms of the concepts and categories so very current in his age. It is a fruitful and interesting line of philosophical research to which many in the West as well as in India have come. It should not be supposed that Prof. Misra or any one in the line claims any finality for his interpretation, his programme rather implies that he keeps the line open for others, but a contender should not feel restless and injured and be prepared for a patient and decent debut in terms of sound reasoning.

The whole debate between Prof. Misra and Prof. Chattopadhyaya seems to veer round the following points:

1. Whether the account of the concept of *adhyāsa* which Śaṅkara gives is logical or psychological? This point involves a wider one.
2. Whether philosophy is concerned with analysis of language or explanation of fact? These two points lead to a third one.
3. Whether *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge signifies critique of language or scriptural revelation? Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not deal in detail with *śabda* but makes only a passing reference to Prof. Misra's views on it in his paper under reference. It needs a discussion because Prof. Chattopadhyaya has a lot to speak about it elsewhere.<sup>16</sup>

Let us now dilate a little upon the above points to decide whose view appears more sound and convincing. We shall take points (1) and (2) together because they are inter-related.

To begin with, philosophy does not enquire about physical facts in the way in which chemistry and physics, his-

tory and politics, psychology and cybernetics do. The framework which a philosopher presents may, of course, serve as a model for enquirers in other areas of knowledge and there is no bar on the philosopher to pursue enquiries other than philosophy and he might engage his own framework as a model in those other enquiries. But then the distinction between philosophical enquiry and non-philosophical enquiry should not be lost sight of and when one has got to appreciate the contribution of a particular thinker to philosophy one must disengage his pursuit of philosophy from other pursuits.<sup>17</sup> It might also be that a philosopher gets a motive to think over a particular problem from a particular matter of fact (e.g., development of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning from a road accident), but that is an extralogical aspect of a philosophical problem. Particular matters of fact do not go to corroborate or controvert a philosophical doctrine. 'They are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact,' as Ayer puts it.<sup>18</sup> When one gives Śaṅkara the regard of a philosopher, it is by virtue of this regard that one must not view him as propounding factual — psychological or physiological — doctrines. Śaṅkara is not preoccupied with explaining as to why and how do perceptual illusions occur and suggesting means of release from them. He is preoccupied with explaining the logic of perceptual judgments. *Adhyāsa* is his technical name for the logical unsoundness of perceptual judgments.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya interprets *adhyāsa* as 'an error of experience whose illogicality(?) consists in this that in it a thing turns out in experience what it cannot be materially and in fact.' Prof. Misra on the other hand, says that *adhyāsa* does not stand for 'an eternal process of psychological illusion and Śaṅkara is not offering any account of illusion at all.' He interprets Śaṅkara as propounding 'a critique of language' with the conclusion that 'language necessarily falsifies the reality it purports to represent.' It is, therefore, entirely a logical point and the situations of rope-snake or shell-silver illusions are merely illustrations of that point.

When a philosopher gives an illustration, it may be clarified here, he does not report about a situation as a scientist does, either to ratify or to reject a particular generalisation. He lays down a logical rule and then cites linguistic use either for its ratification or for its rejection. The linguistic use cited may or may not describe an actual situation; it is sufficient for his purpose if it can describe a possible one. In other words, he tries to find out the permissible uses of language. A use is permissible not because it describes an actual situation; but because it is capable of describing a situation actual or possible. Here 'possible' means 'logically possible' or 'not self-contradictory'. A linguistic use can be said to be logically possible when a situation actual or imaginary sought to be described by it is intelligible and can be said to be self-contradictory when a situation actual or imaginary sought to be described by it is not intelligible. The philosopher is only concerned with the description and intelligibility of a situation. It does not matter whether the illustration chosen by him is actual or possible. In either case he only tries to describe a situation and make it intelligible.<sup>19</sup> Again, this calculation of possibility worked out by the philosopher is not like that worked out by the scientist as when he forecasts a rainfall tomorrow or cooling down of the sun two thousand years after. The philosopher tries to find out whether 'rainy tomorrow' and 'cool sun' are permissible expressions or not and whether they are capable of making sense or not; whether they are self-contradictory or not and whether they are intelligible or not.

Now, if we view Śaṅkara as explaining the logic of perceptual judgments instead of explaining the actual cases of perceptual illusion, then the concept of *adhyāsa* and other related concepts, otherwise remaining cloudy in Prof. Chattopadhyaya's rendering would appear in clear light. Śaṅkara sets in the discussion of *adhyāsa* with the presupposition that the ideas of 'you' and 'I', or to be more specific, the ideas of 'object' and 'subject' are opposed to each other like light and darkness.<sup>20</sup> It is important to notice that light and darkness as matters of fact may combine and

co-exist, but as concept they cannot on point of logic. The expression 'light and dark' is self-contradictory in terms of rules of logic. In any propositional symbolism '*viśayī*' and '*viśaya*' are two distinct and opposite ideas. Prof. Misra takes *viśayī* and *viśaya* to be logical subject and logical predicate where Prof. Chattopadhyaya takes them to be conscious self and material object respectively. Prof. Misra's interpretation keeps harmony with the conception of *viśayī* as *svayamtiṣṭha* (self-existent) or *svayamprakāśa* (self-expressing) but not with the conception of it as conscious self and the conception of *viśaya* as *aparatistha* (existing by other's help) and *aparaprakāśa* (expression by other's help) but not as material object. Logical subject and logical predicate are diametrically opposed to each other in respect of their behaviour in a propositional symbolism. One may try to blur the distinction of subject and object in outward form, that is in surface grammatical structure; but one would not succeed to do it in depth grammatical structure. (*sansargeṇa na tu svarūpeṇa*). This is a distinction of fundamental sort that the logical subject and the logical predicate or their attributes (*taddharmāṇāmapi*) are distinct and asymmetrical in respect of their roles, functions or activities. The logical subject and the logical predicate are philosophical categories to analyse a propositional form. They are not supposed to be articles of furniture of the world as Prof. Chattopadhyaya's interpretation leads us to suppose. In the *Gītā Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara says,

*Tat pada sarvanāma*

*Tasya bhāva tatva*

*Tat viśayaka jñāna tatvajñāna*

(The term 'that' is a ubiquitous name; the manner of its occurrence is ontic; and the knowledge of it is ontology.)

Śaṅkara is interested in discussing about *pratyayas* and *padas* or concepts and terms and their logical behaviour. Philosophical knowledge consists in apprehending that the 'that' or the subject part is incorrigible and stable (*satya*) part in a propositional form whereas the predicate part is corrigible and unstable (*anṛta*) part. But for all practical

purposes (*lokavyavahāra*), they are coupled together (*mithunikṛta*) — I shall not say 'herded together' because it is not an appropriate and happy expression.

Now, let us come to the various explanations of *adhyāsa* given by Śaṅkara. They are the following three:

1. *Smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadrṣṭāvabhāsah,*
2. *Anyasya anyadharma-vabhāsatām, and*
3. *Atasmin tadbuddhiḥ.*

The first explanation says that a judgment is a kind of apprehension like memory but not identical with it. In this apprehension, the present is likened to what was apprehended previously and hence is corrigible. An ordinary judgment involves the application of class concepts. And this application is made possible by means of memory. No one who does not possess the faculty of memory can make a judgment. And where there is judgment, there is possibility of misjudgment. The present judgment regarding application of *viśaya* or attribution of *viśayadharma* to *visayī* is liable to be replaced by a subsequent judgment. This is one aspect of *adhyāsa*.

The second explanation considers another aspect of *adhyāsa*. It says that if something comes to be represented with the credential of another, then it is a case of *adhyāsa*. In an ordinary judgment the *viśayī* is represented with the credential of *visaya*. That is to say, *visaya* or its *dharma* are attributed to the *viśayī* where it is not to be attributed and so the judgment becomes logically unsound.

The second explanation of *adhyāsa* views the matter from the side of *visaya*, while the third one views it from the side of *viśayī*. It says that *adhyāsa* is the representation of that as what it is not. *Viśayī* represents itself (*svayam-prakāśa*), but it is made to be represented through *viśaya* which results in logically unsound judgments.

Now, these explanations give rise to two questions. Every judgment, it is maintained, apprehends the referent under the class concepts and combines *viśayī* and *viśaya*. The first question is whether Śaṅkara intends to charac-

terise each and every judgment as logically unsound. The reply to this question would be that Śaṅkara does not accept the ordinary distinction between true and false judgments. All the so-called true and false judgments of the ordinary level are declared logically unsound excepting those which are called identity judgments (e.g., 'This is that'). The second question is, whether there are two types of *adhyāsa*, one concerning the use of class concepts and the other concerning the combining of *viśayī* and *viśaya*. The reply to this question would be that there are not types of *adhyāsa* but there are two aspects of the self-same *adhyāsa*. The *Vivarṇa Prameya Sangraha* calls these two aspects of *adhyāsa* as *jñānādhyāsa* and *arthādhyāsa*. It is called *jñānādhyāsa* from the point of view of *judgment* which makes use of class concepts and it is called *arthādhyāsa* from the point of view of *proposition* which combines *viśayī* and *viśaya*. A judgment is that which is expressed in a proposition and a proposition is that which expresses a judgment.

Before leaving the discussion of *adhyāsa* it may be emphasised that truth and falsity are concepts of epistemological appraisal in the cognitive level, not in the pre-cognitive level, that is what is called experience. So *adhyāsa* can be said to be there only with respect to judgments and propositions, but not with respect to experience. Experience is neither true nor false. It is simply there. What one believes or what one asserts on the basis of experience is said to be either true or false.

The next and important point to be considered is whether *śabda* is to be interpreted as a critique of language or as scriptural authority. Prof. Misra takes it in the former sense while Prof. Chattopadhyaya in the latter. According to the findings of Prof. Misra, Śaṅkara uses '*āgama*', '*śruti*', and '*śabda*' interchangeably. The direct meaning of '*śabda*' and '*śruti*' is 'language'. Language is an instrument of communication used in a variety of ways. It has one of the uses, not the use in scriptures. *Śrutipramāṇa* is not presented by Śaṅkara as the supreme source of knowledge and the final court of appeal in respect of cognitive matters.

That Śaṅkara does not conceive *śabda* as the final and infallible source of knowledge overriding all others like perception, inference, etc. is confirmed by his statement, 'śrutyānugṛhitatarkah anubhavāngatvena āśriyate' and such others.<sup>21</sup> Śrutyānugṛhitatarkah is taken by Prof. Misra to mean 'reasoning proceeding alongwith the logical tracts of language' and 'anubhavāngatvena āśriyate' to mean 'the very conditions of any determinate cognition'.<sup>22</sup> Those who take *śabda* to mean scriptural authority do some sort of rigging and say that authentic knowledge comes from scriptures for the unenlightened people and that comes from intuition for the enlightened ones.<sup>23</sup> Statements of the scriptures and sayings of the sages may, at the initial level, provide information and material. And in this sense they may be regarded as authorities as Śaṅkara and Strawson are regarded as authorities by Prof. Misra or as Śaṅkara, Prof. Radhakrishnan, Prof. Dasgupta and Prof. Datta are so regarded by Prof. Chattopadhyaya or as all of these illustrious men so regarded by myself. But that does not credit any source as the final dispenser or arbiter of knowledge. That has got to be analysed and examined on the test ground of reason and then accepted or rejected on its own merit. As truth is revealed after analysis and examination of statements coming from any source whatsoever, it is called *āgama*. And as this truth does not come out of sources like perception and inference which are mediated, it is called *aparokṣānubhūti*. If *śabdapramāṇa* or *śrutipramāṇa* is supposed to be the most important of all *pramāṇas* and on the top in the series of importance, then the difference between this *pramāṇa* and other *pramāṇas* would be only a difference in degree and this would provide with the same factual information as others, *albeit* more faithfully and accurately. But the difference between this *pramāṇa* and other *pramāṇas* is one of kind as the following statement of Śaṅkara amply shows.

*Pratyakṣādi pramāṇanupalabdhe hi viṣaye  
śrutiḥ pramāṇam na pratyakṣādi viṣaye.*<sup>24</sup>

(In matters which cannot be comprehended through perception, etc., linguistic analysis steps in.)

Saṅkara intends to draw attention to the fact that perception, inference etc. are accredited sources of knowledge for transaction of business in the world of colour, taste and sound. But when we come to the world of philosophy we leave behind this world and therefore these ordinary sources of knowledge are of no avail here. Saṅkara seems intent to show the sphere of competence of different *pramāṇas* in this way. The knowledge available through the analysis of language without its objects of reference cannot be of the same type as the knowledge available through language with its objects of reference. One is operative in one's own sphere but not so in another's.<sup>25</sup> The philosopher in nobody but a *samīkṣaka* as *Vivarana* terms him. He does not use the instrument of language as it is used in the ordinary plane to make statements in the world. He picks up the instrument itself and examines its function, futility or utility, etc. in abstraction. He studies the structure and behaviour of different linguistic forms and for this task follows the method of reflection and critical analysis.

Saṅkara starts with the *Brahma Sūtra* or the *Gītā* as his authority and studies them critically and comes to his own conclusions. As a writer aptly puts it, 'The Ācharya's method seems to be to start with the authorities and thus, in the final analysis, to discard them, even as the costly lunar module by the lunarnauts.'<sup>26</sup>

Now after going through all these Prof. Chattopadhyaya may flatter himself by saying *a la* S. Hampshire, 'let Prof. Misra translate Saṅkara's doctrine about the ultimate elements of Reality into a doctrine about the ultimate elements of our discourse, but let him not regard at any time that this translation is an account of Saṅkara's own intention.' As Saṅkara's version of *adhyāsa* or *śabda* is not found to carry a burden of extra-logical commitment, Prof. Misra may take away the wind from Prof. Chattopadhyaya's sails and say, 'let Prof. Chattopadhyaya translate Saṅkara's doctrine about the ultimate elements of our discourse into a doctrine about the ultimate elements of Reality but let him not regard at any time that this translation is an account of Saṅkara's own.' This stalemate would be there until it is

realised that interpretations, strictly speaking, are neither true nor false. They are plausible and acceptable or implausible and unacceptable depending on how and how much they are able to accommodate and co-ordinate and systematise and explain. My humble task in this paper has been to show on whose interpretation — Prof. Misra's or Prof. Chattopadhyaya's — various statements of Śaṅkara and other Advaita Vedāntins on *adhyāsa* and *śabda* appear more coherent, plausible and acceptable.

I have not tried here to place the thesis of Prof. Misra beyond discussion and dispute—that would be dispelling one dogma and developing another. Discussion on his thesis can be profitably carried on in at least two ways. First, one can discuss about the standpoint itself as to whether it is defended convincingly by the interpreter; he would discredit himself if he is vacillating between more than one standpoints. Second, one can discuss whether the interpreter is able to apply the avowed standpoint consistently to all the areas to which it is directed. A thesis is examined on its own merit and not thrown out only because it does not conform to the tradition or orthodoxy or because it does not satisfy somebody's ego. Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not examine Prof. Misra's thesis in either of the above two ways but rejects it without giving it a hearing that it deserves. He does not, therefore, succeed in refuting the thesis of Prof. Misra, neither does he succeed in establishing his overbold pronouncement that 'the linguistic thesis (of Prof. Misra) on *adhyāsa*.....has absolutely no basis in Śaṅkara's text!' Prof. Chattopadhyaya tries to ignite a big mass of fire which does not blaze, but ends in smoke.

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#### NOTES

- \* I am grateful to Dr. B. Kar, Lecturer, P.G. Dept. of Philosophy for his valuable suggestions in preparing this paper.

1. Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 473-504.
2. Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 225-236.
3. Prof. G. Misra presented his findings on Śaṅkara Vedānta as a whole at the 43rd. session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1969 which was published in *Bharati* in the same year and in his *Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical Problems*, 1971.
4. General Introduction to '*The Library of Living Philosophers*'.
5. Vide his prefaces to *Analytical Studies* and to *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*, Bhubaneswar, 1976.
6. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, London, 1971, p. 780.
7. *Individuals*, London, 1959, p. 10.
8. Jayanta (circa 800-950 A.D.) in his introduction to *Nyāyamanjirī*.
9. G. J. Warnock, 'Philosophy and Imagination' in *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, 1967, p. 126.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
11. 'A Short History of Analytic Philosophy' in *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, (Ed.), TMH Edn., p. 1.
12. Prefaec to the first edition of *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Univ. of Cal.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Although Prof. Chattopadhyaya objects to Prof. Misra's expression 'floating universal' he uses the expression 'floating appearance'.
15. 'The Religio-Philosophic Culture of India' in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I, Ramakrishna Mission, 1970, p. 163.
16. Vide, for example, his paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Philosophy of Language' presented at the all India seminar of that name held at Vani Vihar in 1971.
17. I have tried to elaborate this point in a paper entitled 'Some Remarks on the Foundations of Metaphysics' accepted for presentation at the ensuing session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1976.
18. *The Problem of Knowledge*, Penguin Books, 1957, p. 7.

19. Cf. Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
20. *Yuṣmat asmat pratyaya gocarayor viśaya visayaineos tamah prakāśavat viruddha svabhāvayoh itaretara bhāvānupapattau etc.*
21. Also, *Nahi śrutiśatamapi sītah agnih aprakāśo vā iti bruvat prāmāṇyamupasaiti. Yadi brūyāt sītah agnih aprakāśo vā iti tathāpi arthāntaram śruteḥ vivakṣitam kalpyam prāmāṇyānyathānupapatteḥ* (*Gītā Bhāṣya*, 18.66) and,  
*Na hi āgamāḥ sahasramapi ghaṭam paṭayitum iśai.*  
Vācaspati, Introduction to Bhāmatī.
22. *Analytical Studies*, pp. 8-14.
23. For example, Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 514.
24. *Gītā Bhāṣya*, 18-66.
25. *Yasya vākyasya tātparyaviśayībhutasamānsargo mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tat vākhyam pramāṇam.* Vedānta Pāribhaṣa, 4.1.
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## RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY: AN ANALYSIS

1. During the past couple of decades or so I have often heard almost every Indian philosopher speaking of making philosophy relevant to the age and conditions of society. One has only to look at the UGC reports, Proceedings of the various Seminars and Symposia organised in the country and the informal discussions held on innumerable occasions to get the feel of how the Indian community of philosophers and non-philosophers think about the issue. It is possible to ask many questions about relevance of philosophy, for example, whether philosophy is, can be, or ought to be, relevant to society. If an answer to the question is in the affirmative a further question is raised: In what ways can it be said to be relevant? and if the answer is in the negative, the question falls dead. This kind of question about relevance of philosophy, to my mind, is a substantive question. But, I want to discuss here a formal question, a question of conceptual analysis about the issue, namely, What is meant by the expression "relevance of philosophy"? To my mind, unless a certain reasonable level of clarity is achieved about the meaning of this expression I do not think the substantive question about the matter can be discussed meaningfully, and with direction and clarity. It is likely that my analysis of the formal aspect may lead me on to say something by way of an answer to the substantive question also; or it may suggest in a direct or an indirect manner the direction in which an answer to the substantive question may be sought or found. But, that would be a different matter. For my focus I have chosen to analyse only the formal aspect of the issue.

2. It is natural that one is inclined to take necessary and available precautions against the tyranny of language, especially when the words employed come from the vocabulary of everyday use. One precaution that is available to me is that I stick to the dictionary meaning of words. This would assure me that in so far as the ordinary usage of words is concerned I won't be led astray. The *SOED* records

the established use of the word "relevant" as follows: (1) bearing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand; (2) legally pertinent or sufficient; and (3) remedial or relieving. One typical usage of the word is illustrated by the sentence viz., "Many things in a controversy might seem *relevant* if we knew to what they were intended to refer" (Jowett). The *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary* notes that 'relevant' implies a traceable, significant, local connection. Besides the dictionary usage, the word has sometimes been used in the sense of 'modernising', as for example in the phrase "to make the philosophy courses relevant" is intended to mean "to modernise the philosophy courses" in the light of the recent developments in the field. However, I do not think that when the issue of making philosophy relevant is considered the word is intended to be used in this sense. This sense of "relevant" is reflected in the discussions that we sometimes have in the Committees of Courses and the Faculty Meetings.

3. Nor does it seem to me that the talk of the relevance of philosophy is concerned with the sense of "relevant" as legally pertinent or sufficient. In this sense, "relevant" is used as affording evidence which tends to prove or disprove a certain theory or statement. This usage of "relevant" occurs in the legal practice where on the strength of relevant testimony a given case is decided one or the other way. Besides, this sense of "relevant" could be said to be pertinent to our issue if at all there were good reasons to suppose that there are facts of philosophy which could be discovered, collected, organised, and cited as evidence in support of the truth or falsity of certain substantive philosophical theses. And this too would be acceptable only if philosophy could be regarded as a branch of knowledge. There are philosophers, however, (and this, to my mind, is a matter of accepting or rejecting a point of view,) who regard philosophy anything but a branch of knowledge. Compare in this context what Wittgenstein said in the *Tractatus*:

Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them. (4.111).

Or, when Moore reflecting on the nature of philosophy in his *Lectures on Philosophy* added:

everybody would agree with Wittgenstein 4.1122 that Darwin's Theory of the Origin of Species including man has nothing more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis of Natural Science: & that whatever it may have to do with it, it's not the business of philosophy to discuss whether it's true or not. (p. 10)

It seems to me, then, that the only sense of "relevant" which is pertinent to the analysis of the concept of 'relevance of philosophy' is the sense of the word in which it is used to mean having a bearing upon, being connected with, or pertinent to, the matter in hand. So, in the course of my discussion, I would employ the word in this sense only whenever I speak of the relevance of philosophy.

4. I am afraid, I am still far from being clear on the subject. I must enquire also into the question as to *what* after all is being said to be relevant. To what that is relevant is a different, and as I said earlier, a substantive question into which I venture not to enter.

What is being asked is whether philosophy is, can be, or ought to be, relevant to the age and conditions of society, whether philosophy is responsive to the present challenges, or whether it can be said to deal with these challenges responsibly. I am sure, there has already been noticed a certain level of ambiguity and vagueness in the use of the expression "philosophy" in the preceding sentence. How can philosophy ever be said to be *responsive* to the present challenges? How can it ever be said to deal with the challenges *responsibly*? For, "*responsive to*" and "*responsibly*" are not the expressions that go well with "philosophy", unless of course one is using the expression "philosophy" metaphorically as intentionally synonymous with the expression "philosopher". For after all it is the individual, the philosopher who, if at all, can ever be said to be responsive to whatever challenges there are or might be. Again, the adverbs like "*responsibly*", "*irresponsibly*", or "*indifferently*" are correctly used to qualify someone's

actions or his manner of doing them; but to be sure they do not go well with "philosophy" which in its Greek sense is intended to be used as synonymous with love of wisdom and not with the doing of some action.

5. What then after all is meant by "philosophy" when a question about the relevance of philosophy is asked? It seems to me that the expression "philosophy" ought to be so used that it makes a discussion on the question of the relevance of philosophy reasonably illuminating. To be sure, philosophy as such is not informative enough. It is often the case that by the use of the expression "philosophy" what we really intend to mean is either a philosophy of life, or a world-view, or the study of philosophy, or the teaching of philosophy, or philosophical practice or a theory of philosophy. I do not claim that the alternatives indicated are either exclusive or exhaustive. But, faced with the ambiguity and vagueness of the variety of the uses of the word "philosophy" one is inclined to say — at least in moments of despair or disillusionment — that philosophy is nothing but history of philosophy, or that there are different philosophies belonging to different disciplines, such as the philosophy of history, of linguistics, of logic, of physics, of mathematics, or of whatever science or discipline that you will, but that there is no philosophy as such. One who thinks on these lines may claim that the philosopher's job is only to concern himself with the general questions that are or can be raised about and the implications of the specific sciences and disciplines. On this view, the philosopher's job would also include, particularly in the case of those studies which aspire to be raised to the respectable status of 'science', to construct, propose, or offer analyses of concepts and statements occurring in the discipline in a manner in which they become amenable to the application of the scientific methods and techniques. The thinkers who associated themselves with the *International Encyclopaedia of the Unified Science* present a paradigm of making philosophy in this sense relevant to the age and conditions of society. The philosophers of the period harnessed their thinking and committed themselves to the methodology which served

best the interests of the realization of the ideal of a society in which what dominated was the cultural outlook of science and technology. They conceived the philosopher's job not in the manner of "a body of doctrine but an activity" (*Tractatus*. 4.112). "Without philosophy", they held, "thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" (*Ibid.*, 4.112).

6. A look at the history of philosophy shows that there has not been only one conception of philosophy, only one meaning of the expression "philosophy", but that relevant (in the sense of relative) to the cultural setting of a society there have been different conceptions of philosophy and that "philosophy" acquired a new meaning or usage dependent upon what that setting was and how the philosophers as individuals responded to their situational stimuli. The conceptions of philosophy of the ancient Indians before Pāṇini and those developed by the Greeks around the sixth century B.C. and the Europeans between the two World-Wars are pretty good examples of the relevance of philosophy to their societies in their different and changing spatio-temporal and cultural conditions. These considerations warrant me to say that the expression "a theory of philosophy" is not at all as odd as at first blush it might appear to be and also that it is perfectly reasonable to ask the question whether a certain concept, conception, or theory or philosophy is or is not relevant to the age and conditions of society.

Not only is it sensible to ask whether a theory of philosophy is or is not relevant to the age and conditions of a given society, but it must also be said that the teaching and the study of philosophy, or the method and the practice of philosophy, in their form and function, are necessarily consistent with the theory of philosophy pertaining to a particular period of a given society. When this is not the case, philosophy tends to become otiose and socially irrelevant. This may occur on account of several factors — economic, political, social, cultural, or what you will. The two major movements in the history of Western philosophy —the logico-analytical and the existentialistic— are the

two notable illustrations of how philosophy in both form and function was made to serve the scientific, technological, and the existential socio-cultural conditions of the times. The logico-analytical movement developed in response to the challenges thrown in by the growth in science and technology, while the existentialistic movement was the result of making philosophy reflect upon the existential conditions of the human individual who found himself inwardly split-up and self-alienated.

7. Philosophy is not a mere intellectual exercise; and from what I have said above it follows that a question about the relevance of philosophy is a perfectly askable question, and that logically or factually there is nothing to prevent philosophy from being relevant to the age and conditions of society. I wish to submit here that philosophy can be made relevant only by and through the individual who does philosophy. It is the philosopher in his capacity as an individual member of his society that he makes philosophy or whatever he does relevant to the needs and challenges in his society. To my mind, he is able to perform this function only if he is committed to serve his society, is sensitive to the needs it has, and responds to the challenges with a deep sense of responsibility. But if he remains blind or indifferent to the challenges presented to him, whatever else he may be surely he is not a philosopher who is alive and responsive and is doing his job as a responsible member of his society.

8. I wish to close this paper with a personal note. We who call ourselves philosophers in this country are in a peculiar position. Most of us who live in cities and are educated in the Western style seem to have become rootless: We do not speak the language in which our ancient thinkers expressed themselves; we seem to be cut off from our cultural bonds, and we evaluate ourselves in all seriousness by the Western standards irrespective of their relevance or adequacy. We do not know where we belong. We do not know whether to take a Wittgenstein or a Śāmkara as our philosophical models. We look either to the hoary past or to what is being done or undone in Oxford, Cambridge,

or Harvard; and we do not care to have a look at what is happening in and around us in our own country. Nor do we care for or even respect what our own fellow-philosophers are doing in the field. In our philosophical writings, a third rate Western philosopher is cited as an authority with a rare sense of awe and respect; while a first rate Indian philosopher who is earnestly engaged in serious philosophizing is shown the worst form of insult — by ignoring him altogether. It seems to me that we are split up within ourselves as individuals and have developed a certain level of alienation from our own soil. We are confused and obsessed with making philosophy socially relevant and responsive to the national needs without clearly seeing as to how this can be done. We are groping in the dark and fondly hope to get hold of some handy technology desirably to be imported from the UK or the Continent or the USA or, if possible, from the USSR so that we could employ it as a magic wand for making philosophy socially relevant. How is all this possible? To my mind, what we really need is to develop a theory and a method of philosophy born of reflection upon what we have on our own soil. It is then only that the philosophy in the country will find itself socially relevant and responsive to the national needs.

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#### NOTES

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## REVIEWS

Concept of Personality in Sāṃkhya Yoga and the Gitā: Kali Charan Das, Professor of Philosophy, Gauhati University: Published by the Registrar, Gauhati University. First Edition August 1975. Price Rs. 25/-, pp. i-viii + 220.

The work under review is a doctoral thesis submitted by Prof. K. C. Das and approved by the University of Gauhati for the D.Phil. Degree a few years ago. It is now published in a book form with suitable changes. At the end of the foreword to the book the author expresses his deep concern for restoring ancient Indian Wisdom and promoting peace and progress of humanity. He feels an urge to study Indian Philosophical concepts in the light of modern scientific developments and to examine their relevance to modern life. With this general attitude in mind and with a background of specialisation in Modern Western Psychology, the author has presented in this book his research in the ancient Indian concept of personality with special reference to the Sāṃkhya Yoga and the Gitā. He certainly deserves our compliments for this work. The work has inevitably led the author into areas of comparative study of ancient Indian Philosophy of Mind or what he prefers to call Hindu psychology and modern western psychology. The general trend of the work is to show that ancient Indian Philosophy contains significant concepts and doctrines about human personality, and if they are fully explored and adequately re-stated they may go a long way in solving many of our fundamental problems, theoretical and practical, concerning human personality. It is a part of the author's argument to suggest that the conceptual framework, methodological pre-suppositions, contentual coverage of facts, and preventive psycho-somatic medicine as well as curative therapeutics of ancient Indian psychology are, although of a complex character, more sound and useful.

The work consists of a brief introduction, the exposition of the theme in ten chapters and the eleventh chapter giving summary and conclusion. A title-wise general bibli-

graphy is given at the end. However, there is neither an index at the end nor an analytical table of contents at the beginning.

The brief introduction (pages v to viii) contains a general listing of some aspects of studies in the psychology of personality the author wishes to explore and more or less a re-statement of the chapter headings to indicate the area covered by the present study.

For purposes of this comparative study the author, although vaguely aware of their internal differences, considers the system of Sāmkhya, Yoga and the Gītā together as containing a common basic theory of personality and follows this approach throughout the work. The definition of personality, the structural components of personality, the problem of mind-body relation, the concept of self, the meaning and function of unconscious, the problem of heredity vs. environment in personality differences, the problem of traits and types of personality are some of the problems the author has dealt with in details in the main body of the work. As can be easily seen, this broad spectrum of study does not allow the author to enter into any analysis in depth of most of these problems; and the reader has to remain content with the general presentation of issues and views.

The first chapter is intended to acquaint readers with the standpoint of Indian psychology in general and that of the Sāmkhya-Yoga in particular. With regard to the methods of inquiry adopted in ancient Indian psychology the author seems to vacillate between two different views: Indian methods of inquiry are typically un-modern (p. 1 and p. 146) and Indian methods of inquiry have great affinity with modern science (p. i). In the absence of required elaborations and justification of these statements, the reader is left in doubt. The same may be said about the author's view that Indian psychology is neither empirical, nor is it introspective, rather it is more experiential (p. 5) and 'it might be competent to lay at rest many a burning problems in modern psychology and philosophy' (p. 16).

## REVIEWS

The seventh chapter deals with some peculiarities in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga psychology, and the eighth chapter deals with relevant concepts pertaining to personality in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system. These two small chapters cover more or less the familiar outline of the Sāṃkhya view of Buddhi, Ahamkāra and Manas, and of the fundamental difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. One feels that they might as well have been placed immediately after the first chapter for a more coherent account.

The second chapter contains an exposition of the ancient Indian view of the physical basis of personality. This exposition is mainly based upon the Haṭha-yogic works like the Śiva Samhitā and the Gheraṇḍa Samhitā and B. N. Seal's 'The positive sciences of the ancient Hindus'. It brings out the Haṭha-Yoga view of Cakras or plexuses and the spinal sympathetic system. The Yoga methods of control (Samyama) are shown to be comprehensive and efficacious for an integrated personality, a unique mind-body complex. The account is mainly informative and no point is taken up at a philosophical level either for clarification or for discussion.

The concept of unconscious in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Gītā, and its role in the make-up of personality are the two important topics discussed at great length in the third chapter. The Sāṃkhya view of the Sūkṣma Śarīra is carefully differentiated from the Western Psychological view of the unconscious found in Freud or Jung or Adler. "The Sūkṣma Śarīra not only transmigrates but it is the perennial carrier of the effects, vestiges or saṃskaras of past actions, which furnish the propensities, potencies and other materials constituting the unconscious" (p. 53). In this way the concept of the unconscious acquires a comprehensive form and extent in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view. The Citta and its modification (vṛttis) constitute the personal unconscious for each individual. The author argues that the Yoga is a process of psycho-synthesis for the integration of personality, the raw materials of which are in the unconscious.

This interesting and provocative comparison is extended in the fourth chapter where the author discusses the concepts of instincts, sentiments and character in relation to personality. The Sāṃkhya view of guṇas, the Yoga view of Kleśas and the Gītā view of different Mārgas for self-realisation are shown to be integral aspects of the Indian Psycho-synthetic prescription.

The questions of heredity and personality types are taken up for discussion in the fifth chapter. The author shows that the ancient Indian view of heredity is bound up with the theory of Karma and other related concepts and hence heredity is a more comprehensive psycho-physical set of pre-existing conditions which is uniquely personal for each individual. Basic difficulties in the theory of traits and types are pointed out to conclude that although the Indian psychology makes use of the concepts of sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasika, it is after all an over simplification of a complex problem.

The meaning and definition of personality occupies the author's attention in the sixth chapter where a general survey of contemporary psychological theories of personality is given. The author is in general agreement with Professor G. W. Allport's definition and account of personality. Where he differs from Allport, he is however far from convincing, and more often he seems to be not taking the points either in sufficient depth or at length.

A conceptual analysis of personality is attempted in the tenth chapter under the title 'Metaphysical Study of Personality : A Comparative Review'. It gives very brief accounts of the views of William James, J. Royce, F. H. Bradley, Pringle-Pattison etc. without any perspective comments; and these accounts are not properly linked with the discussion of the Indian views of personality. If the author is in full agreement with the criticism of the Sāṃkhya concept of Puruṣa by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan as he seems to do so (p. 396), then his earlier discussions generally approving the Sāṃkhya dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti lose all force, and one wonders whether without separating out

the conceptual differences between the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga and the Gitā views on personality it would be possible to make the whole study more cogent, convincing and meaningful. For this reason this chapter appears to be rather a weak link in an otherwise interesting and stimulating study in the Indian Philosophy of mind with focus on the concept of personality.

Uniform method of giving references in the footnotes; classified, authorwise bibliography; names and subject indexes; and more careful proof-reading at the next edition will certainly increase the readability and utility of this work for advanced and research students of the subject.

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
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writers' affiliations.

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